Reuben, J.:— This appeal by the defendant in a suit for ejectment arises in the following circumstances.
The suit relating to a house in Nabinagar Bazar was instituted by the plaintiff as a suit for the ejectment of a tenant on the termination of his tenancy by a notice to quit. The case of the plaintiff, as stated in the plaint, is that he had a room with a verandah in Nabinagar Bazar; the building collapsed in the earthquake of January, 1934, and the defendant, who wanted a house for establishing a shoe shop, agreed to reconstruct the building at an estimated cost of Rs. 200 and to remain in the building as a tenant at an annual rental of Rs. 40, the cost of building to be set off against the rental payable for the first five years. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant reconstructed the building in accordance with the agreement and the cost of the reconstruction was completely satisfied by setting off against it the rent up to the 31st December, 1939. Thereafter, the defendant agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 42 per annum but, in fact, made no payment whatever. In addition to the prayer for ejectment, the plaintiff asked for arrears of rent up to the date of the expiry of the notice to quit and damages thereafter.
The defendant, in his written statement, denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and set up a, title in himself. He pleaded that the property in question belonged to one Mathura Saran, a member of the same family as the plaintiff; that Musammat Champa Kuer, widow of Mathura Saran, sold the property to one Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay by a registered sale deed, dated the 4th September, 1931, in the farzi name of Hakim Missir, a, servant of Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay; and that this defendant purchased it from Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay by a, registered sale deed, dated the 1st March, 1936. He denied the allegation in the plaint about the agreement to rebuild the house and to hold it at a rent of Rs. 40, and also the allegation, about the subsequent agreement to pay rent at Rs. 42.
The parties went to trial on the following issues:—
1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action or right to sue?
2. Is the suit as framed maintainable?
3. Is the court-fee paid sufficient?
4. Is the suit barred by the law of limitation?
5. Is the plaintiff entitled to claim rent and damages for the ‘room and osara’ and also recovery of possession of the same as mentioned in the plaint?
6. Has the plaintiff got any right and title to the land over which the room and osara stand?
7. Did the defendant agree to set off Rs. 200 being the cost of rebuilding the room and osara after the earthquake against their, rent?
8. Is the kebala, dated 1st March 1936, propounded by the defendant valid, genuine and for consideration?
9. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?”
In his judgment, however, the Munsif of Muzaffarpur considered only two issues, observing,
“He (the defendant) has taken several other pleas in the written statement, and several issues were originally framed. But the decision of the suit rests on the following two issues only:—
1. Is there relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. If so, is the plaintiff entitled to realise arrears of rent and damages?
2. Was the notice to quit served on the defendant duly?”
In the Munsif's order-sheet, there is nothing to show that the issues were amended by him before evidence was adduced by the parties, and the indications are that the issues as stated in his judgment were framed by him either at the time of writing the judgment or during the course of the trial.
On the first issue, as framed by him, the Munsif found the evidence adduced by the plaintiff insufficient to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. Hence, he dismissed the suit without coming to any finding on the second issue.
The plaintiff appealed against this decision. This appeal (Title Appeal no. 118 of 1943) was disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Muzaffarpur, on the 9th February, 1944. He agreed with the Munsif that the evidence of the plaintiff was insufficient to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. In view of the decision in Ramdahin Lohar, however, he considered that the Munsif ought to have decided the issue regarding the plaintiff's title to the property, and, if he decided the point in favour of the plaintiff, should have directed the defendant to deliver possession of it to the plaintiff. He remanded the case to the Munsif for further trial and for a finding on the issue regarding the subsistence of valid title in the plaintiff observing:—
“A specific issue on the question of title was raised to that effect (vide issue no. 6 of the issues framed by the lower court on 24th April, 1941). So in view of the ruling cited above [Ramdahin Lohar's case] the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the rent claimed land and room in suit if he is found to have a subsisting title to the same. Parties also adduced some evidence in proof of their respective title to the disputed room and site thereof. But the same do not seem to have been fully considered by the learned Munsif. Since the defendant is admittedly in possession of the land and room, it would not be sufficient to investigate and decide merely the question of title to the land and room but also the issue as to whether the plaintiff was in possession of the land and room within 12 years before the date of the institution of this suit. In the circumstances the only course open before us is to remand the case to the court below for a clear finding on the issue as to whether the plaintiff has a subsisting title to the disputed land and the room thereon. The parties may be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence on the said question at issue if any of them so desires.”.
