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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act)
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act)
  • under:14. Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
  • sub-section (2) of section 42,
  • section 30. Section 42(2)
  • TRADE UNIONS ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act)
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act)
  • under:14. Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
  • sub-section (2) of section 42,
  • section 30. Section 42(2)
  • TRADE UNIONS ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are 25 employees of Someshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. Respondent No. 1 is a recognised union and respondent No. 2 is the Managing Director of the mill. Respondent No. 1 (the union) filed a complaint against the management alleging acts of unfair labour practices and sought relief that the members listed in Annexure 'A' of the complaint be made permanent from the date of their appointment and be paid monetary benefits of permanent workmen.

Subsequently, several workmen were made permanent by the management. Those workmen (including the present petitioners) applied to the Industrial Court for deletion of their names from Annexure 'A' on the ground that they did not intend to pursue the complaint. The Industrial Court dismissed that application as not maintainable after framing the issue whether an individual employee/member of the complainant union could be permitted to appear and file affidavits to withdraw the complaint to his extent. The petitioners challenged the Industrial Court's order by filing Writ Petition No. 6154 of 2001, which was dismissed by a Single Judge on 6-3-2002. The present Letters Patent Appeal challenges that dismissal. The Division Bench heard counsel for the petitioners and for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and ultimately dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether individual employees (members of a recognised union) can be permitted to appear before the Industrial Court and procure deletion of their names from a collective complaint filed by the recognised union.
  2. Whether provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (in particular sections 33 and 33A) and section 21 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the Trade Unions Act) preclude individual appearance or withdrawal where a recognised union has filed a complaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners (25 employees) sought deletion of their names from Annexure 'A' of the union's complaint because they did not wish to be party to the complaint after being made permanent by the management.
  • Counsel for the petitioners argued that no provision of law prevented the petitioners from seeking deletion of their names and that the Single Judge had not considered this aspect in proper perspective; therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal ought to be allowed.

