Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Women's Right of Property Act (XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938).
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Women's Right of Property Act (XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The testator Sadashiv Laxmiram Bhatt died on 13-5-1939 leaving a will dated 23-4-1939. He named his wife Bai Shiva and daughter Bai Savita (married to Tripurashankar Shivashankar) and described movable and immovable property in the will.

The will (exhibit 27) appointed Bai Shiva "waras" of all properties, directed that she should take possession and "enjoy independently all the remaining property" according to her liking; and then provided that whatever remained after Bai Shiva's death would be taken by Bai Savita (or, if Savita was not alive, by her heirs).

After the testator's death, Bai Shiva, who obtained possession, executed a settlement (described as a dharmadai settlement) on 10-8-1940 disposing of movables worth Rs. 4,345 and appointed trustees to carry out the directions of that settlement. Bai Shiva died on 7-9-1940.

Bai Savita instituted suit on 20-4-1941 seeking recovery of Rs. 4,845 (alleging Bai Shiva did not take an absolute estate under the will and thus lacked authority to make the settlement). The trial court accepted Savita's contention and decreed the suit. The trustees appealed to the District Court of Ahmedabad, where the Assistant Judge reversed the trial court, holding that Bai Shiva had an absolute estate and therefore could validly make the settlement; the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. Bai Savita then filed this second appeal against the District Court's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on construction of the will dated 23-4-1939, the testator conferred on his wife Bai Shiva an absolute estate (including the power to alienate movables) or only a life estate subject to a gift over to the daughter Bai Savita.
  2. Whether the settlement (dharmadai settlement) executed by Bai Shiva during her lifetime in respect of the movables is valid if Bai Shiva took only a life estate under the will.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Bai Savita / Mr. Thakor)

