Cases referred :
Kalpnath Rai Vs. State 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : 1998 ALL MR (Cri) 240 (S.C.) [ 10 ]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra 1984 SCC (Cri.) 487 [ 15 ]
State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdev Singh 1992 SCC (Cri.) 705 [ 15 ]
Advocates appeared :
MR. S. R. PASBOLA for the appellant.
MR. A. M. SHRINGARPURE, A.P.P. for the respondent.
:- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 21st March, 2001, passed by the Special Judge under the Maharashtra Control of Orgnised Crime Act, 1999 (hereinafter called as MCOC Act), Greater Mumbai in M.C.O.C. Special Case No.4 of 2000.
2. It may be noted at this juncture that in all six accused were named in the charge-sheet. However, the case against Accused Nos.2 and 6 was abetted as they were reported dead pending the trial. The case was further directed to be kept on the dormant file against Accused Nos.4 and 5 as they were found absconding and hence the case proceeded against Accused No.1 only.
Appellant-Accused No.1 faced the trial on the charge under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and further under Section 3(1)(i), 3(2), 3(4) and 3(5) of MCOC Act and also under Section 25(1-B) read with Section 3 of the Indian Arms Act, 1959. However, he was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. But was convicted for offences punishable under Section 3(2) of MCOC Act, 1999 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs, in default of payment of fine to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one year. He was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3(4) of MCOC Act, 1999 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced in similar manner. He was further convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3(5) read with Section 4 of MCOC Act, 1999 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced in similar manner. He was further found guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 25(1-B)(a) read with Section 3 of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and was directed to pay a fine of Rs.500/- in defult of payment of fine he was directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
3. The facts giving rise to the case, in brief, are thus :-
On 30th October, 1999, Mr. Dhatrak, A.P.I. of Dahisar Police Station received information about one person having been shot dead by four unknown persons opposite Side Walk Hotel, S. N. Dube Road, Rawalpada Junction, Western Express Highway, Dahisar (East), Mumbai. The victim was carried to Bhagwati Hospital and was declared dead before admission. Crime was reported as F.I.R. No.403 of 1999 at Dahisar Police Station on 30th October, 1999 at about 8-15 p.m. against unknown person. The victim who was declared dead in Bhagwati Hospital , was identified as Narayan Vyankat Pujari by his brother Subayya Vyankat Pujari. Inquest panchanama was drawn in respect of the dead body as per Exhibit 9 and thereafter from the spot of offence one empty cartridge of 9 m.m. pistol was found and some other articles such as two molar teeth, three pieces of lead, one motor-cycle black in colour of Yamaha make having registration No.GJI 3031 with speedo meter in broken condition were also found. The dead body of the said Narayan Vyankat Pujari was referred for post-mortem examination and post-mortem examination was carried out in due course wherein 13 external injuries noted in the post-mortem notes were found with corresponding internal injuries. There were also firearm injuries which were stated to be fatal and the victim had died as a result of haemoerhage due to firearm injuries.
4. In the course of the investigation by the Dahisar Police Station, certain statements were recorded in respect of the incident occurred on 30th October, 1999 opposite Side Walk Hotel, Dahisar (East), Mumbai. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that the appellant-accused was arrested on 7th November, 1999, and was searched under panchanama (Exhibit 17). In the plastic carry bag, which he was carrying, currency notes of a total sum of Rs.1,40,000/- were found along with two mobile phones and one loaded revolver containing three live cartridges. The police also found one digital diary containing certain telephone numbers and one notebook and some visiting cards. In the course of the investigation, according to the prosecution, it was revealed that the accused used to contact certain persons in order to extortionate money from them. The accused was using a pseudonymous name Prakash. The prosecution has examined P.W.8 - an Octroi Inspector, P.W.9 - a hotel owner and P.W.10 - a painting contractor about the threats on telephone and asking the victims of extortion to contact one O. P. Singh and others such as Nana, Gurubhai, Rohit, etc. It is further the case of the prosecution that during the course of the investigation, test identification parade was held by Special Executive Magistrate and the articles which were seized in F.I.R. No.403 of 1999 of Dahisar Police Station, as also the articles seized from the accused were referrred for expert opinion to Chemical Analyser and ballistic expert. The Chemical Analysts reports were received in due course of the investigation.
