Patkar, J.:— In this case the plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain lands conveyed to defendant 1 by Sabu, the adoptive father of the plaintiff, under a sale deed, Ex. 85, dated 21st September 1903, and the other lands in suit conveyed by Sabu and his wife, defendant 6, by the deed of gift, Ex. 55, on 26th June 1917. The plaintiff was adopted in June 1919 by defendant 6, the widow of Sabu who died in September 1917. Out of the lands which were given in gift by Ex. 55, Survey No. 181 was alienated by defendant 1 in favour of defendant 5, her Mukhtyar, in 1918, who in his turn sold it to defendant 2 in May 1921. Survey No. 336, one of the lands given in gift, was sold by defendant 1 to defendadts 3 and 4 in September 1918. The case of the plaintiff was that the sale transaction of 1903 was illegal and void, because defendant 1 was the mistress of Sabu, and though the ostensible consideration was cash, the real consideration was illegal, that is, past and future cohabitation. As regards the deed of gift, it was alleged by the plaintiff that defendant 1 was in a position to dominate the will of Sabu and that it was for the same unlawful object and consideration.
2. Defendant 1 denied that she was the mistress of Sabu and contended that she was admitted as an orphan into the house of Sabu's father and was brought up by Sabu's mother, Gangava, that she was married to one Yellappa, that the sale deed was for cash consideration and that the gift was not invalid, and that as regards the properties comprised in the sale deed, the suit was barred by limitation. The sale deed, Ex. 85, dated 21st September 1903, was in respect of nine lands for Rs. 800. Out of the nine lands, four lands were repurchased by Sabu by Ex. 87 in May 1905 for Rs. 400. The lands were transferred to the name of defendant 1 in 1904 and continued to stand in her name. The deed of gift was in respect of ten lands including Survey Nos. 181 and 336 sold to defendants 2, 3 and 4. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the sale deed was passed not for cash as stated in the deed but for past and future cohabitation, but held that the suit in respect of the property comprised in the sale deed was barred by limitation as defendant 1 was in adverse possession for more than 12 years. With regard to the deed of gift the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that it was for past and future cohabitation and the deed of gift was void and the suit was within time, and therefore awarded the plaintiff possession of the lands comprised in the deed of gift, and ordered him to pay compensation to defendants 2, 3 and 4 for the improvements made by them in Survey Nos. 181 and 336 comprised in the deed of gift.
3. It appears from the evidence that defendant 1 was brought up by Gangava, the mother of Sabu. It is difficult to believe the defendant when she stated that she used to go to Sabu's house for household work and that she never met Sabu in private and knew him only by face till his death. It appears clear from the evidence that defendant 1 stayed with Sabu, the plaintiff's adoptive father, and that there was illicit connexion between defendant 1 and Sabu. Rajapa, Ex. 54, Amajeva, Ex. 59, Raghavendra, Ex. 65, Chandsaheb, Ex. 67, Joti, Ex. 70, Balappa, Ex. 71, and Maddanappa, Ex. 72, prove that defendant 1, Sabava, was the mistress of Sabu. (After discussing the evidence and holding that defendant 1 stayed with Sabu as his mistress and continued to live with him as his mistress after the death of her husband, the judgment proceeded.) The next question is whether the sale deed, Ex. 85 was passed for a cash consideration of Rs. 800, or whether the consideration was past or future cohabitation of defendant 1 with Sabu. Defendant 1 relies on the sale deed Ex. 86, passed in her name by one Ningava on 6th February 1900 for a consideration of Rs. 100, and it is urged that defendant 1 used to carry on money-lending business. The evidence on the point is very meagre and the income of the land purchased by defendant 1 by Ex. 86 was insufficient to provide the consideration of Rs. 800 for the sale deed, Ex. 85. Witness Ex. 109, examined in the lower Court to prove the payment of consideration to Sabu, was properly disbelieved by the learned Judge. I agree with the view of the lower Court that the ostensible consideration of Rs. 800 was not paid and that the real consideration for the sale deed was past and future cohabitation. It is contended on behalf of the appellant, defendant 1, that the past cohabitation is a good consideration for the sale deed and reliance is placed on the decision on the case of Dhiraj Kuar v. Bikramajit Singh (1), and it is further urged that in the community to which Sabu belonged concubinage is not regarded with disfavour, and that a dasiputra is recognised among Shudras as an heir and maintenance is enforceable by a concubine. It would be convenient to discuss the question of the sale-deed and the deed of gift separately.
