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  • sections 8 and 14 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, sections 18 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
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  • sections 8 and 14 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, sections 18 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — S.D. Bajaj, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Raj Kumar Jain, is prosecuted pursuant to First Information Report No. 308 dated 9 June 1979 (Police Station, Ambala Cantt). He is charged under sections 8 and 14 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, sections 18 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code for possession of tablets recovered from him at the Bus Stand, Ambala Cantt on 9 June 1979. On analysis, 4,960 tablets from a polythene envelope were found to be duplicates of Mandrex (white, marked MX) and 990 tablets in a separate polythene bag were found to be duplicates of Aplax (brown). The challan was presented in the trial court on 8 January 1980.

By 6 October 1988 only paltry evidence of four witnesses had been recorded. The petitioner filed Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988 in this Court seeking quashing of the FIR and resultant proceedings on the ground of an inordinate delay of 8 years and 9 months in trial, which he said prejudiced his right to effectively cross-examine prosecuting witnesses and violated the guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The Court heard Shri H.S. Mann, Advocate for the petitioner, and Shri Madan Jassal, Advocate for the respondent, and examined the record before delivering the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an inordinate delay of approximately 8 years and 9 months in the trial process amounts to a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21, warranting quashing of the FIR and prosecution.
  2. Whether precedents cited by the petitioner (including Amar Nath v. The State of Punjab and Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar) establish a rule that delay beyond a specified period (pressed as >7 years) mandates quashing of proceedings.
  3. What is the significance, for quashing relief, of delay occurring during investigation as distinct from delay in the trial stage?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Counsel for the petitioner relied on observations in Amar Nath v. The State of Punjab (1987 (1) RCR 257) and Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (1988 (1) RCR 79), urging that a delay of more than seven years in disposal of the case violates the guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 and therefore the prosecution should be quashed.
  • The petitioner contended that the inordinate delay prejudiced his ability to effectively cross-examine prosecuting witnesses.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments presented in opposition to the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amar Nath v. The State of Punjab, 1987 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 257 Urged by petitioner as authority that delay of more than seven years in disposal violates Article 21 (speedy trial) and supports quashing of prosecution. Not followed as a controlling rule; treated as a single Bench authority relied on by petitioner but contrasted with higher authority of the Supreme Court.
Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, 1988 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 79 Urged by petitioner as authority supporting quashing where delay exceeds seven years. Treated as not determinative; it is a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court and was contrasted with subsequent Supreme Court guidance.
Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 473 : Judgment, Today 1990 (1) SC 74 Supreme Court held that lapse of many years, though regrettable, does not automatically justify termination of proceedings; where evidence is available it may be preferable to direct expeditious disposal rather than quash. The Court directed trials to be completed within a stipulated period in that case. Applied by the court to reject the submission that lapse of time alone mandates quashing. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court's approach to dismiss the quashing petition and instead direct expeditious trial.
Hira Lal v. State of Haryana (1970) 3 SCC 933 : AIR 1971 SC 356 Deals with appreciation of interested and police witnesses' evidence. Held by this Court to be irrelevant to the specific question of inordinate delay in trial; therefore not relied upon for quashing on delay grounds.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.V Pavithram, 1990 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 350 : (1990) 2 SCC 340 : AIR 1990 SC 1266 Concerned with delay during investigation (not delay in trial); Supreme Court observed that no general and wide proposition can be formulated that delay by investigating agency in completing investigation is a ground to quash the FIR. Applied to distinguish delay in investigation from trial delay and to reinforce the proposition that delay alone, particularly during investigation, does not automatically entitle quashing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the petitioner's reliance on earlier authorities that suggested delay beyond a certain number of years (pressing the figure of seven years) could violate Article 21 and warrant quashing. It reviewed the authorities cited by the petitioner and then examined higher authority from the Supreme Court.

The Court placed particular emphasis on the Supreme Court's observations in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, noting that although undue prolongation of trials is regrettable, where the nature of allegations and availability of evidence justify continued proceedings it is not expedient to terminate them on account of lapse of time alone. The Court noted that the Supreme Court directed expeditious disposal rather than blanket quashing in that case.

The Court further observed that decisions dealing with assessment of interested or police witness testimony (Hira Lal) or with delay during investigation (P.V. Pavithram) were not directly on point: Hira Lal concerned appreciation of evidence; Pavithram concerned delay in investigation rather than delay in trial. The Supreme Court's stated position that "no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is any inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay is a ground to quash the FIR" was noted and applied.

