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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 35 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
  • provisions of section 16(6) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. 11. Section 16(1)(g)
  • provisions of sections 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
  • Maharashtra Rent Control Act insofar as section 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) or 16(1)(i),
  • MAHARASHTRA RENT CONTROL ACT 1999
  • section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.
  • provisions of sections 16(1)(k) and 16(1)(i)
  • provisions of section 16(1)(i) and 16(1)(k)
  • provisions of Clause (hh) of section 13
  • Section 16(1)(g) and section 16(1)(i)
  • provisions of section 16(1)(i),
  • provisions of section 16(1)k)
  • provisions of section 16.12.
  • section 16(1)(k),
  • section 16(1)(j)
  • section 16(1)(g)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 35 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
  • provisions of section 16(6) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. 11. Section 16(1)(g)
  • provisions of sections 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
  • Maharashtra Rent Control Act insofar as section 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) or 16(1)(i),
  • MAHARASHTRA RENT CONTROL ACT 1999
  • section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.
  • provisions of sections 16(1)(k) and 16(1)(i)
  • provisions of section 16(1)(i) and 16(1)(k)
  • provisions of Clause (hh) of section 13
  • Section 16(1)(g) and section 16(1)(i)
  • provisions of section 16(1)(i),
  • provisions of section 16(1)k)
  • provisions of section 16.12.
  • section 16(1)(k),
  • section 16(1)(j)
  • section 16(1)(g)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition arises from a challenge to the judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 delivered by the Additional District Judge, Akola in Regular Civil Appeal No. 162/2002. That appeal had been filed by predecessors of the present respondents under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 35 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, challenging the judgment and decree dated 6-7-2002 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akot in Regular Civil Suit No. 140/2002. The trial Court had allowed the suit filed by the present petitioner (landlord) and passed a decree of eviction on account of bona fide need against the original tenant.

The proceedings before this Court were listed and the rule had been issued on 5-10-2007. The record shows respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were served but did not appear before the Court on the listed dates. The present petition challenges the Appellate Court's setting aside of the trial Court's decree and seeks restoration of the trial Court's eviction decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord proved a reasonable and bona fide need to obtain possession of the suit premises for his own occupation under section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
  2. Whether the Appellate Court erred in treating the landlord's claimed need as a requirement for demolition or reconstruction under section 16(1)(i) (and related clauses) instead of applying section 16(1)(g).
  3. Whether the availability of an alternate plot (sale deed Exh.54 in the name of the landlord's son) negates the bona fides of the landlord's claimed need.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (landlord) was residing in tenanted premises and needed the suit premises for his own residence; this established bona fide need.
  • The suit premises comprised a plot of 1,750 sq. ft. with a tin shed of 16×12 feet occupied by the tenants; the petitioner intended to construct his residence on the plot.
  • The Appellate Court wrongly conflated bona fide need under section 16(1)(g) with the need for immediate demolition under section 16(1)(i), and thereby set aside the trial Court's decree without proper basis.
  • The petitioner relied on earlier decisions (e.g., Balwant P. Doshi; Pralhad Dagadu Kalyankar; Sharadchandra Chitnis; Kunhamma; Vishwamitra Ram Kumar) to argue (a) that once landlord shows he resides in tenanted premises and wants the premises for residence bona fide need is established, and (b) inhabitable condition is not a ground to refuse eviction under section 16(1)(g), and (c) courts should adopt a liberal view where personal necessity (including demolition for personal occupation) is involved.

