Manohar Pershad, J.:-
(1) O. S. No. 2/1 of 1953 - 54, out of which this first appeal ore behalf of the defendant arises, was instituted by the respondent herein, a minor, through his guardian aziz khatoon, the mother, for recovery of a sum of (o. S.) rs. 10,000, alleging that the defendant who was his distant relative was in need of money and in that connection approached his mother and represented to her that her husband, khaja kamaluddin, jagirdar, was addicted to drinking, due to which it was difficult to obtain the amount of the jagir deposited in the court of wards and if she proposed to the court of wards that she wanted to purchase a house in the name of her son, she would be able to get the amount lying in deposit there and on that pretext he proposed to sell his house together with the garden (khana bagh) bearing no. 678 at new malakpet, chanchalguda, hyderabad, in consideration of rs. 86,000 (o. S.) after obtaining a sum of rs. 10,000 by way of loan and executiag an agreement of sale dated 13th may, 1950. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant promised that he would obtain the amount from the court of wards through his influence, and although the plaintiff had neither any property nor could afford to purchase a house on payment of such a large sum, nor was the defendant's house so valuable, the defendant obtained the money from him fraudulently, and in spite of repeated demands, the defendant had failed to pay the amount.
(2) The defendant, in his written statement, while admitting having executed the agreement to sell, stated that the agreement was with khaja kamaluddin, the father of the plaintiff, who paid the earnest money under the terms of the agreement and that according to the agreement, khaja kamaluddin was bound to pay the balance of the said consideration amount within two months and get the bungalow registered in his favour and obtain possession of the same, but as he did not abide by his promise, the earnest money lapsed. He inter alia denied that the amount of rs. 10,000 was paid to him by way of loan and stated that that was paid as earnest money of the sale agreement. Legal objection was also taken that unless all the heirs of the deceased jagirdar are co - plaintiffs the suit could not proceed. In the rejoinder, the plaintiff denied the allegations of the defendant and stated that even if there was any agreement of sale, the same could not bind him as it was not beneficial to him. He also alleged that there could not be any case of the lapse of earnest money.
(3) On these averments in the pleadings, the trial court framed the following seven issues : 1. Whether, as alleged in the plaint, the defendant borrowed rs. 10,000 from the plaintiff and described it as earnest money for the purchase of his bungalow ? 2. Whether the agreement, dated 13th may, 1950 was executed by the defendant only for show in order to enable the plaintiff to secure money from the court of wards ? 3. Whether the plaintiff can be allowed to adduce evidence to contradict the terms of the written agreement ? 4. Whether the name of the minor was entered in the agreement as ' benami' and the amount of rs. 10,000 belonged to the deceased khaja kamaluddin? if so, what is the effect of not impleading other heirs of the deceased in this suit ? 5. Can the minor be allowed to repudiate the contract. If so, what is its effect on the suite 6. Is the suit maintainable ? 7. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? evidence was led by the parties, both documentary and oral. On the evidence produced, the learned trial judge found issues 1, 2 end 3 against the plaintiff and issues 4" 5 and 6 to 7 in his favour. In the result, the learned judge decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendant has come up in appeal.
(4) The contention of sri sadasiva rao, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that, when the lower court decided issues 1 to 3 in favour of the appellant, the suit of the respondent for the return of the earnest money could not have been decreed. We do not find any force in this argument. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff came out with the allegations that the amount of rs. 10,000 was advanced to the defendant - appellant by way of loan. The appellant denied that the amount was advanced to him by way of loan and alleged that it was paid to him by way of earnest money. The court below accepted the version of the defendant and rejected the plea of the plaintiff that the amount advanced was by way of loan. When the defendant himself, in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, came forward with certain version and the court believed that version, and if on that version the plaintiff - respondent is entitled to relief, the court would be justified in granting such a relief and there cannot be any objection by the defendant. The only question that would arise is whether as per the version of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to any relief.
(5) It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the version of the defendant - appellant is accepted, in the absence of any mention in the agreement to sell that the contract was on behalf of the minor, acting as guardian, the lower court was not justified in holding that the agreement to sell was not in his individual capacity, but as guardian acting for the minor. In order to appreciate the contention, we have first to refer to the agreement of sale. The said agreement is in urdu but the english translation of the same given by the appellant is accepted to be true by the other side also. It reads :
"i, mohd. Amir ali khan, h. C. S. , son of late mohd. Sardar khan yahiazi, resident or chenchalguda, hyderabad, do hereby of my own accord and free will, execute this deed of agreement, to the effect that i will sell my bungalow with the khana bagh bearing no. 687 and which was constructed on extent of land measuring 5,700 square yards and situate at new malakpet, chenchalguda road, to nawab khaja kamaluddin, son of nawab khaja kamaluddin khan. The vendee being a minor, this contract has been entered into with his father nawab khaja kamaluddin and his mother azeez khatoon. The sale consideration has been fixed at rs. 86,000. From out of the sale consideration, a sum of rs. 10,000 has been received towards earnest money for which a separate receipt has been executed. The guardians of the vendee have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within a period of two months. After the receipt of the balance of rs. 76,000 the sale deed will be got registered and possession of the bungalow and the khana bagh will also be delivered at that time. (sd.) mohd. Amir ali khan. 25th rajjab, 1369 - h - 13th may, 1950."