Respondent No. 1 (Recognised Union)'s Arguments

  • Counsel for the union contended that sections 33 and 33A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 bar individuals from appearing in proceedings before the Industrial Court where a recognised union is entitled to represent employees.
  • It was not disputed that respondent No. 1 was a recognised union; accordingly, both the Industrial Court and the Single Judge correctly dismissed the petition.
  • Counsel relied on four reported judgments to support the proposition that individual workmen have no right of appearance before the Industrial Court when a recognised union represents them.
  • He further contended that permitting individual employees to withdraw would enable employers to neutralise or undermine the recognised union's bargaining power by entering into individual agreements, thereby frustrating collective bargaining and harming workmen's welfare.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santuram Khudal v. Kimatrai Printers, Processors, 1971 (1) L.L.J. 274 (Supreme Court) Held that, read together, statutory provisions vest plenary power in the representative-union to appear or act on behalf of employees and deprive individual employees of the right to appear where the representative-union enters appearance. The court relied on Santuram to affirm that individual workmen cannot appear in proceedings before the Industrial Court where a recognised union represents the employees; the passage quoted was applied to support dismissal of the appeal.
Shramik Uttarsh Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 78 (Supreme Court) Confirmed that a representative-union under the BIR Act has exclusive rights to represent employees in complaints relating to unfair labour practices (subject to the statutory scheme); emphasised collective bargaining rationale and the embargo on representation by others where a representative-union has appeared. The court relied on this decision to support the view that the statute and jurisprudence aim to facilitate collective bargaining and prevent fragmentation of representation; it formed part of the body of authority justifying dismissal.
Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 890 (Supreme Court) Explained the statutory scheme that where a representative-union appears in proceedings under the Act, no one else (not even the employee) can be allowed to appear; exceptions in sections 32 and 33 are limited and do not apply where a representative-union has appeared. The Girja Shankar reasoning was cited (via Santuram) to demonstrate that the scheme of the statute imposes a complete bar on individual representation once the representative-union has appeared; the Division Bench applied this principle.
Bank Karmachari Sangh v. K.R. Pawar, Member, Industrial Court, Pune, 1996 (1) Mh. L.J. 539 (Single Bench) Noted statutory hierarchy of persons entitled to appear for employees, with the representative union first; emphasised the scheme of the BIR Act to encourage collective bargaining and discourage proliferation of unions. The court invoked this judgment to reinforce that representative-union status confers authority to act on behalf of employees industry-wide and to justify refusal to permit individual appearance to withdraw from a union-filed complaint.
Hindustan Lever Limited v. Hindustan Lever Employees Union, 2006 (1) CLR 543 (Division Bench) Addressed whether individual settlements between employer and employee were illegal in the context of union representation and unfair labour practice proceedings; upheld view that collective representation principles govern. The court cited this decision as part of the line of authorities supporting the conclusion that individual deviations cannot be permitted to undermine union representation; it contributed to the court's conclusion affirming dismissal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying solely on the statutory language and the line of authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of proceedings: The complaint was filed by a recognised union under the MRTU and PULP Act (Trade Unions Act) and the dispute is industrial and collective in nature. The party before the Industrial Court is the recognised union, and the Industrial Court is called upon to decide whether there was an act of unfair labour practice by the management.
  2. Examination of statutory provisions: The court considered section 33A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act) relied upon by petitioners but found it inapplicable because section 33A pertains to disputes referred by the State Government to arbitration under section 72. The court reproduced section 72 and concluded the present dispute did not arise from a government reference; the initiative came by way of a union complaint, so section 33A was not available to the petitioners.
  3. Interpretation of section 21 of the Trade Unions Act: The court observed that section 21 grants the right of appearance or the right to act only to a recognised union for the specified matters and underlined that this provision supports union representation rather than individual appearances in such matters.
  4. Reliance on precedent: The court reviewed and relied on four judgments (including Santuram and Girja Shankar) which consistently held that where a recognised representative-union appears, individual employees are deprived of the right to appear or act in proceedings under the relevant statutory scheme. The opinion quoted Santuram and Girja Shankar to explain that the legislative scheme intends that the representative-union alone represents employees in such proceedings.
  5. Policy rationale: The court accepted the policy underpinning the statutory scheme and precedents — that collective representation and bargaining are to be facilitated and protected; permitting individual withdrawals from collective complaints would nullify the bargaining power of recognised unions.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: For these reasons — statutory interpretation, inapplicability of section 33A, the exclusive role of recognised unions under section 21, and supporting precedents — the court found no merit in the petitioners' submissions and affirmed the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition and concluded that individual employees cannot be permitted to seek deletion of their names from a complaint filed by a recognised union in the Industrial Court under the statutory scheme.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' request to have their names deleted from Annexure 'A' of the union's complaint is denied by the courts; the union remains the proper party before the Industrial Court to pursue the unfair labour practices complaint.
  • Legal consequence: The court applied and followed existing precedent that where a recognised union represents employees, individual workmen do not have the right to appear or act in such proceedings. The decision enforces that established principle; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond the authorities relied upon.
Letters Patent Appeal dismissed.
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    Rajendra Zumber Jagtap And Others v. Baramati Taluka Sakhar Kamgar Sabha And Others

    D.G Deshpande, J.:— Heard Counsel for the petitioners and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

    2. The impugned order of the Single Judge came to be passed in Writ Petition No. 6154 of 2001 on 6-3-2002, by which the Writ Petition was dismissed, and, therefore this Letters Patent Appeal.

    3. Respondent No. 1 is the Recognized Union, respondent No. 2 is the Managing Director of Someshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and the petitioners who are 25 in number are the employees of the said Sakhar Karkhana. Complaint came to be filed by the respondent No. 1 against the management on the ground that management has committed acts of unfair labour practices. Relief that was sought in the complaint was that members, on whose behalf the complaint was filed and who were enlisted in Annexure ‘A’ of the complaint, should be made permanent from the date of their appointment and they should be directed to be paid monetary benefits of permanent workmen.

