K.K Desai, J.:— [His Lordship after setting out the facts and dealing with the first contention of the plaintiffs, proceeded.] The second contention made on behalf of the plaintiffs was that the defendants were not entitled to take out the above notice of motion before obtaining leave to defend. In that connection, Mr. Divan argued that under s. 10 of the Code the direction to Court is not to proceed with the trial of any suit. Relying upon the scheme of O. XXXVII of the Code and observations in the cases of Symon & Co. v. Palmer's Stores (1903), Limited . [1912] 1 K.B 259. and Dewanchand & Sons v. Dora Few . 1952 54 Bom. L.R 754., he contended that trial in a summary suit never commences in any event until and after a defendant obtains leave to defend. In that very connection, relying upon the observations in the case of Sennaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand . 1921 I.L.R 46 Bom. 431, S.C 23 Bom. L.R 1228., and other authorities, he pointed out that interlocutory orders are permitted to be made in suits ordered to be stayed. On the basis of these authorities, he contended that the plaintiffs had a right to issue a summons for judgment and unless the defendants at the hearing of such summons had been given leave to defend the trial of the plaintiffs' suit could not commence. The contention was that the scheme of O. XXXVII is that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment without any trial if the defendants did not obtain leave to defend. The submission on the above footing was that before considering the above notice of motion, the learned Judge should have permitted the plaintiffs to have issued a summons for judgment and considered the question about granting or refusing to the defendants leave to defend. The reply of Mr. Nariman on behalf of the defendants was that the above notice of motion claiming stay of the plaintiffs' suit does not raise defence to the plaintiffs' suit at all. The provisions in s. 10 are mandatory and obligatory and in the result whenever facts to which the provisions of s. 10 may be applicable are disclosed to or brought before a Court, it would be obligatory to order stay of suit. He further contended that the scheme of O. XXXVII now enables a defendant to file his appearance without obtaining leave in that connection. The scheme of O. XXXVII which previously prevented a defendant from appearing without obtaining leave has now been amended. In that connection, he relies upon the observations made in Krishnanath Balkrishna v. Ram Ratan . 1960 68 Bom. L.R 407. and Jagannath Murlidhar v. Rupchand . 1953 56 Bom. L.R 916.. In the last referred case, on behalf of the plaintiff, it was contended that in the summary suit that was before the Court the defendant was not entitled to take out a notice of motion for recording a compromise because he had not obtained leave to defend. The contention was negatived after noticing that the marginal note to O. XXXVII, r. 3 was “Defendant showing defence on merits to have leave to appear”. Tendolkar J., held that under O. XXIII, r. 3 it was obligatory on the Court if an agreement or compromise was proved at any time before passing a decree to record the agreement and to proceed to pass a decree in terms of such an agreement. He observed that where a defendant seeks to have a compromise recorded he is not defending a suit on merits and it was not necessary for a defendant in a summary suit to obtain leave to defend for the purpose of taking out a notice of motion for recording a lawful compromise. In the case of Krishnanath Balkrishna v. Ram Ratan Mody J. pointed out that the decision in the case of Pestonji v. Jamshedji . 1925 28 Bom. L.R 138. was given in 1925.
“…and what applied then were the provisions of O. XXXVII, r. 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. Under O. XXXVII, r. 3, it was not open to a defendant not only to defend the suit but even to appear in the suit except with the leave of the Court.” (p. 408).
2. He then referred to the amendments made in the scheme of O. XXXVII by this Court by exercising powers under s. 122 of the Civil Procedure Code and observed that after the amendments it was not necessary for the defendant to obtain leave of Court for filing his appearance although it continued to be necessary for him to obtain leave of the Court to defend the suit. In connection with the application before him made on behalf of the defendant for installments, he held that the defendant was not applying for being heard in his defence and was making an application on the footing that the decree may be passed as applied for by the plaintiffs but that decree be made payable by installments. It is sufficient to state that in our view, having regard to the scheme of O. XXXVII as amended by this Court, it is now not necessary for a defendant to obtain leave to appear in a summary suit. He can make applications which do not raise a defence to the suit without obtaining leave to defend. It is also clear that when ordering a suit to be stayed under the provisions of s. 10 the questions that the Court decides are not those of merits of claim and defence between the parties. The Court has to ascertain if a previously instituted suit is pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction and whether the matter in issue in the subsequently instituted suit is directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. Mr. Nariman is right in relying upon the observations of the High Court at Allahabad in the case of Ramrichpal Singh v. Dayanand Samp . [1955] A.I.R All. 309, F.B, where Malik C.J, observed (p. 313):
“To my mind a plea under s. 10, Civil P.C does not constitute a defence to the suit…”.
3. It is clear that Mr. Divan was not right when he contended that by claiming stay of the plaintiffs' suit by the above notice of motion the defendants were raising defence to the suit.
4. Now, even if Mr. Divan might be right that the trial in a summary suit does not effectively commence unless a defendant obtains leave to defend and complies with the conditions imposed for such leave, in our view a defendant in a summary suit would be entitled to apply to the Court for stay of the subsequently instituted suit. This is so because the true intent of the provisions in s. 10 is that common matters in issue in two suits should be ordinarily decided in a previously instituted suit.
5. This would be the position even if the subsequently instituted suit may be a summary suit. Now, if the contention made by Mr. Divan is accepted, a plaintiff in subsequently instituted summary suit where defendant is refused leave, to defend or does not comply with conditions imposed for leave to defend would get a decree as prayed without any trial whatsoever. In our view, the scheme of s. 10 does not permit such a situation to arise. This would be so even if Mr. Divan is right in his submission that trial in a summary suit only commences after the defendant obtains leave to defend. In our view, an application under s. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not raise any defence on the merits of controversy between the parties and relates only to the question about the proper Court for decision of such issues. This second contention, therefore fails.
[The rest of the judgment is not material to this report,].
6. Appeal dismissed.