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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • General Clauses Act (X of 1897) at s. 3, cl. (45):-
  • provisions of s. 10, Limited Act,
  • Art. 36, Limitation Act. 1929 , 20
  • s. 235 Companies ACt (vii 1913).
  • Art. 116, Limitation Act
  • Act Arts. 115 and 116; (3)
  • Art. 36, Limitation Act.
  • s. 235 companies Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • companies Act s. 235.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • General Clauses Act (X of 1897) at s. 3, cl. (45):-
  • provisions of s. 10, Limited Act,
  • Art. 36, Limitation Act. 1929 , 20
  • s. 235 Companies ACt (vii 1913).
  • Art. 116, Limitation Act
  • Act Arts. 115 and 116; (3)
  • Art. 36, Limitation Act.
  • s. 235 companies Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • companies Act s. 235.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Karachi Bank (Limitation question under s.235 Companies Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Karachi Bank suspended payment on 6 March 1929. Shareholders' attempt at voluntary liquidation was disallowed and the court ordered compulsory winding up on 13 May 1929, appointing the applicants as joint liquidators. The liquidators caused the bank's accounts to be examined by Messrs. A. F. Ferguson & Co., and, following that report, instituted proceedings under section 235 of the Companies Act (vii of 1913).

The liquidators' application (Ex. 1) alleges that board resolutions of 9 September 1920 and of 4 August 1922 required various officers (manager, cashiers, agents, accountants) to furnish security; despite the resolutions, inadequate or no security was taken (in one instance only Rs. 1,000). After the bank was wound up it transpired that certain Bombay branch officers (manager, accountant, cashier, ledger clerk) committed criminal breach of trust and were convicted. The liquidators allege loss of approximately Rs. 66,000 attributable to the directors' disregard of the board resolution and gross negligence, and they seek to make the directors liable under s.235.

A central preliminary legal point — limitation — was contested at length. The proceedings were instituted on 26 December 1930, and the court considered whether the liquidators' claim under s.235 was time-barred under the Limitation Act and, if so, which Article applied and from what date limitation began to run.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the liquidators' application under s.235 is governed by Article 36 (misfeasance independent of contract), Article 115 or Article 116 (contractual causes of action), Article 120 (residuary), or another Article of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the misfeasance alleged is "independent of contract" (thus falling under Art. 36) or is contractual (thus falling under Art. 115/116).
  3. Whether the expression "contract in writing registered" in Art. 116 includes the articles of association of a company registered with the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act.
  4. If the claim is contractual, from what date does the period of limitation run — in particular, whether the directors' omission to decide on security is a continuing breach so that limitation runs from the cessation of that continuing breach (with reference to Art. 115 and s.23 of the Limitation Act) or whether s.24 (period from time when the injury results) applies.
  5. Whether the pleadings (Ex. 1) fairly present a contractual breach or whether no averment of breach of contract was made such that limitation arguments should be assessed differently.

Arguments of the Parties

Liquidators' Arguments

  • The liquidators contend there is a contractual relationship between the company and its directors; part of this contract is contained in the articles of association and part is implied (an implied contract that directors will "guide their conduct in accordance with the ordinary habits or rules of business").
  • Relying on Govind Narayan v. Ragunath Gopal, they argued that Article 120 should be applied (Sir Amberson Marten had applied Art. 120 in that decision), and if Art. 120 applied the claim would be in time.
  • The liquidators also relied, for the computation of limitation in certain respects, on s.24 (that where a suit for compensation does not arise until a specific inquiry results, limitation runs from the time the injury results), and they identified specific dates on which injury resulted (a table of dates and amounts is set out in the pleading).

