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Case Number

S.M.A No. 3 of 1949

Attorney(S)

S.K. Ghose and C.R. Lahkar - K.R. Barooah
D. N. Medhi and B.B. Das

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ram Labhaya
Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice Sir R. F. Lodge
Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice T. V. Thadani

Acts

Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC,
Article 180 of sch. I, Limitation Act.
SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
Article 180, Limitation Act,
Article 100, Limitation Act.
Article 12, Limitation Act

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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Ram Labhaya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The decree-holder purchased the suit property in an execution sale held on 25 February 1944. The sale was formally confirmed on 27 March 1944. On 26 March 1945 the judgment-debtor petitioned under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to have the sale set aside, alleging that the decretal amount had been paid to the decree-holder on 27 March 1944 (four days before the confirmation). That petition was dismissed on 4 October 1945. An appeal to the District Judge failed, and a revision petition to the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court was dismissed on 22 July 1947. The auction-purchaser applied for delivery of possession on 3 May 1948 (more than three years after the formal confirmation of the sale). The judgment-debtor opposed the application on the ground of limitation. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the auction-purchaser's application; the District Judge (L.A.V.) affirmed that order on 9 February 1949. This appeal challenges those dismissals and turns on the interpretation of Article 180 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act (the three-year period for applications for delivery of possession and the point at which a sale "becomes absolute").

Legal Issues Presented

For the purpose of Article 180 of the Limitation Act, when does a judicial sale "become absolute" — from the date of formal confirmation under the CPC or from the final disposal of litigation challenging the confirmation?
Whether an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale made under provisions other than O.21 R.90 (specifically Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC) prevents the sale from becoming absolute for the purposes of Article 180 while that application remains pending.
Whether the reasoning in Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi (Privy Council) — that a sale does not become absolute until the final determination of proceedings challenging confirmation — applies to applications not strictly made under O.21 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (auction-purchaser)

The sale did not become absolute for the purposes of Article 180 until the final disposal of the judgment-debtor's revision petition by the Calcutta High Court (i.e., the sale's finality was in question until the revision was dismissed).
Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi to support the proposition that the three-year limitation period runs from the date the sale finally becomes absolute (after termination of all litigation), not from the date of formal confirmation where further litigation was pending.
The appellant referred to other decisions (Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, Muthu Korakki v. Mahamed Madarammal, Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh) to support the contention that pending litigation challenging confirmation prevents the sale from being treated as final for limitation purposes.

Respondent's Arguments (judgment-debtor)

The respondent conceded that if the challenge to the sale had been under O.21 R.90, the sale could not be regarded as confirmed until final decision; however, he sought to distinguish Chandramani on the ground that the petition in the present case was not made under R.89 or R.90 but under Section 47/151 of the CPC.
The respondent argued that the Privy Council decision should not be extended to applications for setting aside sales that are not covered by O.21 of the CPC, implying that a sale is absolute from the date of formal confirmation unless the challenge is under the specific rules of O.21.
He also argued that the judgment-debtor's petition was based on an uncertified payment/adjustment (not certified under O.21 R.2), and therefore such a payment could not be recognized by the execution court; the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court had dismissed the revision on that basis and that the uncertified payment made the Section 47/151 petition not a true ground to delay finality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi, 38 C.W.N. 901 : A.I.R. (21) 1934 P.C. 134 (Privy Council)

Holds that a sale does not become "absolute" for the purposes of Article 180 of the Limitation Act until the final disposal of proceedings challenging the confirmation of the sale; limitation runs from the final decision where such litigation is instituted.

The court followed the Privy Council's interpretation and applied it to the present facts; it held that the same principle applies where challenges are made under other provisions of the CPC (e.g., S.47/S.151) and not limited to O.21 R.90.

Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, A.I.R. (20) 1933 Cal. 311 : 147 I.C. 981 (Calcutta High Court)

Holds that when parties are litigating whether a sale should be confirmed, the sale cannot be said to have become final or conclusive; confirmation is regarded as taking place from the date when litigation on the confirmation is terminated.