The issue of limitation mentioned by the Subordinate Judge is not a new one, being issue no. 4 of the issues as originally framed.
The defendant came up in appeal against this decision in Second Appeal no. 255 of 1944, which was disposed of by Beevor, J., on the 29th August, 1945. His Lordship set aside the order of remand because, in his opinion, the circumstances did not justify a remand for further evidence. He pointed out that, even if the plaintiff had a right to succeed on his title, this would give him no right to adduce any evidence in addition to the evidence already adduced by him in the trial court. It was sought before him to challenge the correctness of the view taken in the case of Ramadahin Lohar as to the possibility of giving the plaintiff relief on title in a suit brought to eject a tenant. His Lordship refused to consider the point, as it would only arise after the plaintiff was found to have established a subsisting title.
Under the direction of Beevor, J., the appeal has now been reheard by the Subordinate Judge; first court, Muzaffarpur, who has found that the plaintiff has a subsisting title to the property and has decreed the suit, for ejectment and had allowed damages at the rate of Rs. 40 per year from the period of the commencement of the defendant's occupation of the property. Hence, the present appeal.
Mr. Hareshwar Prasad Sinha for the appellant has contended strenuously that the proposition of law enunciated in Ramdahin Lohar's case is incorrect. He relies on Gobindakumar Sur which he urges, was approved of in a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Narayan Jha, and on Chennavera Swamy.
Gobindakumar Sur was a case of an action in ejectment brought by the plaintiffs after the expiry of a notice to quit served on the tenants defendants. The question which arose before Their Lordships was the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and of jurisdiction. Their Lordships held that the suit came within the provisions of section 7, clause (xi), sub-clause (cc), of the Court-Fees Act, and that the term “tenant” in this section includes in the case of such a suit an ex-tenant, whose tenancy has been terminated by a notice to quit. In the course of this decision, they dealt with an earlier decision of Cammiade, J., reported in Govinda Ram Agarwala, in which it had been held that the ex-tenant in such a suit is not a tenant within the meaning of section 7, clause (xi), sub-clause (cc), and, therefore the valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction should be on the basis of the market value of the property in suit. Their Lordships pointed out that, though the interpretation put by Cammiade, J., on the term “tenant” was not correct, his decision was nevertheless correct on the facts of the case, because, in a previous rent suit brought by the plaintiff and fought up to the High Court, the plaintiff had been defeated on the issue as to the relationship of landlord and tenant. They, however, remarked that the “proper course would have been to dismiss the suit, when it was found that there had been no contract of tenancy between the parties and not to convert it into a suit of another nature—a declaratory and possessory suit—the cause of action in the two suit being different, giving rise to different issues.” This remark was in the nature of an obiter dictum.