4. As regards the sale-deed for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 800, no transfer could be made, under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, for an unlawful object or consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. Section 23 of the Contract Act, lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. The consideration or object of an agreement in such a case is said to be unlawful, and every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. In the case of a sale-deed the consideration is the amount paid as the price for the sale. The consideration is different from the object. If the consideration or object of passing the sale-deed be immoral, i.e, past or future cohabitation, the transfer would be void under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, read with Section 23 of the Contract Act. In Dhiraj Kuar v. Bikramajit Singh it was held that a suit lay for arrears of allowance agreed to be paid to a woman for past cohabitation. It was observed in that case as follows (p. 788):
Such a consideration, if consideration it can properly be called, which seems to as more than doubtful, would not be immoral, so as to render the contract ‘de facto’ void. But we think the more correct view is to regard the promise to pay the allowance as an undertaking on the part of Bikramajit Singh to compensate the woman for past services voluntarily rendered to him, for which no consideration, as defined in the Contract Act, would be necessary.
5. It appears that the case was supposed to fall under Section 25(2) of the Contract Act, though it is not specifically referred to in the judgment. The view would seem to be supported by a dictum, which appears to be obiter, in the case of Ningareddi v. Lakshmawa (2), where it was observed as follows (p. 168):
Though such an agreement is not supported by consideration, yet as an agreement to compensate for past services voluntarily rendered, it was both according to the English and the Indian law valid and enforceable against him: see Section 25, Clause (2) of the Contract Act (9 of 1872) and Dhiraj Kuar v. Bikramajit Singh .
6. It was however held in Kisandas v. Dhondu (3) that past consideration is not good consideration for a transfer of property. The point does not appear to have been discussed in the judgment. It was further held that if the transaction was considered as a gift, it would be invalid as the property was joint family property. In the case of Hussein ali v. Dinbai (4), which related to an agreement to pay a certain amount for services rendered as a nurse but was in reality for past cohabitation, it was held that the consideration for the document being past cohabitation, it was unlawful as immoral or opposed to public policy, and the case of Dhiraj Kuar v. Bikramajit Singh was dissented from. It appears that the document on which the suit was brought was held to be not executed and signed by the deceased, and therefore the discussion on this point would appear to be unnecessary. The reasoning however appears to me to be unassailable. Under Section 25 of the Contract Act, an agreement is void if made with, out consideration unless it came within one of the exceptions. Cl. (2) provides an exception, namely, a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do. The word “voluntarily,” according to the decision in Sindha Shri Ganpatsinghji v. Abraham (5) would exclude anything done at the request of the promisor, and it is difficult to hold that the services rendered by a mistress were rendered otherwise than at the request of the person keeping the mistress. Though under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act, services already rendered at the desire of the promisor are placed on the same footing with services to be rendered and would constitute a consideration for an agreement, a consideration which is immoral at the time, and therefore incapable of supporting an immediate promise to pay, cannot become innocent by passage of time. Dhiraj Kuar's case has been distinguished in the judgment of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Alice Mary Hill v. William Clarke (6).
7. For the sale-deed in question there was no cash consideration of Rs. 800 as stated in the document. Ordinarily the consideration for a sale is a valuable consideration or price, and it is difficult to hold that past cohabitation, besides being immoral, is a valuable consideration. The sale-deed, therefore, might amount to a gift to defendant 1. The object of the deed is alleged by the plaintiff to be either past or future cohabitation. The word “object” in Section 23 of the Contract Act, is distinct from “consideration” and means something aimed at, and has been held to mean “purpose or design” in the decision in Jaffer Meher Ali v. Budge-Budqe Jute Mills Co. (7), confirmed by the appeal Court in Jaffer Meher Ali v. Budge-Budge Jute Mills Co. (8). If the object of a transfer of property is immoral, the transfer is void, and there cannot be any conveyance of any interest effected by the transfer. The object of the sale-deed in the present case was future cohabitation and might also be said to be a reward for past cohabitation. If the transfer is invalid, the person passing the document retains the title in himself, and would ordinarily be entitled to recover the property on the ground that the title has not passed from him. But the principle of equity enunciated in the case of Ayerst v. Jenhins (9) would prevent the Court from giving aid to a person guilty of immoral conduct to recover the property on the ground of public policy. In Ayerst v. Jenhins it was held that a Court of equity would not, at the instance of a settlor or his legal personal representative, adversely set aside a settlement by which the settlor confers on a stranger the absolute beneficial interest in property legally vested in trustees, although such a settlement may have been made for an illegal consideration not appearing on the face of the instrument. It was observed by Lord Selborne as follows (p. 283):
In the present case relief is sought by the representative, not merely of a particeps criminis, but of a voluntary and sole donor, on the naked ground of the illegality of his own intention and purpose; and that, not against a bond or covenant or other obligation resting in fieri, but against a completed transfer of specific chattels, by which the legal estate in those chattels was absolutely vested in trustees, ten years before the bill was filed, for the sole benefit of the defendant. I know no doctrine of public policy which requires, or authorizes, a Court of equity to give assistance to such a plaintiff under such circumstances …. But the voluntary gift of part of his own property by one particeps criminis to another, is in itself neither fraudulent nor prohibited by law, and the present is not the case of a man repenting of an immoral purpose before it is too late, and seeking to recall, while the object is yet unaccomplished, a gift intended as a bribe to inequity …. It is a maxim of law not opposed to any equity, that in pari delicto melior est conditio possidentis; and it is a principle of equity, that long delay in seeking to rescind a transaction originally voidable, on the faith of which other persons have irrevocably made their arrangements in life, may operate as a bar to relief.