The court treated this decision as consistent with Chandramani and used its ratio to support the conclusion that the sale was not absolute until termination of the litigation.

Muthu Korakki v. Mahamed Madarammal, 43 Mad. 185 : A.I.R. (7) 1920 Mad. 1 F.B.

The opinion lists this

Summary of the Opinion (Ram Labhaya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

For the purpose of Article 180 of the Limitation Act, when does a judicial sale "become absolute" — from the date of formal confirmation under the CPC or from the final disposal of litigation challenging the confirmation?
Whether an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale made under provisions other than O.21 R.90 (specifically Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC) prevents the sale from becoming absolute for the purposes of Article 180 while that application remains pending.
Whether the reasoning in Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi (Privy Council) — that a sale does not become absolute until the final determination of proceedings challenging confirmation — applies to applications not strictly made under O.21 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (auction-purchaser)

The sale did not become absolute for the purposes of Article 180 until the final disposal of the judgment-debtor's revision petition by the Calcutta High Court (i.e., the sale's finality was in question until the revision was dismissed).
Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi to support the proposition that the three-year limitation period runs from the date the sale finally becomes absolute (after termination of all litigation), not from the date of formal confirmation where further litigation was pending.
The appellant referred to other decisions (Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, Muthu Korakki v. Mahamed Madarammal, Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh) to support the contention that pending litigation challenging confirmation prevents the sale from being treated as final for limitation purposes.

Respondent's Arguments (judgment-debtor)

The respondent conceded that if the challenge to the sale had been under O.21 R.90, the sale could not be regarded as confirmed until final decision; however, he sought to distinguish Chandramani on the ground that the petition in the present case was not made under R.89 or R.90 but under Section 47/151 of the CPC.
The respondent argued that the Privy Council decision should not be extended to applications for setting aside sales that are not covered by O.21 of the CPC, implying that a sale is absolute from the date of formal confirmation unless the challenge is under the specific rules of O.21.
He also argued that the judgment-debtor's petition was based on an uncertified payment/adjustment (not certified under O.21 R.2), and therefore such a payment could not be recognized by the execution court; the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court had dismissed the revision on that basis and that the uncertified payment made the Section 47/151 petition not a true ground to delay finality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi, 38 C.W.N. 901 : A.I.R. (21) 1934 P.C. 134 (Privy Council)	The Privy Council held that a sale does not become "absolute" for the purposes of Article 180 until the final disposal of proceedings challenging confirmation; limitation runs from the final decision where such litigation is instituted.	The court followed this interpretation and applied it to the present case, holding that the same principle applies where a challenge is made under other provisions of the CPC (e.g., S.47/S.151) and not only where the challenge is under O.21 R.90.
Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, A.I.R. (20) 1933 Cal. 311 : 147 I.C. 981 (Calcutta High Court)	When parties are litigating whether a sale should be confirmed, the sale cannot be said to have become final or conclusive; confirmation is to be regarded from the date when the litigation is terminated.	The court treated this decision as supporting the principle that a sale's finality is postponed until termination of litigation and used it to reinforce the conclusion reached in this appeal.
Muthu Korakki v. Mahamed Madarammal, 43 Mad. 185 : A.I.R. (7) 1920 Mad. 1 F.B	The opinion mentions this case among authorities cited by the appellant; the specific rule or principle invoked from this case is not set out in the opinion.	The court records that the case was cited by the appellant but the opinion does not describe how this case's principle was relied upon in detail.
Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh, 23 Cal. 775 : 23 I.A. 45 P.C	Held that there was no final, conclusive and definitive confirmation of sale while the question whether the sale should be confirmed was in litigation; confirmation dated from the time when litigation terminated.	The court relied on Baijnath as authority for the proposition that confirmation is only final when litigation on confirmation has terminated; the principle was applied to conclude the sale here became absolute on termination of the related litigation.
Neckbar v. Prakash Nag, 56 Cal. 608 : A.I.R. (17) 1930 Cal. 86	The earlier rule — that the three-year period in Article 180 should be reckoned from the date of confirmation under O.21 R.92 rather than from final disposal of the judgment-debtor's application — was laid down in this case.	The court recorded that the Privy Council overruled Neckbar in Chandramani; the opinion treats Neckbar as having been displaced on the question of when the limitation period begins where confirmation is contested.
Biroo Gorain v. Jainurat Koer, 16 C.W.N. 923 : 13 I.C. 63	Supports the view that a payment or adjustment not certified in accordance with O.21 R.2 CPC cannot be recognized by a court executing the decree.	The court acknowledged this line of authority but held that it did not defeat the appellant's position because the judgment-debtor's petition was entertained and litigated through several courts, creating pending litigation that affected finality for limitation purposes.
Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh, A.I.R. (18) 1931 P.C. 33 : 27 N.L.R. 95 (and cited Cal. report)	Also cited in support of the principle that an uncertified payment cannot be acted upon in execution proceedings.	The court noted these authorities but found them not decisive against the appellant because the petition based on the uncertified payment was nevertheless entertained and contested, giving rise to litigation that postponed finality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying that the decisive question was the interpretation of the word "absolute" in Article 180 of the Limitation Act (three-year period for applications for delivery of possession). It reviewed the procedural history: formal confirmation of sale on 27 March 1944, followed by a Section 47/151 petition by the judgment-debtor (26 March 1945) to set aside the sale; that petition was dismissed after hearings in three courts with the final dismissal of the revision petition by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court on 22 July 1947.