The case of Narayan Jha was similarly one in which the question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction arose. It was disposed of by the Full Bench on the basis that, under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, the objection could not be raised because it had not been raised at the earliest opportunity and because the lower appellate court had not recorded that there was any prejudice by reason of the incorrectness of the valuation. In the course of this decision, the Full Bench referred to the case of Gobindakumar Sur and observed that, if the question of title is raised by the defendant and it is found as a fact that there was no contract of tenancy, the proper course would be to dismiss the suit and not to convert it into a declaratory and possessory suit “which is of another nature entirely”. This observation was clearly an obiter dictum
The facts, upon which the case of Chennaveraswamy was decided, do not appear from the law report. The suit as framed was brought on the basis of a tenancy for the ejectment of the tenant. Both the courts below found against the tenancy and it was contended that the appellant was nevertheless entitled to have his title to the land adjudicated on and if it were proved, to get a decree for the ejectment of the defendant as a trespasser. Ayling and Oilfield, JJ., agreed with the reasons given by the Subordinate Judge in his judgment for refusing to go into the question of title, but they did not state in their judgment what the reasons were. The case of Balmakund, which was relied on by Agarwala, J. (as he then was) in Ramdahin Lohar's case, was cited before their Lordships oil behalf of the appellant. In distinguishing that case, their Lordships observed,
“It would be impossible in this case to enquire fully into the title to the property on the pleadings as they stand Evidently, it was a case in which the question of title had not been fully raised in the pleadings and, therefore, could not be investigated.
The decision in Ramdahin Lohar's case is based upon a decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Balmakmid's case. There is another decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in the same volume, the case of Abdul Ghani. One or the other of these decisions has formed the basis of all the reported decisions of this Court, to which our attention has been drawn. I will, therefore, deal with these two cases before coming to the cases of this High Court.
In Abdul Ghani's case, the plaintiff sued to recover possession of a house which was in the possession of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that, about eight years previously, the defendant had hired the house from him at a monthly, rent of one rupee, and that the defendant failed to pay rent for a period of ten months, and that the plaintiff had given her notice to quit. The plaintiff claimed possession of the house and damages but made no claim for arrears of rent. The defence set up was that the defendant and her sons had been in adverse possession of the house in question for a period of seventeen years. The defendant denied that she had ever hired the house from the plaintiff and alleged that she had purchased the land which formed the site of the house and had built the house thereon. On these pleadings, issues were joined, among others, whether the plaintiff was the owner of the house in dispute and whether the defendant had been in possession of the house for more than twelve years. The court of first instance found that the plaintiff had not succeeded in proving the tenancy alleged by him, but that the plaintiff had all along, been in proprietary possession of the house, and that the defendant's possession was merely permissive. The Munsif accordingly decreed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the decision on the sole ground that, in as much as it had been established that the defendant's possession of the house was permissive, and the plaintiff had not come to the court on the allegation that the defendant's possession was permissive, he could not succeed in the suit. On a remand by the High Court for the trial of the issues: (1) What was the nature of the occupation of the house in dispute by the defendant and (2) Was the defendant's possession adverse or permissive? If adverse, for how long did the defendant hold such possession? The lower appellate court found that the plaintiff was the owner of the house, and that the defendant occupied the house as a friend with his permission, and, further, that the defendant had never before asserted a title to the house in dispute, and that her possession was permissive. The Full Bench set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and restored that of the Munsif, observing:—
“It is now contended before us by the learned Vakil for the respondent, notwithstanding these findings, that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not establish the case which he set up, namely, that there had previously been a subsisting tenancy, his suit must fail. We cannot accede to his contention. It is clear that the defendant was not taken, by surprise. She clearly understood the case which she had to meet, namely, the case set up by the plaintiff that he was the owner of the house……………. We think that there was nothing in the claim and the issues which were raised which could possibly have taken the defendant by surprise, and now that the true facts have been ascertained by the Court, the technical difficulty which has been relied upon cannot, we think, be allowed to defeat the plaintiff's claim.”