5. In the course of the investigation, it was further disclosed that the appellant was involved in the offence of extortion in the past and he also was a member of an organised crime syndicate/gang. Thus, a prior approval to prosecute the accused under the provisions of M.C.O.C. Act, 1999 was sought. Prior approval under Section 23(1)(a) of the said Act was granted as per Exhibit 65 on 20th November 1999, after the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), Brihan Mumbai was satisfied about the past criminal history of the accused and the prima-facie case attracting the provisions of the MCOC Act, 1999. After prior approval, the investigation was taken over by Mr. Pote, Assistant Commissioner of Police, North-West Region. Sanction to prosecute the accused under the Indian Arrms Act was also obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquarters, Brihan Mumbai on 25th May 2000. On completion of the investigation and after obtaining the due sanction under MCOC Act the accused was charge-sheeted to the Special Court .
6. The learned Trial Judge framed charges against the accused for the impugned offences under the said counts of the Indian Penal Code as well as MCOC Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty. The defence of the accused is that of total denial of any criminal liability. The prosecution led its evidence at length on which basis the learned Trial Judge concluded that there was no evidence against the accused for holding him guilty of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, however, he came to the conclusion that the evidence on record was sufficient to show that the appellant-accused was guilty of the various offences under MCOC Act read with 120-B of I.P.C. as well as the impugned offence under the Arms Act and therefore, proceeded to record the order of conviction and consequent sentence against the accused in the aforesaid manner.
Hence, the present appeal.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned A.P.P. at length. I have also perused the entire evidence on record with the help of the learned Counsel for both the sides.
8. It may be noted at this stage that, as noted earlier, originally six accused persons were charge-sheeted in this case, out of which Accused Nos. 3 and 6 were reported dead and Accused Nos.2, 4 and 5 are shown to be absconding and, therefore, the case against them is directed to be kept on the dormant file and to be revived after they are traced and hence the case proceeded only against the present appellant, who is Accused No.1. It may further be noted that the learned Trial Judge concluded that there was no evidence against the present appellant for commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and hence he was acquitted of the said charge. The State has not filed any appeal against the acquittal of the appellant for the said charge and therefore, we are concerned in this appeal only with regard to the evidence on record which pertains to prove offences against the appellant which are under MCOC Act as well as Arms Act. In view of this position, it would be just and proper on my part to look into the provisions of MCOC Act, 1999 in order to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective. section 3 of mcoc act deals with punishment for organised crime. The present appellant is convicted for commission of the offences punishable under Section 3(2), 3(4), 3(5) read with Section 4 of MCOC Act and, therefore, it would be worthwhile to note the scheme of the said provisionsThe provision of sub-section (5) of Section 3 stipulates that whoever holds any property derived or obtained from commission of an organised crime or which has been acquired through the organised crime syndicate shall be punishable under the said provision. Section 4 stipulates punishment for possessing unaccountable wealth on behalf of the member of organised crime syndicate.
Now, Section 2(1)(d),(e) & (f) defines "continuing unlawful activity", "organised crime" and "organised crime syndicate" as follows :-
"Section 2(1)(d) :- "continuing unlawful activity" means an activity prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within the preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence;
(e) "organised crime" means any continuing unlawful activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means, with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency;
(f) "organised crime syndicate" means a group of two or more persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a syndicate or gang indulge in activities of organised crime."
9. Therefore, the Penal provision under Section 3(2)(4) and (5) as well as Section 4 of the said Act would be invoked if the activities of the accused involved come within the definition of clauses (d), (e) and (f) of Section 2(1) of the said Act. In other words, in order to being the accused within the four corners of the said provision, the prosecution is required to establish that the accused is a member of an organised crime syndicate as defined in the said manner. The organised crime would be that wherein the member is involved in continuing unlawful activity as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate and uses violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion or other unlawful means, with the object of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency. The continuing unlawful activity would mean an activity prohibited by law which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more undertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of an orgnaised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within a period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance thereof.
If the prosecution has proved this ingredient and the fact that the accused comes within the four corners of this provision, then and only then certain presumption would be raised as contemplated under Section 22 of the said Act. However, before availing of the said presumption, it is the duty of the prosecution to establish and prove the involvement of the accused as contemplated by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21 of the said Act. In other words, the presumption contemplated under the said provision under MCOC Act would not be available for the prosecution if the requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22(1) are not established on record. On the background of this legal and statutory matrix, let us now turn to the evidence on record vis-a-vis various objections raised on behalf of the appellant in order to show that the prosecution has failed to prove the involvement of the appellant under the impugned provision of MCOC Act.