  • Mr. Thakor (for the appellant) relied on numerous cases where similar wills were construed to give the widow only a life estate; he contended that the testator intended only a limited estate in the widow because he also provided for succession to the daughter after the widow's death.
  • He argued that in construing Hindu wills the Court should bear in mind the Privy Council observation that Hindus generally desire that estates be retained in the family and that women do not ordinarily take absolute estates with power to alienate; therefore the widow should be held to take only a life interest unless the will shows a contrary intention.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments presented in the proceedings before this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
49 I.A 251 Warning that it is dangerous to construe the words of one will by reference to construction adopted in a different will. The Court cites this as a caution against relying too readily on superficially similar decisions when construing the present will.
27 Bom. L.R 3802 (Marten, J.) Approach to construing wills: look at the whole will, reconcile clauses, and first determine true construction irrespective of authority. The Court follows this methodology — read the will as a whole and seek the testator's intention independently before resorting to precedents.
(1901) 1 Ch. 9393 Referenced in support of the general proposition about construing an instrument as a whole before applying authority. Included in the Court's statement of method; used as part of the authorities that indicate the proper approach to construction.
57 I.A 2824 Privy Council: the intention of the testator must be gathered from the terms of the will read as a whole; numerous cited cases differed on terms. Used to reinforce that the words of the will themselves are determinative and other cases may differ and thus have limited assistance.
35 I.A 1186 Referred to as approving certain observations of Privy Council about Hindu wills (context noted). Considered by the Court while evaluating the line of authorities but not treated as decisive against finding an absolute estate here.
35 I.A 177 Example where Privy Council gave effect to the full intention of the testator and held a Hindu widow got an absolute estate. Relied upon to show that Hindu wives may get absolute estates when the will so indicates; supports the Court's conclusion in the present case.
15 Pat. 1518 High Court view that it is not a universal rule that Hindus are averse to giving absolute estates to females or that women do not take absolute estates which they can alienate. Quoted to support the proposition that one should not assume a widow cannot be given absolute ownership; assists the Court's reasoning.
45 Bom. L.R 6699 (Kania, J.) Observation that earlier notions about Hindu reluctance to give absolute estates are outdated; mention of Hindu Women's Right of Property Act (XVIII of 1937 as amended). The Court expresses agreement with Kania, J.'s view and cites it to justify not approaching the will with preconceived notions specific to Hindus.
Hindu Women's Right of Property Act (XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938) Statute cited to show legislative change affecting notions of widows' rights and ownership. Used by the Court (via Kania, J.'s observations) to note changing legal and social context relevant to will construction.
24 Bom. 42010 Stated in the opinion to have held no real difference between 'waras' (heir) and 'malik' (owner). Cited to support the Court's conclusion that the word "waras" can convey absolute ownership in appropriate context.
38 Bom. L.R 175 Discusses authorities and holds that where it is clear a will intends an absolute gift over after life interests, the intention is given effect; also treats the meaning of words like 'waras'. The Court relies on Broomfield, J.'s observations in this decision extensively to support that 'waras' may confer absolute estate unless a contrary intention appears.
57 I.A 282 Referenced in relation to use of the word "waras" and its effect in conferring absolute estate (text references this decision in that context). Cited as authority that the use of "waras" has been held to give an absolute estate to widows in at least one case.
24 I.A 7612 Referenced with respect to the meaning of words like 'malak' (malik) conferring heritable and alienable estate absent context to the contrary. Used to argue analogy that 'waras' should be given similar meaning as conferring heritable and alienable estate unless context shows otherwise.
35 I.A 17 Decision bearing on whether words conferring absolute ownership require express power of alienation; discussed as changing earlier Bombay presumption. The Court treats it as an important decision that overruled earlier Bombay presumption and supports giving effect to diapositive words conferring absolute ownership unless displaced by context.
49 I.A 113 Explains 35 I.A 17: power of alienation need not be expressly conferred where words give absolute ownership unless context indicates otherwise. Relied upon for the principle that express words of alienation are not necessary if diapositive words indicate absolute ownership.
56 I.A 37214 Statement of the question: whether diapositive words create an estate of inheritance and whether subsequent clauses are sufficient to displace such words or are merely repugnant. Quoted to frame the proper test for deciding whether subsequent clauses cut down what otherwise would be an absolute estate.
22 Bom. 40916 Case where widow was held to take only a life estate though words of power were used; cited by appellant. Court reviews it but notes it was decided prior to 35 I.A 17 and that its reasoning may have been affected by later Privy Council authority.
24 Bom. 420 Case where wife was called rightful heir and daughter named as heir after wife's death; held wife took only life estate. Court distinguishes this case from the present, noting different terms and that it predates later controlling decisions.
25 Bom. L.R 18917 Case where widow's powers were discussed and the gift over to son was an important circumstance leading to life estate finding. Court notes special circumstances of that case (gift over to son) and treats it as distinguishable from the present facts.
49 I.A 1 Case where wife was constituted owner and daughters were to take whatever remained after her death; held widow had absolute estate. Applied as a directly analogous authority: where the will gives the widow full authority and names successors only to what remains, that indicates an absolute estate.
A.I.R 1935 Mad. 701418 Referenced together with a Madras decision where wife was given full authority to enjoy property and remainder went to named person only if something remained. Considered by Court as comparable authority that such enactments indicate an intention to give the wife maximum enjoyment and an absolute estate subject only to what remained at her death.
A.I.R 1935 Mad. 704 Decision holding the testator intended to give his wife as full an enjoyment as possible and that what remained at her death would pass to the named person. Relied upon as analogous to present facts and supportive of holding the widow had an absolute estate and could alienate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court sets out the foundational rule for construing wills: ascertain the testator's intention by reading the will as a whole and reconciling its clauses, rather than mechanically applying constructions from other, superficially similar wills. The Court explicitly warns (following cited authorities) against construing the words of the present will merely by analogy with other wills.

Applying that approach, the Judge reads the material clauses of exhibit 27 in sequence:

  • The testator appoints Bai Shiva "waras" of all his movable and immovable properties.
  • He directs that Bai Shiva should take possession "of her own freewill" and "enjoy independently all the remaining property ... in such way as she liked."
  • The will then specifies that "after the death of my wife Bai Shiva whatever moveable and immoveable property may be left by her the said property ... is to be taken possession of by my daughter" — i.e., the daughter takes only what remains at the wife's death.

The Court interprets these clauses together to infer the testator's intention: the use of "waras," the express direction that the wife should "enjoy ... in such way as she liked," and the specification that the daughter takes only what remains, together indicate an intention to confer an absolute estate on the wife rather than a mere life estate. The Court relies on authority (including Privy Council decisions and later High Court and Bombay decisions) for subsidiary legal propositions, notably:

  • Where diapositive words create an estate of inheritance, subsequent clauses must clearly displace that effect; otherwise diapositive words carry the force of granting an absolute estate.
  • It is not necessary that the will expressly confer a power of alienation upon the widow where words of absolute ownership appear; absolute ownership implies associated rights unless context shows otherwise.
  • Terms such as "waras" have been held in previous cases to be capable of conveying an absolute, heritable and alienable estate in the absence of contrary contextual indications.