(6) The court below, on a reading of the document, has come to the conclusion that this is an agreement executed by khaja kamaluddin and aziz khatoon as guardians for the minor khaja jamaluddin. In other words, the court below has held that this document was executed on behalf of the minor by the guardians. The contention of sri sadasiva rao, as stated earlier, is that, if the document was intended to be executed on behalf of the minor, there would have been a mention of the same in it, and in the absence of it, that it is on behalf of the minor, it has to be taken that it was in their individual capacity. We are not prepared to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The document has been executed in favour of the minor. The mention of the words, " the vendee being a minor this agreement has been entered into with his father nawab khaja kamaluddin and his mother azeez khatoon " and " the guardians of the vendee have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within a period of two months " is clear to show that this agreement is one on behalf of the minor by the father and the mother acting as his guardian. If, as is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that this agreement was not on behalf of the minor but by the father and the mother, acting in their individual capacity we cannot understand why they should have said that the vendee being a minor this contract was entered into by them. They could have instead said that this property was purchased for their son khaja jamaluddin by them and they have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration. Relying on the fact that the amount of rs. 10,000 paid to the defendant - appellant was the amount of nawab khaja kamaluddin lying in deposit in the court of wards, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the amount belonged to the father of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had no share in it, that would go to show that nawab khaja kamaluddin khan wanted to purchase a house in the name of his son after entering into an agreement in his individual capacity. This argument is equally devoid of force. It is no doubt true that the amount of rs. 10,000 paid to the appellant was the amount lying in deposit in the court of wards in the name of khaja kamaluddin, plaintiff's father. But it may be noted that when aziz khatoon, the mother, applied to the court of wards that since her husband was addicted to drink and spending money extravagantly she wanted to make some provision for her children and thus wanted to purchase a house, khaja kamaluddin khan filed a petition in the court of wards to the effect that he had no objection if rs. 40,000 were made over to his wife. It also appears that it was only after this that rs. 10,000 were advanced to khaja kamaluddin khan for the purchase of the house. When khaja kamaluddin had already agreed to give a portion of the amount lying in deposit to his children and wife, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the amount belonged to kamaluddin and he alone paid the earnest money loses its importance.
(7) It is next "urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that the agreement of sale was on behalf of the minor, it being an illegal agreement prohibited by the personal law, was not enforceable. In this connection, the learned counsel relied on section 23 of the contract act, section 365 of mulla's mohammadan law, and the case of thasi muthukannu and others v. Shunmgavelu pillai, (1905) i. L. R. 28 mad. 413 :15 m. L. J. 286.
(8) We may at the outset point out that this plea that the document was not enforceable as it was an illegal contract was not taken in the written statement and no issue has been framed to that effect. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, since it is a legal point and goes to the very root of the case, he is entitled to take such a plea. As the point raised was a pure question of law, we allowed the learned counsel to raise it. But we do not find any merit in it. Section 23 of the contract act is in the following words : the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless - it is forbidden by law ; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law ; or is fraudulent ; or involvel or implies injury to the person or property of another ; or the court regards it as immoral or oppoesd to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. " section 364, mulla's mohammadan law, enjoins : "a de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor. Such a transfer is not merely voidable, but void. " thus, it is clear that under section 23 of the contract act, if any agreement or contract is entered into between the parties, which is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature, that if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to person or property of another or the court regards it as immoral and opposed to public policy, such an agreement being unlawful would be void.
(9) The contention of sri sadasiva rao is that, under the personal law, khaja kamaluddin was forbidden to enter into any agreement of purchase on behalf of his minor son and any agreement or contract entered into by him would not only be unlawful but void. We are not prepared to agree with his contention. Under the codified criminal law, acts forbidden by law seem practically to consist of acts punishable under the penal code and all acts prohibited by special legislation or by regulation or orders made under authority derived from the legislature. Section 365, of mulla's mohammadan law, on which great stress is laid, only refers to the competency of the guardian and does not prohibit him from entering into an agreement. When there is no prohibition, we cannot understand how it can be urged that the agreement in question being forbidden by law, it is unlawful and void.
