Respondents 1 to 15 made application (IDA) No. 3083 of 1977, under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Disputes Act), in the Labour Court, Bombay, presided over by respondent 17, against the petitioner and respondent 16 for computation of money due to them on the ground that they were in the permanent employment of the petitioner and respondent 16 and were performing the jobs of reconditioning steel of galvanising drums which work came within the purview of au engineering industry and as per a notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, prescribing the minimum wages for the engineering industry with effect from 1 December 1974, they be paid the difference between the wages actually paid to them and to which they were entitled under the Minimum Wages Act for the engineering industry under the said notification. They thus claimed Rs. 2,77,916 for all of them.

2. Their application was resisted by the petitioner contending that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the claim under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and except the first four or five respondents, others were never in his employment. The petitioner also contended that he did not carry on business in an engineering industry as alleged and that prior to 1 December 1974, he was paying minimum wages to his employees as prescribed for the employees working in a commercial establishment under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, as he was running a purely commercial establishment.

3. Appreciating the evidence adduced before him, the learned Labour Judge rejected all the contentions of the petitioner and accordingly by his judgment and order, dated 28 November 1983, allowed the application and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 2,27,916 to respondents 1 to 15.

4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

5. At the time of admission, the petitioner filed a statement in this Court (marked X), indicating the amounts due and payable to the first four respondents and undertook to pay the same within four weeks. Sri Shastri, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 15, accepted the said amounts in full satisfaction of the claims of respondents 1 to 4. As regards the claims of respondents 5 to 15, rule nisi was issued and interim relief staying the execution of the impugned order was also granted to the petitioner on his furnishing security for half the amounts awarded to respondents 5 to 15. We are, therefore, now concerned with the claims of respondents 5 to 15 only. They shall hereinafter be referred to as “the workmen.”

6. Sri Cama, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, raised in all five contentions for my consideration. The first point which he made is that the petitioner's establishment was never an engineering industry and always was and is covered by the Shops and Establishments Act. The submission is that the workmen are not entitled to the minimum wages permissible in an engineering industry under the notification in question. In this connection, he referred to entry 36 of the Schedule, Part I, to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which reads as under.

“Employment in engineering industry (not being an employment falling under entry 26 in this Dart), that is to say, any industry engaged in any manufacturing process in relation to any machinery, tools, instruments, utensils, or articles, or parts thereof, manufactured from ferrous or non-ferrous metals or any alloys (including manufactures of ancillary products for automobile industry, manufacture of bicycles including its spare parts) and process connected therewith such as shaping, pressing, extrusion, turning, fabricating, processing, smelting, refining, drilling, cutting, joining, grinding, forging, welding, buffing, eletroplating and moulding.

Explanation:— For the purpose of this entry, the expression ‘manufacturing process’ shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in Cl. (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948.”

Sri Cama, vehemently urges that this entry is divided into two parts that:

(i) there should be an engineering industry; and

(ii) the other processes should be connected therewith. The submission is that there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner here was engaged in an engineering industry because he does not manufacture any product meaning he does not produce a new item of any commodity as he only repairs old drums.

To substantiate his argument Sri Cama relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (D.P Madon and M.H Kania, JJ.) in Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Habib Kasambhai, [1975 (35) S.T.C 560], and submitted that it was held therein that for an activity to amount to manufacture it must result in a different commercial article or commodity.

7. There is no dispute about this proposition of law but the fundamental question is that the Division Bench was dealing with a matter covered Under the provisions, of the Bombay Sales-tax Act and the learned Judges were considering whether or not purchase of old and empty drums and resale of them after repairing would amount to “manufacture” for the purpose of levying sales-tax on such a commercial commodity. They were thus concerned with the definition of the word “manufacture” under S. 2(17) of the Bombay Sales-tax Act, 1959, which read as under:

“‘manufacture’, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise processing, treating, or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing process as may be prescribed.”