Respondents/Tenants' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The tenants attempted to show that, apart from the suit plot, the landlord's family had two other plots in the same town; they suggested the landlord could use those plots as alternate accommodation.
  • It was pleaded that the landlord could construct on the remaining area of his possession (i.e., without displacing the tenant's tin shed), and that the landlord was proposing constructions (including shops) beyond what was required for personal occupation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balwant P. Doshi v. Shantaben Dhirajlal Shah (2002 (4) Mh.L.J 473) Cited for the proposition that once a landlord points out he is residing in tenanted premises and wants the premises for his residence, bona fide need stands established. Relied upon by petitioner's counsel as supporting the establishment of bona fide need under section 16(1)(g).
Pralhad Dagadu Kalyankar v. Laxman Rambhau Palange (2005 (4) Mh.L.J 304) Used to show that inhabitable condition of premises cannot be a ground to refuse a decree for possession under section 16(1)(g). Pressed by petitioner to support that condition of the premises (inhabitability) does not negate bona fide need under clause (g).
Sharadchandra Vasant Chitnis v. Mrs. Neela Ashok Korde (2008 (4) Mh.L.J 873) Noticed the distinction in the scheme of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act between section 16(1)(g) and sections 16(1)(k) / 16(1)(i); discussed interplay and obligations relating to demolition/reconstruction and restoration of possession. The Court invoked and discussed this judgment to explain how clauses (g), (i) and (k) operate in distinct fields and to show that sections (k) and (i) provide for restoration obligations which clause (g) does not.
Kunhamma @ Laxmi Ammas Children v. Akkali Purushothaman (2007 (5) SCALE 719, Supreme Court) Cited for the principle that personal necessity of landlord includes repossession of demised premises for the purpose of its demolition. Relied upon by petitioner to urge that personal necessity can include demolition for personal occupation; Court noted it in the context of establishing the scope of personal necessity.
Vishwamitra Ram Kumar v. Vesta Time Company ((2007) 4 SCC 374) Pressed to urge that courts should adopt a liberal view in circumstances concerning landlord's personal necessity. Referenced by petitioner; Court acknowledged it was pressed into service to support a liberal approach where personal necessity is claimed.
M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal ((2001) 2 SCC 355) Principle that availability of alternate accommodation with the landlord has adverse bearing on finding as to bona fides if the landlord unreasonably refuses to occupy available premises; alternative accommodation must be suitably available. The Appellate Court relied on this decision to note the existence of sale deed Exh.54 (in the name of the landlord's son) and to find that alternate accommodation adversely affected the landlord's bona fides; this Court reviewed and rejected that application of M.L. Prabhakar to the present facts.
Ramniklal Pitamardas Mehta v. Indraman Amratlal Seth (AIR 1964 SC 1676) Referenced for observations that clause akin to section 16(1)(g) applies when landlord reasonably and bona fidely requires premises for occupation and may include demolition and reconstruction for occupation. Quoted in the discussion (via the Sharadchandra judgment) to support the proposition that clause (g) applies even when demolition and reconstruction are necessary for the landlord's own occupation.
Chandrakant Pundlikrao Randive v. Lalit Kantilal Thakkar (2009 (5) Mah.LJ 287) Applied to show that a landlord's desire to construct a house for self-occupation on a different plot and being in a tenanted premises may suffice to establish bona fide requirement; also notes landlord's discretion as to size and comparative hardship considerations. This Court relied on that judgment to illustrate similar factual circumstances where bona fide requirement and landlord's discretion were accepted; used to support restoration of trial Court's decree here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a step-by-step analysis grounded in facts found by the trial Court, the Appellate Court's reasoning, statutory distinctions within the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and precedents.

