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  • SECTION 95 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • 154 and 155 and Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • rule in Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Transfer of Property Act by section 100,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • SECTION 95 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • 154 and 155 and Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • rule in Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Transfer of Property Act by section 100,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit properties are four survey numbers (Nos. 154, 155, 156 and 157) originally owned by the Thorats. In 1877 the Thorats mortgaged these lands to the Yadavs. In 1891 the equity of redemption in survey Nos. 156 and 157 was transferred to the Tagares by two documents (Exhibits 62 and 63), each sale for Rs. 99. In 1904 the Tagares brought a suit against the original mortgagees (the Yadavs) to redeem the properties comprised in the 1877 mortgage; the Thorats (original owners) were parties to that suit. In that prior litigation Thorats' contention that the 1891 transactions were mortgages was rejected; Tagares were permitted to redeem on payment of Rs. 1,562-8-0 and obtained possession in 1906.

In 1924 the Thorats (plaintiffs) brought the present suit against Tagares seeking redemption and accounts of the mortgage transactions and possession of the suit properties. The Subordinate Judge and another lower Court held that the transactions touching survey Nos. 156 and 157 were sales and not mortgages. As to survey Nos. 154 and 155, the Subordinate Judge held that Tagares occupied the position of original mortgagees and applied Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act, allowing redemption of those two numbers on payment of Rs. 665-8-0. On appeal the Assistant Judge held that the Thorats' suit as to survey Nos. 154 and 155 was barred by limitation under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act and dismissed the suit. The present appeal challenges the findings on the nature of the 1891 transactions and contends the suit is not time-barred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What was the true legal character of the 1891 transactions relating to survey Nos. 156 and 157 — sale or mortgage?
  2. Whether the Thorats' suit (in respect of survey Nos. 154 and 155) is barred by limitation, and specifically whether Article 144 or Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act governs the Thorats' claim.
  3. Whether the position of the Tagares after redeeming the mortgage (including any charge under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act) made them co-sharers or mere lien/charge holders, and from what point, if any, adverse possession (for limitation purposes) began.
  4. Whether the precedent Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga (and the principle of subrogation described therein) affects the limitation question in the present case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Thorats') Arguments

  • The finding that the 1891 transactions (Exhibits 62 and 63) in respect of survey Nos. 156 and 157 were sales and not mortgages should not be accepted.
  • The suit to recover possession of survey Nos. 154 and 155 is not barred by limitation because Tagares were strangers who became subrogated to the rights of the mortgagees, relying on Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga.
  • Alternatively, if redemption by Tagares created a charge under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act and thus Article 144 applies, the Thorats' suit would not be barred until it was shown that Tagares' possession had been adverse to Thorats for more than twelve years.

