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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff wife against her husband for past and future maintenance, which was dismissed by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Belgaum on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff married defendant 1 around 1914 or 1918 and they have lived apart since about 1920. She claimed arrears of Rs. 3300 and future maintenance of Rs. 400 per annum, seeking a charge on certain immovable property situated in Belgaum district. At the time of suit, the plaintiff resided in Sangli and the husband in Miraj, but the suit was filed in Belgaum due to the location of the property. Defendant 1 contended that he had sold the entire property to his natural father, defendant 2, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value. The plaintiff alleged the sale was a sham to defeat her maintenance claim.

The trial Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction without framing proper preliminary issues. On appeal, this Court set aside the decree and remanded the suit with specific issues regarding the right to charge maintenance on the property, the validity of the sale to defendant 2, and the jurisdiction of the Belgaum Court. After further evidence, the trial Court affirmed the plaintiff's right to charge maintenance on the property but found the sale valid and dismissed the suit again for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Assuming the plaintiff is entitled to separate maintenance from defendant 1, can she claim to have it made a charge on his immovable property?
  2. If so, is the sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 a hollow and sham transaction, thus inoperative and not affecting defendant 1's title?
  3. Does the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Belgaum have jurisdiction to try the suit?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff argued that she is entitled to charge maintenance on the husband's immovable property.
  • She contended that the sale of the property to defendant 2 was a bogus transaction intended to defeat her maintenance claim.
  • On appeal, her advocate raised two new grounds: one based on Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC, 1908, and the other on Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to hold the property liable for maintenance even if the sale was upheld.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Defendant 1 claimed he had sold all his property to defendant 2 and had no interest left, thus the Belgaum Court lacked jurisdiction.
  • Defendant 2 claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value.
  • Respondents contended that the sale was genuine and not a sham transaction.
  • They argued that the plaintiff had lost the opportunity to raise the new grounds in the earlier appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
2 Bom. 5731 (Westropp, C.J.) Maintenance of wife is a personal legal obligation of the husband, permanent and continuous. Clarified that husband's duty to maintain wife is independent of property possession, but wife can claim maintenance from husband's property if available.
5 Bom. 992 A Hindu husband cannot alienate all his immovable property without making suitable provision for wife's maintenance. Established wife's right to maintenance from husband's property after his death and conditions during his lifetime.
44 Cal. 473 Court can entertain a question of law raised for the first time on appeal if it does not depend on disputed facts. Allowed consideration of new legal grounds raised by the plaintiff on appeal.
14 Bom. 2064 Effect of claim proceedings under Order 21, Rules 58 and 63 CPC is limited to the particular property in dispute and does not create res judicata for other properties. Distinguished the conclusiveness of claim proceedings and held plaintiff cannot rely on them to resist defendant 2's claim.
13 Bom. 725 Attachment ends when decree amount is paid; subsequent suit under O. 21, R. 63 may be unnecessary. Held that attachment was deemed withdrawn when decree was satisfied, affecting the conclusive effect of orders.
51 Cal. 5486 Attachment orders are valid unless challenged by suit; if attachment is removed, no obligation to file suit. Clarified the scope and effect of "shall be conclusive" under O. 21, R. 63 CPC.
15 Mad. 4987 Decree in earlier suit is binding if the Court was competent to try subsequent suit. Rejected plaintiff's plea of res judicata based on prior decision as the Court in former suit was not competent to try the present suit.
29 I.A 1968 Res judicata applies only if the Court which made the former decree was competent to try the subsequent suit. Supported the Court's finding that the plaintiff cannot rely on res judicata against defendant 2.
23 Bom. 3429 Under Hindu law, wife has right to maintenance out of husband's property and can pursue property even in hands of transferee with notice. Supported plaintiff's claim under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act.
13 Lah. 4110 Debts contracted by Hindu husband take precedence over wife's right of maintenance on property. Held that purchaser who bought property to discharge debts acquires good title against wife's maintenance claim unless charge already created.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first recognized the well-established principle that a husband's duty to maintain his wife is a personal and continuous legal obligation, independent of property ownership. However, the wife can claim maintenance charged on the husband's immovable property if he owns any.