Opponents' Arguments

  • The opponents argued that the claim against directors must be treated either as a breach of contract (bringing Art. 115/116 into play) or as independent of contract (Art. 36). They argued Art. 36 applied and would limit the claim accordingly.
  • They contended s.24 has no application because the defalcations were not the result of the directors' failure to take security; officers could be dishonest irrespective of security and the misappropriations therefore were not causally caused by the alleged failure to take security.
  • Opponents further argued that the pleadings do not aver any breach of contract (no express allegation that directors breached a contract), invoking pleading rules (Khiaram v. Chatomal) and arguing no amendment had been sought to introduce such a contractual claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab (3 Feb 1898) Listed as an early case but concerned damages for cutting and carrying away crops (a different factual matrix). Noted as materially different and not further relied upon for the s.235 limitation issue.
Hukum Chand v. Bank of Multan (1922) (Chambers & on appeal) Held that s.235 creates no new rights; limitation must be calculated under existing Limitation Act provisions and time must run from the date of misfeasance (the decision in Chambers said limitation under s.386 and time run from date of misfeasance). Placed in the chronology as one of the first cases addressing s.235; used to illustrate the view that s.235 provides a summary remedy rather than new substantive rights — a position from which other courts dissented.
In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. (English Court of Appeal) English authority relied upon in subsequent Indian decisions on the character of directors' liability and the nature of remedies in winding up. Referred to as influential; later Indian decisions (and this court's reasoning) align with the English Court of Appeal on parts of the limitation/contract analysis.
In the matter of Union Bank, Allahabad (1925) Walsh J. held that s.235 creates, at least in part, a new right for the liquidator to apply in the interests of creditors and depositors (thus suggesting a different limitation analysis). Cited as an authority dissenting from the Lahore view; the court noted this decision and ultimately aligned with the Bombay and Allahabad approach on the question whether the misfeasance was independent of contract.
Bhim Singh v. Liquidator of Union Bank of India (21 Oct 1926) The High Court of Lahore considered and expressly dissented from the Allahabad view; relied on In re City Equitable and held the application governed by Art. 36 of the Limitation Act. Presented as an example of the conflicting judicial views; this court reviewed the sequence and distinguished the present point, ultimately not treating the Lahore position as binding for the present conclusion.
Govind Narayan v. Ragunath Gopal (20 Nov 1929) Sir Amberson Marten concluded that Articles 36, 115 and 116 did not apply to the application under s.235 and applied Article 120 (residuary) — i.e., took a view favoring Art. 120. Cited by the liquidators in support of applying Art. 120. The court reviewed this decision closely but ultimately declined to adopt Govind Narayan's complete analysis for the present facts, preferring to follow other High Courts and the English Court of Appeal on the contractual nature of the alleged misfeasance.
Narasimha Ayyangar v. Official Assignee, Madras (17 Jan 1930) Discussed the conflict between High Courts (Allahabad and Lahore) and posed the question whether a new right arises on winding up. Noted as part of the judicial landscape; the Madras High Court followed Lahore on certain points — the present court considered these conflicts in choosing which authorities to follow.
Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. Venkatarama Chetty (1918) Sir John Wallis held that the word "registered" in Art. 116 could include documents registered under a special law, such as the Companies Act. Noted as taking one view on the meaning of "registered"; the present court considered this authority but preferred the contrasting view adopted by the Madras Full Bench.
Rama Seshayya v. Sri Tripurasundari Cotton Press, Bezwada (Full Bench, 1925) Full Bench disagreed with Ripon Press, holding that registration under the Companies Act (depositing memoranda/articles with Registrar) should not be treated as "registered" within the meaning of Art. 116. The court found this view persuasive on statutory construction of "registered" and relied on the General Clauses Act and the Registration Act to conclude that Art. 116 does not include company registration; this supported applying Art. 115 instead.
Manekal v. Suryapur Mills Co. Ltd. (Bombay) Bombay decisions are referenced as being inclined to the view that "registered" may not include company registration (aligning with the Madras Full Bench), or at least as part of the judicial debate. Used in the court's selection among conflicting authorities; the court followed the Bombay (and Allahabad) line on key issues.
Khiaram v. Chatomal Cited on pleading law: parties must plead material facts (plead facts, not law); a party must confine itself to the case set up in its pleading. Relied upon by opponents to argue no averment of breach of contract had been made; the court examined the pleadings and concluded that the existing averments of fact were sufficient without amendment to permit the contractual limitation analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court treated the limitation question as preliminary and analyzed statutory text, the pleadings, and a sequence of authorities in chronological order to resolve conflicting judicial opinions.