    4. In the course of time or proceedings several workmen were made permanent by the management, and therefore, those workmen who were made permanent moved the Industrial Court by an application that their names be deleted from Annexure ‘A’ because they did not intend to pursue the complaint. The Industrial Court after hearing the parties dismissed that application on the ground that it was not maintainable. This was done by the Industrial Court after framing for consideration the following point:

    “Whether individual employee/member of the Complainant Union can be permitted to appear and file affidavit/pursis to withdraw the complaint to his extent?”

    5. Against this order of the Industrial Court, the present petitioners, who are 25 in number filed the Writ Petition. It was their contention that even if the petitioners were members of the respondent No. 1 Union they cannot be prevented from moving the Industrial Court to get their names deleted from the complaint filed by the Union. The Single Judge after referring to the nature of the complaint observed as under:

    “The complaint has been filed under the provisions of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act which also provides for recognition of a recognised union. The party before the Industrial Court is the recognised Union, which has filed a complaint. The dispute raised is on behalf of a body of workmen. The dispute raised is an Industrial Dispute on behalf of the members of other workers employed in the Industry. The Industrial Court in such a case will be called upon to decide whether there is an act of unfair Labour Practices committed by the Management. The settlement between some workers and the Management by itself will not result in the Unfair Labour Practices ceasing to exist, if on the date of the complaint there was in fact as act committed which amounted to an unfair Labour Practices.”

    6. It is also observed subsequently that:

    “In a dispute of collective nature individual persons have no right to be joined as proper or necessary parties. Their presence is not necessary for considering the grant of relief or making the order passed effective.”

    7. And in this background of the matter, dismissed the writ petition and hence this Letters Patent Appeal.

    8. Counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to section 21 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Trade Union Act”) and section 33 and 33A of The Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1946”). He also contended that what the petitioners wanted that in the complaint lodged by the respondent No. 1 Union they do not want to be a party and their name should be deleted from the Annexure ‘A’, referred to above, and, no provision of law could prevent them from doing so. He also contended that this aspect of the matter has not been considered in proper perspective by the Single Judge, and therefore, Letters Patent Appeal was required to be allowed.

    9. On the other hand, counsel for the Union - respondent No. 1 urged that sections 33 and 33-A of the Act of 1946, clearly bar individuals from appearing in all proceedings before the Industrial Court and the right to do so was given to a recognised union. He also urged that there was no dispute that the respondent No. 1 was a recognised union, and, therefore both the Industrial Court and the Single Judge rightly dismissed the petition. Our attention was drawn by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1 to the following Judgments in support of his contention:

    1) Supreme Court Judgment reported in 1971 (1) L.L.J 274, Santuram Khudal v. Kimatrai Printers, Processors, 2) Supreme Court Judgment reported in (1995) 3 SCC 78, Shramik Uttarsh Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd., 3) Judgment of Single Bench of this Court reported in 1996 (1) Mh. L.J 539, Bank Karmachari Sangh v. K.R Pawar, Member, Industrial Court, Pune, 4) Judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 2006 (1) CLR 543, Hindustan Lever Limited v. Hindustan Lever Employees Union

    10. On the basis of the aforesaid four judgments and the provisions of the aforesaid Act, counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the petitioners had no right to appear before the Industrial Court and contend that their names should be deleted. According to him, if this was permitted then every employer will win over, by whatever means available, the individual employee and enter into agreement with them and frustrate the existence of trade unions' affecting power of collective bargaining which may ultimately affect the welfare of the workmen.

    11. In our considered opinion, we do not find any force in the submissions made by the Counsel for the petitioners. Section 33A of the Act of 1946, upon which reliance was placed by him, is of no help to him, because it refers to disputes between employees and employer referred to arbitration of a Labour Court or the Industrial Court under section 72. Section 72 is reproduced as under:

    “72. Disputes between employees and employees may be referred by (State) Government to arbitration of Labour Court or Industrial Court. — (1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained the (State) Government may, at any time on the report of the Labour officer or on its own motion, refer any industrial dispute between employers and employees to the arbitration of a Labour Court or the Industrial Court.