The court examined the Privy Council decision in Chandramani, which held that in construing "when the sale becomes absolute" under Article 180 regard must be had not only to O.21 R.92(1) but also to other material sections and orders of the CPC, including those relating to appeals. From that premise the court reasoned as follows:

If a confirmation order under O.21 R.92 does not make the sale absolute where an application to set aside the sale is pending under R.90, then there is no principled basis to hold that the sale would be absolute where the challenge is brought under some other provision of the CPC (e.g., Section 47 or Section 151) if such applications are made within three years of confirmation.
The logic underpinning Chandramani and the Calcutta decisions (including Chhogan Lal and Baijnath) is that where the formal confirmation is itself the subject-matter of litigation the confirmation cannot be treated as final for limitation purposes until that litigation is finally determined.
The court rejected the respondent's attempt to distinguish Chandramani on the ground that the present petition was under Section 47/151 rather than O.21 R.90. The court held that such a distinction is indefensible in principle; applications that challenge confirmation under any CPC provision and are entertained will have the same effect of postponing finality until termination.
Although authorities cited by the respondent (e.g., Biroo Gorain and Nanhelal) establish that uncertified payments cannot be recognized in execution proceedings, the court found that this did not dispose of the appellant's position. The judgment-debtor's petition was entertained and fully litigated in three courts; during the pendency of that litigation the auction-purchaser could not regard the sale as final or predict the result. Therefore, the mere fact that the petition was ultimately dismissed for reason of uncertified payment did not prevent the period of limitation from being treated as running only from the termination of the litigation.
The court considered the position in Neckbar (which had reckoned limitation from formal confirmation) and noted that the Privy Council in Chandramani had overruled Neckbar on this point.

On these grounds the court concluded that the sale in the present case did not become absolute on the date of formal confirmation (27 March 1944) but acquired finality on the termination of the litigation commenced by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale (i.e., after the revision dismissal on 22 July 1947). Because the auction-purchaser's application for delivery of possession (3 May 1948) fell within three years of the termination of that litigation, it was not barred by Article 180.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The court held that, for purposes of Article 180 of the Limitation Act, the sale became absolute only upon termination of the litigation commenced by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale (i.e., the sale was not absolute from the date of its formal confirmation while that litigation remained pending).

