This revision petition raises a short but important question of law. It is this: Whether a person, whose property has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, is entitled to interest under Section 28 of the Act on the amount of compensation awarded to him from the date of the dispossession, in case the authorities have taken only symbolic possession and not actual physical possession of the property from him.
2. The material facts of the case lie in a small compass. Some land including two fields in dispute were acquired by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1 of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The Collector determined the compensation payable for the land including the two fields in dispute. On a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, compensation of the land was enhanced from Rs. 800 per bigha to Rs. 4,250 per bigha and interest was swarded according to law. This was also payable in respect of the aforesaid two fields. Consequent upon the enhancement, the Collector remitted the requisite amount to the court which paid it to the claimant-petitioner. The petitioner, however complained that the interest in respect of the aforesaid two fields on the amount of compensation awarded by the court had not been deposited and he applied to the District Court for calculation of the interest and requested the payment of the balance amount. Notice of the application was issued to the Union of India, which contended in reply that interest on the enhanced compensation in respect of the two fields in dispute could not be allowed, since the Government had not taken physical possession of the said fields. On the trial of the application, the facts established on the record are that the Naib Tehsildar took symbolic possession of the two fields in dispute on 15th June, 1963 and then on 13th August, 1964 by a notification issued under subsection (1) of Section 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, by virtue of the powers of the Central Government vesting in him for the purpose, placed the land including the two fields in dispute, which had vested in the Central Government, at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority for the purpose of development in accordance with the terms of the said Act. The Naib Tehsildar, who was examined as R.W 1, deposed from the record that symbolic possession of the two fields in dispute, namely Khasra No. 5/15 measuring 3 bighas 11 biswas and Khasra No. 5/16/1 measuring 5 biswas, had been taken and that physical possession of the same had not been taken by the Naib Tehsildar and he had passed on the symbolic possession to the Tehsildar, Land and Building, on the same day. The Court below accepted the above statement of the Naib Tehsildar and held that actual possession of the aforesaid two fields had not been taken over by the Union of India and as such the petitioner was not entitled to the interest claimed and the application was dismissed by the impugned order. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved has come up to this court in revision.
3. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that under Section 4 a notification is issued indicating that the specific land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Thereupon, it is lawful for the officer of the Government to enter upon the survey and to take other steps for the purpose. Under Section 5-A, the interested parties are, after the notification under Section 4, entitled to file objections against the acquisitions; after considering the said objections, a decision is taken by the appropriate Government and under Section 6 a declaration is issued to the effect that the specified land is needed for a public purpose and this declaration is conclusive of the fact that the land is needed for the public purpose or for a company, as the case may be and after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in the manner provided by the Act. Thereafter, the Government directs the Collector to make order for acquisition of the land. The Collector then takes steps to measure and mark and prepare plan of the land and then issues a public notice under Section 9 inviting persons interested to claim compensation. The Collector enquires into the claims under Section 11 of the Act and then determines the questions relating to the area of the land, apportionment of the compensation and the award made under Section 11 is published in accordance with Section 12. Section 16 of the Act, which is material, reads as follows :
“16. When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.”
Under Section 17, the Collector has been authorised to take possession in specified cases before the making of the award. Such land also vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. The aforesaid provisions from Sections 4 to 17 are contained in Part II of the Act. Part III deals with the provisions for reference of the dispute to the District Court and procedure prescribed thereon. It also deals with the principles and procedure for award of compensation. Section 28 on which the party relies is reproduced below :
“If the sum which in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into court.”
4. The other provisions of the Act are not material for determination of the dispute raised before me, except that reference has been made to Sections 35 and 36 where temporary possession can be obtained by the Government, and under Section 47 of the Act the Collector as a Magistrate may enforce surrender of the land to the Collector, in case he is opposed or impeded in taking possession of the land. Section 46 provides for punishment for obstructing the Collector in carrying out the duties under section 4 or 8 of the Act.
5. The provisions of law requiring interpretation in the instant case is Section 28. which has been reproduced above. On its construction, there is no doubt that if possession of the acquired land had not been taken, then no interest is payable. If actual physical possession has been taken, then interest is payable as provided in the section. The question for consideration is what is the result of only symbolic possession having been taken.
