- This is a petition by Gobind Singh under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the order dated 6th May, 1963 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Hissar reducing him from an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police to a Head Constable. 2. According to the allegations of the petitioner, he joined the Police Department in the erstwhile Patiala State as a Constable in 1943. He was promoted to the rank of an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police in 1954 and was confirmed in that post on 7th May, 1958 after the merger of the Pepsu State with the State of Punjab. In 1960, he was posted as Incharge of Police Post, Sabathu, district Shimla, and remained there till 23rd January, 1961. During the course of his stay there and in the discharge of his officials duties as a police officer he came in conflict with one M.L. Shah of that place. As an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, he had to investigate a case under Section 420, Indian Penal Code, against M.L. Shah and his brother, Kishan Lal. He also opened their history sheets since they were undesirable persons. He censored their letters, which they received from the foreign countries and stopped their fraudulent business. He also got the gun licence of Kishan Lal cancelled. Similarly, he incurred the displeasure of one Bala Ram, an M.E.S. employee of Sabathu, who was also the Secretary of the Labour Union of M.E.S. Workers, Sabathu, and was instigating them to go on strike at the time of All India Employees General Strike in 1960. The petitioner had reprimanded him for indulging in anti-national activities. The petitioner had also alienated the sympathies of Shri Yog Raj, Inspector, C.I.D., and Shri Jiv Raj Mehta, Sub-Inspector, Vigilance. All these persons conspired together and got a false complaint made against him through M.L. Shah. On the basis of this complaint, the petitioner was charge-sheeted on five grounds on 21st April, 1962. Subsequently, a departmental enquiry was conducted against him by Shri Daljit Singh Dhillon, Superintendent of Police, Simla, respondent No. 2, who exonerated him from three charges, but held him guilty under two of them. Since the petitioner was posted in the district of Hissar at that time, the Competent Authority to pass final orders was the Superintendent of Police of that district. Therefore, the papers were sent to him and he was provisionally of the opinion that the penalty of reduction in rank should be imposed on the petitioner. As a result, on 13th August, 1962 he issued a notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why this penalty should not be imposed on him. Thereupon the petitioner submitted his representation on 22nd August, 1962. After considering the same, he came to the conclusion that the two charges, as held by the Enquiry Officer, had been proved against the petitioner and since they were of a serious nature, the punishment of reduction in rank was imposed by the impugned order dated 6th May, 1963. Against this order, the petitioner filed an appeal, but it was rejected on 31st July, 1963 by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Ambala Range, respondent No. 1, who, however, held that the petitioner was guilty only under one charge. This led to the filing of the writ petition on 24th August, 1963. 3. In the return filed by respondent No. 1, it was stated that the petitioner was enlisted as a Constable in the year 1945 and was confirmed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police on 9th May, 1958. It was admitted that an enquiry against him commenced on the basis of a statement made by M.L. Shah to Shri Yog Raj, Inspector C.I.D., during the course of an investigation of a case against the former under Sections 414/411, Indian Penal Code, and the Opium Act, at Police Station C. Division, Amritsar. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the mandatory provisions of Police Rule 16.38(1) and (2) had not been complied with in this case and that had vitiated the entire proceedings. During the course of investigation against M.L. Shah for offences under Sections 414/411, Indian Penal Code, and the Opium Act, he made a statement before Shri Yog Raj, Inspector, C.I.D., making allegations of corruption against the petitioner. It was stated by him that the petitioner had taken Rs. 30/- and one bottle of English wine from Shri Bala Ram. This constituted criminal offences under Section 161, Indian Penal Code, and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by a police officer in connection with his official relations with the public. according to Police Rule 16.38, immediate information of such a complaint had to be given to the District Magistrate, who had to decide whether investigation of such a complaint should be conducted by a police officer or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st class powers. According to the learned counsel, this was not done by the Superintendent of Police in the present case. It was also contended that Rule 16.38(2) had not been followed. The District Magistrate had merely acted upon the facts supplied and suggestions made in the memorandum of the Superintendent of Police, Simla, and he did not come to an independent decision that the petitioner had to be proceeded against departmentally as indicated in this sub-rule (2). Moreover, no reasons, as required by this sub-rule were given by the District Magistrate and, thus, the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was altogether illegal and invalid. 5. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that Rule 16.38(1) did not apply to this case because M.L. Shah did not make any complaint as defined in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Superintendent of Police, Simla, who was the punishing authority of the petitioner and under whom he was serving. Secondly the offence committed by the petitioner was not in connection with his official relations with the public. Reliance for this submission was placed on Dhaneshwar Narain Saxena v. Delhi Administration ., AIR 1962 SC 195 and Amrik Singh v. The State of Punjab and others, 1963 Cur.L.J. 473 : 1963 P.L.R. 802. Learned counsel submitted that the investigation in the present case was made by the Vigilance Department on the basis of the statement made by M.L. Shah to Shri Yog Raj, Inspector, C.I.D. The Vigilance Department was competent to take cognizance of corruption cases as soon as information in regard to them came to their notice. In the present case, this Department sent their report to the Superintendent of Police, Simla, who referred the matter to the District Magistrate of that place on 26th March, 1962 for obtaining his order under Police Rule 16.38. On the same day, the said District Magistrate, after going through the relevant papers, accorded his permission to proceed departmentally against the petitioner. It was contended that Rule 16.38(1) should be so interpreted as not to come in conflict with the statutory powers of the Station House Officer or the Superintendent of Police to investigate cognizable offences under Sections 156 and 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also submitted that Rule 16.38 was not mandatory. It was merely an executive instruction. It was further contended that no police Rule applied in the present case and if at all any did, it was Rule 16.23. 6. The relevant portion of Rule 16.38 is as under :- "Rule 16.38(1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected magistrate having 1st class powers. (2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *" The question for decision is whether the Punjab Police Rule 16.38 applies to the present case and, if so, whether it has been fully complied with. 7. The word "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under that code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer. This definition cannot be made applicable to the Police Rule 16.38, because under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complaint has to be made to the Magistrate, whereas under the Police Rules, it is specifically stated that the complaint should be received by the Superintendent of Police and it must indicate the commission by the Police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. Moreover the Police rules nowhere lay down, either expressly or impliedly, that the definition of the word `complaint' as given in the Code of Criminal Procedure, has to be applied. Similarly, the word `investigation' in the Code of Criminal Procedure is defined as under - "investigation includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer, or by any person other than a Magistrate, who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf." This definition cannot be imported in Police Rule 16.38, where it is clearly stated that investigation of a complaint shall be conducted by the police officer or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st class powers Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the word `complaint' used in Rule 16.38 should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, which means an `accusation', but it should indicate the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. Rule 16.38 does not require that the complaint should be made to the Superintendent of Police. All that it says is that it must be received by him either personally or through proper channel. In the present case, the complaint was made by M.L. Shah to Shri Yog Raj, Inspector C.I.D., during the course of an investigation and the same was ultimately received by the Superintendent of Police, Simla, under whom the petitioner was posted. Now, the point arises whether the offence was committed by the petitioner in connection with his official relations with the public. From the allegations made in charge No. 1, which are as under, it is clear that this was a criminal offence committed by the petitioner in connection with his official relations with the public :- "That while you were posted as Incharge Police Post, Sabathu, in Police Station Dharampur, Mst. Phullan Devi (P.W.23) was bitten by a dog near village Kakar Hatti which was stated to be of Bala Ram Lohar of the same village, that said Bala Ram was later produced before you by a constable, whom you told of a complaint, received against him for his dog having bitten the daughters of Sairu and Heru, that Bala Ram later left the Police Post on his producing witnesses before you that he did not own or possess a dog, but that on the same evening, Bala Ram was again produced before you, when you expressed your desire to help him in the matter, but at the same time, you also expressed your helplessness on the plea that the law on the subject indicated an offence, that you then asked your constable to explain the matter to Bala Ram, that the constable thereupon took Bala Ram aside and asked him for a bottle of English wine for getting the matter hushed up, that Bala Ram then arranged for a bottle of liquor, which he left with your servant in your absence. That on the following day, Bala Ram was again produced before you for your recording his statement, but the matter was put off for three consecutive days on one pretext or the other with the result that Bala Ram declined to appear before you any further, saying that he was a poor man and could not afford to do more than what he had done already. That you had thus unnecessarily harassed said Bala Ram and had also obtained a bottle of liquor as a mean of hushing up the matter." Moreover, the Superintendent of Police, Simla, had himself in his memorandum dated 26th March, 1962 addressed to the District Magistrate, Simla, mentioned thus - "I have to report that preliminary inquiries made against Assistant Sub-Inspector, Gobind Singh, No 242-A, for the period he remained posted as Incharge Police Post Sabathu reveal that :- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 6. These acts of the defaulter constitute a criminal offence and tant-amount to gross misconduct on his part. As the above acts were committed by the defaulter in connection with his official relations with the public and the inordinate delay so far caused will render it difficult to establish and substantiate the guilt against the defaulter in Court of law, it is proposed to deal with the Assistant Sub-Inspector departmentally. 