Key steps in the court's analysis:

  1. Characterization of the Allegation: The court examined the liquidators' pleading (Ex. 1). The primary allegations are misfeasance and a formal alternative allegation of breach of trust. The pleading does not expressly allege a written contractual breach in the articles of association; the liquidators rely on an implied contractual obligation (an implied duty to act according to ordinary business practices).
  2. Whether Misfeasance is Independent of Contract (Art. 36): The court concluded that the misfeasance alleged (the omission to take or properly enforce security and, in particular, postponing and failing to decide the security question) is not independent of contract. It is part of the duty (contractual relation) between directors and the company. Therefore Article 36 (which applies to misfeasance independent of contract) does not govern limitation in this instance.
  3. Meaning of "Registered" in Art. 116: The court considered conflicting decisions (Ripon Press; Rama Seshayya; Manekal) and statutory definitions. Relying on the General Clauses Act and the preamble/structure of the Registration Act, the judge concluded that "registered" in Art. 116 means registration under the law for registration of documents (the Registration Act) and not the incidental registration of a company and its articles under the Companies Act. Therefore the articles of association are not a "contract in writing registered" for Art. 116 purposes.
  4. Choice Between Arts. 115, 116 and 120: Having found (a) the misfeasance is contractual (i.e., not independent of contract) and (b) the implied contract is not "in writing registered," the court held that the limitation question is governed by Article 115 (three years) rather than Art. 36 or Art. 116. Article 120 (residuary) was therefore unnecessary to consider further for this case.
  5. Starting Point for Limitation under Art. 115 and s.23/s.24: The court identified that Art. 115 provides several starting points (e.g., when the contract is broken, when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or when a continuing breach ceases). The misfeasance alleged was characterized as a continuing breach: the directors postponed an important decision (about security) without date or resolution, and that omission constituted a continuing dereliction as long as the decision remained deferred. Accordingly, the period of limitation under Art. 115 would run from the time when that continuing breach ceased (subject to factual findings). The court noted that s.23 (fresh period for continuing breaches) supports this approach as it provides that in a continuing breach a fresh period begins to run during the continuance; for that reason s.24 need not be decided in detail for the articles other than Art. 36.
  6. Pleading Sufficiency: In response to the opponents' submission that no pleading alleged breach of contract, the court emphasized the principle "plead facts, not law." The court found that the existing factual averments (resolutions, failure to take security, subsequent losses and convictions) suffice to allow the court to declare the law arising from those facts without an amendment pleading an express contractual breach.
  7. Treatment of Authorities and Choice of Precedent: The court surveyed a number of authorities illustrating divergence. While it acknowledged the Lahore view and some Full Bench conclusions, the court expressly indicated it preferred the reasoning of the High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad and decisions following the English Court of Appeal where that reasoning was aligned. On that basis it concluded the misfeasance was not independent of contract and Art. 115 governs limitation here.

The court expressly left open the disputed questions of fact; the ultimate date on which limitation begins to run (i.e., the moment the continuing breach ceased, if it did) must be determined after factual findings are made and by applying the appropriate clause of Art. 115 to those facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

(1) The misfeasance alleged against the directors is not independent of contract and therefore Article 36 of the Limitation Act does not govern limitation in this case; (2) registration of a company under the Companies Act is not equivalent to "registration" of a contract within the meaning of Article 116 of the Limitation Act; (3) limitation for the liquidators' claim is governed by Article 115 (three years); and (4) an omission by directors to reach any conclusion on an important matter properly before the board is a continuing breach of duty, and limitation does not begin to run until a point to be determined by applying the appropriate clause of Article 115 to the factual findings.

Immediate consequences and implications:

  • The court's legal conclusions mean that the liquidators' claim will be tested under the three-year period of Article 115 rather than under Article 36 or Article 120. Whether particular items of loss fall within time will depend on the factual determination of when the continuing breach ceased or when the relevant breach occurred.
  • The court left all disputed questions of fact open for further determination; it did not make final factual findings fixing the exact starting date for limitation for each item of loss listed in the pleadings.
  • The opinion resolves the interpretive question — for the facts before it — that company registration does not equate to "registration" for Art. 116; this affects whether Art. 116 can be invoked where a contractual obligation is based on company articles deposited with the Registrar.
  • The court did not rely upon s.24 in the determination because, having characterized the wrongdoing as contractual and continuing, Art. 115 (with the support of s.23) provided the appropriate framework. The court therefore did not make a final determination on the broader applicability of s.24 to all the articles considered.
  • The court's conclusions resolved the immediate limitation point for the purpose of further proceedings but left it to later factual determinations to apply Art. 115's appropriate starting point for each alleged breach.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond those explicitly set out by the court in the opinion excerpt.