    (2) The provisions of this Chapter with such modifications as may be prescribed shall apply to such arbitration.

    (3) The employers of such employees shall in the prescribed manner be made parties to such arbitration.”

    12. The very wording of section 72 will show that it covers altogether different area and present dispute did not come before the Industrial Court on a reference by the Government. The initiative came by way of complaint lodged by the Union, therefore, section 72 has no application in the instant case and consequently the present petitioners cannot bang upon the provisions of section 33A of the Act of 1946. Section 21 on the other hand of the Trade Unions Act gives right of appearance or right to act only to a recognised union.

    13. All the four judgments relied upon by the counsel for the respondent No. 1, clearly laid down that individual workmen has no right of appearance in case of a dispute before the industrial Court and when they are represented by a recognised union. In paragraph 13 of Santuram's case, the Supreme Court has clearly held:

    “Now a combined reading of sections 80, 277A, 30, 32 and 33 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy of preventing the exploitation of the workers and augmenting their bargaining power, the Legislature has clothed the representative-union with plenary power to appear or act on behalf of the employees in any proceedings under the Act and has deprived the individual employees or workmen of the right to appear or act in any proceedings under the Act where the representative-union enters appearance or acts as representative of employees….”

    14. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (1962) 2 S.C.R 890, was relied upon in Santuram's case, wherein it was observed as follows:

    “The result, therefore, of taking sections 27A, 32 and 33 together is that section 27A first places a complete ban on the appearance of an employee in proceedings under the Act once it has commenced except through the representative of employees. But there are two exceptions to this ban contained in sections 32 and 33. Section 32 is concerned with all proceedings before the authorities and gives power to the authorities under the Act to permit an employee himself to appear even though a representative of employees may have appeared but this permission cannot be granted where the representative-union has appeared as a representative of employees. Section 33 which is the other exception allows an employee to appear through any person in certain proceedings only even though a representative of employees might have appeared; but here again it is subject to this that no one else, not even the employee who might have made the application, will have the right to appear if a representative union has put in appearance as the representative of employees. It is quite clear, therefore, that the Scheme of the Act is that where a representative-union appears in any proceeding under the Act, no one else can be allowed to appear not even the employee at whose instance the proceedings might have begun under section 42(4). But where the appearance is by any representative of employees other than a representative-union authorities under section 32 can permit the employee to appear himself in all proceedings before them and further the employee is entitled to appear by any person in certain proceedings specified in section 33. But whenever the representative-union has made an appearance, even the employee cannot appear in any proceedings under the Act and the representation must be confined only to the representative-union. The complete ban, therefore, laid by section 27A on representation otherwise than through a representative of employees remains complete where the representative of employees is the representative-union that has appeared; but if the representative of employees that has appeared is other than the representative-union then sections 32 and 33 provide for exceptions with which we have already dealt. There can, therefore, be no scope from the conclusion that the Act plainly intends that where the representative-union appears in any proceeding under the Act even though that proceeding might have commenced by an employee under section 42(4) of the Act, the representative-union alone can represent the employee and the employee cannot appear or act in such proceeding.”

    15. In the second judgment of the Supreme Court in Shramik Uttarsh Sabha also the same view has been accepted and adopted by the Supreme Court. There very question involved in that Appeal was:

    “Does a representative-union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act) have the exclusive right to represent the employees of the Industry concerned in complaints relating to unfair labour practices under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act) other than those specified in Items 2 and 6 of the Schedule IV thereof.”