And here we are concerned with the meaning of the word “manufacture” as is assigned to it in Cl. (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, which reads as under:

“‘manufacturing process’ means any process for—

(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or

(ii) pumping oil, water, sewage, or any other substance; or

(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or

(iv) composing types for printing, printing letterpress, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book-binding; or

(v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or

(vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage.”

The said Division Bench distinguished and differentiated between the term “manufacture” as is found in the Sales-tax Act and the one under the Factories Act in the following manner:

“In the first place, as we have already pointed out in our decision in Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. No. 9 of 1973], the definition of the expression “manufacture” in Cl. (17) of S. 2 of the said Act has to be interpreted bearing in mind the fact that it has been inserted in the setting and context of a sales-tax legislation of which the pith and substance is a tax primarily on the sales of goods and subsidiarily on the purchase of goods. The said Act is a piece of fiscal legislation, whereas the Factories Act is a piece of social welfare legislation, and it would be highly dangerous to interpret the definitions of terms in a fiscal statute in the light of the definitions or interpretations given to similar terms in social welfare legislation. Apart from this, we may point out that the definition of the expression “manufacturing process” in S. 2(k) of the Factories Act clearly specifies that the process of generating, transforming or transmitting power would amount to a manufacturing process, and hence on the very terms of that definition, transforming electrical energy from a high to a low potential and the process of transmitting such energy through supply lines were both manufacturing processes. It is very significant that in the definition of the expression ‘manufacturing process’ under the Factories Act, it has been provided, inter alia, that repairing, oiling, wishing and cleaning would be processes amounting to ‘manufacturing process’ for the purposes of that Act, whereas under the said Act none of these activities are included even in the comprehensive definition given to the term “manufacture” in S. 2(17) of the said Act.”

Therefore, the question raised by Sri Cama has already been answered by the Division Bench itself and I have nothing further to add but, that apart, the evidence, in the present case, makes it crystal clear that the business activities of the petitioner amounted to manufacturing process in an engineering industry. Thus, it was averred in the application by the workmen that they had been performing the jobs of reconditioning steel or galvanising drums. Except a bare word of the petitioner in the written statement that they were/are never an engineering industry no other particulars were mentioned in the written statement to point out as to how and why the manufacturing activities of the petitioner would not come within the definition of an engineering industry. Moreover, the evidence of one of the workmen — Ramnihan Vijayee — shows that he was doing the job of cleaning old drums by putting them in shape, etc. He further deposed that he used to keep those old drums in machine in order to put them in shape and he was also welding and again cleaning those old drums. He was removing old paints of the old drums and painting them again. In the cross-examination he said that dents in the old drums were removed by hands and a machine was installed to fill water in the drums. Thereafter, air was filled in the drums by hand pumps and after such pressure was given the drums are emptied and were brought in proper shape by hammering. The drums were again cleaned by caustic soda and repainted. Painting work was done by machines. Welding work was done by gas welding. Another workman — Ramnayan Sudhali — deposed that spray painting, welding and air pumping were done by machines. The petitioner adduced his own evidence but did not speak a single word about his actual business activities. The evidence, on the record, read as a whole, leaves not even an iota of doubt in my mind that the petitioner was running an engineering industry and the workmen were entitled to the minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act prescribed by the notification in question effective from 1 December 1974.

8. The second and third contentions of Sri Cama can be dealt with together. He submits that:

(i) it is only when there is a dispute as to computation of money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money that an application under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can lie; and

(ii) since this is a claim under the Minimum Wages Act, the proper forum would be the Authority appointed under S. 20 of the said Act.

The submission is that there is nothing to compute in terms of money if the workmen are entitled to wages under the Minimum Wages Act for which the proper forum would be the authority appointed under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. To substantiate his argument, Sri Cama relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur, [1980—(I) L.L.N 39], wherein it was held in Paras. 8 and 9, at page 43:

“… The Payment of Gratuity Act enacts a complete code containing detailed provisions covering all the essential features of a scheme for payment of gratuity … Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under any other Act. Therefore, the applications filed by the employee under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not lie, and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of them.”