In Balmakund's case, the plaintiff came into court alleging that he was the owner of a certain cattle shed, which he had built at his own expense:, that the defendant had rented from him a portion of this shed; that after a while he had ceased to pay rent, and that, when the plaintiff asked him to vacate the shed, he refused to do so. He alleged termination of the tenancy by the service of a notice to quit and asked for two reliefs: (1) that a decree be passed against the defendant for five months' arrears of rent for the shed, and (2) for ejectment of the defendant from the shed. The defendant traversed the allegations in the plaint. He pleaded that the plaintiff was not the owner of the cattle shed, and that he (the defendant) had been in proprietary and adverse possession of it for several years. The court of first instance framed only one issue, namely, whether the defendant had rented from the plaintiff a part of the cattle shed in question. Notwithstanding this, evidence as to title was adduced on both sides, and the Munsif came to the conclusion that, although the plaintiff had failed to prove the lease, there probably had been a lease of some sort, and, in any case, the cattle shed belonged to the plaintiff and he was entitled to eject the defendant therefrom. The court accordingly decreed the plaintiff's claim for ejectment but not for rent. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff could succeed only if he succeeded in proving the tenancy. Agreeing with the Munsif that the plaintiff had failed to prove the lease, he dismissed the plaintiff's claim altogether. The plaintiff came up in appeal to the High Court, and, as the two Judges who heard the appeal were divided in opinion, the decree of the Subordinate Judge stood. Against this decree, the matter came up in Letters Patent to the Full Bench. In proposing the order of the Full Bench reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge and directing a trial by him on the evidence already upon record of the issue, who is the owner of the cattle shed, the subject matter of the suit, and a return of his finding thereon to the High Court, Stanley, C.J, observed:—
“It is obvious from this that the question of title to the property was definitely raised, and it is clear from the evidence in the case that this question was determined after an examination of the evidence which was adduced on both sides upon this question…………. The question of title was clearly raised in the pleadings, and the evidence on both sides was directed to it. The defendant could not be, and was not, taken by surprise in regard to it.
He dealt with the observation of Knox, J., in the second appeal, in supporting the decision of the Subordinate Judge, that the plaintiff having come to court on a false case was not entitled to any relief, and pointed out that on the findings of the Munsif it did not at all follow that the plaintiff had put forward a false case. In agreeing to the order proposed by His Lordship the Chief Justice, Banerji, J. drew attention to an observation of Chamier, J., in Haji Khan to the effect that, if a court sees that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief which he claims, although on grounds other than those put forward in his claim, the court should grant such relief if the defendants were not thereby taken by surprise. He pointed out that, in the case before the Full Bench, the question of title was properly raised and arose for investigation.
The case of Balmakund was followed by Wort, J., in Mohammad Yusuf. In this case a claim for adverse possession was set up by the defendant, and it was found by the courts of fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property within twelve years of the institution of the suit. His Lordship stressed the remarks in the judgment of Banerji, J., to which I have referred above, and, referring to the facts of the case before him, remarked:—
“They (the defendants) in fact claimed adverse title in contradiction of title by adverse possession and they invited the courts below to investigate it. Both courts have come to the conclusion that they have not established that title. Now it would be a matter of surprise to me if at this time of the day in India a plaintiff who has established facts which would entitle, him to the particular form of relief claimed, should be debarred from obtaining that relief merely because the allegations or some of them had not been established in their entirety.”
In Ramdahin Lohar's case, Agarwala, J. (as he then was), followed the decision in Balmakund's case, pointing out that there was no suggestion that the defendant was taken by surprise, that in fact the defendant had produced a parwana on which he relied, and the question of title “was thoroughly investigated by the trial court on evidence which the defendant placed before the court”. To the same effect is the decision of Beevor, J., in the case of Saral Sonar where His Lordship followed the decision in Abdul Ghani's case and in that of Mohammad Yusuf.