10. The provision of Section 23(2) of MCOC Act stipulates that no Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police. Therefore, it is clear that the sanction by the competent Authority is a prerequisite before taking congizance of the impugned offence by the Special Court . The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sanction accorded in the present case suffers from several infirmities and on that count alone the congizance taken by the Special Court of the impugned offence under the said Act is rendered bad in law. It was submitted that the document of sanction (Exhibit 85) did not make reference to the organised crime at all or extortion, but only made mention of offence of murder and as such it is not clear whether all the relevant material was put before the sanctioning authority to satisfy itself before granting sanction under MCOC Act. It was further urged that the proposal for sanction, which is on record, did not ask for sanction of prosecution under section 4 of mcoc act, but sanction has been given for prosecution under the said provision. Further, there is no sanction for prosecution under Section 3(5) of MCOC Act, though the learned Trial Judge has framed charge thereunder and has convicted the accused for that offence for which there was no sanction at all. On this basis it was urged that the conviction under Section 3(5) of MCOC Act is bad in law per se.
In this regard, I have critically perused the sanction order (Exhibit 85), wherein it is clearly mentioned that the Competent Authority was satisfied about the activities of the accused and his associates within the meaning of Section 3(1)(i), 3(2), 3(4) and Section 4 of MCOC Act and, therefore, it was issued under the said count. In my considered view even though there is no specific mention of Section 3(5) of MCOC Act and when the proposal for sanction did not make mention of Section 4 of the said Act, still no irregularity or illegality has been committed. This is plainly due to the reason that the Special Court is empowered to deal not only with connected offences but also other offences under the said Act, as can be seen from sub-section (2) of Section 7 of MCOC Act which reads thus :-
"Section 7(2) - If in the course of any trial of any offence under this Act, it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence under this Act or under any other law, the Special Court may convict such person of such other offences and may pass any sentence authorised by this Act or as the case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof."
In this regard, it would be worthwhile to refer to the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Kalpnath Rai Vs. State (through CBI), reported in 1998 SCC (Cri.) 134, wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with similar aspects pertaining to TADA, it has observed that once cognizance of any offence under TADA has been taken validly by the Designated Court with a proper sanction the Court is not disabled from convicting the accused for any other offence proved during the trial, whether or not sanction has been accorded in respect of such other offence. The raison detre is that it is the Court of Law which after a judicial scrutiny is satisfied on the materials placed before it that another offence has been made out and such satisfaction is of a higher calibre than the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority. Therefore, this ratio can very well be applied to the present situation and I hold that the sanction issued under Section 23(2) of MCOC Act in this case is legal and proper and the Trial Court was well within its right to invoke the provision of Section 3(5) of the said Act even though no separate sanction was issued on that count.
11. It appears from the record that the present appellant is involved in this case and the provisions of MCOC Act were invoked in view of the various articles found in his possession at the time of his arrest on 7th November 1999 in a plastic carry bag containing currency notes of total amount of Rs. 1,40,000/- along with two mobile phones and one loaded revolver containing three live cartridges. The police also found one digital diary containing certain telephone numbers and one notebook and some visiting cards. This was the material which formed the basis for the prosecution to show that the accused was involved in organised crime and was a member of an organised crime syndicate and his activities amounted to continuing illegal activities in furtherance of organised crime. It appears to be the prosecution case, which is also relied upon by the learned Trial Judge that the accused person was found possessing a huge amount of Rs.1,40,000/- which could not be held as the lawful income of an auto-rickshaw driver. According to the learned Trial Judge, the accused failed to explain satisfactorily about the possession of such huge amount as well as possession of various articles such as two mobile phones, one Casio digital diary, one notebook containing many telephone numbers as also visiting cards. The panchanama (Exhibit 17) indicated many telephone numbers, including that of Harshad Mehta and other rich persons. P.W. 24 Investing Officer in the course of his evidence has stated as to how police could discover from the diary found with the accused that the accused was having international contact numbers of known members of an organised crime syndicate of Chhota Rajan based at Malasiya. The said police officer further deposed about contact numbers not only from Malasya but from Australia and Singapore and, therefore, during the course of investigation, information was sought from Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited about the country code numbers and it was confirmed that country code of Singapore was 65 while country code of Australia was 61 and country code of Malasya was 60. The accused was also found in possession of two mobile phones with sim cards bearing certain numbers and pertaining to certain mobile phones which were prepaid and activated since 1-10-1999.