Direct Consequence for the Parties:

The auction-purchaser's application for delivery of possession was held not to be time-barred, as it was within three years from the date on which the litigation terminated.
The orders of the Courts below (which dismissed the auction-purchaser's application as barred by limitation) were reversed.
The matter was remanded to the learned Munsiff for disposal of the application for delivery of possession according to law.
Because an interesting question of law arose, the court directed that each party should bear their own costs in all courts.

Broader implication noted by the court: the interpretation adopted advances substantial justice and avoids hardship by treating a sale as non-final while bona fide litigation contesting its confirmation is pending.

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Krishnadatta Bujarbarua v. Sindhuram Choudhury .

Ram Labhaya, J.:— This is an appeal from the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, L.A.V, dated 9th February 1949 by which the order of the Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati, dated 4th September 1948, dismissing the application of the auction-purchaser for delivery of possession under O. 21, R. 95 was affirmed.

2. The relevant facts are as follows: The property in suit was sold in execution of a decree on 25th February 1944. The decree-holder was the auction-purchaser.

3. The sale was confirmed on 27th March 1944 evidently because no application for setting aside the sale was made within the period of 30 days under R. 89, 90 or 91 of the CPC. About a year later, on 26th March 1945, the judgment-debtor applied under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC, to have the sals set aside alleging that the decretal amount had been paid to the decree-holder on 27th March 1944, just four days before the confirmation of the sale. This petition was dismissed on 4th October 1945. The judgment-debtor preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge, who declined to interfere. The judgment-debtor then sought to have the orders of the Courts below revised. The revision petition was also dismissed on 22nd July 1947, by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court. The learned Chief Justice held that the payment or the adjustment between the decree-holder and the judgment, debtor was an uncertified one and therefore could not be recognised or taken notice of by reason of the provisions contained in O. 21, R. 2 of the CPC. The decree holder-auction-purchaser Page: 90applied for delivery of possession on 3rd May 1948, more than three years after the original order confirming the sale, which was passed on 27th March 1944. The petition was resisted by the judgment-debtor on the ground of limitation. The plea has prevailed in the Courts below. The decision of the appeal tarns on the interpretation of Article 180 of sch. I, Limitation Act. The article in question provides a period of three years for applications for delivery of possession. The starting point for limitation, according to the article, is the date on which the sale becomes absolute. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the sale in this case became absolute for purposes of Article 180, Limitation, Act on the date on which the petition of revision was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court. Till then the sale could not have been regarded as final for purposes of limitation as the very finality of the sale was in question. He has relied on Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi, 38 C.W.N 901 : (A.I.R (21) 1934 P.C 134), a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council. The other cases to which we have been referred to by him are Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, A.I.R (20) 1983 Cal. 311 : (147 I.C 981), Muthu Korakki v. Mahamed Madarammal, 43 Mad. 185 : (A.I.R (7) 1920 Mad. 1 F.B) and Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh, 23 Cal. 775 : (23 I.A 45 P.C).

4. In Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi, 38 C.W.N 901 : (A.I.R (21) 1934 P.C 134), the decree, holders were the auction-purchasers. The sales were held on 10th February 1923. The judgment-debtors applied under O. 21, R. 90 to have the Bale set aside. The application was dismissed on 15th April 1924 and the sales were confirmed on 22nd April 1924, under O. 21, R. 92. The judgment-debtors appealed to the High Court from the order refusing to set aside the Bales. The appeal was also dismissed on 17th March 1927. Sale certificates were duly issued in May and June 1928. On 10th September 1928, the auction, purchasers applied under O. 21, R. 35 for delivery of possession of the properties purchased by them at the auction sales. The application was resisted on the ground of limitation. The Calcutta High Court held that sales became absolute on 22nd April 1924 even for the purposes of Article 180, Limitation Act and the application for delivery of possession whish had been put in on 10th September 1928, was thus barred. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that on the facts of the case before them, the sales did not become absolute within the meaning of Article 180, Limitation Act until 17th March 1927, and that the application for possession of the properties was not barred by the Act.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent concedes that if the application for setting aside the sale had been under O. 21, R. 90 of the CPC as in the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council, the sale could not have been regarded as confirmed till the final decision of the petition for setting aside the sale. He seeks to distinguish the Privy Council decision on the ground that the application for setting aside the Bale in the case before us was not made under R. 89 or 90. It was under Section 47/151 of the CPC. His contention is that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council cannot be extended so as to include within its scope applications for setting aside sales which are not covered by O. 21 of the CPC. We do not think it is possible to make any such distinction.