    Karachi Bank Ltd v. Shewaram & Others.

    -

    These proceedings arise out of the collapse of an institution which dignified itself with the title of the Karachi Bank. This bank suspended payment on 6th March,1929. An attempt was made by the shareholders to wind up the business by a voluntary liquidation. This however was disallowed and the court ordered the compulsory winding up of the said bank, and appointed the applicants joint liquidators for that purposes. This was done on 13th May 11929. The liquidators caused the accounts of the bank to be submitted to professional examination by Messrs. A. F. Ferguson & Co. a firm of chartered Accounts. In consequence of the report made by these examiners the Liquidators have taken action under the companies Act s. 235. At the outset a point of law arises which has been argued with much learning and at great length. The authorities which must be reviewed are so numerous that by general consent it was thought expedient, before attempting to go any further, to get this question of limitation out of the way. The averments material for the present purpose are these. they will be found in the application EX. 1, at paras, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

    " 7. That on 9th September 1920 the then Board of Directors passed the following resolution the Manager and cashier, Karachi Head Office, and the Agents, and Cashier at different branches shall furnish securities as under to the satisfaction of the Directors.

    Head Office Manager ..... RS. 25,000-0-0 Head Office Cashier ...... " 15,000-0-0 Bombay Agent ...... " 20,000-0-0 Hyderabad Agent ...... " 20,000-0-0 Larkana Agent ....... " 20,000-0-0 Each of the Cashier of Branches " 10,000-0-0

    8. In 1922 when one of the employees of the bank committed defalcation of a large sum of money, the board of Director on 4th August 1922 passed the following resolution of different officers mentioned in the resolution under the subject no. 2 of the meeting of the Board dated 9th September, 1920 be drawn and they be asked to finally state what they have got to say with regard to giving of security as directed therein. They may be also asked to state that in the event of their being unable to furnish the required security what is the maximum security they are prepared to offer or what amount in cash they are prepared to deposit; the amount deposited in cash is to carry 6 per cent interest. It is further resolved that the accountants of the different Branches and Head Office be also asked to give security in the same manner as the Cashier at Branches and Head Office respectively."

    9.After these resolution were passed Mr. L. Alphonso was appointed manager of the Bombay Branch and Mr. A. K. Gulrajani, accountant, In spite of the passing of the above resolution no security was taken from the accountant and the grossly inadequate security of Rs. 1,000 was taken from the manger. After the bank was wound up it has transpired that the Manager the Accountant, the Cashier and the Ledger Clerk at Bombay had committed criminal breach of trust and had misappropriated large sums of money. Complaints were filed against them and all of them were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

    10. On account of disregard of the resolution of the Board and on account of gross negligence of the Directors the bank has, by means of the defalcations referred to in para 9 above, suffered loss to the extent of Rs. 66,000 inclusive of contend that the Directors are liable to make good this loss and should be made liable for the sum of Rs. 66,000 ."

    Most of these averments are indisputable. The resolutions speak for themselves, The fact that no sufficient security was taken cannot be denied, the charges of embezzlement are on record, and the convictions are admitted. On these averments of fact proceedings were instituted under s. 235 companies Act (vii 1913). The material part of the section is in these terms.

    "(1) Where in the course of winding up a company it appears .... that any past or prescient director.... has been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the company the court may, on the application of the liquidator or of any creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of the director..... and compel him..... to contribute such sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation .... as the court thinks just (2) this section shall apply notwithstanding that the offence is one for which the offender may be ceremonially responsible; (3) the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to an application under section as if such application were a suit."