  1. Findings of Fact:
    • Both the trial Court and the Appellate Court accepted that the petitioner-landlord was residing in tenanted premises.
    • The trial Court found that other plots alleged to be available to the landlord were not suitable for residence and that the landlord had established his need to occupy the suit plot; accordingly it passed a decree for eviction on bona fide need.
  2. Appellate Court's Approach and Errors (as identified by this Court):
    • The Appellate Court treated the landlord's need as one for demolition/reconstruction and applied section 16(1)(i), observing that the landlord proposed construction including shop blocks and that the tenant occupied only about 150 sq. ft. of a 1,750 sq. ft. plot.
    • It observed that the landlord proposed constructing about 900 sq. ft. and that he could construct on remaining area without evicting the tenant; it also noted sale deed Exh.54 (in the name of the landlord's son), and relied on M.L. Prabhakar to find that alternate accommodation existed, adversely affecting bona fides.
    • The Appellate Court concluded that the landlord was constructing more than required for personal need and therefore the need was not sincere; this Court found that such findings were unsustainable and represented a misapplication of law.
  3. Statutory Construction and Clause Distinctions:
    • The Court analyzed the text and scheme of section 16(1) clauses—particularly (g), (i) and (k)—and explained their distinct operation: clause (g) concerns reasonable and bona fide need of landlord for his occupation; clause (i) concerns landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement for immediate demolition (with obligations to restore possession under certain subsections); clause (k) concerns demolition ordered by a municipal or competent authority.
    • The Court emphasized that once the landlord shows premises are required for his own occupation, clause (g) applies and there is no need to invoke clause (i); the landlord's intention to use part of a future larger building for letting or other purposes does not dilute the bona fides of his stated intention to occupy himself.
    • Where demolition is compelled by municipal order (clause k) or where demolition/reconstruction requires restoration obligations, those clauses operate in their own fields and do not eclipse clause (g).
  4. Evaluation of Alternate Accommodation Argument:
    • The Court found the Appellate Court's reliance on Exh.54 (sale deed in the name of the son) misplaced because Exh.54 showed only an open plot with no constructed accommodation; advising the landlord to build on that plot is not permissible in law.
    • Thus the existence of the sale deed did not amount to suitably available alternate accommodation capable of defeating the landlord's bona fide claim under M.L. Prabhakar.
  5. Use of Precedents:
    • The Court reviewed and applied prior authorities (including Chandrakant P. Randive and Sharadchandra Chitnis) to support the proposition that the landlord's bona fide need for self-occupation and his discretion as to size of construction are relevant considerations and that comparative hardship may be considered, but such planning or proposals to let part of a future structure do not negate bona fides.
  6. Conclusion of Analysis:
    • The Court concluded that the Appellate Court's application of mind was perverse and contrary to law because it incorrectly shifted the matter into clause (i) and allowed considerations (such as hypothetical suitability of alternate land) to outweigh the trial Court's finding of bona fide need under clause (g).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed and set aside the judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 delivered in Regular Civil Appeal No. 162/2002, dismissed that appeal, and restored the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 140/2000 by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akot on 6-7-2002. The writ petition was allowed and the rule made absolute; no order as to costs. Petition allowed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The trial Court's decree for eviction in favor of the petitioner (landlord) on account of bona fide need under section 16(1)(g) is restored; the Appellate Court's contrary order is set aside.
  • Statutory clarification emphasized by the Court: Sections 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(i)/(k) operate in distinct and mutually exclusive fields; once bona fide need for self-occupation under clause (g) is established, there is no requirement to apply clause (i).
  • Obligation to restore possession: The Court noted that clause (g) does not impose an obligation on the landlord to restore possession to the tenant after eviction; such obligations arise under specific clauses (i) and (k) in their respective contexts.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion confines itself to clarifying the correct application of clauses (g), (i) and (k) to the facts before it; the judgment reverses the Appellate Court's decision and reaffirms existing distinctions in the statutory scheme as discussed in precedent, but the text does not assert the creation of a new legal principle beyond the applied statutory interpretation and reliance on earlier authorities.

Petition allowed.
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    Rajendrakumar Sharandas Sharma v. Shrikrushna Babanrao Guhe

    1. The matter is part heard. None was present for respondents/tenants yesterday. There is no appearance even today. The order sheets show that this Court issued Rule in the matter on 5-10-2007 and though respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are served, they have chosen not to appear.