On this basis the Court concluded that the petitioner's remedy was not to quash the prosecution solely on the ground of lapse of time. Instead, the appropriate course (consistent with Supreme Court guidance) was to direct the trial court to proceed expeditiously and complete the trial within a fixed short period, leaving the petitioner to raise any defenses or pleas before the trial court.

Holding and Implications

The petition (Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988) is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The dismissal means the prosecution is not quashed on the ground of inordinate delay alone. The trial will continue in the trial court.
  • The Court directed the trial court to expedite proceedings and complete the trial within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.
  • The petitioner was permitted to raise the same pleas urged in the quashing petition before the trial court in defence.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new general precedent; it follows and applies the Supreme Court's approach that delay alone (including delay in investigation) does not automatically justify quashing, and that expeditious disposal may be the proper remedy where evidence is available.

    Raj Kumar Jain v. State Of Haryana .

    S.D Bajaj, J.:— In case First Information Report No. 308 dated 9th June, 1979 of Police Station, Ambala Cantt, petitioner Raj Kumar Jain is being prosecuted in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala under sections 8 and 14 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, sections 18 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code because 4960 tablets recovered from him from inside a polythene envelope carried by him at Bus Stand, Ambala Cantt, on 9th June, 1979, were found on analysis to be the duplicate of Mandrex of white colour having mark MX thereon and another 990 tablets carried by him in separate polythene bag were found on analysis to be the duplicates of Aplax of brown colour. Challan against the accused petitioner was presented in the trial court on 8th January, 1980. Recording of paltry evidence of four witnesses against him having not been completed till 6th October, 1988, the Page: 90petitioner filed Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988 in this Court for quashing the First Information Report and resultant proceedings before the learned trial court on the grounds of inordinate delay of 8 years and 9 months in trial resulting in rendering the prosecution much too state, prejudicing his right of effectively cross-examining the prosecuting witnesses and defeating the guarantee of speedy trial envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

    2. I have heard Shri H.S Mann, Advocate, for the petitioner, Shri Madan Jassal, Advocate for the respondent and have carefully gone through the material on record.

    3. Referring to the observations made in Amar Nath v. The State of Punjab, 1987 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 257 and Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, 1988 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 79 it has been urged that delay of more than seven years in the disposal of the case violates Constitutional guarantee of speedy trial envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the prosecution of the petitioner calls for being quashed. Both the authorities cited are a single Bench authority of this Court and a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court. This view of the matter was negatived by the Supreme Court in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 473 : Judgment, Today 1990 (1) SC 74. Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed:—

    “The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been prosecuted in all criminal cases for offences under section 408 or 409 IPC, that the proceedings are pending for over 25 years, the prolongation of the trial without any fault on the part of the appellant amounts to prosecution of the appellant and, therefore, the proceedings should have been quashed by the High Court. It is maintained that in spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name has teen recorded by the prosecutor. We have been taken through the various steps taken in each case and the nature of the evidence purported to have collected.

    We do not consider it necessary to narrate the detailed facts leading to the present appeal except to state that the trial in the pending cases has been unduly protracted due to various causes. It is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. We think that the circumstances of the case only call for appropriate directions for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceeding and the law has to be allowed to take its own course to prevent miscarriage of justice. The High Court has directed the Trial Court to proceed with the cases against the appellant day-to-day and decided them expeditiously. We would however direct the Trial Court to dispose of the cases within a period not exceeding one year from the date of the receipt of the records. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Trial Court forthwith. The appeals are dismissed accordingly subject to the above directions.”

    4. Observations made in Hira Lal v. State of Haryana, (1970) 3 SCC 933 : AIR 1971 SC 356 pertain to appreciation of interested and police witnesses evidence and have no bearing on the point in issue. Similarly in State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.V Pavithram, 1990 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 350 : (1990) 2 SCC 340 : AIR 1990 SC 1266 the apex Court was concerned with delay during investigation and Page: 91not the inordinate delay in trial involved in this case.

    5. Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed, “It follows from the above observations that no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is any inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay is a ground to quash the FIR”.

    6. In this view of the matter Criminal Misc. No. 7246-M of 1988 fails and is accordingly dismissed. Learned trial court would, however, expedite the trial and complete in within a period of three months from the date of communication this order. The petitioner may, if he is advised, avail himself of the pleas raised in the quashing petition before the learned trial court for defending himself.

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    Comments

    Raj Kumar Jain v. State Of Haryana .
    (Jan 7, 1991)