The Court considers the appellant's reliance on older Bombay decisions that had found life estates in superficially similar wills, but distinguishes them on two grounds: (1) some predate later Privy Council authority (particularly 35 I.A 17) which altered the earlier presumption against alienability by widows, and (2) the terms of those wills often more clearly assumed that the daughter would receive the whole estate at the wife's death, whereas the present will expressly contemplates that there may be nothing left at the wife's death (indicating the wife had full power to dispose of the property during her lifetime).

The Court also expressly accepts the view (as articulated by Kania, J. in an earlier reported decision) that modern statutory and decisional developments (including the Hindu Women's Right of Property Act) counsel against approaching Hindu wills with an a priori assumption that widows do not take absolute estates. The judge states agreement with that departure from older presumptions.

On the combined factual reading and the cited legal principles, the Court concludes that Bai Shiva received an absolute estate under the will, and that nothing in the will's subsequent clauses sufficiently displaces the diapositive effect of the word "waras" together with the other words of enjoyment and the specific gift over to the daughter only of whatever remained.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed. The Court holds that, on true construction of the will, Bai Shiva was given an absolute estate and therefore the settlement made by her during her lifetime cannot be challenged on the ground that she lacked authority to make that settlement.

Direct consequences:

  • The decision of the District Court (Assistant Judge) holding that Bai Shiva had an absolute estate is affirmed; the plaintiff's suit (Bai Savita) fails and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • The deed of settlement executed by Bai Shiva in respect of the movables is valid and cannot be set aside on the basis that she had only a life estate.

Broader implications: The opinion reiterates and applies existing principles about will construction and the effect of diapositive words such as "waras" and supports the proposition that, absent clear context to the contrary, words showing full ownership (and coupled with directions to "enjoy" property freely) should be given effect. The Court does not state that it is creating a new, binding precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts before it.

    Bai Savita v. Girjashankar Mohanlal

    Rajadhyaksha, J.:— The point that arises for consideration in this second appeal is about the construction of a will of one Sadashiv Laxmiram Bhatt who died on 13-5-1939, leaving a will dated 23-4-1939. He left behind him his wife Bai Shiva and his daughter Bai Savita who was married to one Tripurashankar Shivashankar. After referring to these relatives and giving the description of his movable and immovable properties, he proceeded to state as follows in exhibit 27:

    “I appoint my wife Bai Shiva waras of all this because Bai Shiva stays with me and she serves me very well and I have full faith that in future also she will serve me very well and hence by this will I make my wife Bai Shiva waras of all the properties, movable and immovable, after my death.”

    2. The testator then stated that during his lifetime he was full owner of this property and thus entitled to add to or decrease it. But that after his death, all the properties, moveable and immoveable, and all the dues that were due and that might be due and what was omitted to be written in the will but may be found, Bai Shiva was to take in her own possession of her own freewill, that out of the same according to his reputation and custom, Bai Shiva and his daughter Bai Savita and his nephew Lalshankar and his son-in-law Tripurashankar were to perform the funeral obsequies and ceremonies. After the performance of the obsequies and ceremonies, “Bai Shiva was to enjoy independently all the remaining property, moveable and immoveable, in a way that was according to her liking and in such way as she liked.” The testator then went on to say:

    “After the death of my wife Bai Shiva whatever moveable and immoveable property may be left by her the said property both moveable and immoveable is to be taken possession of by my daughter and out of that property my daughter Savita, my nephew Lalshankar and my son-in-law Tripurashankar should perform the funeral rights of my wife Bai Shiva, and whatever movable or immoveable property was then left should be taken possession of by Savita and, if Savita was not alive, by her waras sons and they should make dispositions of it in any manner they liked.”