At one stage, the learned Trial Judge, in the course of his judgment has referred to a particular aspect, which is factually incorrect. This aspect is of vital importance and, therefore, I must make a reference to it. The learned Trial Judge has stated in his judgment (page 23) that P.W. 24 - V. V. Sawade was the investigating officer, who has stated in his evidence that Telephone No. 00601230335070 is discovered to be that of Gurubhai Sattam at Malasiya; Telephone No. 0061412036854 is discovered to be that of Chhota Rajan @ Nagabhai @ Sheth at Australia and one visiting card of Kshetropadhya in which Telephone No.006597862962 of O. P. Singh at Singapore and Telephone No. 9811011869 and 9810084511 which were of one Farid from Dehradun were mentioned. Now, repeated scrutiny of the testimony of P.W.24 - Sawade shows that he has not at all mentioned this aspect in his evidence. It is not clear from where this aspect is found by the learned Trial Judge which is mentioned in the judgment. This assumes importance because this is the only material which is said to be on record which would connect the accused person to the alleged gangsters like Chhota Rajan and Guru Sattam from Malasya and Australia . So far as the visiting card of one Kshetropadhya is concerned on whose card the number of O. P. Singh was found from Singapore, the said Kshetropadhya himself is not examined as a witness and, therefore, it cannot be assumed that the accused had some connection with O.P. Singh from Singapore . In other words, no doubt that certain telephone numbers and mobile numbers were found in the diary which was found in custody of the accused at the relevant time wherein certain overseas numbers from Malasya, Australia certain Singapore were mentioned. However, it is nowhere in evidence that those numbers were of the said known gangsters like Guru Sattam. Chhota Rajan and O.P. Singh. No investigation is made in that line at all and what is available on record is nothing but surmise on the part of the prosecution witnesses. Unfortunately, the Trial Judge appears to be carried away with such surmises and in his enthusiasm he has incorporated the said parts in his judgment which is not in the evidence at all.
It is in the evidence that the digital diary which was found in the custody of the accused was operated by P.S.I. Wagh and then those numbers were enlisted in panchanama (Exhibit 17), however, said P.S.I. Wagh is not at all examined and, therefore, the connecting link which was necessary between operation of digital diary and contents of the panchanama is totally missing. It is needless to mention that the contents of the digital diary was required to be proved like any other document which was possible only through the evidence of P.S.I. Wagh, who operated the diary and allegedly stated those numbers to the writer of panchanama, which has not been done and, therefore, serious lacuna has remained in the present case in that regard. Similar is the position with regard to the mobile phone numbers as well as mobile phone sets found in possession of the accused. It appears from the record that the prosecution reached dead end in the course of the investigation and could not establish any link in that regard between the accused and the alleged organised gang syndicate run by Chhota Rajan.
12. The prosecution has thereafter put reliance on the evidence of P.W.8, an Octroi Inspector, P.W. 9, a hotel owner and P.W. 10, a paint contractor whose names are kept secret deliberately. They have stated that during the month of October they received threats of extortion on their phones from one Prakash. He gave them certain numbers and asked them to call on those numbers which were obviously overseas numbers. None of those witnesses in fact contacted the overseas numbers to confirm whether the threats were true or false. However, the accused person is sought to be connected with those threats only because phone number of P.W. 8 was found in the diary of the accused when he was arrested. Therefore, mere mention of telephone number of P.W. 8 which was found in the diary of the accused cannot allow us to jump to the conclusion that the accused must be the same person with pseudonymous name Prakash making extortion calls to the said witnesses, especially when it is not the prosecution case that overseas numbers given by the said Prakash were in fact ascertained by him as to whether they were belonging to Guru Sattam of Malasiya or Chhota Rajan from Malasya. Moreover, the witnesses have stated that they made complaints to the Extortion Cell and their phones were kept under observation. If it was so, it is not explained as to why the phone of person by name Prakash could not be traced at all because it is not the prosecution case that mobile phones which were found with the accused person were the same phones from which P.W. 8, P.W. 9 and P.W. 10 were contacted during the relevant period. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence connecting the accused person either with the said person Prakash or with the calls allegedly made to said witness, no presumption can be raised that those must be from the accused only because phone number of P.W. 8 was found in the diary of the accused person.