6. The decision of the case turns on the interpretation of the word “absolute” occurring in Article 180, Limitation Act. This meaning could not be different in the two sets of cases. If a formal order confirming the sale under R. 92 of the CPC, does not make the sale absolute for purposes of Article 180 if an application to set aside the sale is made by the judgment-debtor under O. 21, R. 90, we do not see how the sale would be absolute if the application for setting aside the sale is made under some other provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a distinction would be indefensible in principle. Where the formal order of confirmation is challenged by a petition under some provision of the Code of Civil Procedure the order itself comes into question. If such a petition is made within three years, the period within which an auction-purchaser must apply for possession under R. 95 of the CPC, the sale cannot be described as absolute during the period that the petition for setting aside the sale remains pending. The reasoning is equally applicable to applications under R. 90 and application under S. 47 or 151. On principle, therefore, it is difficult to agree to a distinction between an application of the judgment-debtor for setting aside the sale under O. 21, R. 90 on the one hand, and an application under other provisions of the Code, e.g, Ss. 47 and 151, if they are made within three years from the date of the formal confirmation of the sale. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have not left the matter in any doubt even so far as this question is concerned. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Lancelot Sanderson and he observed in the course of the judgment as follows:

“Upon a consideration of the sections and orders of the Code, their Lordships are of opinion that in construing the meaning of the words ‘when the sale becomes absolute’ in Article 180, Limitation Act, regard must he had not only to the provisions of O. 21, R. 92(1) of the Schedule of the CPC, but Page: 91also to the other material sections and orders of the Code, including those which relate to appeals from orders made under O. 21, R. 92(1).”

7. It is clear that in construing Article ISO, the provisions of R. 92 and those chat relate to appeals from orders under that rule are not the only ones which have to be considered. Regard must he had also to other material sections and orders of the Code. Applications covered by other sections also will have the same effect, therefore, as applications under R. 92 of O. 21 will have. We do not see how a different result could have been arrived at.

8. Their Lordships overruled Neckbar v. Prakash Nag 56 Cal. 608 : (A.I.R (17) 1930 Cal. 86) in which it was laid down that the period of three years provided in Article 180, Limitation Act for an auction-purchaser's application for delivery of possession should be reckoned from the date of the confirmation of the sale under O. 21, R. 92 and not from the date of the final disposal of the judgment-debtor's application under O. 21, R. 90. On the other hand they approved of the decision reported in Chhoganlal v. Beharilal, 6 C.L.J 520 : A.I.R (20) 1933 Cal. 311. In this case also, the application for setting aside the sale was presumably under O. 21 of the CPC. But relying on Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh, 23 Cal. 775 : (23 I.A 45 P.C) an earlier decision from their Lordships of the Privy Council, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that it could not be said, when the parties were litigating as to whether the sale should be confirmed or not, that the sale had become final or conclusive. The confirmation of the sale, according to the learned Judges, could be regarded as having taken place from the date when the litigation following upon the application for setting aside the sale terminated, viz., the date of the final decision of the Court in that litigation. It is noteworthy that the ratio of this decision is not limited to applications under O. 21.