    No act on the statute books has given rise to more divergence of informed opinion than the Limitation Act, and the court cannot but regret that the Legislature should have left the limitation clause appendend to this section so equivocal as it is. The task of showing that the application is time falls upon the applicants, who are liquidators. Their main reliance for this purpose is upon Govind Narayan V. Ragunath Gopal. The learned Judges who decided that has followed In re City Equitable Insurance co. They have held first that there is a contract between the company and each of its directors; second, that that contract is to be found mainly in the articles of association but partly elsewhere. On this findings sir A. Marten concluded that neither Art,. 36 nor Art 115 nor Art. 116 applied to an application under s. 235. He therefore applied to an applied Art 120 . Mr. O'Sullivan, who ably argued the cases for the liquidators, therefore request that the article should be applied to this case. If this be done the whole claims is in time. About this there can be no questions; and the opponents have their fore used their best endeavors to show that there are other articles elsewhere in the schedule which provide for such a case as this. They argue that for this reason RECOGNISE Art. 120 cannot be had. The opponents argue thus : The claim against the directors must either be a breach of contract or it is independent of contract. In the one case Art. 115 applies and in the other Art s36. Either of these articles would exclude the whole or at any rate a great part of the liquidators' claim.

    It now appears that the liquidators allege contract. The misfeasance alleged is the omission to take security from the Manager the Accountant and the Cashier of the Bank's branch at Bombay .It is impossible to contend that in the articles of association which are said to set forth so much of the contract between the dictators and the company as is in writing. there is any clause which says the directors shall not appoint any officer except sufficient security. But the liquidators argue that there is another part of this contract which is not expressed but implied. There is they say an implied contract to

    "guide their conduct in accordance with the ordinary habits or rules of business by which prudent men are guided in the conduct of their own affairs."

    Of this implied contract the liquidators alleged that there has been a breach. But the opponents answer that in the averments, which they are called upon to meet, there is no word of any such contract or of any such breach. The statement of claim has not been amended, they say to bring it in to conformity with the case which now the liquidators are settling up and every party must confine himself to the case which in his owns pleading he has elected to set up. The facts material for the decision of this point these. The prayer clause in Ex. 1 is these terms;

    " The applicants pray of a declaration that the opponents have been guilty of misfeasance and or breach of trust in respect of the several matter referred to in the forgoing paras and pray that the opponents or such of them as are found guilty be ordered to pay to the applicants such amount of loss suffered by the bank as detailed in the foregoing paras and as may be determined by the court and costs...... and interest."

    There is nothing here about any breach of contract. The principal allegation is misfeasance. There is indeed a formal alternative allegation of breach of trust. But of this alternative nothing much has been said in the course of the arguments. Now the article of the limitations act in which the word "misfeasance " occurs is Art 36. That article is in these terms :

    36. For compensation Two years when the malfeasancne, for any malfeasance, mis- misfeasance or non- feasanace or non-feasance feasance takes place. independent of contract and not herein specially provided for.

    This is the article on which the opponents wish to rely. The liquidators answer: This article does not apply because the misfeasance alleged is not independent of contract. But in any case the point of time from which the years will begin to run is subject to the general provision contained in s. 24. That section says:

    " In the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific inquiry actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results."

    Now the dates on which injury actually resulted are these :-

    DATE AMOUNT EX.NO.

    8-7-1927 4,800 111

    9-7-1927 16,000 70A

    18-8-1927 2,300 110

    30-9-1927 3,000 112

    22-10-1927 3,000 68B

    9-2-1928 4,600 70C

    1-3-1928 3,570 68A

    7-3- 1928 3,000 73A

    27-3-1928 2,000 66H

    8-8-1928 1,000 66D

    17-8-1928 2,400 65A

    14-9-1928 1,000 66F

    31-10-1928 1,000 68C

    31-10-1928 4,000 69A

    4 -1-1929 2,500 66F

    6-3-1929 17,000 70D

    The proceeding were instituted on 26th December 1930, There fore even if the period is taken to be the period allowed by Art. 36, still much of the liquidator's claim would be in time s. The opponents have their answer to this argument also they say s. 24 has no application because there is no injury which can be said to be the result of their misfeasance. The deflections are not the result of their failure to take security. Officers of a bank may be dishonest although they have given no security- they may be dishonest although the consequences recoil upon other than their own. These are the contentions of the several parties.

    The articles to be considered are Arts. 36,115, 116 and 120 and the sections are 13 and 24. Taking the articles in the order in which they come in the Act, I deal first with Art. 36. Under this article cases have been quoted. Since there have been differences of judicial opinion I arrange the cases in a chronological sequence in order that the development of the doctrine may be more readily observed:

    1898 3rd February. Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab- This was a suit for damages for cutting carrying away crops. It is totally different case which need no detain us further.