8. In that case the object of the settlement was future cohabitation, and as the settlor lived with the woman for some time as husband and wife and the legal representative ten years afterwards brought a suit to set aside the settlement on the ground of its being founded on a bad and illegal consideration, the suit was held not maintainable. At p. 284 it was observed as follows:
It may be that the door of this Court is not closed against persons repenting of such an unlawful connexion, and desirous of extricating themselves from fetters which, if relief were refused, might practically bind them to it. But in a case presenting no such circumstances, I think it consistent with all sound principle, and with all authority, to recognize the importance of the distinction between a completed voluntary gift, valid and Irrevocable in law, (as I hold the transfer of these shares to the defendant's trustees to be), and a bond or covenant for an illegal consideration, which has no effect whatever in law.
9. It is pertinent to observe that a transfer of property for an immoral consideration or object is void under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, and not merely voidable. The case of Ayerst v. Jenhins has been considered in Thasi Muthukannu v. Shunmugavelu Pillai (10), where a young and inexperienced plaintiff assigned to the defendant, a dancing-girl, a mortgage for Rs. 1,500, and the consideration stated in the document was not real, but the real consideration was future continuance of immoral relations between the plaintiff and the sister of the defendant. It was held that where the transaction amounted to a voluntary gift, it could not be set aside, but where a transaction, though completed, was intended to be for a consideration, it could be impeached if the consideration was immoral, and it made no difference whether the transaction was executed or executory. The case of Ayerst v. Jenkins was distinguished on the ground that the assignment of the mortgage was not a gift but was intended to be passed for a consideration and also purported to do so and therefore could be impeached, and reference was made to Phillips v. Probyn (11), which has been criticized in Ash burner's Principles of Equity, 1902 Edition, at p. 138. It was further held that the plaintiff was not in pari delicto on the ground of his age and his inexperience and want of independent advice.
10. The case of Ayerst v. Jenkins was followed in Deivanayaga Padayaahi v. Muthu Reddi (12), where it was held that it is a well established rule of equity that a person who has transferred his property to another for an illegal or immoral purpose cannot get it annulled if the intended purpose has been carried out, and that Section 6, Clause (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, had not the effect of modifying the rule of equity. In that case the illegal purpose was past and future cohabitation. It was held by Oldfield, J., that the fact that in a certain section of the community concubinage is allowed and is not regarded as immoral does not make a settlement made by a member of such community in consideration of concubinage any the less immoral. I agree with the view thus enunciated and it is an answer to the other argument raised on behalf of defendant 1 that in the community to which Sabu belonged concubinage is not regarded as immoral and that a dasiputra is entitled to inheritance. In that case the transfer was not only for past cohabitation but for future cohabitation, and some years after the date of the transfer a suit was brought to set aside the transfer. It was held by Abdur Rahim, J., in that case that though the wording of S. 8(h), Cl. (2), was clear that no transfer could be made for an unlawful object or consideration, it did not lay down in what classes of cases the Court would or would not assist a person particeps criminis, and did not modify the well established rule of equity as propounded in Ayerst v. Jenkins .