Sri Cama also relied upon a judgment by a Division Bench of this Court, (Deshmukh, C.J, and Sri Sujata Manohar, J.) in Pastoal D'Souza v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1981 — (II) L.L.N 519] and invited my attention to Para. 12, at page 525:

“Assuming, therefore, that there can be a claim which will legitimately fall under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act as also under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, can it be said that this kind of claim before us is covered by both, and, therefore, an application under S. 33C(2) could not be said to be bad? Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments on either side and the interpretation of S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Supreme Court, we are of the view that the nature of the present dispute is such that it falls, under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act squarely, and, therefore, there is nothing to be investigated under the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reason is obvious. What is due to the workman is never the subject-matter of controversy: Whether he is paid full amount due or there has been some deduction is the only narrow question to be considered and answered in the present case. Such a dispute, being of a very narrow nature of a limited character, would, legitimately fall under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. That authority having been created specifically for certain claims which must be raised within the period of limitation, we think that a marginal or a narrow dispute of that type must be confined to the provisions of S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. Such a dispute cannot be taken to the forum contemplated under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for the simple reason that neither the entitlement nor the amount due and payable to the workman is in doubt. In our view, therefore, the present dispute should have been lodged before the Payment of Wages Act Authority, and the Presiding Committee of the Industrial Court or Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot be said that the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act as also the provisions of S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are common for every type of claim regarding payment between the employer and the employee. Though some claims may be overlapping and may legitimately fall under either of these provisions, so far as the dispute of the present type is concerned, we are of the view that it squarely falls under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act alone and does not seem to have any legitimate place for the enquiry contemplated by S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has thus taken a correct view of the matter and has lawfully rejected the application filed by the workman before him.”

9. I am afraid, these judgments are of no avail to Sri Caraa. Firstly, the Minimum Wages Act is not a self-contained code like the Payment of Gratuity Act and secondly the Division Bench of this Court decided the matter before it involving a dispute of Rs. 100 in the facts and circumstances of that case. Therefore, both the judgments are irrelevant to the issues involved in this case. A Single Judge of this Court (Dhabe, J.) in Prabhat Enlarging Works, Nagpur v. Prabhakar Antaramji Bagmare, [1985 L. & I.C 1185] held:

“It is thus clear that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, is primarily concerned with fixation of rates of minimum wages and resolving disputes, if any, about the said rates and is not concerned with enforcement of payment of wages for which the relevant provisions are contained in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and this Act. As such, the remedies under the said Act for enforcement of payment of wages cannot be barred by S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. It may also be pertinently seen that S. 24 of the said Act bars a remedy of civil suit only for recovery of wages and not the remedies under any other Act which would show that the remedy under this Act for recovery of wages is not barred. The second contention, therefore, that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, is a self-contained code and, therefore, the instant applications under S. 33C(2) of the Act are barred must, therefore, fail. I am supported in my view by the Division Bench decisions of this Court in the cases of Union Of India v. John Samuel Peters*, [1975 — II L.L.N 52]; Municipal Council, Akola v. Second Labour Court, Nagpur, [1976 — (I) L.L.N 78]; and Lal and Company v. Kulkarni (R.N), [1968 — II L.L.J 518], in which the claims of the employees for, arrears of minimum wages have been held to be maintainable under S. 33C(2) of the Act. The above decisions of this Court are binding upon me.”

[emphasis supplied]

Further, a Division Bench of this Court (Qazi and Vaze, JJ.) in Municipal Council, Achalpur v. Shaikh Rahim Shaikh Rustam, [1985 (1) C.L.R 64], observed as under:

“The provisions of S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are not inconsistent with or repugnant to each other. Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, is, therefore, not an exclusive remedy in supersession of the remedy provided by S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. A workman can make an application under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of wages even though he can recover the same by making an application under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act.”

