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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff applied for an order permitting her examination de bene esse on two grounds:

  • She is a woman who, by the customs and manners of her country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public (reliance on section 132(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  • She is seven months pregnant and seeks protection in case childbirth incapacitates her from later giving evidence.

The defendants indicated they would accept an adjournment of the hearing for about three months to allow the plaintiff to recover from childbirth. The plaintiff's husband filed the only affidavit supporting the summons, deposing that the plaintiff "has never appeared in public." The matter came before the Court for directions on whether the plaintiff should be allowed private examination by the trial Judge (de bene esse or by commission) or whether she must appear in open Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, as a woman who observes purdah, falls within the exemption under section 132(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore ought not to be compelled to make a personal appearance in Court.
  2. Whether the plaintiff should be permitted examination de bene esse because she is seven months pregnant and may become permanently incapacitated from giving evidence due to childbirth.
  3. Whether the phrases "personal appearance in Court" (section 132(1)) and "attending the Court" (Order 26, Rule 1) are synonymous, and the proper construction of "in Court" (i.e., whether it means the public courtroom or the Court building/other court-connected private rooms).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position

  • The plaintiff seeks an order for examination de bene esse on two grounds: (a) exemption from public appearance under section 132(1) due to observance of purdah; and (b) pregnancy (seven months) with possible risk of incapacity from childbirth.
  • The supporting affidavit (by the plaintiff's husband) states that the plaintiff "has never appeared in public."

Defendants' Position

  • The defendants offered a reasonable alternative of adjourning the hearing for approximately three months to enable the plaintiff to give birth and recover, thus removing the need for de bene esse examination on the pregnancy ground.
  • The defendants thereby implicitly accepted that if the only obstacle were the present pregnancy, an adjournment would meet the plaintiff's concerns.

Counsel and Authority Arguments Referred to the Court

  • Counsel (Mr. Somjee) pointed out earlier judicial treatments of the question, including the decision of Edgley, J. in I.L.R (1941) 2 Cal. 1552 and earlier Calcutta cases (including Trevelyan, J. in 26 Cal. 651 and a decision by Lort-Williams, J.).
  • Reference was also made to consideration of the point in Allahabad and Madras, and to a not-fully-reported decision of this Court in which a similar order had been made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
I.L.R (1941) 2 Cal. 1552 (Edgley, J.) Considered the relationship between the phrases "personal appearance" and "attending in Court" and treated them as synonymous. The Court regarded this authority as part of a strong body of decisions and treated the two phrases as synonymous for purposes of construing section 132(1) and Order 26, Rule 1.
56 Cal. 8651 (Lort-Williams, J.) Expressed the view that "personal appearance in Court" differs from "attending in Court" — e.g., a woman conveyed in a palki or completely veiled need not be regarded as "personally appearing." The Court considered this a minority view and distinguished it from the majority authorities; the judge did not adopt this interpretation as settled law.
26 Cal. 651 (Trevelyan, J.) Warned against forcing into public gaze a woman who may have temporarily left purdah and might wish to return; urged caution before denying exemption. The Court cited and relied on this passage to support the proposition that mere prior instances of going outside purdah do not automatically defeat a claim to protection from public appearance.
Unreported decision of this Court (details not provided) An order for examination on the ground of observance of purdah was in fact made in at least one unreported instance. The Court acknowledged that such an order exists in the unreported record produced, but the facts of that case were not known to the Court and thus had limited effect on the present decision.
References to decisions in Allahabad and Madras (unspecified) Noted as having considered the same or similar question. The Court acknowledged that the point has been considered in those jurisdictions, but specific citations or reasoning from them were not reproduced in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages, dealing first with the pregnancy ground and then with the purdah/personal-appearance ground.

1. Pregnancy Ground

  • The defendants offered an adjournment of about three months so the plaintiff could give birth and recover; the Court found this reasonable and that an adjournment would "completely meet the case" except where childbirth might cause permanent incapacity.
  • The judge stated willingness to make an order for de bene esse examination on the pregnancy ground if the plaintiff felt that childbirth could permanently prevent her from giving evidence. The plaintiff was given three weeks to decide whether to seek de bene esse examination on the basis of risk from childbirth.
  • Any such de bene esse order would be subject to the condition that, if the plaintiff is alive at trial, her deposition would not be read without leave of the trial Judge; if she dies and the suit is continued by personal representatives, the deposition would be available.