The Court examined whether the sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 was a sham. Although the transaction was motivated by the desire to defeat the plaintiff's claim, the Court found that the sale was not entirely hollow. Defendant 2 paid off two genuine mortgage debts of Rs. 9518, which took precedence over the maintenance claim. However, the Court found that a substantial portion of the sale consideration (Rs. 7982) was fabricated or inflated and was not necessary for debt payment.

Applying Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court held that the plaintiff's right to maintenance can be enforced against the transferee if he had notice of the right. Defendant 2, being fully aware of the plaintiff's claim, is liable to the extent of the inflated consideration portion, approximately 16/37 of the property.

The Court also analyzed the effect of Order 21, Rules 58 and 63 of the CPC regarding attachment and claim proceedings. It clarified that the orders in such proceedings are conclusive only concerning the particular property and subject to the result of a suit. Since the decree amount was paid during the appeal, the attachment was deemed withdrawn, nullifying the conclusive effect of the prior order. The plaintiff could not rely on these orders to resist defendant 2's claim.

Regarding res judicata, the Court held that the previous suit and appeal in Athni Court do not bar the present suit because the Court which decided the former suit was not competent to try the present suit filed in the higher Court at Belgaum.

Finally, the Court set aside the lower Court's decree dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction and remanded the matter for further hearing, instructing that the plaintiff's maintenance claim be recognized as a charge on 16/37 part of the property held by defendant 2.

Holding and Implications

The Court set aside the decree of the lower Court and remanded the suit for further hearing and disposal according to law.

The holding establishes that while the sale of the husband's property to his father was not wholly void, the plaintiff wife is entitled to enforce her maintenance claim as a charge on a proportionate part of the property held by the purchaser with notice. The Court clarified the limited effect of attachment orders under the CPC and the conditions for res judicata. The decision directly affects the parties by allowing the maintenance claim to proceed with respect to a portion of the property, but it does not set a new precedent beyond the facts of this case.

    Radhabai Gopal Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi

    Lokur, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff against her husband for past and future maintenance and dismissed by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Belgaum on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try it. The plaintiff was married to defendant 1 about the year 1918 or 1914 and they have been living apart since about the year 1920. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 3300 for arrears of maintenance and future maintenance at Rupees 400 per annum and a charge for the amounts on the property described in the plaint. At the date of suit the plaintiff was living in Sangli and her husband was living in Miraj, but the suit was filed in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Belgaum as the property sought to be charged with the maintenance is situated in Belgaum district. Defendant 1 contended that he had sold the whole of that property to his natural father Vinayak Krishna and had no interest left in it. If the property in suit be found not liable to the charge of the plaintiff's maintenance, the Belgaum Court would have no jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence on the contention of defendant 1, his natural father was added as defendant 2. He claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value of the entire property in suit. The plaintiff contended that the sale was bogus and intended to defeat her claim for maintenance.

    2. The trial Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction without framing proper preliminary issues arising out of the pleadings. On appeal by the plaintiff this Court set aside the decree and remanded the suit with the following specific issues, viz.: (1) Assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to separate maintenance from defendant 1, can she claim to have it made a charge on his immovable property? (2) If so, is the sale of the property in suit by defendant 1 to defendant 2 a hollow and sham transaction and therefore inoperative and not affecting defendant 1's title to it and is defendant 1 still the owner of that property in spite of the sale-deed in favour of defendant 2 and (3) Has the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Belgaum jurisdiction to try the suit? After recording further evidence the trial Court found in the affirmative on the first issue and in the negative on both the parts of the second issue, and again dismissed the suit on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The first issue was framed by reason of the contention urged on behalf of the defendants that the husband's liability to maintain his wife being personal, the plaintiff could not claim a charge on the property in suit, even assuming that he was still its owner. The origin of this contention may be traced to the remark made by Westropp, C.J in the leading Full Bench case in 2 Bom. 5731, wherein, after considering various texts, he observed (p. 598):

    “The injunction contained in these texts is not rendered dependent upon or in anywise qualified by a reference to the possession of family property, and purports to impose a personal legal obligation enforceable by the sovereign or the State. The obligation, too, is not asserted to be merely occasional, but permanent and continuous.”