9. In Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh, 23 Cal. 775 : (23 I.A 45 P.C), the Board of Revenue had discharged an order of the Commissioner by which a sale by the Collector had been confirmed. The Board afterwards on 21st August 1886, discharged its own order and revived that of the Commissioner. It was held that the confirmation of the sale dated only from 21st August 1886, and that a suit brought in July 1887 to set aside the sale under Article 12, Limitation Act was not barred. Article 12, Limitation Act provides a period of one year for setting aside sale in pursuance of decree or order of a Collector or other officer of revenue. The period of limitation, according to the Article commences from the date when the sale is confirmed or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no such suit been brought. Their Lordships did not express any opinion on the question whether the proceedings taken by the parties to stay the confirmation of the sale was such a civil proceeding as is referred to in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, but laid down that there was no

‘final, conclusive and definitive order confirming the sale, while the question whether the sals should be confirmed was in litigation, or until the order of the Commissioner of 25th, January 1884, became definitive and operative by the final judgment of the Board of Revenue on 21st August 1886, or (in other words) that for the purpose of the law of limitation there was no final or definitive confirmation of the sale until that date.’

10. The rule enunciated in this case was the basis of the decision in Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal, A.I.R (20) 1933 Cal. 311 : (147 I.C 981) and this decision received the approval of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chandramani v. Anarjan Bibi, 38 C.W.N 901 : (A.I.R (21) 1934 P.C 134). The principle of the decision discussed above does, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion that the sale in the circumstances of the case before us did not become absolute on the date of its formal confirmation but it acquired the attribute of finality on the termination of the litigation commenced by the judgment-debtor with a view to having the sale set aside.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent has put forward another argument. He contends that the judgment-debtor's petition, though purporting to be under Section 47/151 of the CPC, was not really covered by those sections. It was based on an uncertified payment or adjustment which could not be enquired into or recognised in the course of the execution proceedings. He has relied on Biroo Gorain v. Jainurat Koer, 16 C.W.N 923 : (13 I.C 63), Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh, A.I.R (18) 1931 P.C 33 : (27 N.L.R 95) and 38 Cal. 798 : (A.I.R (25) 1938 Cal. 798?) in support of his contention. He has further pointed out that this was the view that prevailed with the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court in the revision petition of the judgment, debtors. These decisions no doubt support the view that a payment or adjustment not certified in accordance with the provision of O. 21, R. 2 of the CPC, cannot be recognised by a Court executing the decree but this view is no answer to the case set up on behalf of the appellant. The petition of the judgment-debtor was admittedly dismissed for the reason that the payment had not been certified but this petition was entertained. The auction-purchaser was summoned and had to resist it. The litigation was fought in three Courts. Even the revision petition was not dismissed in limine. It was Page: 92disposed of after a full hearing. Daring the pendency of the litigation, the auction-purchaser could not foresee its final result and could not at any stage say that the sale would become absolute or conclusive. In the language of their Lordships of the Privy Council used in Baijnath v. Ramgut Singh, 23 Cal. 775 on p. 785 : (23 I.A 45 P.C)

“there was no final, conclusive and definitive order confirming the sale, while the question whether the sale should be confirmed was in litigation.”

12. The final dismissal of the judgment-debtor's petition cannot in these circumstances, be allowed to affect the interpretation placed by their Lordships on Article 100, Limitation Act. This interpretation has the merit of advancing substantial justice. It also avoids hardship.

13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that for purposes of limitation, the sale in this case became absolute not on the date when the formal order of confirmation was passed but on the termination of the litigation commenced by the judgment-debtor for having the sale set aside. The application of the auction-purchaser for delivery of possession, therefore, is not time barred being within three years from the date of the termination of the litigation. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The orders of the Courts below are reversed and the case is remanded to the learned Munsiff for disposal of the application for delivery of possession according to law. As an interesting question of law was involved in the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in all the Courts.

Thadani, A.C.J:— I agree.

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Krishnadatta Bujarbarua v. Sindhuram Choudhury .

Summary of the Opinion (Ram Labhaya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (auction-purchaser)

Respondent's Arguments (judgment-debtor)

Table of Precedents Cited

Summary of the Opinion (Ram Labhaya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (auction-purchaser)

Respondent's Arguments (judgment-debtor)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Krishnadatta Bujarbarua v. Sindhuram Choudhury .

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