2. Purdah / "Personal Appearance" Ground (Section 132(1) CPC)

  • The judge compared the language of section 132(1) ("personal appearance in Court") with Order 26, Rule 1 (empowering commissions to examine those exempted from "attending the Court") and noted textual differences, but observed that prior decisions (particularly Edgley, J.) have treated the phrases as synonymous. The judge concluded the body of authority treating them as synonymous was strong and should be regarded as settled.
  • The judge took judicial notice that among Muslims and some other communities many women observe purdah to varying degrees; the plaintiff is a Kutchi Memon and admitted to observing purdah, but the strictness of her observance was disputed.
  • The husband's affidavit saying the plaintiff "has never appeared in public" was treated as imprecise; the judge interpreted it to mean she avoids exposure to public gaze and goes out heavily veiled when necessary, rather than literally never leaving her birthplace.
  • The Court observed that the plaintiff had previously attended court on at least one occasion (when the plaint was sworn) and had been present in certain court offices; the judge held that a past instance of public attendance does not automatically bar relief. Trevelyan, J.'s observation was cited to stress caution before depriving a woman of the ability to return to purdah.
  • The judge considered whether "in Court" means the public courtroom or any part of the Court building (including a judge's private chamber). Reference to section 138 (exemption for persons of exalted rank) suggested that "in Court" can mean the Court building. Nevertheless, the judge reasoned that examining a veiled woman in a private room or the judge's chamber (or at her residence) would not realistically expose her to the public gaze, and that even if a strict textual construction required otherwise, the trial Judge could examine her privately or go to her residence.
  • The judge contrasted the position of a plaintiff with that of an ordinary witness: a witness can be compelled by summons, but a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be examined (no witness summons would be issued for the plaintiff). If the plaintiff declines to be examined, she may lose the case, but she is not subject to compulsion to give evidence.
  • On balance, the judge held that if the plaintiff truly observes purdah so strictly that even a private examination in a judge's chamber would offend her modesty, she still has the option of persuading the trial Judge to examine her at her residence; if she does not observe purdah that strictly, she may not fall within section 132(1)'s protection against being compelled to appear in public.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court granted limited relief and directed that the plaintiff be given a choice within three weeks. Specifically:

  • The plaintiff is at liberty to take an order for examination de bene esse under Order 18, Rule 16 within the next three weeks if she so desires.
  • The terms of that order are that, if the plaintiff is alive at the hearing, her deposition shall not be read on behalf of the plaintiff without the leave of the learned trial Judge. If she dies and the suit is continued by her personal representatives, the deposition will be usable.
  • If the plaintiff does not take up the de bene esse order within three weeks, no substantive order is made, and the costs of the present application are reserved to the learned trial Judge.
  • Liberty is reserved to the plaintiff to apply to the learned trial Judge for private examination by him either in his Chamber, at her residence, or otherwise.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff has a time-limited option to secure de bene esse examination with protective conditions; the defendants' suggested adjournment remains an available remedy; the trial Judge retains discretion to permit private examination in his chamber or at the plaintiff's residence.
  • The opinion does not announce a broad new legal principle or depart from established authorities; instead, it applies and follows existing case law and leaves the trial Judge flexible discretion as to how to hear the plaintiff's evidence if necessary.

Order pronounced. Costs of this application reserved to the trial Judge. Counsel certified. "Order accordingly."