Respondents' / Other Parties' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' (Tagares') separate legal arguments beyond the factual findings of the lower Courts and the legal positions adopted by those Courts (that the 1891 transactions were sales and that Article 144 applied to the claim as time-barred).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga Principle that a stranger who pays off a subsisting mortgage may be subrogated to the position of the mortgagee (analogy to section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act). The Court held this case did not bear on the limitation question in the present matter; it related to enforcement of an equitable right after payment of a subsisting mortgage and not to the limitation issue now before the Court.
Vasudev v. Balaji Held that where a co-sharer redeems and obtains possession the appropriate limitation is Article 144 (not Article 148) because the redeeming co-mortgagor's position is that of a charge-holder; suit barred after twelve years from date of redemption/decree. The Court treated Vasudev v. Balaji as a leading authority supporting application of Article 144 where a person who redeems holds with animus against the whole world; it relied on this reasoning to hold Thorats' suit barred.
Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali Referred to as representing the opposite view (the Allahabad High Court decision) from which Vasudev v. Balaji dissented. The Court noted Vasudev v. Balaji dissented from Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali; the opinion cites this to explain the jurisprudential context but follows the Vasudev line endorsed by other High Courts.
Munia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty Accepted the position that possession after redemption is that of a lienor under section 95; suits by original owners may be barred under Articles 126 or 144 depending on facts. The Court noted that the Madras High Court accepted Vasudev's position in Munia Goundan, and treated that acceptance as supporting the application of Article 144 or related limitation provisions in similar factual matrices.
Purna Chandra Pal v. Barada, Prosanna Bhattacharjya Following Vasudev, held a suit brought more than twelve years from the date when the charge came into existence and exclusive possession was obtained would be barred under Article 144. The Court relied on this case as an authority consistent with Vasudev to support the conclusion that Thorats' claim is time-barred under Article 144.
Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali Interpreted section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act; held the phrase “one of several mortgagors” refers to those interested in the equity of redemption, and “expenses properly incurred in so redeeming” includes the mortgage-debt. The Court used Umar Ali to construe section 95 and to support the conclusion that by redeeming the whole mortgage Tagares acquired a charge on the other two survey numbers (154 and 155).
Ramchandra Yashvant Sirpotdar v. Sadashiv Abaji Sirpotdar Held that holding by a co-sharer as a lienor did not contradict the proprietary right of another co-sharer; possession consistent with ownership must be referred to that right instead of to a conflicting right. The Court cited this to explain the distinction between co-sharer cases (where possession is presumed on behalf of all and may not be adverse) and the present case involving a stranger redeeming and holding with animus to exclude the original owner.
Bhaiji Shamrao v. Hajimiya Mohamad Held that possession of joint property by one co-sharer does not constitute adverse possession against other co-sharers unless there is disclaimer/hostile assertion; reflects divergence of views among judges. The Court referenced this case to illustrate the co-sharer line of authority and to distinguish it from the present case where Tagares were not co-sharers.
Chandbhai Mahamadbhai v. Hasanbhai Rahimtoola Case concerned a co-sharer redeeming the mortgage. The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that it was a co-sharer case and thus not applicable to the present facts where Tagares were strangers to the remaining shares.
Sambhu bin Hanmanta v. Nama bin Narayan Held that where redemption was at the request of the original mortgagor the possession of strangers redeeming at the instance of the plaintiff was as lienors; lien exists for twelve years and after its expiry possession would be without right and suit by original owner would be barred after twelve years from extinction of lien. The Court discussed this case, observed the reasoning was somewhat difficult to follow, and treated the case as distinguishable on its facts (redemption at the instance of the original mortgagor) though it was referred to in the overall analysis of limitation and lien duration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two linked parts: (1) the character of the 1891 transactions as sale or mortgage; and (2) the limitation consequences for the Thorats' suit regarding survey Nos. 154 and 155.

On the first question (156 and 157): the Court accepted the concurrent findings of the lower Courts and the conclusion in the prior redemption suit (in which the Thorats were parties) that the 1891 transactions (Exhibits 62 and 63) were sales and not mortgages. The Court treated the prior judgment and the present evidence as sufficient to resolve that factual issue against the appellants.

On the second question (limitation for 154 and 155): the Court considered the effect of Tagares' redemption of the entire mortgage in 1904 (decree) and their taking possession in 1906. The Court analysed the legal position under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act (prior to its 1929 amendment) which, on established construction (including Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali), gives a person who redeems a charge on the shares of co-mortgagors for the expenses properly incurred in redemption — and that “expenses” includes the mortgage debt. Consequently, the Court held that by redeeming the whole mortgage Tagares acquired a charge on survey Nos. 154 and 155.

The Court then examined whether the proper limitation period for Thorats' suit to recover possession on payment of a proportionate part of the mortgage money was Article 148 (which governs suits to redeem) or Article 144 (twelve years, for recovery of possession based on title). The Court drew a crucial distinction between (a) cases of co-sharers where a redeeming co-share's possession is presumptively on behalf of all co-sharers and Article 148 may be inapplicable, and (b) cases where a stranger redeems and holds with animus to claim ownership against the original owner. Citing Vasudev v. Balaji and other High Court decisions (Munia Goundan, Purna Chandra Pal), the Court concluded that where a stranger (not a co-sharer) redeems and obtains possession with the intention to hold against the whole world, Article 144 applies and the original owner's remedy to recover possession on payment becomes barred after twelve years from the date of redemption/possession.