11. On the other hand in Ghumna v. Ram Chandra Rao (13), where a gift was made to a husband and wife for the purpose of maintaining immoral relations with the female donee, and where after the murder of the donor by the donees a suit was brought by the heir of the donor, it was held that the consideration for the transfer was future illicit connexion between the donor and the female donee, and the consideration being unlawful, it could not be a valid consideration for the deed of gift at all, and that the deed was not only voidable but absolutely void from the very beginning and it was not necessary to be avoided by suit. The decision in this case is inconsistent with the decision in Deivanayaga Padayaehi v. Muthu Reddi and the question as to whether the transferor or his heir could get the assistance of the Court for setting aside the gift which was for the continuance of future immoral relations was not considered.
12. The case of Brahmayya Lingam v. Mallamma (14) relates to a gift made for past cohabitation and future cohabitation, and it was held that it was a well established rule of equity that a person, who has transferred property to another for an illegal or immoral purpose, cannot get it annulled if the intended purpose had been carried out, and as part of the consideration was for the past cohabitation and the defendant continued as the plaintiff's concubine for sometime after the deed, the plaintiff could not succeed. The maxim in pari delicts potior est conditio possidentis is intimately connected with another rule of the law, ex turpi causa non oritur actio: see Broom's Legal Maxims, Edn. 9, p. 466, and Scott v. Brown (15). Apart from authorities, the consideration for a sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, is price or valuable consideration. If the object of the sale is the continuance of immoral relations the transfer would be a nullity according to S. 6(h) and no title would pass. If the object is the maintenance of future immoral relations, the transferor can get back the property if the immoral object has not been carried out. It is only where the immoral object has been carried out that the principle that a Court of equity would refuse its aid to a person who is a particeps criminis would prevent the man from recovering back the property. It is difficult to hold that past cohabitation can be considered as consideration for a sale. It has been held by recent Bombay decisions, to which I have referred, that past cohabitation is not a good consideration for a transfer of property. I think that “consideration” means valuable consideration, and where the object of a transfer of property is illegal or immoral the transfer is void, and where the illegal object has been carried out, the Court will not lend its aid to the plaintiff, who has been guilty of such immoral or illegal conduct, to recover back the property. In the case of the sale, deed in the present case, which was for past and future cohabitation, Sabu could not have maintained a suit to recover back the property, as after the date of the sale deed, there was illicit; connexion between Sabu and defendant 1, and the immoral object having been carried out, he would have been prevented from recovering back the property, and according to the decision in the case of Ayerst v. Jenkins his legal representative would also be barred. It is somewhat difficult to hold that the plaintiff, the adopted son, is in pari delicto with defendant 1, the mistress of Sabu. In this connexion I would refer to the doubt expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in the case of Sidlingappa v. Hirasa (16) as follows (p. 412):
Though we have dealt with the case as if both parties to this litigation had been equally culpable, it is to be noticed that it was the plaintiff's father and not the plaintiff who joined the defendant in the fraud, and it is a question whether it can be said that the plaintiff and the defendant are in pari delicto; Mathew v. Hanbury (17), Muckleston v. Brown (18).
13. Assuming that the estoppel as laid down in the case of Ayerst v. Jenhins equally applies to the plaintiff, the adopted son, the plaintiff would be prevented from recovering the properties conveyed in the sale deed on the ground that the immoral object had been carried out by Sabu after the date of the sale-deed. There is also another objection to the plaintiff's claim with regard to the properties comprised in the sale-deed, that the suit is barred by limitation Defendant 1 has been in adverse possession for more than 12 years of the five properties comprised in the sale-deed. The finding of the lower Court was attacked in appeal on behalf of the plaintiff, but I agree with the view of the lower Court that the khata of the properties was transferred to the name of defendant 1 in 1904 or 1905, and the possession of the defendant has all along been adverse. The plaintiff's claim there fore with regard to the properties comprised in the sale-deed must fail. With regard to the deed of gift of 1917, a deed of gift does not require any consideration. According to Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, a gift is a transfer made voluntarily and without consideration. The question is whether the object is immoral or unlawful within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act. In the present case I think that the deed of gift was passed with the motive of recompensing defendant 1 for past cohabitation and with the object of maintaining the immoral relation with defendant 1 in the future. The object, in my opinion, is something which is to be aimed at contemporaneously or in future as being some purpose or design for which a transfer is made. The object means the end to which effort is directed or the thing aimed at, that which one endeavours to attain or carry out. In the present case there was the immoral object so far as the future cohabitation with defendant 1 was contemplated by Sabu. But it appears from the evidence that Sabu was then ailing and though he might have hoped that he would recover, he died soon afterwards. The past cohabitation may be a motive for the gift, but, in my opinion, cannot be said to be an object which implies something aimed at simultaneously or in the future. Past cohabitation would be consideration for an agreement under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act, but is not good consideration for a transfer of property. A gift does not require consideration. It is difficult to hold that past cohabitation can be an object of a gift. Future cohabitation can be considered to be an object of the gift. So far as the object as regards the maintenance of future immoral relations was concerned, I think in the present case Sabu did not carry out the immoral object as he was incapable of carrying it out owing to his illness and died soon afterwards. Sabu therefore could have maintained a suit to recover the properties comprised in the deed of gift. The deed of gift was invalid under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, and the principle of equity enunciated in the decision in the case of Ayerst v. Jenkins would not have come in his way as the immoral object was not carried out. He could therefore have maintained a suit for recovery of the properties comprised in the deed of gift. If this view is correct, the plaintiff, as his adopted son, is entitled to recover the properties.