    3. After the death of the testator, Bai Shiva who obtained possession of the properties made disposition of the moveables worth Rs. 4,345 by a deed described as dharmadai settlement on 10-8-1940, and certain persons were appointed as trustees to carry out the directions contained in the settlement deed. Bai Shiva died on 7-9-1940, and thereupon Bai Savita instituted the present suit on 20-4-1941, to get back the sum of Rs. 4,845 on the allegation that under the will of the deceased Sadashiv, Bai Shiva did not get an absolute estate and was not therefore entitled to effect a settlement of the moveable properties in the manner she had done. The trial Court accepted this contention and decreed the suit. The trustees then appealed to the District Court of Ahmedabad, and the learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal came to the conclusion that Bai Shiva got an absolute estate under the will of her deceased husband and that therefore, she was entitled to make a settlement in respect of the moveables. He, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. It is against that order that Bai Savita the original plaintiff has come in second appeal.

    4. Mr. Thakor on behalf of the appellant has referred to a large number of cases where, according to him in wills similar to the present one, the Courts have come to the conclusion that only a life estate was conferred upon the widow. But in this connection it is just as well to remember the warning which was given by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 49 I.A 251. At page 32 they say:

    “Their Lordships may observe that it is always dangerous to construe the words of one will by the construction of more or less similar words in a different will, which was adopted by a Court in another case.”

    5. The proper way to approach a case of this kind was laid down by this Court in 27 Bom. L.R 3802 where Marten, J. observed as follows (page 385):

    “But it is equally clear that the whole of a will has to be looked to, to ascertain the intentions of a testator, and that the Court must, if it can, reconcile the various clauses in a will. Further, as pointed out by Joyce, J. in (1901) 1 Ch. 9393 as being an observation which has been made in a large number of cases, one has first to endeavor to see what is the true construction of the particular will before the Court irrespective of any authority, and then to see whether there is any authority which prevents one from coming to that conclusion and not first to turn to the authorities, and then to see whether the particular will before the Court comes nearest to one will or to another will in the decided cases.”

    6. In 57 I.A 2824 the Privy Council again emphasised the same point when they observed at page 289 as follows:

    “The intention of the testator must be gathered from the terms of the will, reading it as a whole, and act much assistance is to be gathered from the numerous cases which were cited to the Board, and in which the terms of the wills under consideration differed from the terms of the will in the present appeal.”

    7. Having regard to these observations as regards the principle to be borne in mind in construing wills, it seems to me that reading the will as a whole, the testator in this case intended to confer upon his wife Bai Shiva an absolute estate and not a limited estate as contended by Mr. Thakor. In the first part of the will, the testator makes his wife Bai Shiva the waras of all his moveable and immovable property. Then after giving directions as regards the performance of the obsequies, he directs Bai Shiva to take possession of the properties of her own free will and to enjoy the same independently according to her liking, and then he goes on to say that whatever property may remain after Bai Shiva had enioyed it during her lifetime, it was only that property which Bai Savita was to take possession of and enjoy after the death of Bai Shiva. The use of the word “waras,” the direction that she should enjoy the property in accordance with her own wish and liking, and that it was only that property which was left, ton the death of Bai Shiva, that was to go to Bai Savita, all in my opinion go to show that the testator intended to confer upon Bai Shiva an absolute estate.

    8. It was contended by Mr. Thakor, that in construing such wills one had to bear in mind the observations of the Privy Council in 2 I.A 75, where they observe as follows (p. 15):

    “In construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to me devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family; and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. Having reference to these considerations, together with the whole of a will, all the expressions of which must be taken together without any one being insisted upon to the exclusion of others, their Lordships are of opinion that the two Courts in India, who both substantially agree upon this point, are right in construing the intention of the testator to have been that the widow of his son should not take an absolute estate which she should have power to dispose of absolutely, but that she took an estate subject to her daughters succeeding her in that estate.”

    9. It is true that these observations of the Privy Council have again been referred to with approval in 35 I.A 1186. But in a case which was decided a few months earlier in 35 I.A 177 their Lordships gave effect to the full intentions of the testator, and although it was a will of a Hindu made in favour of his wife, they held that the widow got an absolute estate and not merely a life interest. In 15 Pat. 1518 the High Court took the view that it was not a rule of universal application that the Hindus are averse to giving absolute estates to females or that women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate and very recently Kania, J. has made the following observations in 45 Bom. L.R 6699 (p. 675):