7. It is, therefore, requested that permission as required by Police Rule 16.38 may kindly be accorded and communicated to this office at your earliest." Under these circumstances, there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the State that the offence committed by the petitioner was not in connection with his official relations with the public. The Supreme Court authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the State is not applicable because it does not deal with the interpretation of the Police Rules and, as such, can be of no assistance to the State. As regards Amrik Singh's case, the learned Judge had held that Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules did not apply where the criminal act with which a police officer was charged did not relate to his official relation with the public, but the Rule dealt with criminal offences committed by a police officer in connection with his official relations with the public. There is no dispute regarding the rule of law laid down in this authority. When M.L. Shah made certain allegations to the Inspector, C.I.D., against the petitioner to the effect that he committed a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public, he should have reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, Simla, under whom the petitioner was working. The Superintendent of Police, had then to give the information to the District Magistrate, who had to decide as to whether the investigation of the complaint was to be conducted by a police officer or by a selected Magistrate having 1st Class powers. If in such an investigation, a prima facie (case) was established against the petitioner then the judicial prosecution would have ordinarily followed, unless the District Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded, ordered that the matter be disposed of departmentally. In the present case, this was not done and the investigation of the complaint was conducted by the Vigilance Department without obtaining previous approval of the District Magistrate. The Superintendent of Police then wrote to the District Magistrate that the preliminary enquiries against the petitioner revealed that a criminal offence had been committed by him in connection with his official relations with the public and the inordinate delay so far caused would render it difficult to establish and substantiate the guilt against the defaulter in a Court of Law. It was, therefore, proposed by him to deal with the petitioner departmentally and permission of the District Magistrate as required under Rule 16.38 for so proceeding against him was solicited. The District Magistrate then accorded the necessary permission as recommended by the Superintendent of Police without recording any reasons for the same. It would, thus, be clear that no action under sub-rule (1) of Rule 16.38 was taken. Further, the report of the Superintendent of Police suggesting that departmental proceedings be held against the petitioner and the order of the District Magistrate according the necessary sanction without giving reasons therefore contravened the provisions of sub-rule (2) of this Rule. The contention of the learned counsel for the State that notwithstanding Rule 16.38, the Police Officers were competent to investigate cognizable offences under Section 156 and 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is without any force, because, special Rules have been framed, in which a precise procedure has been laid down for proceeding against police officers. Such a procedure overrides the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect. The argument of the learned counsel for the State that Rule 16.38 was not mandatory and was merely in executive instruction is without any substance. These Rules have been framed under the Police Act, 1861, and it cannot be said that they are merely executive instructions. On the other hand, they have the force of law (also see in this connection State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, A.I.R. 1961 SC 751 and a reading of Rule 16.38 clearly shows that strict compliance with the same is required. Rule 16.23 deals with cases of misconduct on the part of a police officer and a different procedure for that has been prescribed therein. It does not deal with criminal offences committed by a police officer in connection with his official relations with the public and, as such, the present case is not covered by this Rule. Moreover, in the return the State had not taken the position that the petitioner's case was covered by Rule 16.23. Under all these circumstances, in my opinion, Rule 16.38 fully applies to the present case and the same has not been complied with. 8. In view of what I have said above, this writ petition is accepted and the order passed by the Superintendent of Police dated 6th May, 1963 is hereby quashed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Petition accepted.
"Rule 16.38(1)