Ram Labhaya, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration of title and khas possession. Plaintiff purchased the land in dispute by a sale deed, Ex. 1, dated 30th July 1917. To the south and west of this land was Maheswar's land. Maheswar was the father-in-law of the defendant in the case.
2. Plaintiff averred that defendant came into possession of the land by his permission some 5 years before suit on condition that he would vacate the land when plaintiff required it. Some three months before suit, a notice to quit was served on the defendant. He refused to quit setting up a title in himself. The defence was that defendant had acquired title by adverse possession against the true Page: 56owner. He had entered the land without any arrangement with the plaintiff and in the belief that the land was Sarkari khas. The Sadar Munsiff of Gauhati held that plaintiff had failed to substantiate his pleas that defendant entered on the lands with big permission and was a licensee for a period of five years before suit, that he repudiated big title only when he was asked by notice to deliver possession of the land. He farther held that in view of the allegations made in the plaint, it was for the plaintiff not only to prove title but his possession within 12 years before suit. This also he could not prove. The plea of the defendant that he had been in adverse possession for over 13 years was also considered and the finding arrived at was in his favour. Aa a result of these findings, the suit was dismissed. On appeal the order was affirmed by the District Judge, A.Y.D Plaintiff has appealed to this Court.
3. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that plaintiff could succeed on proof of his title without proving that defendant occupied the land as a licensee within 12 years of the suit, unless defendant could prove that his possession was adverse, for a period of 12 years' His grievance is that the Courts below have approached the case from a wrong view point. The view taken by them was that the allegations in the plaint and the proved facts of the case attracted the application of Article 112 and finding that plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years, they came to the conclusion that defendant's possession was adverse. He urged that whether plaintiff was in possession or not, he was undoubtedly the owner of the land. He purchased it by a registered deed in 1917 and defendant, even if in possession, could non-suit the plaintiff only on proof of his adverse possession. The correctness of the finding of the Courts below on the question of defendant's adverse possession was Challenged.
4. The decision of the case turns on the question whether Article 142, Limitation Act governs the case or it is Article 144. Article 144 is a residuary article and can be invoked only if no other article applies to the case. It is, therefore, to be Been whether Article 142, on which reliance is placed by the defendant, has been rightly applied to this case by the Courts below.
5. The question is by no means free from difficulty. There is divergence of judicial opinion on it. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in Official Receiver of East Godavari v. Govinda Raju, A.I.R (27) 1940 Mad. 798 : (I.L.R (1940) Mad. 953 F.B), had to consider this question. Horwill, J. before whom the case came up for disposal first, in his order of reference formulated the question in these words:
“Whether in a case where a plaintiff sets up a case of permissive possession and fails to prove it, the burden then lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of suit or whether the onus is upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years.”
6. It is clear from the question referred to the Full Bench that the question involved in that case was the same as in the case before us. The Full Bench, after a careful consideration of the matter and relying on three Privy Council cases, Mohima Chunder v. Mohesh Chunder, 16 Cal. 473 : (16 I.A 23 P.C); Mohd. Amanulla Khan v. Badan Singh, 17 Cal. 137 : (16 I.A 148 P.C) and Dharani Kanta v. Gabar Ali, 18 I.C 17 : (17 C.L.J 277 P.C) held that it was wrong to say that a person who could prove title in a suit for ejectment had the right to a decree unless defendant proved adverse possession for 12 years. The plaintiff could succeed only if he could say in addition to his title that he had been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of the suit. The onus is not upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years. Two previous decisions of the Madras High Court were overruled.
7. An unproved allegation that defendant was a tenant or say, a licensee was not considered sufficient to shift the onus to the defendant. The reason for the view is obvious. If a person, who is out of possession, can shift the burden of proving adverse possession to the defendant by simply alleging without being under any obligation to prove his allegation that defendant is a tenant or a licensee, the device would be re-sorted by all persons who are out of possession. A plaintiff out of possession cannot succeed in a suit for possession without proof of title. This title which he must prove is not title anterior to the suit. It would not be enough to prove that plaintiff had title say 15 or 20 years before suit. It should be a subsisting title. A subsisting title would involve proof of title in addition to possession within 12 years. If, therefore, a plaintiff bases the case on the permissive character of his defendants' possession and fails to prove it, he may succeed if his title and possession within 12 years have been proved. It is only on proof of subsisting title that a defendant can be called upon to prove his adverse possession. It would not be necessary to go into the question of defendant's adverse possession if plaintiff has not proved his subsisting title in the suit property. The view of the learned Judges of the Madras High Court is founded on three important pronouncements from their Lordships of the Privy Council and we are in respectful agreement with it.
8. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court also came to the same conclusion in Behari Lal v. Narain Das, A.I.R (22) 1935 Lah. 475 : (16 Lah. 442 F.B). In that case, the plaintiffs sued for possession of the property alleging that they were the owners of the house in dispute and that they had given the same on lease to Nabi Bukhsh defendant 2 in 1927, and subsequently Nabi Bakhsh had given a sub-lease to defendant 1, that thereafter they had sued Nabi Bakhsh and defendant 1 for rent and defendant 1 had denied their title and also denied that he was a tenant under Nabi Bakhsh. In other words, the case of the plaintiffs was that the contesting defendant was a sub-tenant and he denied their title sometime before suit. On these facts, it was held that plaintiff's case was governed by Article 142 and not Article 144. The plaintiff's averments were held to imply a plea of possession and dispossession. It was not considered necessary that possession and dispossession be pleaded in express terms. Allegations of fact, from which that inference of possession and dispossession could be drawn, were considered enough for attracting the applicability of Article 142. The view of the learned Judges was that when plaintiffs alleged that defendants were tenants, they we re pleading their possession through the tenants and when they stated that their title was denied by those who were in permissive possession, the allegation amounted to a plea of dispossession. The reason for the view was that dispossession could be actual to the sense of existing actual possession being forcibly terminated by actual dispossession, and it could also be a legal constructive possession terminated by legal dispossession. In other words, it was held that Article 142 covered casts of actual and constructive possession and dispossession. The result arrived at was the same as in the Full Bench case of the Madras High Court, though the process of reasoning is different. A person can remain in possession of the property through a license or a tenant. He is not in actual possession but his possession in law is there. Such a person can certainly be dispossessed and his dispossession in such a case would occur immediately his title is repudiated. There is no reason why Article 142 should not apply to a case like this as held by the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court. In this view of the matter, the plaint in the present case would by necessary implication contain the allegations of possession and dispossession.
9. Following the Full Bench decisions referred to above, we hold that on the pleadings and also on the proved facts of the case, Article 142 applied to facts of this case and plaintiff could succeed only on proving that defendant was in permissive possession for about 5 years before suit as alleged by him or on proof of his possession within 12 years. There is no dispute that plaintiff acquired title to the property in 1917. But so far as possession within 12 years of the suit is concerned, the Courts below are clear and emphatic in their finding that this has not been proved. Defendant, it has been held, came in possession of the property more than 12 years before suit. He did not come in as a licensee. Plaintiff thus was not in possession at any time within 12 years before suit. The finding of the Courts below on the point is not open to question and it has not been seriously disputed. In these circumstances it is not necessary to consider whether defendant has succeeded in showing that his possession was adverse for a period of 12 years. That question does not arise and is not necessary for the disposal of the case. The appeal, in the circumstances, fails and is dismissed with costs.
Thadani, A.C.J:— I agree.
10. Appeal dismissed.