The Court also rejected the appellants' reliance on Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga for the limitation point, observing that Tangya Fala addressed subrogation and equitable rights after payment of a mortgage but did not speak to limitation in the factual matrix of this case.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that Thorats were parties to the prior redemption decree, knew that Tagares (who had no title to 154 and 155) redeemed the mortgage and remained in possession, and that such possession was open, notorious, exclusive and taken with animus to hold against the whole world. Therefore the Thorats' claim was barred under Article 144 as twelve years had elapsed.

Concurring reasons (Murphy, J.) emphasized that a person who redeems while interested only in part of the mortgaged property holds a charge under section 95 (enforceable under the limitation applicable to charges) and is not thereby transformed into a full mortgagee or co-owner in the sense that would prevent application of Article 144 where factually the redeemer holds adversely. Murphy, J. observed there was no exact prior decision on this precise point between strangers and co-sharers, and considered Vasudev v. Balaji as the leading case to support the conclusion reached.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed with costs and the decree of the lower Court is confirmed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The concurrent factual finding that the 1891 documents (Exhibits 62 and 63) effected sales in respect of survey Nos. 156 and 157 is accepted and stands.
  • The Thorats' suit in respect of survey Nos. 154 and 155 is held to be time-barred under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act because Tagares redeemed the mortgage, obtained possession with animus to hold against the whole world, and more than twelve years elapsed before suit.
  • Tagares' position after redemption is recognised as giving them a charge on the other survey numbers under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act (as construed in the authorities cited), and that charge and the character of possession are central to the limitation analysis.

Broader legal implications noted by the Court:

  • The opinion emphasises the distinction between (a) redemption/possession by a co-sharer (where possession is presumptively on behalf of all co-sharers) and (b) redemption/possession by a stranger (who may hold adversely). The applicable limitation period depends on that factual characterization.
  • The Court relied on and aligned with existing authorities (notably Vasudev v. Balaji and subsequent High Court decisions) in applying Article 144 in the factual circumstances where a stranger redeems and holds with animus against the original owner; it did not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond applying those authorities to the case at hand.

Decree confirmed. (Signed: Patkar, J.; concurring judgment: Murphy, J.)

    Ramchandra Khaserao v. Ganesh Balwant Tagare

    Patkar, J.:—

    The suit lands, survey Nos. 154, 155, 156 and 157, belonged to Thorats who mortgaged them to Yadavs in 1877. In 1891 survey Nos. 156 and 157 were sold to Tagares by 1 two documents, Exhibits 62 and 63, for Rs. 99 each. Tagares brought a suit in 1904 against the original mortgagees Yadavs for redeeming the properties comprised in the mortgage of 1877. To this litigation the original owners, Thorats, were jaarties. Thorats contended in that litigation that the sale-deeds in favour of Tagares were in the nature of mortgages, but the contention was overruled and Tagares were allowed to redeem on payment of Rs. 1,562-8-0. Tagares obtained possession in 1906. The plaintiffs Thorats have brought the present suit in 1924 against Tagares for redemption and accounts of the mortgage transactions and for possession of the suit properties.

    Both the Courts held that the sale-deeds relating to the lands, survey Nos. 156 and 157, were in fact transactions of sale and not mortgage. With regard to the other two survey Nos. 154 and 155, the Subordinate Judge held that Tagares occupied the position of the original mortgagees and that Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act applied and not Article 144, and therefore allowed redemption of the lands, survey Nos. 154 and 155, on payment of the proportionate amount of Rs. 665-8-0.