    1922 , 11th January, Hukum Chand V. Bank of Multan, ltd, - This case has not been included in any of the authorized reports. It is the first of all the cases quoted to me in which s. 235 is discussed. The decision was that imitation must be calculated under s. 386 and time must run from the date of the misfeasance. The principal point decided was that s. 235 companies Act vii of 1913 created no new offence and gave no new rights but only provided a summary and efficient remedy in respect of rights which apart from that section might have been vindicated either a law or in equity.

    1922, 3rd August. Bank of Multan Ltd. V. Hukum Chand ---This is the same case which has just been referred to. On appeal it came before the High Court at Lahore where it was argued that on the view taken by the learned Judge in Chambers s. 235 would be practically a dead letter because time might begin to run against the liquidator even before he was appointed. The court again held that s. 235 does not create any new rights or liabilities but simply provides a summary mode of enforcement.

    1925, 27th March. In the matter of union Bank, Allahabad-In this case the high court at Allahabad discussed and dissented from the doctrine already quoted from the decision of the High Court at Lahore. Walsh J., said :

    " It has been said that s. 235 creates no new rights, but as is pointed out in the last edition of Buckley on companies (1924), the statement is only partially accurate........ so far as the liquidator is authorised by this section to apply, in the interests of creditors and depositors under the section it seems to me that a new right in him is created."

    In this judgment Mukerji, J. concurs and he also lays down the proposition that the liability of the directors is certainly not a matter independent of contract.

    1926, 21st October, Bhim Singh V. Liquidator of Union Bank of India-In this case the question whether s. 235 creates new rights came once more before the High Court of Lahore. That Court considered and expressly dissented from the decision of walsh, j., in In the matter of Union Bank Allahabad--- The Court said:

    "Since these cases were decided, the matter so far as that point is concerned has been finally set at rest by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (2)"

    For this reason the Court at Lahore reaffirmed its conclusion upon that point and for that reason it held that the application before it was governed by Art. 36, Limitation Act.

    1929 , 20 th November. Govind Narayan V. Ragunath Gopal.--In this case Sir Amberson Marten delivering, as Chief Justice the decision both of Lahore and Allahabad and found himself unable to adopt entirely the interpretation of the Act given either by the one court or the other. In his view which has already been set out the proper article is 120.

    1930, 17th January, Narasimha Ayyangar V. official Assignee, Madras----In this case, as in Bombay reference is made to the conflict of opinion between the High Court at Allahabad and Lahore. The High Court at Madras observed :

    " The question really turns upon whether an entirely new right with a new cause of section arises on the winding up of a company."
    On this point Madras preferred to follow the decision of the High court at Lahore. It is now the turn of this court to deal with this difference of juridical opinion. I find myself in agreement with the High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad on the question whether the misfeasance with which we are concerned is or is not independent of contract. I feel that I may reach this conclusion without coming into direct conflict with the High Court of Lahore. I have, been careful to set out the point upon which the High Court at Lahore and Allahabad were at variance. It will be observed that it is not one of the point which have been raised in this proceeding. I have not been asked to decide whether or not an entirely new right with a knew cause of action arises on the winding up of a company. I have been only asked to decide whether the misfeasance now alleged is or is not independent of contract. I do not think that the High Court at Lahore can be quoted as authority for the country position. But in any case I prefer to follow Bombay and allahabad who in turn are following the English Court of Appeal.