    2. The challenge is to judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 delivered by the Additional District Judge, Akola in Regular Civil Appeal No. 162/2002. It was filed by the predecessor of present respondents under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 35 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, challenging the judgment, and decree dated 6-7-2002 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akot in Regular Civil Suit No. 140/2002. By that judgment and decree the trial Court at Akola has allowed the suit filed by the present petitioner and passed a decree of eviction on account of bona fide need against the original tenant.

    3. Shri A.M Ghare, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner has contended that the possession was sought because petitioner - landlord is residing in tenanted premises and needed the suit premises for his occupation. The petitioner is retired Sub Divisional Officer from Central Government Service and his wife was also serving as Teacher. The suit premises consists of a plot admeasuring 1750 sq. ft. and there is tin shed admeasuring 16 × 12 feet upon it. The respondents are tenants in that tin shed. The petitioner/plaintiff wanted to construct on the said plot for his own residence and this need is proved by him. The trial Court accordingly appreciated that need and passed a decree for Page: 152eviction. The learned Appellate Court unnecessarily mixed the issue of bona fide need with need for immediate purpose of demolition and has set aside that decree with permission to the petitioner/plaintiff to construct on remaining portion of plot by leaving the tin shed as it is i.e intact for tenant. He therefore, contends that the bona fide need for his occupation has not been denied by that Court.

    4. In this background the learned counsel for petitioner has invited attention to the provisions of section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and has read that provisions in contradistinction with the provisions of section 16(1)(i) and 16(1)(k) to urge that all these provisions operate in separate and distinct fields. It is contended that once landlord points out that he is residing in a tenanted premises and wants the suit premises for his residence, the bona fide need stands established and nothing more is required to be done. Attention is invited to the judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Balwant P. Doshi v. Shantaben Dhirajlal Shah, reported at 2002 (4) Mh.L.J 473, in support. The other judgment in case of Pralhad Dagadu Kalyankar v. Laxman Rambhau Palange, reported at 2005 (4) Mh.L.J 304, is also relied upon to show that inhabitable condition of premises cannot be a ground to refuse a decree for possession under section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Judgment in case of Sharadchandra Vasant Chitnis v. Mrs. Neela Ashok Korde, reported at 2008 (4) Mh.L.J 873, is relied upon to urge that the distinction in the scheme of Maharashtra Rent Control Act insofar as section 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) or 16(1)(i), is noticed therein. Attention is also invited to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kunhamma @ Laxmi Ammas Children v. Akkali Purushothaman, reported at 2007 (5) SCALE 719, to urge that personal necessity of landlord includes repossession of demised premises by landlord for the purpose of its demolition. Lastly, the judgment in case of Vishwamitra Ram Kumar v. Vesta Time Company, reported at (2007) 4 SCC 374 is also pressed into service to urge that the Courts have to adopt a liberal view in such circumstances.

    5. The trial Court as also the Appellate Court has accepted the fact that the petitioner - landlord is staying in tenanted premises. The tenants have attempted to show that apart from the suit plot/property, the family of landlord has two other plots in the same town. The trial Court has found that those other plots cannot be said to be premises suitable for residence for landlord. In any case, the said contention of tenants is not relevant, because, it is for landlord to choose on which plot he will construct his house and reside. Tenant cannot object to such election by his landlord.