    Mariambai v. Abdul Hamid Suleman

    1. This is a summons by the plaintiff in the suit for her examination de bene esse on two grounds: first, that she is a woman who, according to the custom and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public; and, secondly, on the ground that she is seven months gone in pregnancy. I need say nothing about the merits of the case, except that it is obvious from the nature of the plaint that the plaintiff herself is a most material—I might almost say vital—witness, which makes it very desirable that, if possible, her evidence should be heard by the learned Judge who tries the case himself. I shall deal first with the second of the two grounds on which the present summons is based. The defendants have adopted what seems to me a very reasonable attitude in this case, and they say that they are quite prepared that the hearing of the suit should be adjourned for, say, three months, or such other period as will enable the plaintiff to have completely recovered from the effect of giving birth to the present child and not yet to be concerned with producing another. That would completely meet the case except for one fact, which is that a child birth, at best, is a transaction entailing a certain amount of danger, and it may be that the plaintiff may desire to be examined de bene esse on the ground that she may possibly be permanently incapacitated from giving evidence as a result of what she is about to do in two months' time. I should be prepared to make an order on this ground if the plaintiff thinks it worth while to have it. I would give her, say, three weeks to consider whether she would like to be examined de bene esse in view of the risk of child birth. If she decides to take the order for de bene esse examination on that ground, it would be on the terms that if at the trial the plaintiff is still alive, her deposition is not to be read without the leave of the trial Judge. If, on the other hand, she unfortunately dies and the suit is continued by her personal representatives, then of course her deposition will be available for what it is worth. But the other ground, on which this order is sought raises a question of much more general importance and one on which apparently there is no reported decision of this Court, though it has been considered at least once in Allahabad and Madras and on a number of occasions in Calcutta. section 132(1) of the cpc, says:

    “Women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, shall be exempt from personal appearance in Court.”

    2. It is interesting to compare the wording of that section with that of O. 26, R. 1, which empowers the Court to issue a commission for the examination of any person resident within the local limits of its jurisdiction who is exempted under the Code from “attending the Court.” In 56 Cal. 8651 Lort-Williams, J. took the view that “personal appearance in Court” means a different thing from “attending in Court” and that a woman cannot be said to be “personally appearing” in Court when she is in a palki, or veiled completely in a burkha, or otherwise so enclosed that no part of her anatomy is visible to the public gaze. If the matter were res integra, I think I should agree with the learned Judge, because the Legislature having used two different expressions the Legislature presumably intended to convey two different shades of meaning; though this view does involve this serious difficulty that in the very next section to S. 132, namely, S. 133, the Legislature has used the words “personal appearance” obviously as synonymous with “attendance.” Lort-Williams, J. however appears to be in a minority of one among the learned Judges in this country who have considered this question, because in all the other cases which are very fully reviewed in the last reported case, a decision of Edgley, J. in I.L.R (1941) 2 Cal. 1552, the two phrases have been considered synonymous, and I think this body of authority is so strong that I must regard it as settled that they are. That, however, does not conclude the matter. I have to ask myself what women, according to the customs and manners of this country, “ought not to be compelled to appear in public,” and if so whether the plaintiff has satisfied me that she is one of them. The matter stands thus: I am entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that among the Muslims and some other communities a considerable number of women observe purdah, some less strictly than others: but also that women of the plaintiff's community — she is a Kutchi Memon—often do attend Court (veiled) and give evidence. It is common ground that the plaintiff here does observe purdah, but it is disputed how strictly she does so. Her husband, who has made the only affidavit in support of the summons, deposed that she “has never appeared in public.” That cannot be literally true. Strictly construed, it means that she has never, since the day of her birth, left the place of her birth. Of course, that cannot be what the deponent intends to convey. What, I think, he means is that she has never exposed herself to the public gaze, that if and when necessity compelled her to go out into the public street, she has always gone as completely covered as the circumstances reasonably permitted, and that she did not, without necessity, go in public places. As against that, it is not disputed that she attended this Court on one occasion, when the plaint was sworn, and she attended two different offices in this Court, that of the Interpreter and that of the Officer before whom she swore her plaint. It has been pointed out by Mr. Somjee that Edgley, J. considered a very similar point in the case to which I have just referred, and what is more, in the two earlier Calcutta cases similar facts have been considered. For example, in the earliest of them, 26 Cal. 651n3 Trevelyan, J. said (p. 651n):

    “… I should be exceedingly careful before I forced into the public gaze a woman who may have gone outside the purdah either by way of experiment or otherwise. Many a woman may desire to taste the sweets of unsecluded life and have gone out of the purdah, and may desire to go back. Because a woman may once or twice have gone outside the purdah is the Court to keep her outside?”