    On appeal, the learned Assistant Judge held that the suit relating to survey Nos. 154 and 155 was barred by limitation under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, and as he confirmed the finding of the lower Court that the transactions relating to survey Nos. 156 and 157 were in fact sales, he dismissed the suit.

    In this appeal it is urged on behalf of the appellants that the finding that the transactions relating to survey Nos. 156 and ??? were sales and not mortgages should not be accepted. Further, it is urged that the suit to get possession of survey Nos. 154 and 155 is not barred by limitation on the ground that Tagares stood in the position of strangers and became subrogated to the rights of the mortgagees according to the decision in Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga. It is also urged that if under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act the redemption by Tagares gave them a charge on survey Nos. 154 and 155 and Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act applied, the suit relating to survey Nos. 154 and 155 would not be barred till it was proved that Tagares set up an adverse title and their possession commenced to be adverse to Thorats, the original owners of the property, more than twelve years before suit.

    The question as to the real nature of the transactions relating to survey Nos. 156 and 157 was litigated between the parties in the previous suit for redemption brought by Tagares against the original mortgagees Yadavs. In that suit the original mortgagors Thorats were parties and it was held that the transactions represented a sale and not a mortgage of the two survey numbers. The concurrent finding of both the Courts, based on the evidence in the present case, even apart from the previous decision, that the transaction relating to survey Nos. 156 and 157 represented a sale and not a mortgage, must be accepted.

    The next question is whether the suit of the plaintiffs Thorats relating to survey Nos. 154 and 155 is in time. The case of Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga does not bear on the question of limitation. In that case a stranger, who paid off a subsisting mortgage, was considered as subrogated to the position of the mortgagee on the analogy of section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit related to the enforcement of the equitable right of a person who paid off a subsisting mortgage and did not relate to the question of limitation which arises in the present case. So far as survey Nos. 156 and 157 are concerned, Tagares acquired the rights of the original owners and brought a suit for redemption against the mortgagees to which the Thorats were parties. As the mortgage was indivisible, Tagares were allowed to redeem all the four survey numbers on payment of the amount due on the mortgage. Tagares had acquired title to survey Nos. 156 and 157, but so far as survey Nos. 154 and 155 were concerned they were in the position of strangers, though it might be said that they had acquired a right to a portion of the equity of redemption by purchase of two out of the four properties comprised in the mortgage. In a case where a co-sharer redeems a mortgage and gets possession of the whole property, it is held by this Court that Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act applies and not Article 148 to a suit brought by the other co-sharer to recover possession of the property on payment of a proportionate part of the mortgage debt. In Vasudev v. Balaji it was held, dissenting from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali. that Article 148 would be inapplicable on the ground that the position of a redeeming mortgagor is that of a charge holder and a distinction is drawn between a charge and a mortgage in the Transfer of Property Act by section 100, and what a redeeming co-mortgagor has is a charge and not a mortgage, and, therefore, Article 148 would not apply. It was also held that the suit was barred by limitation after twelve years from the date of the redemption under a decree passed against both the mortgagors. This position has now been accepted by the Madras High Court in Munia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty, and by the Calcutta High Court in Purna Chandra Pal v. Barada, Prosanna Bhattacharjya.

    section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act before its amendment by Act XX of 1929 refers to one of several mortgagors redeeming the mortgaged property, and it says that—

    “Where one of several mortgagors redeems the mortgaged property and obtains possession thereof, he has a charge on the share of each of the other co-mortgagors in the property for his proportion of the expenses properly incurred in so redeeming and obtaining possession.”