In support of his contention, Mr. Hareshwar Prasad Sinha has referred also to Jhari Singh and Musammat Walihani. The former case is of a converse nature to the case before us. The plaintiff sued for declaration of his title to the land in dispute, and that he might be put into possession thereof by ousting the defendants, and that he might be awarded mesne profits for use and occupation during the period they had been in wrongful possession. The suit was decreed by the court of first instance. In appeal by the defendants, the Judicial Commissioner held that the plaintiff's case, so far as it was based on eviction and the right to claim khas possession, had not been established, but that there was a cause of action in reference to the plaintiff's title. He accordingly granted a declaration of the plaintiff's title and upheld the decree so far as it awarded mesne profits on the basis of rent payable to the plaintiff on the foot of a tenancy existing between him and defendants nos. 1 to 3. This decree for rent was set aside by the High Court on the ground that a plaintiff coming into court with one case and failing to prove it, should not be permitted to succeed upon another, and that directly in antagonism with his primary allegations. Their Lordships pointed out that it is not open to the Court to convert one cause of action into a different cause of action, a view also expressed in Musammat Walihan's case There is nothing in these two decisions inconsistent with the decisions in the Full Bench cases of the Allahabad High Court. I have mentioned above how, in the case of Balmakund, Stanley, C.J, dealt with the remark of Knox, J., that the plaintiff had come to court with a false case and pointed out that this conclusion did not follow from the findings of the Munsif. As regards the cause of action, it has been pointed out by Banerji, J., in the case of Bolmakund(2), as also by Agarwala, J. (as he then was) in the case of Ramdahin Lohar, that a suit coming within the provisions of section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court-Fees Act is essentially a suit for ejectment on the allegation that the defendant is a trespasser, the tenancy having terminated, and, therefore, there is not really a different cause of action.
Nor do I think that there is any conflict between the observations in the cases of Gobindakumar Sur and Narayan Jha and the decisions of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. All that was observed in the two former cases was that, ordinarily, a suit brought as a suit for ejecting an ex-tenant should not be converted into a case for ejectment on a finding of title. There are several reasons for this. There is, to mention one reason the question of court-fees. A suit of the former kind is usually an easy suit, for it involves only an investigation of the existence of the alleged tenancy and whether the relationship of landlord and tenant has terminated. If the relationship is established, it is not open to the defendant to raise the question of title and, if it is not established, the plaintiff will ordinarily fail. This is one of the reasons why a lesser court-fee is charged for a suit of this kind than is charged for a suit for ejectment on title. This is not merely a question of court-fees but also affects jurisdiction. The higher valuation placed upon a suit of the latter kind means that, if the property is of value, the decision of such a suit will go to a court of higher jurisdiction, presumably, more competent to deal with the questions involved. There is another way in which the question of court-fee is relevant. If it is laid down as a rule that a plaintiff suing to eject an ex-tenant is entitled to succeed on title, if he fails to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, it will be a temptation for litigants to avoid the payment of higher court-fees and higher costs by falsely bringing suits for ejectment on title in the form of suits for the ejectment of an ex-tenant. It is in this reconnection that the remarks made by Knox, J., and by the Division Bench in the case of Jhari Singh become relevant.
It appears to me that the relief, which the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court considered, the courts could and should give, is an equitable relief entirely within the discretion of the court within the provisions of Order VII, rule 7, of the Civil Procedure Code. If the question of title has been raised in the trial, of the suit and has been investigated, the parties knowing about it and adducing evidence on the point, and the court is in a position to give the plaintiff the relief asked for on the basis of his title, there is no reason why the court should drive the plaintiff to file another suit in order to get this relief, provided that the plaintiff has done nothing to disqualify him from receiving equitable relief, e.g, by coming to court with a false story. In this view of the matter, the question of court-fees is no bar to the grant of such relief. Nor will the question of pecuniary jurisdiction arise in the matter unless an appellate court is able to come to a finding within the meaning of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act that there has been prejudice caused. It is in the light of these remarks that the case must be examined to see whether the plaintiff before us can be given relief on title.