    3. The mere fact that the plaintiff has attended this Court, possibly by mistake as to what she ought to do—but I do not feel at all convinced of that—cannot, in itself, compel me to refuse her the relief which she now seeks. The question, however, remains, whether on this evidence, and in the face of S. 132, I am necessarily bound to make an order for her examination either de bene esse or on commission merely on the ground that she is a strict observer of purdah. Such an order has been made on that ground by this Court in one case which has not been reported but the record of which has been produced to me, and Mr. Somjee tells me that he is informed by his professional clients, the solicitors concerned, that it was contested; but I do not know what the facts on that occasion were. It is, as I say, eminently desirable, if at all possible, that the learned Judge who tries the case should hear this lady. Even if it is not possible to observe the lady's countenance while she gives her evidence, he will at least have some opportunity of observing her demeanour for himself, as for example, noting the hesitancy or lack of hesitancy with which she answers the questions put to her. Should I by refusing to make an order for her examination on commission be compelling her to appear in public? The answer is, I think, “No.” Nothing that I say now is to prejudice in any way any application she may choose to make to the trial Judge to examine her himself at her own place of residence, or, if he is not willing to do that, in his private Chamber. The question does not seem to have been before considered whether the expression “in Court” in S. 132 means “in the Court room” i.e, the room in the Court building where the Court sits in public, or whether it includes any part of the Court building. In this connection Mr. Somjee pertinently referred me to S. 138, which provides for the exemption of persons of exalted rank from personal appearance in Court, in which, I suppose, undoubtedly the words “in Court” mean “in the Court building.” If a person is exempted on the ground of rank from attending in Court, I could not, I presume, compel him to appear in my private Chamber, but I do not wish to express any positive opinion on that point. However that may be, I do not think (apart from the authorities) that a woman who is conveyed to the Court building in some suitably curtained vehicle and then escorted to a private room in that building, suitably and completely veiled in a burkah or some other garment, and is examined in a private room, could be said to be making, “a personal appearance in Court.” Literally, she would not be doing so if she were conveyed suitably veiled into the Court room. Grant, ed, however, that on a true construction of the section she would be doing so, I see no reason to extend that construction still further, and apply it to an examination of a veiled woman in the privacy of a Judge's Chamber. There she will be, even to the Judge not an observable form, but only an observable voice. It is also open to doubt whether a private room where the Judge can hear her evidence is “Court” at all. But even if it is, and if, contrary to my own belief, it would really offend the plaintiff's ideas of modesty to attend in that room, it will still be open to the plaintiff, if she can, to persuade the learned trial Judge to proceed to her place of residence to take her evidence. The further point which requires to be noticed is that in many, though not all, of the cases to which I have been referred, the person it was desired to exempt from personal appearance on the ground that she could not be compelled to come to Court was not a party but a mere witness. A witness, in the ordinary course, is compelled to come to Court because a witness summons is served on him or her and he or she can be sent to jail if he or she does not obey the summons; but no such summons will be issued on the plaintiff if she cannot get the Judge to examine her privately, either in her own place of residence, or in the Judge's private Chamber. Nothing will compel her to give evidence at all. At most, she will lose her case, but if she chooses to lose her case rather than to have the Judge hear her voice, that is her affair. No compulsion is put on her at all.

    4. To sum up, then, assuming—about which I am far from satisfied—that the plaintiff is a person who observes purdah so strictly that she would regard it as a violation of purdah to appear in a public Court even completely veiled in a burkah, still she can give her evidence to the learned trial Judge either in his Chamber or at her residence, if he is prepared to go there. If she is not a person who observes purdah so strictly as that, then I think she is not, within the meaning of S. 132, “a woman who ought not to be compelled to appear in public,” assuming that she can be said to appear in public at all if she merely goes into a public place completely shrouded from the public gaze.

    5. The order, therefore, I propose to make is this: The plaintiff to be at liberty to take an order for her examination de bene esse under O. 18, R. 16, if she so desires at any time within the next three weeks on the terms that her deposition, if she is alive at the hearing, be not read on behalf of the plaintiff without the leave of the learned trial Judge. If the plaintiff does not take up that order, then no order except that the cost of this application be reserved to the learned trial Judge. Counsel certified. Liberty reserved to the plaintiff to make any application to the learned trial Judge she may desire for her examination privately by him either in his Chamber or at, her residence or otherwise.

    D.S/D.H

    6. Order accordingly.

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    Mariambai v. Abdul Hamid Suleman
    (Jul 3, 1945)