    3. This merely emphasizes the well recognised doctrine that the maintenance of the wife is a legal and imperative duty of the husband independently of his possession of any property. But it does not mean that she has no right to be maintained out of her husband's property, if he possesses any. Her right of maintenance during her husband's lifetime is in a way higher than after his death, since in the latter case it depends on the property left by her husband. In 5 Bom. 992, it was held that a Hindu husband cannot alienate the whole of his immovable property, though self acquired, without snaking for his wife a suitable provision for her maintenance to take effect after his death. During her husband's lifetime the wife cannot claim separate maintenance from him unless she can make out sufficient reasons for not staying with him, whereas after his death she can claim separate maintenance from his coparcener or heirs if he has left sufficient property. In either case her claim to be maintained out of his property cannot be denied. But the plaintiff is not satisfied with a bare personal decree against her husband but wants to have a charge on his property. Hence the second issue had to be framed. Her learned advocate Mr. Abhyankar has urged before us two new grounds for holding the property in suit, or at least some of it, liable for her maintenance even though its sale to defendant 2 be upheld, one based on O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, 1908, and the other on Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He says that as they involve pure questions of law arising out of facts either proved or admitted, they should be considered though they were never urged before. It is true that if these grounds had been urged and upheld in the former appeal, the decision might perhaps have been different. It is therefore urged for the defendants that the plaintiff must be deemed to have given up those grounds. It would perhaps be more correct to say that those grounds were then lost sight of and the plaintiff should not suffer for the oversight.

    4. It is well settled that provided the determination of a question of law which is raised for the first time in appeal does not depend upon a decision as to facts which are in dispute, the Court is not only competent but should in the interests of justice entertain the plea: 44 Cal. 473. It is therefore necessary to see whether the points newly raised by Mr. Abhyankar can be disposed of on the evidence already on record.

    5. The question under O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, arises in this way. The plaintiff had some stridhan lands of her own in Sangli State. After her marriage with defendant 1, he took them into his possession for management. After the plaintiff went to live with her maternal relations she filed a suit in the Sangli Court to recover possession of her lands from the defendant, together with mesne profits. The trial Court gave a decree for possession, but not for mesne profits. In appeal she succeeded in obtaining a decree for mesne profits also. She got that decree transferred for execution to the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Athni on 13th July, 1926, as defendant 1 owned two lands at Kagwad in Athni taluka. Within a month thereafter defendant 1 sold all his immovable property to his natural father, defendant 2, — all his lands in British India for Rs. 17,500 on 2nd August, 1926, and his lands in Bhor State for Rs. 2500 on 16th September, 1926. In December 1926, the plaintiff presented a darkhast to execute her Sangli decree and recover her mesne profits by the attachment and sale of defendant 1's Kagwad lands. When they were attached, defendant 2 stepped in and made an application under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC, to have the attachment raised on the ground that he was in possession of them as their bona fide purchaser for value from defendant 1. His application was dismissed and he filed a suit to have it declared that the Kagwad lands belonged to him and were not liable to be attached in execution of the decree obtained by the plaintiff against defendant 1. His suit was dismissed, and he filed an appeal to the District Court. When that appeal was pending, the decretal amount due to the plaintiff was paid off, and the attachment of the Kagwad lands naturally came to an end. The appeal was then heard on merits and was dismissed. The learned Judge remarked that the decision of the appeal was purely of an academical interest as the amount claimed in the darkhast had already been paid. But as the parties wanted to go on with the appeal, he heard it and held that though the sale was not effected with the sole intention of defrauding the plaintiff, the transfer was made with the clear knowledge that she would thereby be defrauded. He observed:

    “It is possible to hold that the object was two-fold, firstly, as a consideration for the moneys which the plaintiff was to advance and secondly, in order to bring Badhabai (the plaintiff) into difficulties as regards the execution of her decree against Gopal.”