    “Observations from several cases laying stress on the fact that in construing the will of a Hindu it should be remembered that he did not want, particularly in respect of any immoveable property, to give his widow an absolute estate and that he should be deemed conscious of that and that normally she would have no power of alienation, were read out. I must point out that those observations to say the least are entirely out of date. With the process of time notions have changed and that is recognized by the Hindu Women's Right of Property Act (XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938). The Courts have now to recognise that in the absence of any testamentary disposition on the death of a man his widow acquires an equal right with the sons in her husband's estate. It should be recognised also that a Hindu testator has full knowledge of what the word ‘owner’ (malik) means and it need not necessarily be thought that when he consciously uses that word, unless otherwise indicated, he means anything less than full ownership as construed in the case of any other citizen of India. Whatever may have been the view in considering the wills of Hindus in 1874 (when the basis of this discussion appears to have started in reported cases), the trend of the later decisions clearly is that if words showing that full ownership is given to the widow are used, they are not to be lightly brushed aside on some supported idea of a Hindu giving restricted estate only to his widow or female relations. It is true that a will as a whole must be construed and if there are words which clearly limit the words previously used giving an absolute estate the same should be given effect to. But in my opinion it is improper in the year 1942 to approach a will of a Hindu with any preconceived notions which are not applicable to a testator of any other community.”

    10. With respect I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by Kania, J. It was then argued that in the present will the word “malik” has not been used but that Bai Shiva had been made a waras of the estate. In 24 Bom. 42010 this Court held that there was no real difference in the meaning of the word “waras,” i.e, heirs, and the word “malik,” i.e, the owner. Broomfield, J. adopted this view in 38 Bom. L.R 17511 at p. 182. In 57 I.A 282 the word that was used was “waras” and it was held that this word gave an absolute estate to the widows of the testator. Similarly, the word “waras” was held to confer an absolute estate on the widow in 15 Pat. 151. If then the word “warisa” has the same connotation as the word “malik” and the word “malak” has been held in 24 I.A 7612 as conferring a heritable and an alienable estate in the absence of context indicating a different meaning, it must follow that the word “waras” must be given the same meaning as conferring upon Bai Shiva an absolute heritable and an alienable estate unless there was something in the context and in the words used in the subsequent part of the will which could be construed as cutting down an absolute estate as indicated by the word “waras.”

    11. It is true that in the present will there are no words conferring expressly on Bai Shiva the right to alienate the property. The case in 35 I.A 17 was explained by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 49 I.A 113, as laying down that the power of alienation need not be conferred upon the devisee by express terms, but that if words were used conferring absolute ownership upon the wife the wife enjoyed all the rights of ownership without their being conferred by express and additional words unless the circumstances or the context were sufficient to show that such absolute ownership was not intended. The point to consider in each case was stated by the Privy Council in 56 I.A 37214, as follows:

    “The question for determination has always been whether there are diapositive words creating an estate of inheritance in the first instance; and, if so, whether the subsequent restrictive clauses are sufficient to displace the effect of such diapositive words or whether such subsequent clauses are merely repugnant to the absolute estate.”

    12. In the present instance, in my opinion, the word ‘waras’ confers an absolute estate of inheritance, and there are not only no restrictive clauses, but the words subsequently used, in my opinion, emphasise the absolute nature of the inheritance, because the will goes on to say that if any property remained on the death of Bai Shiva, it was only such property that was to be taken possession of by Bai Savita.

    13. All the authorities which are referred to at the Bar were considered by this Court in 38 Bom. L.R 175, where Broomfieldn, J. made the following observations (p. 180):

    “These authorities, in my opinion, do establish this, viz., that where it is clear on reading the instrument as a whole that the testator intended an absolute gift over after a life estate or series of life estates, then that intention will be given effect to in spite of the fact that the language used would ordinarily, that is apart from the contrary intention appearing from the context have sufficed to confer an absolute estate on the person taking in the first instance. Those taking the estate ultimately will then gat a vested interest at once. The case sites? by the learned counsel for the respondents in this connection, 35 I.A 17; 49 I.A 1; 49 I.A 129;15 49 I.A 25 and 24 I.A 76, contain nothing inconsistent with this proposition, since what is laid down is those cases as to the nature of the estate taken by a Hindu widow, is all subject to the condition that a contrary intention does not appear from the context.”