14. The case of Ram Sarup v. Bela (19) is distinguishable on its special facts as the gift in that case was made to the mistress and her children, and it was difficult to distinguish the gift to the woman from the gift to the children and the gift to the woman was considered to rest on the valid and moral consideration on which it was stated to rest at the time. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the gift was unconditional and even if it was otherwise, the gift to which an immoral condition was attached remained a good gift, while the condition was void. In the lower Court an attempt was made by the plaintiff to impeach the deed of gift on the ground of undue influence. It appears that on that day Sabu passed a sale deed, Ex. 66 in favour of one Shidappa. I agree with the finding of the lower Court that defendant 1 did not dominate the will of Sabu, and that the deed of gift was not induced by undue influence. With regard to survey No. 181 in the possession of defendant 2 and survy No. 336 in the possession of defendants 3 and 4, I agree with the finding of the lower Court that defendant 2 improved the land in his possession after an expenditure of Rs. 1,000, and defendants 3 and 4 also improved certain portions of survey No. 336 after an expenditure of R. 400 each. The evidence in the case supports the finding of the lower Court on this point. I think therefore that the view of the lower Court, that the plaintiff is entitled to get back the properties comprised in the deed of gift which are in the possession of defendant 1 is correct. The view of the lower Court that the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of survey No. 181 from defendant 2 on payment of Rs. 1,000 and survey Nos. 336/1 and 336/2 from defendants 3 and 4 on payment of Rs. 800 is also correct in the circumstances of this case. The result therefore is that both the appeals are dismissed with costs and the cross-objections are dismissed with costs.
Barlee, J.:— I agree that both appeals must be dismissed, but I reach this con elusion by a different path and shall therefore give my reasons as shortly as possible. The questions to be answered in these appeals are: (1) Whether the deceased Sabu transferred land to the defendant Sabava in 1903, when he executed a sale deed in her favour, and in 1917, when he and his wife executed a deed of gift. This is important because of the plea that the documents were never acted on, for, if that were the case, there would be no effective defence of limitation; (2) if it be found that the lands were in fact transferred to Sabava we have to decide whether they were transferred for consideration, and what it was in either case; (3) whether the consideration, if any, was unlawful; (4) whether the transferor, had he lived would have been estopped from pleading that the consideration was unlawful, and whether his representative in interest is in no better case. (Ater setting out the fact and discussing the evidence, the judgment proceeded). The learned Subordinate Judge has held that inasmuch as Sabava was in adverse possession of the lands conveyed in 1904 for 26 years before suit, the plaintiff cannot now claim them (Article 144). On his behalf it is argued that Sabu was all along in possession. But, as the learned Subordinate Judge has said, the indicia of possession were with Sabava, as the lands were entered in her name in the Record of Eights; and I must add that the present argument is inconsistent with the case which has been pleaded that Sabava had great influence with Sabu and used it to feather her nest. If in 1904 she persuaded him to convey lands to her it is probable that she took care to enter on possession. It is not the plaintiff's case that the transfer was nominal to conceal Sabu's interest. He was not pressed by creditors and had no apparent object in preparing a false, document. It may be that he gave her, the sale deed, to enable her to make a claim after his death, and still remained in effective possession; but it was for the plaintiff to establish this fact, if true, and he has not done so. The principal contention in this Court has reference to the document of 1917, which purported to be a deed of gift. It has been faintly argued that concubinage is not an unlawful consideration inasmuch as it is recognized by Hindu law. But we cannot accept this view. I do not press the point that the concubinage had probably at one time been adulterous, for Sabava's husband died at least 12 years before the conveyance. But I know of no rule of Hindu law which legalizes concubinage. The best that can be said is that Hindu law entitles a concubine in certain circumstance to maintenance out of the estate of her paramour, and that is a very different thing. As pointed out by Macleod, C.J