    6. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the appeal having been dismissed, the order in the miscellaneous application refusing to raise the attachment must be treated as conclusive under O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, and that the plaintiff can claim to have her maintenance charged at least on the two Kagwad lands. This contention is based on an unwarranted exaggeration of the effect of the claim proceedings under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC. That rule provides that when any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection as if he was a party to the suit. After such investigation the Court may allow the claim under R. 60 and release the property from attachment or disallow the claim under R. 61 and uphold the attachment. Then R. 63 says that when a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. What is conclusive is the order passed under R. 60 or R. 61 which only decides the liability or non-liability of the particular property to the attachment already effected. This limited effect of the order was clearly defined in 14 Bom. 2064. In that case the plaintiff purchased two plots A and B from one Gopal. In execution of a decree against Gopal, plot A was attached and sold by auction to the defendant. The plaintiff did not then intervene. Next year the defendant obtained another decree against Gopal and got the plaint plot B attached in execution of that decree. The purchaser plaintiff applied for the removal of the attachment. The defendant's contention that the sale was colorable was not upheld and the attachment was raised. The defendant did not file a suit. Then the plaintiff filed a suit to establish his title to the plot A. The defendant again contended that the plaintiff's sale was colourable. Holding that the finding in the claim proceedings in respect of plot B did not debar the defendant's defence in respect of plot A, although the plaintiff had purchased both the lands under one and the same sale-deed, Jardine, J. observed: If the decision as to the validity of the deed had been a final decision in a suit as distinguished from an execution proceeding, it would have created an estoppel by res judicata. Between the parties the orders to which Section 283 (now O. 21, E. 63) of the CPC, refers, are subject to the result of a suit, if any, conclusive, but this conclusiveness exists only as regards the particular property in dispute.

    7. This distinction is patent from the wording of O. 21, R. 63, itself. That rule does not require the plaintiff to establish his ownership of the property attached, but “the right which he claims to the property in dispute.” If the suit has been instituted by the decree-holder, against whom an order has been passed under R. 60 releasing the property from attachment, the right which he claims in the suit is the right to have the property attached in execution of the decree against his judgment-debtor. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff is the objector, who has been unsuccessful in the objection proceedings before the executing Court, the right which he claims in the suit is the right to have the property in dispute released from attachment, it not being the property of the judgment-debtor. It will be seen that in either case it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish his own title in the property in question, but what he has to establish is, in the first case, the claim to have the property attached, and in the other to have it released from attachment. Subject to the decision in that suit, the order passed by the executing Court is conclusive. But that order must be subsisting at the date of the decision of the suit. If the order upholds the attachment, but for some reason or other the attachment comes to an end, the order upholding it becomes defunct, and then there is no purpose in filing a suit to have it set aside or in proceeding with the suit if one has already been filed. Thus, in 13 Bom. 725 A obtained a decree against B and in execution attached certain property. B objected and applied to have the attachment raised. His application was rejected, but the judgment-debtor paid the amount of the decree into Court and the attachment was removed. A then again attached the same property in execution of another decree against B and his application to remove it was rejected. Within one year thereafter he filed a suit under o. 21, R. 63. It was held that it was not necessary for him to file sway suit after his first application was set aside, since the attachment had been raised on the satisfaction of that decree.

    8. Similarly, in 51 Cal. 5486, where the attachment was released within a year after the order dismissing the claim case and execution proceedings were again taken after the lapse of several years, a title suit brought to resist the attachment was held not to be time-barred. Rankin, J. observed (pp. 559-561):

    “The meaning (of the words ‘shall be conclusive’) is that the act of the Court is to be valid unless there is a suit. It means that the attachment held valid in the claim case shall be valid, and the attachment removed shall be as though it never was, so far as the parties are concerned. The rule seems to mean that subject to a suit factum valet, the act of the Court shall not be questioned save in that way. The effect of the decision as to possession in other proceedings in which that question may again arise is not the matter to which the words ‘shall be conclusive’ are directly addressed. The principle is that the object of making a claim in execution is to remove the attachment, that when the attachment is withdrawn that object is gained, and that, if there exists no attachment, or proceeding in execution of which the order in the claim case can take effect, one is not bound to bring a suit complaining of such order.”