    We have therefore reached the position that the misfeasance with which we have now to deal is not independent of contract within the meaning of Art. 36, Limitation Act. This also disposes of the necessity for discussing in detail s. 24 . It is not contended that the section would apply to any of the articles which I have been asked to consider with the exception of Art. 36. When we have reached the position that the relation between the director and the company is a contractual relation there is a temptation to pass at once to the proposition that the choice is now restricted to two alternatives. Either the contract is in writing registered to two alternatives. Either the contract is in writing registered or it is not. Either Art 116 governs the limitations or Art .115 . But even this short passage is not free from obstruction. Sir Amberson Marten in the case already quoted declined to apply either art. 115 or Art 116 To this conclusion he came with some hesitation; but his reasons were that Art.115 would not apply because the part of the contract was in writing registered namely the Articles of Association. Article 116 on the other hand does not apply because the whole of the contract was not in writing registered. This lays dome under the obligation of coming to a conclusion on the question what is meant in Art,116 by the words"contract in writing registered." Do these words include "Articles of Association" registered with a Registrar of Companies? This is a second point on which we encounter a conflict of decisions. There have been fluctuations of opinion both in Madras and Bombay. In 1918 Sir John Wallis delivering the judgment of the court in Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. V. Venkatarama Chetty laid it down that there is no reason why the term "registered"in Art. 116, Limitation Act should not include documents registered under any special law, such as the Companies Act as well as under the Registration Act. In Madras the term was understood in this sense until 1925 When the same question was reconsidered by a Full Bench in Rama Seshayya V. Sri Tripurasundari Cotton Press, Bezwada. Their Lordships observed that it had no doubt been held not merely that the registration of a contract, in the ordinary sense was covered by the article but also the deposit of the memorandum and articles of association of a limited company with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies under the direction of that Act. Their Lordships proceeded :

    "That seems to us to be putting an intolerable strain upon the word" registered and on which the draftsman of the statute could not possibly be thought to have contemplated."

    They therefore, come to the conclusion that Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co. Ltd., V. Venkatarama Chetty had been incorrectly decided, and they thought they ought to say so. In Bombay the current of judicial opinion took the contrary course. In Manekal V. Suryapur Mills Co. Ltd., the court was at least inclined to hold the same view as was taken by the full Beach of the Madras High Court in Rama Seshayya V. Sri Tripurasundari Cotton Press Bezwada. Sir Amberson Marten's judgment in that case no doubt left this particular point open. Nevertheless when he returned to this matter Narain V. Ragunath Gopal he elected to adhere to the opinion expressed by Sir John wallis and definitely repudiated by the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras. Here again I find myself constrained to make my election between the two different opinions advisedly propounded by two different High Court. In addressing myself to the task I set out from the firm ground afforded by statute. The word "registered" is defined by the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) at s. 3, cl. (45):-

    "Registered used with reference to a document shall mean registered in British India under the law for the time being in force for the registration of documents."

    Where shall we seek for this law? The preamble to the REgistration Act supplies and answer to this question. The words there used are these :-

    "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate the enactments relating to the registration of documents it is hereby enacted as follows:

    It appears to me that these words elucidate and define the words used in the General Clauses Act. That Act does not say: " Registered under any law for the time being in force." It says "under the law for the time being in force for the registration of Documents."

    The law for that purpose has been consolidated in the Registration Act. The Officer who is appointed under the Companies Act is primarily a Registrar not of documents, but of companies. Incidentally in the discharge of his duty he may be called upon to register certain documents. But in my opinion,which is also the considered opinion of the High Court of Madras, the registration referred to in Art. 116 Limitation Act is not registration of companies but registration under Act XVI of 1908. By this way I am brought to the conclusion that the contract with which we have to deal in these proceedings is not a contract in writing registered within the meaning of Art.116. I think therefore there remains no reason why the limitation period should not be held to governed by Art.115.

    One thing at least is clear. The contract of which the liquidators allege a breach is not any part of any written contract. It is a part of an implied contract. There is no doubt that this implied contract, at least, is not in writing registered. I think, therefore that it may properly be held that limitation in this particular instance at any rate is governed by art 115. This decision eliminates from our consideration Art. 120 That article is a residuary article and it only comes into operation if there is no special article buy which the limitation is directly controlled. A further point which I should not leave out of account has been raised by Mr. Dipchand arguing the case for opponents Nos. 2,3, and 6. His point is that in the pleadings which he has been called upon to answer no averment of a breach of contract is made. He quotes Khiaram V. Chatomal and he points out that no amendment has been asked for. Now the law of pleadings may be tersely summarized in four words : " Plead facts, not law." In this form it will be found in the first few pages of any text-book on the art of Pleading and this form can be justified by the Civil Procedure Code, O. VI, r. 2 --

    " Every pleading shall contain and contain only a statement in concise form of the material facts on which the party, pleading relies for his claim."

