S.D Bajaj, J.:— In case First Information Report No. 308 dated 9th June, 1979 of Police Station, Ambala Cantt, petitioner Raj Kumar Jain is being prosecuted in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala under sections 8 and 14 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, sections 18 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code because 4960 tablets recovered from him from inside a polythene envelope carried by him at Bus Stand, Ambala Cantt, on 9th June, 1979, were found on analysis to be the duplicate of Mandrex of white colour having mark MX thereon and another 990 tablets carried by him in separate polythene bag were found on analysis to be the duplicates of Aplax of brown colour. Challan against the accused petitioner was presented in the trial court on 8th January, 1980. Recording of paltry evidence of four witnesses against him having not been completed till 6th October, 1988, the Page: 90petitioner filed Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988 in this Court for quashing the First Information Report and resultant proceedings before the learned trial court on the grounds of inordinate delay of 8 years and 9 months in trial resulting in rendering the prosecution much too state, prejudicing his right of effectively cross-examining the prosecuting witnesses and defeating the guarantee of speedy trial envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
2. I have heard Shri H.S Mann, Advocate, for the petitioner, Shri Madan Jassal, Advocate for the respondent and have carefully gone through the material on record.
3. Referring to the observations made in Amar Nath v. The State of Punjab, 1987 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 257 and Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, 1988 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 79 it has been urged that delay of more than seven years in the disposal of the case violates Constitutional guarantee of speedy trial envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the prosecution of the petitioner calls for being quashed. Both the authorities cited are a single Bench authority of this Court and a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court. This view of the matter was negatived by the Supreme Court in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 473 : Judgment, Today 1990 (1) SC 74. Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed:—
“The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been prosecuted in all criminal cases for offences under section 408 or 409 IPC, that the proceedings are pending for over 25 years, the prolongation of the trial without any fault on the part of the appellant amounts to prosecution of the appellant and, therefore, the proceedings should have been quashed by the High Court. It is maintained that in spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name has teen recorded by the prosecutor. We have been taken through the various steps taken in each case and the nature of the evidence purported to have collected.
We do not consider it necessary to narrate the detailed facts leading to the present appeal except to state that the trial in the pending cases has been unduly protracted due to various causes. It is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. We think that the circumstances of the case only call for appropriate directions for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceeding and the law has to be allowed to take its own course to prevent miscarriage of justice. The High Court has directed the Trial Court to proceed with the cases against the appellant day-to-day and decided them expeditiously. We would however direct the Trial Court to dispose of the cases within a period not exceeding one year from the date of the receipt of the records. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Trial Court forthwith. The appeals are dismissed accordingly subject to the above directions.”
4. Observations made in Hira Lal v. State of Haryana, (1970) 3 SCC 933 : AIR 1971 SC 356 pertain to appreciation of interested and police witnesses evidence and have no bearing on the point in issue. Similarly in State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.V Pavithram, 1990 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 350 : (1990) 2 SCC 340 : AIR 1990 SC 1266 the apex Court was concerned with delay during investigation and Page: 91not the inordinate delay in trial involved in this case.
5. Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed, “It follows from the above observations that no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is any inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay is a ground to quash the FIR”.
6. In this view of the matter Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988 fails and is accordingly dismissed. Learned trial court would, however, expedite the trial and complete in within a period of three months from the date of communication this order. The petitioner may, if he is advised, avail himself of the pleas raised in the quashing petition before the learned trial court for defending himself.
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