    16. In this judgment the Supreme Court also relied upon the judgment in the case of Girja Shankar. Then in paragraphs 14 and 15 the Supreme Court has observed as under:

    “14. Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act, upon which emphasis was laid on behalf of the appellants, states that no employee in an undertaking to which the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act applies shall be allowed to appear or act or be allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to the unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV except through the recognised union. It is important to note that the reference is to employees in an undertaking to which the Industrial Disputes Act applies and not to employees in an undertaking to which the BIR Act applies. Apart therefrom, the section permits an employee, not a union other than the recognised union, to so appear. The provisions of section 21 do not, therefore, lead to the conclusion that a union other than a representative-union can appear in proceedings relating to all unfair labour practices other than those specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV.

    15. It is true that an order of the Industrial Court in the proceedings concerned would bind all employees of the first respondent even though there may be some among them who own allegiance not to the representative-union but to the appellant. The objective of the provisions of the BIR Act and the MRTU and PULP Act, read together, and the embargo placed upon representation by anyone other than the representative of the employees, who, for the most part, is the representative-union, except in matters pertaining to an individual dispute between an employee and the employer, is to facilitate collective bargaining. The rationale is that it is in the interest of industrial peace and in the public and national interest that the employer should have to deal, in matters which concern all or most of its employees, only with a union which is representative of them. It may be that a union which was representative of the employees may have in the course of time lost that representative character; it is then open, under the provisions of the BIR Act, for a rival union to seek to replace it.”

    17. In the third judgment of Single Bench [B.N Srikrishna, J. (as he then was)] of this Court in the case of Bank Karmachari Sangh, it was observed as under:

    “Section 30 of the Act prescribes the hierarchy of persons entitled to appear or “act”, in the order of preference, on behalf of employees in an industry in an local area. Significantly, the representative union is the first in the hierarchical list enumerated in section 30. Section 42(2) provides that an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter not specified in Schedule I or III, shall give a notice in the prescribed form to the employer “through the representative of employees” who shall forward copy of the notice to the authorities prescribed therein. Under the scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, any industrial dispute with regard to the industrial matters not specified in Schedules I and III can only be raised by employees by issuing a notice of change under sub-section (2) of section 42, which can only be done through the representative of employees. Section 42 has been interpreted by judicial pronouncements taking the view that the representative-union does not act merely as a Post Office and has wide discretion in the matter. Under the scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the representation on behalf of the employees is industrywise. So long as the union is qualified to act as a representative union by fulfilling the qualifications contained in sections 13 and 14 of the Act, it is entitled to be registered as a representative-union. It is important to notice that the membership criterion for a representative union under section 13 is membership not less than 25% of the total number of employees employed in any industry and not in any industrial undertaking in the industry. As long as this criterion is fulfilled, the representative union is entitled to act on behalf of all employees in the industry as the representative union irrespective of individual membership of employees in individual undertakings. The reason for this is not far to seek. As the preamble of the Act indicates, the Act is “An Act to regulate the relations of employers and employees, to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes…” The underlying philosophy of the Act appears to be to discourage mushrooming of unions and to encourage stable and healthy collective bargaining between the employer and the recognized Collective Bargaining Agent for the entire industry. It is this refrain which recurs throughout the scheme of the Act, reflecting itself in the several provisions of the Act, which were noticed by the Supreme Court in the three decisions referred to above.”

    18. In the last judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan Lever Limited case, the question was whether individual settlement entered into between employer and employee was illegal and the Industrial Court has given a finding against the employer. This view was confirmed by the Single Judge and the Division Bench considering various judgments of the Supreme Court upheld that view.

    19. It will be clear from the aforesaid four judgments that the Single Judge was justified in dismissing the petition.

    20. On the face of it, the argument of Counsel for the petitioner is found attractive that workmen simply want to get their names deleted and there should be no objection in doing that but rightly this prayer is rejected by the Industrial Court and the Single Judge, because if it is permitted the bargaining power of the recognised union will be totally nullified and will become zero. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above and particularly the view expressed by the Supreme Court and this Court in all the four Judgments referred to above, we do not find any force in the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants. In the result, Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.

    Letters Patent Appeal dismissed.
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    Rajendra Zumber Jagtap And Others v. Baramati Taluka Sakhar Kamgar Sabha And Others
    (Dec 7, 2006)