the maintenance of a discarded concubine is not an unlawful object, but it does not follow that concubinage is not immoral: Husseinali v. Dinbai . The argument seriously pressed on us is that Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, has no application to gifts inasmuch as a gift is a transfer of property without consideration. Since a donee has not to prove consideration it does not matter, it is said, whether the motive of the gift be good or bad. The first part of this argument can be answered in a few words. The Transfer of Property Act mentions four or five classes of conveyances, but obviously the list is not complete for there is no mention of the very usual form of conveyance of which the consideration is not cash but some sort of service, e.g, a conveyance made in discharge of a liability to provide maintenance which was the subject-matter of the Full Bench case, Madam Pillai v. Badrakali Ammal (20), or a conveyance made in discharge of a contract. It follows then that we are not bound to decide that the conveyance in suit was a gift because it is called a gift. In fact this argument begs the question.
15. The next question is more difficult to answer. And here my path diverges from that taken by my learned brother. If there was consideration in our case, it was past or future service. If it was future service the way is clear, for future cohabitation was beyond doubt an immoral object. But I find myself unable to accept the view that the parties were contemplating future illicit intercourse. It is true that they did not contemplate separation; but future concubinage is not the same as future residence, and since Sabu was old or elderly and admittedly very ill and Sabava was 47 years of age, I think they were making arrangements for the time when she would be left alone. That was not an unlawful object. I am therefore compelled to examine the evidence with a view to determine whether, as alleged by the plaintiff, past intercourse was the consideration of the agreement or merely the motive. The real question at issue is then one of fact. What I have to discover is whether the past concubinage was merely the motive for the gift or whether a promise was made by Sabu to Sabava in return for it so as to constitute an agreement. If there was an agreement it would obviously have been unenforceable; and, since Section 23 of the Contract Act, has been incorporated in the Transfer of Property Act, the conveyance made in discharge of the agreement was invalid. If on the other hand, there was no promise which linked the past concubinage with the conveyance, the latter is unimpeachable. (After considering-the evidence, the judgment proceeded.) A number of cases have been cited as authorities on the question of the effect of a conveyance in consideration of concubinage, but unfortunately there is but one in which the facts were similar to those of this case, and in that case the decision was on another ground and we find a mere expression of opinion: Kisandas v. Dhondu . The only other case of this Court, Husseinali v. Dinbai , was one of contract and not of conveyance. In Thasi Muthukannu v. Shunmugavelu Pillai a mortgage was assigned with the object of future illicit intercourse; and in Deivanayaga Padayachi v. Muthu Reddi there was a settlement of land with the object of or in consideration of a promise of future illicit intercourse. In Brahmayya Lingam v. Mallamma there was a conveyance in consideration of past and future cohabitation. Lastly, there are two Allahabad cases: Dhiraj Kuar v. Bikramajit Singh and Lachmi Narain v. Wilayti Begam (21). But these were decided prior to the Transfer of Property Act and cannot help us in intrepreting its provisions.
16. The last question is that of estoppel. Reliance is placed on the English case of Ayerst v. Jenhins , for the rule that an agreement for an unlawful object is irrevocable if the unlawful object be fulfilled. This principle has been adopted by this Court in connexion with conveyances in fraud of creditors: Sidlingappa v. Hirasa . It rests on the ground of estoppel; see Deivanayaga Padayachi v. Muthu Reddi . But in this case, if the facts are as found by the trying Judge, I cannot see that there is any reason for the application of that principle. Sabava did not allow illicit intercourse on the strength of a promise of these lands; or, if she did, as my learned brother has held, the unlawful purpose was not carried out since it is admitted that Sabu never recovered from his illness. My conclusion, then, is that the older transaction is unimpeachable because of adverse possession, but the so-called gift of 1917 was void and can be set aside or ignored. I agree that both appeals and cross-objections must be dismissed with costs.
K.S
17. Appeals dismissed.