    Tagares in this case cannot be said to be one of the several mortgagors, nor can they be said to be co-sharers with Thorats. They were entitled to a portion of the equity of redemption in the two lands, survey Nos. 156 and 157, and; so far as survey Nos. 154 and 155 were concerned, they had no title as co-sharers. In Umar Ali v. Asmat Ali reference is made to section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act as being unskilfully drawn and clumsily worded section and the phrase “one of several mortgagors” was held to mean one of the several persons interested in the equity of redemption, and the expression “expenses properly incurred in so redeeming” included the mortgage-debt. It is clear, therefore, on the authorities, that by virtue of the redemption by Tagares of the whole mortgage, they acquired a charge on the properties, survey Nos. 154 and 155, under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, and a suit by Thorats to recover possession of those survey numbers on payment of the proportionate amount of the expenses incurred in redemption will be governed by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act and not by Article 148 of the Act.

    A distinction is, however, drawn where a co-sharer redeems a mortgage and it is held that the possession of the co-sharer after redemption is on behalf of all the co-sharers, and therefore though a co-sharer has redeemed the properties and has acquired a lien under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, his possession does not contradict the possession of the other co-sharers, and his possession is presumably on behalf of all, and unless there is ouster, adverse possession under Article 144 would not begin.

    In Ramchandra Yashvant Sirpotdar v. Sadashiv Abaji Sirpotdar it was held that the holding by a co-sharer as a lienor did not, in any way, contradict the ulterior proprietary right of his co-sharer, and it was observed as follows (p. 424):—

    “On the contrary, it implied and preserved their right, since it would be impossible for a man to hold a lien on his own property. But, then, as long as a possession can be referred to a right consistent with the subsistence of an ownership in being at its commencement, so long must the possession be referred to that right, rather than to a right which contradicts the ownership”

    In Vasudev v. Balaji the finding of the lower Courts that the co-sharers' possession was adverse was accepted and the suit was held barred under Article 144.

    In Bhaiji Shamrao v. Hajimiya Mohamad, where one of the tenants-in-common redeemed the mortgage without the knowledge of the other co-tenant, it was held by Scott C.J, on difference of opinion between Beaman J. and Hayward J., that the possession of joint property by one co-sharer did not constitute adverse possession against any other co-sharer until there had been a disclaimer of the latter's title by open assertion of a hostile title by the former. It was held by Beaman J. that a suit would be barred by Article 144 whether redemption was with or without the knowledge of the co-sharers. Hayward J. differed. The precise point was not discussed in the judgment of Scott C.J, who followed the previous decisions of this Court, and held that the possession of joint property by one co-sharer did not constitute adverse possession against any other co-sharer until there was a disclaimer of the latter's title.

    In the present case Tagares were not co-sharers in any sense of Thorats, and therefore, the principle that the possession of a co-sharer is on behalf of all the co-sharers would not apply. The case of Chandbhai Mahamadbhai v. Hasanbhai Rahimtoola can also be distinguished on the ground that it was a case of a co-sharer redeeming the mortgage. It, therefore, follows that if Article 144 applies and a stranger redeems the property and holds it as owner to the knowledge of the original owner, the title to recover possession on payment of the proportionate part of the mortgage money would become barred under Article 144 after the lapse of twelve years. The case of a co-sharer or a tenant-in-common redeeming the mortgage stands on a different footing.

    In Sambhu bin Hanmanta v. Nama bin Narayan the redemption was at the request of the original mortgagor and it was held that the possession of the strangers redeeming the property at the instance of the plaintiff was in their position as lienors, and that the lien would exist for twelve years, and that after the expiration of the twelve years their lien would be gone and their possession thereafter would be of persons holding without any right and the suit by the original owner would be barred by limitation by the efflux of twelve years from the date of the extinction of the lien. It is somewhat difficult to follow the reasoning in that case, as in the case of Vasudev v. Balaji, the possession of even a co-sharer who was in possession as a lienor under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act was held to be adverse on the evidence in the case from the date of the redemption, but the facts in that case are quite distinguishable as the redemption was at the request of the original mortgagors.