13. The prosecution has further relied upon the evidence of P.W. 18, who is the Superintendent of Arthur Road Jail, Mumbai. According to him, the present accused is kept in Jail Circle No. III wherein gangsters belonging to Chhota Rajan and Subhash Singh Thakur are detained. He has stated that it was the accused person who made statement before him that he belonged to Chhota Rajan gang and hence he was kept in Circle No. III with other gangsters of Chhota Rajan. In my view, no elaborate discussion is required in respect of futility of such nature of evidence which is brought on record. There is absolutely no foundation to hold that the accused person made such statement before the jail authorities nor there is any iota of evidence to show that in fact the accused belonged to Chhota Rajan gang. In other words, he cannot be held as a gangster belonging to Chhota Rajan gang only because he is kept in Circle No. III where Chhota Rajan gangsters are kept.
14. Perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows the fact that the accused was found in possession with a large amount of money along with two mobile phones, one digital diary, one notebook with many telephone numbers as well as visiting cards belonging to builders and people like Harshad Mehta was indicative of the fact that he was an extortionist. The fact that some of the numbers were overseas telephone numbers to Malasya, Singapore and Australia were also found sufficient to raise a presumption against the accused that he belonged to an organised crime syndicate. In my considered view, as noted earlier, the presumption available as contemplated under section 22 of mcoc act would not be available unless certain aspects are proved beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, unless it is established on record that the accused was none else than the person by name Prakash who was making threatening calls to P.W. 8, 9, and 10, or that the overseas numbers found in possession of the accused were in fact of gangsters like O.P. Singh, Chhota Rajan and Guru Sattam, and unless it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount found in possession of the accused was connected to organised crime, no such presumption could be raised as contemplated under Section 22 of the said Act and the exercise in that regard made by the learned trial Judge cannot be accepted in law, especially when there is no investigation made to connect the accused with the said gangsters to show that those particular numbers belonged to the said gangster and none else
15. The learned Counsel for the appellant brought to my notice one more infirmity in the entire process of the trial that before drawing the conclusion, on the basis of the so called statement of P.W. 24 Sawade to the effect that the telephone numbers found in possession of the accused belonged to the gangsters Chhota Rajan, Guru Sattam and others the said apparently incriminating fact was not brought to the notice of the accused in the course of his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, he was deprived of explaining the situation which has caused prejudice to him. Critical perusal of the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows that it was conspicuously silent regarding the so called version of P.W. 24 - Sawade of which much capital has been made and in fact the learned Trial Judge has observed in his judgment (para 23) that the police discovered the digital diary and it was found that the accused was having international contact numbers of known members of organised crime syndicate of Chhota Rajan based in Malasya and P.W. 24 further deposed certain telephone numbers of Guru Sattam from Malasya and Chhota Rajan from Australia and one visiting card on which O. P. Singh of Singapore was given. Allegedly this is the only statement which appears to connect the accused with the organised crime syndicate, but it has not been explained specifically to the accused in the course of his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In fact, I may note at this juncture, that P.W. 24 has not made such statement at all. However, the learned Trial Judge has insisted that P.W. 24 has made such statement and, therefore, it was the duty of the Trial Judge to put this particular fact to the accused in the course of his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and failure to do so becomes fatal to the prosecution case.
The learned Counsel for the appellant sought to put reliance on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1984 SCC (Cri.) 487, wherein it is categorically observed that the circumstances in respect of which the accused is not examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be used against him. The Apex Court in its subsequent ruling in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdev Singh & Anr., reported in 1992 SCC (Cri.) 705 it is observed thus :-
"Section 313 of the Code is a statutory provision and embodies the fundamental principle of fairness based on the maxim audi alterem partem. It is trite law that the attention of the accused must be specifically invited to inculpatory pieces of evidence or circumstances laid on record with a view to giving him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so. The section imposes a heavy duty on the court to take great care to ensure that the incriminating circumstances are put to the accused and his response solicited. The words "shall question him" clearly bring out the mandatory character of the clause and cast an imperative duty on the court and confer a corresponding right on the accused to an opportunity to offer his explanation for such incriminating material appearing against him. It is, therefore, true that the purpose of the examination of the accused under Section 313 is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the incriminating material which has surfaced on record."
Therefore, no matter how vague or unreliable the prosecution evidence in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereon. In the present case before us the so called material which is brought on record through the testimony of P.W. 24 - Sawade is seen to be the only material which would amount to connect the accused with the organised crime syndicate members and, therefore, it was bounden duty of the Trial Judge to put that particular statement with specific particulars to the accused in the statement under Section 313 to provide him an opportunity to explain and failure to do so would prove fatal to the prosecution case.