6. To appreciate the concept of the two kinds of taking possession, reference may be made to the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions for taking physical possession is contained in Rule 35 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while the provision for taking symbolic possession is contained in Rule 36. Rule 35 provides that if possession is to be delivered, it would be delivered, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree. Rule 36 provides that if the decree is for delivery of any immovable property in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy, the possession is to be delivered by affixing the copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode at some convenient place, the substance of the decree in regard to the property. These provisions lay down that if a judgment-debtor is bound by the decree to deliver possession, the possession should be taken from him by physically removing him from the property. On the other hand, if the actual physical possession be with some person (who is not bound by the decree) possession would be delivered by the order of the court in the manner provided by Rule 36 and this would, therefore, be sufficient compliance with the decree. This kind of possession, where the occupant is not physically removed, but only possession in law is taken from him, has come to be known as symbolic possession.
7. What is the effect of symbolic possession? In Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ram Chunder Bysack, (1880) ILR 5 Cal 584, a Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court held that delivery of symbolic possession must be deemed equivalent to actual possession in respect of the parties bound by the decree, but as against the third parties, the symbolic possession would be of no avail. This rule of law has been approved by the Judicial Committee in Radha Krishna v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1917 PC 197 (2), where the Committee after mentioning and approving Juggobundhu Mukerjee's case, observed that “symbolical possession is available to dispossess a party sufficiently where he was a party to the proceedings in which it was ordered and given.” Radha Krishna's case has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in M.V.S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470, in paragraph 20. In this case, the Supreme Court also observed that even assuming that the grant of symbolic delivery of possession ought not to have been made and that the executing court acted illegally in making such order, it could not be argued that the executing court had no jurisdiction to make the order or that the act of symbolic possession was a nullity in the eye of law. Therefore, the grant of symbolic possession by the Court tantamounts in law to delivery of actual possession.
8. The question is well settled that where the law allows symbolic possession to be delivered, it is, as laid down by the aforesaid authorities, equivalent to delivery of actual physical possession as against the judgment-debtor or a person bound by the decree, but it is of no avail against third parties. What will be the legal position, if symbolic possession is not required by law to be delivered and a decree-holder or a person entitled to obtain possession has a right to obtain actual physical possession, but fails to obtain the same and in its stead feels satisfied by obtaining symbolic possession?
9. Such a case came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Lokessur Koer v. Purgun Roy, (1882) ILR 7 Cal 418. The court observed that the plaintiff had been put in possession under the decree by the officer of the court and, therefore, the form in which the execution had been carried out was not material and “as between the parties, the formal possession operates in point of law and fact, as a complete transfer of possession from the one party to the other”. The court, however, proceeded to state that “as against third parties, this would not be the result, but as between the parties to the suit, the formal delivery passes the actual possession.” To the same effect is the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of Lahore in Harbhagwan v. Taja, AIR 1926 Lah 35. The learned Judge observed that delivery of symbolical possession in the circumstances in which actual possession ought to have been delivered was not a nullity and that “delivery of such possession even erroneously amounts to delivery of actual possession so far as the judgment-debtor and his representatives are concerned............In the eye of law, therefore, the delivery of symbolical possession to a decree-holder, even in cases in which actual possession should have been given, puts an end to the adverse possession of the judgment-debtor and effectually vests the property in suit in the decree-holder......” The High Court of Madras in A.L.N. Sathappa Chetti v. Thayyanayaki Animal, AIR 1942 Mad 698, also took the view that where the plaintiff was entitled to take possession of the property, but instead he gets only symbolic possession, the fact that he had obtained only symbolic possession interfered with the possession of the judgment-debtor.
10. The matter was considered at length by a Division Bench of the High Court of Lahore in Miru v. Nur Muhammad, AIR 1949 Lah 252. The Court observed “the delivery of symbolical possession, whether through mistaken application by the plaintiffs or otherwise, in circumstances in which actual possession should have been asked for or could have been delivered, and minor irregularities not materially affecting the degree of publicity attending the delivery proceedings, do not prejudice the effect of the proceedings in relation to the parties to the suit and if one of these parties is the party in possession, such proceedings will have the effect of determining such possession”. The Supreme Court in Shew Bux Mohata v. Bengal Breweries Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 137, was faced with the facts that the decree-holder who was entitled to obtain physical possession from the judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code, satisfied himself by giving a receipt acknowledging full delivery of possession and allowed the execution to be dismissed on the ground that full possession had been delivered by the defendant, but in fact he allowed the defendant-judgment-debtor to physically remain on the premises. In these circumstances, the court observed in paragraph 22 of the report that although the defendant was bound by the decree and could be physically removed, he was not required by the decree-holder to be physically removed, but the possession had otherwise been taken. Still it was “open to the decree-holder to accept delivery of possession under that rule without actual removal of the person in possession. If he does that, then he cannot later on say that he has not been given that possession to which he was entitled under the law”. The High Court of Lahore in Full Bench decision in Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB), observed “dispossession may be either actual in the sense of an existing actual possession being forcibly terminated by actual dispossession, or it may be a legal constructive possession being terminated by a legal dispossession.”