    6. The Appellate Court has found that need was for demolition and hence provisions of section 16(1)(i) was applied. It noticed that the landlord was constructing not only a residential house, but also certain shop blocks and the total area with landlord was 1750 sq. ft. out of which the tenant was occupying only 150 sq. ft. and landlord proposed to construct only 900 sq. ft. The tenant had also pleaded the landlord can construct house on remaining area in his possession. The Appellate Court then proceeded to observe that it was not the case of landlord that area in possession of tenant could not be excluded as proposed construction then becomes impermissible or contrary to the bye-laws of municipal council. This line of application of mind has proceeded further and in Page: 153paragraph No. 22 the Appellate Court has observed that the landlord was constructing three shops in the basement and three shops on ground floor. Because of these observations, it found that landlord was constructing some thing more than what was needed for his personal requirement. It also noticed that it was not the case of the landlord that the shop premises were needed by him for his personal occupation or then by his sons and it concluded that under section 16(1)(g), landlord can obtain possession of the suit premises only for his personal occupation and cannot obtain possession for construction of house with additional non-residential premises not intended for his self-occupation. It has opined that he has to obtain possession under section 16(1)(i) for said purposes. It has relied upon the judgment reported at (2001) 2 SCC 355, M.L Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal., to note that the plaintiff had alternate accommodation available with him. This finding is reached on the basis of the Sale deed at Exh.54 which admittedly is in the name of son of landlord and when sale deed was obtained that son was about 18 years old. In the judgment referred to above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that availability of alternate accommodation with landlord has adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of landlord, if he is unreasonably refusing to occupy the available premises to satisfy his need. It is also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that such alternative accommodation to entail denial of claim of the landlord must be suitably available. The facts show that there is no construction on plot purchased vide Exh.54, and this judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court has been used by the Appellate Court only to note that the plaintiff was constructing a house with more of non residential premises and for that purpose he wanted possession of suit premises. It therefore concluded that said need was not sincere and honest. The finding is unsustainable.

    7. The Appellate Court has failed to note that Exh.54 Sale deed did not show ownership of any structure and it was only a open plot. It has only found that a house can be constructed more suitably on that plot. Such an exercise to advise landlord is not permissible in law. It therefore, cannot be said that the alternative accommodation is available to the present petitioner.

    8. The judgment of this Court in case of Chandrakant Pundlikrao Randive v. Lalit Kantilal Thakkar, reported at 2009 (5) Mah.LJ 287, relied upon by Shri Ghare, learned counsel for petitioner, shows that plaintiff there wanted to construct his house at Umred and he was staying at Nagpur in tenanted premises. On the plot at Umred there was a godown and it was the specific case of plaintiff that he had no other house either at Nagpur or at Umred. In this background, this Court has applied its mind to note that the facts were sufficient to make out a case for bona fide requirement. This Court has also found that the size of the house to be constructed was in absolute discretion of the landlord and then has proceeded to consider the aspect of comparative hardship.

    9. In Sharadchandra Vasant Chitnis v. Mrs. Neela Ashok Korde (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court has considered the facts where plaintiff/landlord wanted to demolish a building which was more than 100 years old and in dilapidated condition. The Municipal Corporation had issued notice for demolition of said building and the landlord then terminated the tenancy of the defendants. He stated that he was residing in a small house insufficient for family, his son had completed M.B.B.S, and was prosecuting Post Graduate Page: 154studies, married to a Doctor wife and the couple wanted to have their own dispensary. Existing structure was claimed to be small which required demolition and landlord wanted to construct a new building for his residence and for son and daughter-in-law to start practice. The facts therefore show that the provisions of sections 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, were relied upon for seeking a decree of eviction and in paragraph No. 11, the learned Single Judge of this Court has found that section 16(1)(g), deals with reasonable and bona fide requirement of premises by landlord for his occupation. Under Section 16(1)(k), the eviction can be ordered for demolition, if the premises required immediate demolition as per the orders of the Municipal Council. It is to be noticed that there is no provision in any of these clauses requiring the landlord to provide accommodation or restore possession of dispossessed the tenant. In this background, provisions of sections 16(1)(k) and 16(1)(i) are noticed and it is found that there legislature specifically provided for restoration of possession to the tenant after repairs or reconstruction. It is also noticed that the work of reconstruction under section 16(1)(j) is taken up for his own benefit and optimum utilization of FSI by landlord. In paragraph No. 15, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ramniklal Pitamardas Mehta v. Indraman Amratlal Seth, reported at AIR 1964 SC 1676 has been relied upon, and observations made in paragraph No. 13 by the Hon'ble Apex Court are quoted. The learned Single Judge has noted that the provisions of Clause (g) applies not only when landlord proves his bona fide need to occupy the premises, but also apply when he proves that need and points out that some alterations and repairs were necessary. In paragraph no. 16 of this judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the provisions of Clause (hh) of section 13 before it were not applicable when landlord reasonably and bona fidely required the premises for his own occupation, even if he had to demolish those premises and erect a new building on it. It is apparent that the provisions of clause (hh) are pari materia with the provisions of section 16(1)(i), and the Hon'ble Apex Court has further noticed that the said clause (hh) applied to cases where landlord did not require premises for his own occupation, but required them for erecting new building which can be let out to tenants.