16. No doubt that the accused professes to be an auto-rickshaw driver and it is unlikely that he would come into possession of a large amount of Rs. 1,40,000/- along with a revolver with live cartridges. He was also found possessing two mobile phones and a digital diary containing several telephone numbers, including overseas telephone numbers and, therefore, it is quite possible that he is not a character like the simple auto-rickshaw driver which he professes to be, but in all the probabilities would be engaged in illegal activities. However, possibility of involvement in the illegal activities only due to said aspects would not warrant us to hold that he is involved in continuous illegal activities concerned with organised crime and he is connected to organised crime syndicate. In other words ,initially it must be proved that the accused is involved in organised crime and then the presumption under section 22 of mcoc act would be available. However, it would not be legal to hold that the accused is involved in organised crime only because he was found in possession of such articles. I am aware of the fact the menace of the organised crime has caused serious threat to law and order of peace loving society as a result of extortion and unlawful activities, including collection of protection money or money laundering etc. The black money generated by such illegal acts being very huge is having an adverse effect on our economy and, therefore, to curb such illegal activities of the organised crime/gang the MCOC Act has been enacted. However, that does not mean that mere possessing of incriminating articles, like in the present case vide panchanama Exhibit 17, would be sufficient to connect the person like the accused to the organised crime unless and until satisfactory investigation is made in that regard to connect the accused with such organised crime or syndicate. In the present case, the investigating machinery, for the reasons best known to itself, failed to bring on record specifically that the particular overseas telephone numbers did belong to the said gangsters which aspect would have been sufficient to raise a presumption that the accused was in contact with the said gangsters, which has not been done.
Therefore, I hold that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is involved in any of the crimes connected with MCOC Act.
17. Then comes the turn of evidence regarding the offence under the Arms Act. Panchanama (Exhibit 17) shows that a country made revolver loaded with three live cartridges was found in possession of the accused. This revolver has been described as break frame 6 chambered country made revolver having mark AK MADE on its but with three live cartridges as described in the panchanama. P.W. 4 and P.W. 25 deposed about the seizure of the weapon. Sanction was obtained under the Arms Act as per Exhibit 66 granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Headquarters, Mumbai. The weapon along with three live cartridges seized was sent with a forwarding letter, copy of which is produced at Exhibit 67 which bears endorsement that Forensic Science Laboratory, Mumbai had received the articles in sealed condition on 16th December 1999. As per the report from the Ballistic Expert (Exhibit 68) they found the weapon described therein in working order with residue of fired ammunition nitrite detected in barrel washing indicating that it was used for firing prior to its receipt in the laboratory, but regarding the three live cartridges, the Ballistic Expert opined that randomly selected two 32 revolver cartridges were dismantled for examination and the caps of those cartridges were found live on test firing through the revolver which was seized from the accused, that the prosecution has definitely established that the accused was found in possession of a country made revolver which was loaded with three live cartridges which was found in working condition. Therefore, this evidence in the light of evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 24 is further corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 28 and it shows that the prosecution has satisfactorily established that the accused was found in possession of a firearm in working order alongwith live cartridges which are explosives within the meaning of Explosives Act. Thus, in the absence of any licence to possess such weapon which was in working order containing live cartridges, the accused did contravene Section 25(1-B)(a) read with Section 3 of the Indian Arms Act, 1959 and, therefore, I do not see any reason why the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court regarding the offence under the Arms Act should be disturbed.
18. For the reasons recorded above, I hold that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the accused under MCOC Act and, therefore, the reasoning adopted and findings recorded by the Trial Court to that extent cannot be accepted and, therefore, to that extent the appeal is required to be allowed. So far as the charge under the indian arms act is concerned, the prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the appeal to that extent shall stand dismissed.
19. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and subsequent sentence passed by the Special Judge dated 21st March 2001 in M.C.O.C. Special Case No. 4 of 2000 against the appellant-accused for offences punishable under Section 3(2), 3(4) and 3(5) read with Section 4 of MCOC Act, 1999 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code is hereby set aside and the appellant-accused is acquitted of the offences under the said charge.
However, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant-accused for offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) read with Section 3 of the Indian Arms Act, 1959 is hereby confirmed and the appeal to that extent stands dismissed.
Appeal partly allowed.
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