    No doubt, if the liquidators in this case desired to allege that the directors are trustees and as such subject to the drastic provisions of s. 10, Limited Act, an allegation which has been unsuccessfully made in other similar cases---- then such breach of trust must be expressly pleaded. There is, no doubt in the prayer clause some reference to breach of trust. But that point has not been one of those which have been agitated before me in argument. In like manner it is no doubt true that except by way of amendment no new ground of claim and no allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleading shall be made but in this case there has been no attempt to alter any initial averment of fact. These still stand as they were originally made. This is enough. It is the duty of the parties to state only the facts on which they rely for their claim. It is for the court to declare the law arising out of those facts. I have now brought myself to the conclusion that limitation in this case is governed by Art. 115. but this does not completely dispose of all the matters in controversy. Article 115 provides various starting points from which the period of three years is to run. The words of the article are these -----

    "When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or where the breach is continuing, When it ceases."

    Now the misfeasance with which the directors are charged in this case appears from the resolution passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors held on 23rd September, 1922. The facts which led up to this resolution were these : Originally the Board had resolved to take security from various officers in very substantial sums. The officers concerned had represented that it was impossible for them to comply with the requirements of the Board in this respect. It was then resolved that they should be asked to state what is the maximum security they were prepared to offer or what amount in cash they were prepared to deposit. The replies which they made were submitted to the Board of September, 1922 and the following resolution was the passed :-

    "Resolved ---After reading the replies of the various members of the staff the Board resolves that the Assistant Manager and the cashier of Head Office be asked to furnish security for Rs. 5000 each (say rupees five thousand each) in cash or otherwise tot the satisfaction of the Board. The security to be furnished within two months. The question of the other members of the staff at Head Office and branches deferred for want of time."

    The question thus deferred was never taken up again and never decided. It turned out, however, to be a very crucial question. Now the position of a director must not be made so onerous that no man who has other business of his own on his hands would venture to undertake it but on the other hand, the names of responsible directors must not be allowed to become a mere trap to delude the unwary investor. I should be very slow to make any director pecuniarily responsible for any loss which might unfortunately be incurred by an honest error of judgment. But the misfeasance alleged in the present case is not an error of judgment. It is an omission to exercises any judgment at all. The allegation is (and it is borne out by the minute book) that the Director simply postponed this very vital question without a date. No decision upon it was every reached or recorded. It appears to me by thus postponing this questions and leaving it undecided the directors were committing a dereliction of duty which can only be regarded as a continuing breach. As long as they continued to defer a decision on this point they continued to neglect that which is a part of any director's duty and must be considered to be a part of the contract between themselves and the company. For these reasons it appears to me that the starting point for the three years of limitation must be governed by the third part of time clauses in Art.115 I have not hitherto made nay reference to s. 23 That section would however, appear to suggest that a great part of the foregoing discussion might have been curtailed. Section 23 says :-

    " In the case of a continuing breach of contract in the case of a continuing wrong independent of contract a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrongs, as the case may be, continues."

    If this section be applied it would appear to be of little consequence whether the cause of action be supposed to be ex delicto or ex contractu. In either case since the breach or the wrong (which ever it be ) is continuous, a fresh period of limitation would begin to run at every moment while the directors continuous, a fresh period of limitation would begin to run at every moment while the director continued in dereliction of their duty. Nothing that has been hitherto said is intended to decide any disputed questions of fact. Those question all remain open. The point with which I have been dealing are points of law; and on them my conclusions are these :- s(1) the misfeasance alleged is not independent of contract and the limitation is for this reason not governed by Art 36; (2) the registration of a company under the Companies ACt is not equivalent to a registration of the Articles of Association within the meaning of the limitation Act Arts. 115 and 116; (3) the limousine in this case is governed by Art. 115 and the period is three years. (4) an omission by directors to come to any conclusion whatsoever on an important piece of business duly proposed for the decision of the Board is a breach of duty which continues as long as the decision is deferred, and the limitation does not begin to run until a point of time to be determined by the application of the appropriate clause of Art 115 to such findings of fact as may hereafter be recorded.

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    Karachi Bank Ltd v. Shewaram & Others.
    (Nov 25, 1932)