(10) The case of thasi muthukannu and others v. Shanmugavelu filial, (1905) i. L. R. 28 mad. 413 : 15 m. L. J. 286. Does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, for that was a case where the agreement was for immoral consideration. That being so, it would be hit by section 23 of the contract act. The present agreement is not one of that type.
(11) It is next urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that the agreement to sell executed by the guardians was not unlawful still the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover the amount of rs. 10,000 under section 65 of the contract act, for that section does not apply to contracts which are void ab initio but to such contracts which are discovered to be void. Reliance was placed on the case of narayana rao v. Ramachandra rao, a. I. R. 1959 andh. 370. And sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata narahari rao, (1959) 2 an. W. R. 241. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Section 65 of the contract act, which refers to the liability of the person receiving the consideration to repay the same, when that agreement is discovered to be void, reads thus :
"when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it."
(12) The learned counsel for the appellant lays great stress on the words " when an agreement is discovered to be void or when a contract becomes void " and contends that these words clearly show that it does not apply to a contract, which is void ab initio. We are not prepared to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Their lordships of the privy council, while considering the scope of section 65 of the contract act, in the case of harnath kuar v. Indar bahadur, (1922) 44 m. L. J. 489 : l. R. 50 la. 69 : a. I. R. 1922 p. C. 403. Have held that an agreement discovered to be void includes agreements void from the inception. We are also of the same view. Section 65 deals with agreements and contracts. The distinction between agreements and contracts is apparent from section 2, clauses (e) and (h) ; by clause (e) every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement and by clause (h) an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. It follows, therefore, that section 65 deals with agreements enforceable by law and with agreements not so enforceable. Section 2 (g) enjoins that, if an agreement is not enforceable by law it is said to be void. It would appear, therefore, that an agreement discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by law and on the language of the section would include an agreement that waslvoid in that sense from its inception as distinct from a contract that becomes void. The agreement in question was manifestly void from its inception and it cannot be said that it became void, because its subject - matter was incapable of being bound in the manner stipulated.
(13) The case of sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata narahari rao does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. On the other hand, it supports our view that section 65 of the contract act applies to contracts which are void db inttio. This was a case of sale of paddy. Under the ordinances in force in the state of madras, known as madras foodgrains procurement order, 1947 and the madras foodgrains (intensive) procurement order, 1948, sale of foodgrains was only permitted to persons holding licence. The first defendant, to whom 106 bags of paddy were sold, had no licence. The plaintiff, who sold the paddy, was unaware of his disability. The court foundlthat the contract was unenforceable. As a result of that finding the trial court gave a decree to the plaintiff for the recovery of the value of paddy. That judgment was affirmed on appeal by the subordinate judge and ultimately by this court in second appeal. In this case reliance was placed on the judgment of a full bench (five judges) of the erstwhile hyderabad high court in budhulal v. Deccan banking co. , a. I. R. 1955 hyd. 69. That was a case where the banking company had laid an action on the basis of a promissory note executed in its favour of a stated sum. The defendant, in the written statement, while admitting the execution of the promissory note, among other things, raised an objection that inasmuch as the promissory note, was payable to bearer, it contravened section 15 of the hyderabad paper currency act. Section 15 of the hy erabad paper currency act, corresponding to section 32 of the reserve bank of india act, declared that the making of an instrument in contravention of the provisions of section 15 was an offence punishable with a fine equal to the amount of the bill, hundi, note or engagement in respect whereof the offence was committed. Section 15, hyderabad paper currency act, enacted :
"no person in h. E. H. The nizam's dominions shall draw, accept, make or issue any bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note or engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand,, or borrow, lend or take up any sum or sums of money or any such bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note or engagement."
having regard to these provisions, it was held by the full bench that the promissory note was invalid. After holding thus, the learned judges thought that by reason of section 66 of the hyderabad contract act, corresponding to section 65 of the indian contract act, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount advanced under the promissory note. The case of budhulal1 was one where the contract was void from the very inception.
(14) The case of narayana rao v. Ramachandra rao, a. I. R. 1959 andh. 370. Was a case where the amount of rs. 10,000 alleged to be due on a promissory note was found as amount payable by way of reward and that being unlawful gratification, was hit by section 23 of the contract act. The instant case is not one of that type. We are therefore clear that since the agreement in the instant case was void ab initio, the defendant who received rs. 10. 000 from the plaintiff's parents was liable to repay the amount to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, we agree with the trial court.