    10. The provisions of section 16(1)k) clearly show that the premises are required to be demolished as per order of the Municipal Authority or any other competent authority. Thus action for demolition is not at the volition of landlord, but as per the dictate of some third person, which landlord is legally obliged to comply with. Section 16(1)(i) speaks of landlord reasonably and bona fide requiring the premises for immediate purpose of demolition. It is therefore, apparent that in the scheme of section 16(1)(i), it is the action or intention of landlord which is important. Section 16(1)(k) does not make any provision for allotment of any portion or part of new structure which may be raised after demolition of old structure to the tenant, and this aspect is already considered by the two judgments of learned Single Judges of this Court mentioned above. The obligation upon landlord to accommodate the tenant is only under section 16(1)(i), and it is because of the fact that the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building on the premises sought to be demolished. It is therefore, clear that the reasonable and bona fides of need of the landlord for the purpose of Page: 155immediate demolition are required to be viewed in this background. It, therefore, appears that when the balance FSI is proposed to be utilized by landlord for his own benefit or then he proposes to demolish old building with a view to erect a new building, subject to fulfilment of the ingredients of section 16(1)(i), a decree for eviction can be passed with obligation upon him to restore possession to tenant as per the provisions of section 16(6) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

    11. section 16(1)(g) speaks of reasonable and bona fide need of landlord for his occupation. Thus the reasonable and bona fide requirement of landlord for self occupation is the factor on which the said provision operates. If that need is proved, the decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant. The phrases and words used in sections 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(i) clearly shows that under section 16(1)(i), the premises are not required for his occupation by landlord. The moment landlord shows that the premises are needed by him for his own occupation, there is no question of therefore going to section 16(1)(i) and it is section 16(1)(g) which is only applicable. The need of demolishing the house in occupation of tenant or desire not to restore the possession of tenant, cannot be a circumstance, to doubt the bona fide personal requirement proved by the landlord. Here the landlord is stating that he wants to construct a house for self-occupation on suit plot, after tenant vacates it. There is no question of doubting his bona fides in this situation. In the process if he is constructing a big house and if he wants to let out portion thereof, either for residential or for commercial purposes, that action will not dilute the bona fides of or reasonableness of his need. Such design by him may be on account of various contingencies but that is not relevant to hold that clause 16(1)(g) is not attracted. In a given case he may be required to arrange for finance and make provision for its repayment. Such planning cannot be viewed as indication of any bad faith or mala fides. I find that it is the need for his self-occupation which is of prime importance and all material ingredients in the scheme of section 16(1)(g) are established here and once such ingredients are established there is no need to go to other provisions of section 16.

    12. It is an admitted position that after decree of eviction is passed under section 16(1)(g), the legislature has not put any obligation upon the landlord to restore possession to tenant. section 16(1)(g) and section 16(1)(i) operate in distinct and mutually exclusive fields. Section 16(1)((i) or (k) cannot and do not eclipse the sweep of section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.

    13. I, therefore; find that the application of mind by the Appellate Court is perverse and contrary to law. The judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 delivered in Regular Civil Appeal No. 162/2002 is therefore, quashed and set aside. The said appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 140/2000 by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akot on 6-7-2002 is restored. Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.

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    Rajendrakumar Sharandas Sharma v. Shrikrushna Babanrao Guhe
    (May 7, 2010)