    14. Mr. Thakor relied on the principles laid down in the above quotation and contended that although the word ‘waras’ might have sufficed to confer an absolute estate on Bai Shiva, the intention of the testator was to confer a life estate inasmuch as he also wanted Bai Savita the succeed to the property after the death of Bai Shiva. In this connection he referred to two or three cases of the Court where the word ‘malak’ or ‘waras’ has been used in connection with conferring an estate upon the wife and still this Court had come to the conclusion that only a life estate was given to the widow. The first case that he relied upon was 22 Bom. 40916 where the testator made a will making his wife Bai Suraj the powers of the property. The wife had powers to do in the same way as he had absolute powers to do, and in case of his wife's death, his daughter Mahalaxmi was the owner of the pro-property; and it was held that Bai Suraj took only a life estate under the will, and Mahalaxmi got a vested remainder. Another case on which Mr. Thakor relied was 24 Bom. 420 where the tesla, tor said that after his death his wife was the rightful heir, and that after the death his wife his daughter Bai Nathi was the rightful heir. It was held that the wife took a life estate and Bai Nathi took an estate vested in interest from the testator's death. But both these two cases were decided prior to the decision of the Privy Council in 35 I.A 17 and, as pointed out by Brcomfield, J. in 38 Bom. L.R 175, following the dictum of Macleod C.J in 25 Bom. L.R 18917, 35 I.A 17 had overruled the view previously ??? in Bombay that there was a presumption that a widow was not intended to have the power of alienation end that therefore in 22 Bom. 409 and 24 Bom. 420 the Court might not have held that the widow had, an absolute estate any how even apart from the gift over.”

    15. In both these cases, the terms of the will more or less assumed that after the death of tbs widow the whole of the estate would go to the daughter. There were no words in those wills, as we find in the present one, which would suggest that there may possibly be no estate left on the death, of the wife, indicating thereby that the wife had an absolute power of alienation over the property. Mr. Thakor also referred to the case in 25 Bom. L.R 189. Undoubtedly in that case the widow was given power “to consume, enjoy or do what she liked with respect to what remained out of the property of the testator,” and after the death of the wife the son Chimanlal was made the owner of the estate. But the special considerations of that case have been pointed out in 38 Bom. L.R 175. At p. 181 Broomfield, J. observes:

    “As for 25 Bom. L.R 189 the gift over in that case was to the testator's son, and that was the circumstance on which the Court mainly relied in holding that the widow was intended to have a life interest only.”

    16. In my opinion, therefore, none of the cases relied upon by Mr. Thakor—two of which were decided prior to 35 I.A 17 — are of any assistance in the present case for the purpose of holding that the widow got only a life estate in the property.

    17. The two cases which are more in point are 49 I.A 1 and A.I.R 1935 Mad. 701418. In the first case, by cl. 3 of the will, the testator constituted his wife the owner of the property and provided that she should leave whatever property might remain after her death to the two named daughters as she liked. This is a clear indication that the testator intended his wife to do what she liked with the property and thus constituted her an absolute owner thereof, and the daughters were named as the persons who were to succeed to the property only if any such property remained at the death of the wife. Under these circumstances, their Lordships held that the testator gave an absolute estate to the widow. Similarly, in the present case, the clause which makes the daughter Bai Savita the owner of whatever property remain on the death of Bai Shiva clearly indicates that Bai Shiva was to have an absolute estate in the property and Bai Savita was intended to succeed only to such property as remained at the death of Bai Shiva. Similarly, in A.I.R 1935 Mad. 704, the wife of the testator was given a full authority to enjoy the property, for effecting wills, etc., and that if any property remained at the time of her death, the testator directed that it should be taken by Nataraja Pillai after her death. On a construction of the will, it was held that

    “the testator had the intention of giving to his wife a right to enjoy the property as absolutely as possible and that if she did not, during her lifetime, get rid of the property or that into which it had been turned and did not leave it by will, her enjoyment would come to an end with her death and what was left… would pass to N.”

    18. Both these cases in my opinion are clearly applicable in construing the will in the present case.

    19. I am therefore of opinion that on the true construction of the will the testator gave an absolute estate to Bai Shiva and that therefore the deed of settlement made by her during her lifetime cannot be challenged on the ground that Bai Shiva had no authority to effect that settlement. In my opinion the view taken by the learned Assistant Judge is correct.

    20. The appeal fails and is therefore dismissed with costs.

    21. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bai Savita v. Girjashankar Mohanlal
    (Apr 8, 1946)