(15) It is further urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that section 65 of the contract act was applicable and under that provision the defendant is liable to repay the amount, since the amount paid was by way of earnest money and nawab kamaluddin khan committed default in not paying the balance of the purchase money within two months of the contract, that amount lapsed and the defendant was justified in forfeitting the same. On behalf of the other side, it is contended by sri vaidya that the word " bayana " used in the agreement does not only mean " earnest money " but also means money paid by way of deposit. It is next urged that even if it is taken that the word " bajana " means " earnest money ", parties never intended that the earnest money would be forfeited in case of default, as they never doubted about the matter going through and for that they did not treat rs. 10,000 as security or guarantee for the completion of the contract, and so it was not inserted in the agreement. It is not denied, by the learned counsel for the plaintiff - respondent that if the word " bayana " is taken to mean " earnest money ", then the defendant has the right to forfeit the same on default of the purchaser to complete the sale transaction, for, earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward. It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee. "we may in this connection refer to kunwar chiranjit singh v. Har swamp, (1925) 50 m. L. J. 629:a. I. R. 1926 p. G. 1. We have therefore first to see whether the word " bay ana " means only earnest money or it means also deposit. In order therefore to see whether it is a deposit or earnest money, courts have always applied the golden rule of intention, which has to be gathered from the document itself. In the agreement of sale, the sale consideration is shown as rs. 86,000. Out of this, rs. 10,000 have been paid and there is a further recital that on payment of the remaining amount of sale money of rs. 76,000 the sale deed would be registered and possession will be given of the house and khana bagh. The payment of 1/8th of the purchase money is clear to show that the intention of the parties was that the amount was deposited being security for and part - payment of the sale transaction. Even if we take it that the amount of rs. 10,000 mentioned in the agreement of sale was the earnest money, the question of forfeiture does not arise, firstly for the reason that the agreement to sell is one by the guardians and that being unenforceable in law ; and secondly, there is a differing version of the defendant relating to the forfeiture clause. As stated earlier, there is no mention of any forfeiture in case of default in the agreement. The defendant, in his written statement, only states that the earnest money lapsed and does not refer to any oral agreement, whereas in his oral testimony has come forward with the version that there was an undertaking between the parties that earnest money shall be forfeited in case of default. If as stated by the defendant, that there was such an understanding between the parties, we fail to understand why the defendant, who is the writer of the agreement and the receipt, would fail to make a mention of the same in those documents. The defendant has tried to explain the omission by saying that since the court of wards was an intermediary and there was no risk of default apparently involved and it was thought that the contract was honoured by both the parties, this was not mentioned in the agreement. The contention of sri vaidya is that, this very explanation of the defendant is sufficient to come to the conclusion that parties never intended that the earnest money would be forfeited in case of default. We find sufficient force in the contention of sri vaidya.
(16) When the defendant himself says that he was confident that the contract would go through as the court of wards was the intermediary and. There was no risk of default, we cannot understand why there should be a talk of forfeiture of the earnest money, that apart, we may point out that the defendant knew full well that the property was to be purchased from the amount of the deposit, which kamaluddin khan had with the court of wards and subsequently it was found that there was no sufficient funds for the purchase of the house, as such, the question of forfeiture does not arise. Yet another argument was advanced by sri vaidya, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, relying on the case of venkoba char v. Kuri sanjisappa, a. I. R. 1937 mad. 681. That rs. 10,000 being a heavy amount, forfeiture of the same would be in the nature of penalty aad no court would allow the defendant to retain the whole of the amount. The question whether forfeiture of the earnest money by the defaulting purchaser is penalty or not would depend on the fact as to what is the proportion between that amount and the purchase money. Of course, if the earnest money constitutes a large part of the price, stipulation for its forfeiture would be in the nature of a penalty, as observed by venkataramana rao, j. In venkoba char v. Kuri sanjivappa. But if the amount deposited bears a small reasonable proportion to the price and there is no such disproportion and nothing unreasonable, that stipulation cannot be treated as penal, as observed in that very case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the light of the above principles, if we were to refer to the agreement in question, we find that the purchase price is rs. 86,000 and a sum of rs. 10,000 has been paid by way of deposit or earnest money, which is a little more than the 1/8th. The amount of rs. 10. 000 cannot be said to be disproportionate to the purchase price, so as to hold that the stipulation was penal. We are therefore - clear that the defendant has not made out a case for entitling him to forfeit the amount of deposit and retain the same. Sri sadasiva rao, the learned counsel for the appellant made a last request that in case this court is of the view that the defendant has not made out a case for the forfeiture of the amount, at least, he should not be clubbed with costs. We are not prepared to accept the request of the learned counsel for the appellant. Costs normally follow the result. The circumstances of the case discussed above, in our opinion, do not justify non - awarding of costs to the plaintiff. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.