11. As a result of the discussion of the aforesaid authorities, my conclusion is that obtaining a symbolic possession is in law equivalent to obtaining actual physical possession and has the effect of terminating the legal possession of the person bound by the decree and order. However, this does not affect third parties, who be in actual possession of the property and who are not bound by the decree or order, and who have been removed by the taking of possession. Their rights may or may not be changed by the delivery of symbolic possession. But so far as the judgment-debtor or the person bound by the decree or order is concerned, his dispossession is in the eye of law complete by delivery of symbolic possession and neither of the parties to the proceedings can thereafter be allowed to agitate that symbolic possession does not have the effect of delivery of physical possession and the judgment-debtor continues to have the same legal rights as before the delivery of symbolic possession owing to any irregularity in the delivery of possession.
12. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, I find that the Government acting through the Collector could take actual possession, but it chose to take only symbolic possession of the two fields in dispute on 15th June, 1963. Thereupon, the said fields had admittedly in view of Section 16 of the Act vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Thereafter the Government went a step further and placed the said fields at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority. This could not be done by the Government, unless and until the land had vested in the Government and the land could not have vested in the Government unless it had taken its legal possession. The fact that the Collector or the Government allowed the petitioner to remain physically on the land in dispute and in the circumstances of the case did for any reason not think it fit to physically throw him out, does not lead to the conclusion that the Government had not taken possession of the land or that the petitioners had not been dispossessed in the eye of law. Surely, after the Collector had taken possession under Section 16, the petitioner could not exercise any rights of ownership or possession in respect of the land in dispute; he could neither construct any structure nor let out the land to anybody and in law it would be deemed that he was holding physical possession of the land under and on behalf of the Government which had legally taken symbolic possession of the land and in whom it had absolutely vested. Had the Government not desired to take possession of the land for any reason there was no point in its proceeding to take a symbolic possession and then vesting it in the Government and again placing it at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority. Under these circumstances, it is rather strange on the part of the Government to contend that although for purposes of Section 16 it had taken possession of the land which had vested in it and had been placed at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority, still it be deemed not to have taken possession for purposes of paying interest to the claimant.
13. Section 28 of the Act, which has been reproduced above, does not make any distinction between physical possession and symbolic possession and as soon as the Collector has proceeded under Section 16 or 17 of the Act (as the case may be) and has taken possession of the land, the date from which the liability to nay interest arises under Section 28 of the Act becomes fixed. Interest under Section 28 of the Act is awarded on compulsory acquisition in lieu of possession and for being deprived of the amount of compensation since the taking of the possession. The Supreme Court in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh. AIR 1961 SC 908, observed in paragraph 19 that when a claim for payment of interest is made by a person whose immovable property has been acquired compulsorily, he is not making claim for damages properly or technically so-called; but he is basing his claim on the general rule that if he is deprived of his Land he should be put in possession of compensation immediately; if not in lieu of possession taken by compulsory acquisition interest should be paid to him on the amount of compensation. In Uttar Pradesh Government v. H.S Gupta , AIR 1957 SC 202, the Supreme Court awarded interest on the amount of compensation which was restored by the Supreme Court and which though deposited had not been paid to the claimant on account of various interim orders. In T.N.K. Govindaraju Chetty v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras, AIR 1968 SC 129 the court observed in paragraph 9 that interest was in truth compensation for loss suffered on account of deprivation of property and the source of the obligation imposed by the statute to pay interest arises because the claimant kept out of his money.
14. In view of the said rule of law and the construction of the statutory provision, there is no scope for holding that the interest is payable only on physical dispossession and not upon symbolic dispossession under the Act. Surely the claimant has been deprived of his title and rights in the land and the market value has been paid to him as on the date of Section 4 notification only and no more. He could not legally derive any profits or exercise any rights of ownership or possession of the land as against the Government after its taking possession of it under Section 16. He is therefore, certainly entitled to obtain the interest, which the law allows to him, and which the court had awarded to him at six percent. per annum from the date of the taking of the possession of the land to the date of payment of the amount of compensation awarded. The impugned order must accordingly be reversed.
15. As a result. I hold that the petitioner is entitled to interest in respect of two fields in dispute from the date of symbolic possession which had been taken by the Naib Tehsildar on 15th June, 1963. The revision is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is reversed. The lower court will now calculate the amount that is payable in view of my findings and cause the same to be paid in accordance with law. The petitioner will have costs of the revision from the Union of India.
Revision allowed.