    In the previous suit Thorats objected that the transaction with reference to the two survey Nos. 156 and 157 did not represent a sale but represented a mortgage, and they were parties to the redemption decree and knew that Tagares, who had no title to survey Nos. 154 and 155, redeemed them under the decree and remained in possession. Their possession, therefore, to the knowledge of Thorats was open, notorious and exclusive, and the suit of Thorats would become barred by limitation under Article 144, after twelve years from the date when Tagares obtained possession.

    In Munia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty, where redemption was effected by the purchaser from the father of ancestral property, it was held that the possession of such purchaser after redemption was that of a lienor under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the suit of the purchaser from the son was not governed by Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act but was barred under Article 126, or in the alternative under Article 144. It was observed by Sadasiva Ayyar J., at page 658, as follows:—

    “In this case, it is clear on the proved documents and the facts found by the lower appellate Court that the third defendant when he purchased in 1897 had the animus to claim title as the sole owner of the equity of redemption and not merely to claim title to the first defendant's father's one-fourth share, and that he took possession in April 1898 with the animus to hold the whole half share against all the world and not as a mere co-sharer with the first defendant in that half share.”

    The same view was accepted in Purna Chandra Pal v. Barada Prosanna Bhattacharjya where it was held, following the decision in the case of Vasudev v. Balaji, that a suit brought more than twelve years from the date when the charge came into existence and more than twelve years from the date when exclusive possession was obtained in a suit for redemption, would be barred under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act.

    In the present case, Tagares obtained possession of survey Ramohandba Nos. 154 and 155 with the animus of holding the property as against the whole world and had no intention to hold it on behalf of the original owners Thorats. The claim, therefore, of the original owners, Thorats, was rightly held by the learned Assistant Judge to be barred by limitation.

    The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed with costs.

    Murphy, J.:—The facts are that the original owners, the Thorats, mortgaged four separate numbers in 1877 to a man named Jadhav for Rs. 1,000. In 1891 they sold the equity of redemption of two of these survey numbers to Tagares, by two separate deeds each for Rs. 99. In 1904 Tagares sued to redeem the four survey numbers covered by the mortgage, as they were bound to do, and were decreed redemption. They did redeem and got possession in 1906. The original owners, the plaintiffs, were parties to the suit. The defendants, were in possession from 1906 to 1924 when this suit was brought. It was to redeem the two survey numbers which had been redeemed by Tagares, but in which it is now contended the original owners still had the equity of redemption. The suit has failed in the Court below, on the ground that it is governed by the twelve years limitation rule in Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, and not by Article 148 which fixes the period of limitation for a suit to redeem.

    The question turns on a finding as to the real character of the possession of a person interested only in a portion of mortgaged property, who redeems the whole mortgage.

    It is clear that under section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act he holds a charge on it, which he can enforce within the period of limitation set out in Article 132. He is in the position of the mortgagee to that extent—but does this make him a mortgagee? If not a mortgagee, is he a co-owner, and if so, from what point does his adverse possession begin, if his possession is adverse at all?

    There is no decided case on the exact point. We have been referred to the cases of Ramchandra Yashvant Sirpoidar v. Sadashiv Ahaji Sirpotdar, Vasudev v. Balaji, Tangya Fala v. Trimbak Daga and Bhaiji Shamrao v. Hajimiya Mahamad. But these are all cases of co-sharers, where the point of departure for limitation would be as in Article 144.

    Here the redeeming mortgagor had no interest in the property in question, and was merely holding it as having been compelled to redeem it, and so long as the charge he had on it was not discharged. The leading case seems to me to be that of Vasudev v. Balaji In this case the other party interested was a co-mortgagor and twelve years limitation was held to apply by Sir Lawrence Jenkins and the point of departure was the date of redemption.

    The other point—the real character of the transaction of the sale of the equity of redemption by Exhibits 62 and 63—has been found against the appellants on the facts by both Courts below.

    I think that the suit was not in time and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Decree confirmed.
    J.G.R
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    Ramchandra Khaserao v. Ganesh Balwant Tagare
    (Jul 25, 1932)