Looked at in this light, it seems clear to me that he can not. It is true that the question of title was put in issue and that these were the issues on which the parties went to trial. I am not at all sure, however, that it was on these issues that the parties actually adduced evidence. I say this not only from the fact that the Munsif considered only two issues namely, the issues of the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and of the sufficiency of the notice to quit, but because the order-sheet and the judgment itself indicate that even at the time of the trial the Munsif was proceeding on the basis that these were the only two relevant issues. The question of title, was far from simple, as is apparent from a perusal of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. Nevertheless, the Munsif, having concluded in one day the recording of the evidence, fixed the very next day for delivery of judgment and delivered his judgment on that day. Further, we find from his judgment that a petition filed by the defendant for examining himself on commission, on the ground that he was ill and unable to come to court, was rejected by, the Munsif because he considered it unnecessary to examine the defendant when the evidence adduced by the plaintiff falls short of establishing a case for him that is to say, the plaintiff having failed to make out the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Munsif refused to let the defendant adduce all the evidence which he wished to adduce. That the Munsif did not take all the necessary evidence on the question of title would also appear from the action taken by the Subordinate Judge in appeal in dealing with the question of title. The first Subordinate Judge, before whom the matter came in appeal, considered the evidence recorded as insufficient, and remanded the case to the Munsif for a finding on title after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence thereon. This order, as I have mentioned, was set aside by Beevor, J. The matter then came before the successor of the previous Subordinate Judge. He, too, found the evidence on the record inadequate by itself for coming to a decision on the point. He, therefore, held a local inspection. It is well established that the purpose of such a local inspection is to enable the court to understand the evidence on the record and not to bring fresh evidence on the record. I am unable to say here that the local inspection has not also been used for the latter purpose. For instance, the Subordinate Judge mentions that in his sketch map he has incorporated the admissions of the parties as regards the possession of different persons. Incidentally, I may remark that it is difficult to follow the note of local inspection as it makes references to certain marks on the Subordinate Judge's sketch plan which do not appear in that sketch map. In consequence, I have not been able to follow the reasoning in the Subordinate Judge's judgment, based upon his memorandum of local inspection, by which he has arrived at his conclusion on the point of title.
In his judgment, the Subordinate Judge characterises the evidence on the point of title as “very meagre”. He then proceeds to deal with certain “admitted” facts. It is not quite clear/what admissions were made, whether the admissions are contained in the record as prepared by the Munsif or were made before the Subordinate Judge. The case of the plaintiff depended upon an award said to have been made by arbitrators in relation to the property of the family of which the plaintiff and Mathura Saran were members. According to the plaintiff the property, which forms the subject matter of the suit, was allotted to the plaintiff by this award. The defence challenged the genuineness of this award, but it was held by the Subordinate Judge to be genuine. The insufficiency of the evidence on the point is clear from the ground given by the Subordinate Judge for finding this award to be genuine:—
“I find from a perusal of the contents of the award, which I shall discuss presently that the genuineness of the award cannot be questioned.”
And, again,
“The contents of the award show that great pains were taken by the arbitrators in giving the award and that the facts stated therein could not have come to light unless there were statements of the parties before them and the arbitrators perused the documents to which they have referred in the award.”
This award, be it noted, purports to have been given about three years after the reference to the arbitrators was made, and does not bear the signature of one of the three arbitrators. These points were glossed over, however, because plaintiff's witness no. 3 was not cross-examined regarding them. It is on the basis of this award that the Subordinate Judge comes to the conclusion that the property in suit belongs to the plaintiff and it is, also, on the basis of this award that he finds that the plaintiff was in possession of the property at least till 1933 (vide page 10 of the brief).
In these circumstances, I find it difficult to hold that the question of title has been fairly tried between the parties, and that the plaintiff is entitled to ask the Court in its discretion to grant him relief on title.
On the above grounds, I would allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge and dismiss the suit. The defendant will get his costs throughout.
Shearer, J.:— I agree. I must say, however, that I find it difficult to conceive of a case where a plaintiff, seeking to recover possession of land from the defendant on the footing that the defendant is his tenant and his tenancy has been determined, can be entitled to a decree on the footing that the defendant is not a tenant but a mere trespasser. If there is evidence to show that the defendant is the latter and not the former, it must have been let in wrongly or by accident. In this particular case, however, there is no such evidence. Where the court is unable to say, on the evidence, whether the defendant is a tenant or a licensee but is able to say definitely that if he is not the one he is the other the position is quite different, and there is no difficulty in passing a decree.
S.H
Appeal allowed.