This being the position in law, I find no substance in contentions 2 and 3 of Sri Cama.

10. The fourth contention of Sri Cama is that there is no evidence on record to show that the concerned workmen worked for as many number of years as they claimed. This submission of Sri Cama is also meritless. We are now concerned only with respondents 5 to 15 as the claims of respondents 1 to 4 who worked with the petitioner for ten to fourteen years are already settled. Respondents 5 to 15 worked with the petitioner for eight to twelve years as can be seen from their application under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ram Nihal deposed that he was in the services of the petitioner for about 13 years. Similarly, Ramnayan Sudhali deposed that he worked with the petitioner for 13 years and along with him were other 17 workmen in the employment of the petitioner. The petitioner Ramakant Yadav in his evidence did not speak a word contradicting the above evidence adduced on behalf of the workmen except making a vague statement that all the 15 workmen were not in his employment for the present (emphasis supplied). In other words, the petitioner, in the Labour Court, did not dispute the period of employment of the workmen with him. His case there was that at the time of giving evidence on 19 March 1983, the workmen were not in his employment.

11. The last contention of Sri Cama is that out of fifteen workmen only two entered the witness box and their evidence is not sufficient to draw inferences against the petitioner as was done by the Labour Court. To this, the reply is simple that it is not the quantity of the evidence, but the quality of the same, which is to be looked into and the evidence has to be read as a whole. Regard being had to the entire evidence on record, I am more than convinced about the case of the workmen and that all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are not only frivolous but also bogus.

12. It may be recalled here that respondents 1 to 15 had in all claimed Rs. 2,27,916 out of which the claims of respondents 1 to 4 are settled. It means that the claims of the first four respondents to the extent of Rs. 69,576 were settled for whatever amounts they got. Therefore, the claims of respondents 5 to 15 to the extent of Rs. 1,58,340 remains to be considered. As against this, the petitioner has now, without prejudice, filed calculations as to the amounts due to respondents 5 to 15 for the relevant period from 1 December 1974 to 30 September 1977 as under:

Name Difference per month Total months Total difference payable Less Leave Balance payable 1. Rajaram Lautan 169 34 5746.00 487 5259.00 2. Ramadhar Munosar 182 34 6188.00 546 5642.00 3. Munnar Chotkan 169 34 5746.00 487 5259.00 4. Jamina Jaglal 117 34 3978.00 351 3627.00 5. Sevak Gudun 104 34 3536.00 312 3224.00 6. Aasmohammed Mustakhimkhan 104 34 3536.00 312 3224.00 7. Chunilal Buddu 104 34 3536.00 312 3224.00 8. Ramchander Ramyadi 104 34 3536.00 312 3224.00 9. Jairam Thunsilal 104 34 3536.00 312 3224.00 10. Israyil Mohammed Hakit 136.50 34 4641.00 410.50 4240.50 11. Parag Budal 130.00 34 4420.00 390 4030.00 4739.9.00 4231.50 43167.50

Sri Shastri accepts these calculations as correct and he submits that respondents 5 to 15 are ready and willing to accept the same in full and final satisfaction of their claims for the period from 1 December 1974 to 30 September 1977. Therefore, nothing remains to be computed in terms of money as to what exactly is payable to respondents 5 to 15. They can be paid money as per the calculations filed by the petitioner as above.

13. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to pay the amounts due to respondents 5 to 15 as calculated by him, stated in the last paragraph on or before 31 October 1987 failing which he shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum on the said amounts. The petitioner had furnished security as ordered by this Court on 12 March 1984. The said security shall not be discharged till the entire amounts due to respondents 5 to 15 are paid up by him.

14. Rule is discharged with costs quantified at Rs. 11,000 which shall be divided by and between respondents 5 to 15 equally (Rs. 1,000 each).