    9. In the present case as soon as the plaintiff's decree, in execution of which the Kagwad lands had been attached, was satisfied, during the pendency of defendant 2's appeal, the attachment must ipso facto be deemed to have been withdrawn under O. 21, R. 55 of the CPC, and there remained no order of the executing Court which could be made conclusive by the decision of the appeal. Yet the parties to the appeal might fight it out on its merits to its end, not for the purpose of giving finality to the order of the executing Court which had already spent itself, but to have their dispute about the right to the property settled once for all. The decision will then debar the parties from agitating the same question again on the ground of res judicata, and not because of the finality of the previous order of the executing Court. If there be no effective order of the executing Court existing, it can in no way be affected by the decree in the suit or the appeal one way or the other. Hence the plaintiff cannot now take shelter under the order of the executing Court and resist defendant 2's claim to the Kagwad lands on the ground of its being conclusive. But as the parties wanted to get a final decision in the suit, she can rely upon it as a bar to another litigation in respect of the same property under the provisions of section 11 of the cpc. But admittedly she cannot claim the benefit of that section. In order that a decision in a former suit may operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, it is necessary that the Court which tried the former suit must have been a Court competent to try the subsequent suit. Mr. Abhyankar for the plaintiff contends that the Athni Court was competent to try the suit with regard to the Kagwad lands and its decision is binding between the parties so far as those lands are concerned, and he relies upon the ruling, 15 Mad. 4987. In that case the daughter of a deceased Hindu brought a suit in the Court of a District Munsif for a declaration that the defendant was not the adopted son of her deceased father as he claimed to be. It was found that the alleged adoption was valid and the suit was dismissed. Then the adopted son sued her in the same Court to recover some of his adoptive father's property which had gone into her possession. She again challenged the validity of the adoption and contended that the value of the entire property which went to the defendant by his adoption being worth more than Rs. 2500, the District Munsif was not competent to try the first suit. This contention was disallowed because the first decree, not being appealed against, was binding on her and the Court which passed it was competent to try the second suit. It was not the case of the Court which tried the first suit being incompetent to try the second suit. As held in 29 I.A 1968 a decree in a previous suit cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent suit unless the Judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. If the plaintiff had reduced the value of her claim and filed this suit in the Court of a Second Class Subordinate Judge, defendant 2 would have been debarred from relying upon his sale-deed with regard to the Kagwad lands. But having chosen to file this suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge she has deprived herself of the benefit of the decision obtained by her in her favour in the Athni Court. It is not, therefore, open to her to plead the bar of O. 21, R. 63, or of res judicata by reason of the decision in appeal in her litigation at Athni.

    10. Before considering the second new ground urged by Mr. Abhyankar under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, it will be more convenient to deal with the nature and consideration of the sale-deed passed by defendant 1 to defendant 2. The circumstances under which it was passed raise a doubt about the bona fides of the transaction. Defendant 2 is the natural father of defendant 1 and has given him in adoption. The property in suit is the property of defendant 1's adoptive family. Since the plaintiff began to live separate from defendant 1 in 1920, he has not been on good terms with her and he has married a second wife. About the year 1922–1923 he went to Poona and did business as a contractor. Then he went to Bombay about the year 1924 and started the business of removing goods by motor trucks. He says that he incurred losses in that business and had to borrow debts. He had a motor accident and a suit for Rs. 20,000 for damages was filed against him in this Court. When that suit was pending the plaintiff got her decree of the Sangli Court transferred to the Athni Court for execution on 13th July, 1926. Defendant 2 knew about that suit and he had even sent in his own handwriting questions to be put to the plaintiff in her cross-examination in the Sangli Court. Defendant 1 says that he was living joint with his father till 1929–1930 and that until he was 20 years old defendant 2 was looking after his estate. Defendant 2 died during the pendency of this suit and therefore has not been examined. But a certified copy of his deposition in the Athni suit has been produced. It shows that he was not ignorant of defendant 1's affairs. It was in these circumstances that Bapusaheb alias Sakharam Ganesh Phadke sent a wire to defendant 2 and called him to his place at Kalyan. It was on his advice that within three weeks after the plaintiff's Sangli decree was transferred to the Athni Court and before she filed her darkhast, the sale-deed in dispute was passed by defendant 1 to defendant 2 on 2nd August, 1926. By that deed he purported to convey his entire property in British India for Rs. 17,500. Six weeks later, on 16th September, 1926, he passed another sale-deed to him purporting to convey his entire State property for Rs. 2500. Thus he had ostensibly left no immovable property for himself out of which the plaintiff could recover either her decretal dues or her maintenance. The plaintiff filed her darkhast after both these sale-deeds were executed. These dates indicate that the object of the sales must have been to defeat the plaintiff's claim.

    11. It is admitted that Bapusaheb Phadke was an intimate friend of the family and his deposition shows that he was keenly interested in having the sale deed in suit upheld. He says that defendant 1 was going to commit suicide on account of his heavy debts and so he sent a wire to defendant 2 in order to persuade him to lend money to defendant 1 and relieve him of his debts. This reason given by him for sending for defendant 2 is palpably false. It is true that Bapusaheb Phadke is a man of status and was the President of the Thana Local Board and Kalyan Municipality. But he appears to have been solicitous about the welfare of his friend's family. There was no cause for defendant 1 even to think of committing suicide at that time. The suit for damages was still pending. His motor truck which was involved in the accident had been insured and in fact the suit was compromised and the damages were paid by the insurance company. So there was no reason for defendant 1 to be afraid of that suit. Bapusaheb Phadke claims to have saved him from suicide by inducing his father to pay off his debts and take over all his immovable property. The contents of the sale deed in suit show that it was intended to pay off three debts, viz., Rs. 4060, due on a mortgage deed of Rs. 4000 passed in favour of Vishnu Phadke in June 1925, Rs. 5458 due on a mortgage deed for Rs. 5000 passed in favour of Ramchandra Joshi in September 1925, and Rs. 6000 due on a promissory note of Rs. 5000 passed to Bapusaheb Phadke in October 1923. The balance of Rs. 1982 is said to have been paid to defendant 1 in cash.

    12. Out of the three debts said to have been satisfied, the two mortgages were hardly a year old and it is not likely that the mortgagees would be anxious to recover their dues which were well secured and were carrying compound interest. The period of repayment fixed in the mortgage deed of Ramchandra Joshi, Ex. 33, was three years and his amount was to fall due for payment in December 1928. Defendant 1 frankly admits that his creditors were not pressing him for payment when he passed the sale-deed. The third debt, assuming it to be genuine, was that of Bapusaheb Phadke himself who was so anxious to save defendant 1. Thus, there was no pressing necessity for Bapusaheb to send for defendant 2 so hurriedly and hustle defendant 1 into transferring all his property to him. It is significant that the sale deed was registered in Bombay. The obvious object was to put the property out of the reach of the plaintiff who, so far as the evidence shows, was the only person who was then after defendant 1 to recover her dues.

    13. The two debts under the mortgage deeds are not disputed. But it is contended that as their total came to about Rs. 9500 only, Bapusaheb's debt was invented in order to make up an adequate consideration for the sale of all the lands in British India to defendant 2. There is a good deal of force in this contention. In his zeal for the good of his intimate friend, Bapusaheb did not mind his name being used in the sale deed as one of the creditors of defendant 1. His debt was to be mentioned as due on a promissory note which could be fabricated at any time and ante-dated, and as he was not going to make any claim under it, he may have thought that there was nothing wrong in it. It is significant that in the sale deed, while all the details of the two mortgage debts were given, the date of Bapusaheb's promissory note was not mentioned. That promissory note purports to have been passed on 29th October, 1923. In that year defendant 1 was doing business as a contractor in Poona and, as he says, he was making a profit in that business. On the other hand Bapusaheb admits that he himself was then heavily indebted to the extent of Rs. 50,000 or Rs. 60,000 and that he had lost all his property. He had no previous dealings with defendant 1 and he admits that he made no inquiries. Yet he claims to have advanced such a large sum of money without any security. He says that he had accounts, but he never produced them. It appears that the date on the promissory note was purposely selected as in October 1923, in order to show that three years were about to expire when the sale deed in suit was passed. But it is not alleged that he was then pressing defendant 1 to satisfy his debt. No evidence is led to prove the consideration of the promissory note and the interested word of Bapusaheb is difficult to believe in the absence of his accounts. Defendant 2's statement in the Athni suit shows that he had an extensive business and he must have maintained accounts. But he never produced them even in that suit although he was called upon to do so. He indirectly admitted that the payment of defendant 1's debts at the time of the sale deed was not entered in his accounts as he had paid them out of his cash balance at home. He said that he used to keep Rs. 5000 to Rs. 25,000 on hand, which is hard to believe. In view of all these circumstances we are not prepared to hold that Bapusaheb's debt was genuine. That amount and Rs. 1982 said to have been paid in cash to defendant 1 were evidently added in the sale deed to show that the price paid was adequate. Thus the only debts which were paid off by defendant 2 on behalf of defendant 1 were those of the two mortgagees amounting to Rs. 9518. The remaining consideration of Rs. 7982 was bogus, and, even assuming that it was paid by defendant 2 to defendant 1, it was not for the satisfaction of his debts. But as the major portion of the consideration was actually paid by defendant 2, the sale cannot be held to be hollow and cannot be set aside. Defendant 2 must therefore he held to have acquired a valid title to the property conveyed to him by the sale deed.

    14. This conclusion having been reached on the evidence already on record, it has to be seen how far it helps the plaintiff to claim the benefit of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, although she did not claim it in the trial Court or in the former appeal. That point has now become a pure question of law and we are bound to consider it in the interests of justice. The section provides that when a third person has a right to receive maintenance, or a provision for advancement of marriage, from the profits of immovable property, and such property is transferred, the right may be enforced against the transferee, if he has notice thereof or if the transfer is gratuitous. Under Hindu law a husband is under a personal obligation to maintain his wife even “if he has to do a hundred things which ought not to be done,” as Manu says. It has yet to be decided whether the plaintiff can live away from her husband and claim separate maintenance from him. But in any event she has a right to maintenance not only from him personally but also out of his property, and for that purpose she can pursue the property even in the hands of a stranger who has purchased it with notice of her claim: 23 Bom. 3429. Before the amendment of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929 it was necessary to prove that the transfer was with the intention of defeating the right of maintenance, etc. But that condition having been deleted by the amendment, bare notice of the existence of the right would be sufficient to make it a burden on the property in the hands of the transferee. Defendant 2 was fully conversant with defendant 1's affairs, his strained relations with his wife and her right to get her maintenance from him. With all this knowledge he purposely bought from him his entire immovable property. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to claim the benefit of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. But under Hindu law debts contracted by a Hindu take precedence over the right of maintenance of his wife or infant child. Hence a purchaser of property sold to discharge the debts of a husband acquires a good title against a wife who seeks to charge it with her maintenance unless this has been already done: 13 Lah. 4110. Hence the sale of the property to defendant 2 for the payment of the two mortgage debts cannot be impugned. But in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim he purchased nearly twice the property by fraudulently inflating the debts of her husband. The payment of the genuine debts of Rs. 9518 cannot be questioned and it takes precedence over the plaintiff's right of maintenance. But having notice of that right, defendant 2 fraudulently purchased the entire property for a consideration, out of which Rs. 7982 was not needed for the payment of debts, and that amount cannot have priority over the plaintiff's right of maintenance. Hence, taking an equitable view of the case, we hold that 7982/17,000 or roughly 16/37 part of the property in suit is liable to bear the burden of the plaintiff's maintenance. This will be taken into consideration in determining the quantum of the maintenance payable to her.

    15. Thus on the second of the three issues sent down to the trial Court our finding is that the sale of defendant 2 is not wholly hollow, that he has acquired a title to the property in suit but subject to the burden of the plaintiff's right of maintenance on 16/37 share in it and that defendant 1 is not the owner of that property. It follows that the finding on issue 3 is in the affirmative. We therefore set aside the decree of the lower Court and remand the suit for further hearing and disposal according to law. Costs of the appeal will be costs in the suit. The costs of the Government, if any, will be paid by the respondents.

    16. 5th March, 1943— After the above judgment was delivered, the appellant and respondents 3 to 5 have entered into a compromise and put in an application that a decree should be passed in terms of the compromise.

    17. So, after the papers of this appeal are received by the trial Court, it will pass a decree in terms of the compromise so far as the appellant and respondents 3 to 5 are concerned and a decree on the merits as between the appellant and respondents 1 and 2. Costs of Government, if any, will have to be paid by the appellant in view of the compromise. Other costs in this Court will be borne by the parties themselves, and costs of the appellant and respondents 3 to 5 in the lower Court will also be borne by the parties themselves. The order regarding costs passed by this Court is hereby vacated.

    18. Decree set aside.

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    Radhabai Gopal Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi
    (Dec 17, 1942)