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  • section 6(iv) and section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act XI
  • section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • section 22(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • section 23(4) the Income-tax
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 6(iv) and section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act XI
  • section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • section 22(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • section 23(4) the Income-tax
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a reference to the Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The case was originally heard by Sir Amberson Marten C.J. and Mr. Justice Blackwell on 13 December 1929 and referred back to the Commissioner to find further facts with a suggestion that the questions then raised should be amended to three specified questions. The Commissioner declined to raise what the Court regarded as the real question, taking the view that he had no power to do so. When argued before the Court (Beaumont, C.J.), the Court concluded that it should amend the questions under its power and raise the real question in addition to the two originally raised.

The Company before the Court is a mutual life assurance association: it is a company limited by guarantee with no share capital, and under Article 6 of its Articles of Association every person who insures his life under a participating policy is to be deemed a member of the Company.

The practical dispute concerned (a) whether premiums paid under participating policies are profits or gains of the Company liable to income-tax and (b) whether the existing assessment made by the Income-tax authorities is valid and binding on the Company. The Commissioner had made an assessment using administrative rules (rules 25 and 35) under section 59, and the Court was called on to decide the legal effect of the Company's structure and the appropriate taxable income.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the premium income received by the Association from its members under participating policies (or any part thereof) is liable to be assessed to income-tax as profits or gains of a business under section 6(iv) and section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act XI of 1922.
  2. Whether such income (the premiums from participating policies) or any part thereof is liable to be assessed to income-tax or super-tax as income, profits or gains under any other provision of the Act, and if so, under which provisions.
  3. Whether, in law, the existing assessment made by the Income-tax authorities is valid and binding on the Company (i.e., whether an assessment equal in amount to the existing assessment is binding).

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee Company's Position (as reported)

  • The Company's solicitors (letter dated 10 February 1927) asserted that the Company was only liable to be taxed on interest and dividends of securities and moneys held by them in India and on interest on loans made to members after making a reasonable allowance for office expenses, and offered to make a declaration of actual income on those lines.
  • The Company did not in fact make a return of the total income required by section 22(1).

Commissioner of Income-tax's Position (as reported)

  • The Commissioner initially declined to raise the question whether the existing assessment was valid, taking the view that he had no power to raise that question.
  • In making an assessment, the Senior Income-tax Officer applied rule 25 and rule 35 under the rules made under section 59. The Commissioner stated in the supplemental case that he had no reliable data, and so applied rule 35 as the appropriate method in the absence of more reliable data.
  • In practice, the Commissioner treated the company's other sources of income (annuity consideration, interest, fees, consideration for reinsuring liabilities, etc.) as constituting taxable receipts (excluding premiums on participating policies) and allocated expenses in a way that left the profits shown in the triennial valuation as representing taxable profits for the purpose of applying rule 35.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiva Prasad Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. Authority for the Court's power under section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act to amend the questions asked by the Commissioner by raising the real question and answering it. The Court followed the view in this case to justify amending the questions referred and to raise and decide the real question (including whether the existing assessment was valid).
Kajorimal Kalyanmal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. Similarly cited as authority for the Court's power under section 66(5) to amend and add questions to those referred by the Commissioner. Used by the Court to support its amendment of the referred questions so as to include the question of the validity and binding nature of the existing assessment.
New York Life Insurance Company v. Styles (House of Lords) Principle that premiums paid by participating policy-holders in a mutual insurance company — who share in the whole of the profits — do not amount to taxable profits or gains of the company; and exposition of what parts of a mutual insurer's receipts are taxable (annuities, non-participating premiums, investment income, and other profits). The Court applied the Styles principle to the assessee Company, concluding that premiums from participating policies are not profits of the Company liable to income-tax, and adopted Styles' approach to identify other sources of income which are taxable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in a logical sequence grounded in statutory duty, precedent, and the practical assessment method employed by the Revenue:

  1. Jurisdiction to amend questions: The Court determined that under section 66(5) it could amend the questions referred by the Commissioner and raise what it considered the real question. The Court relied on the decisions in Shiva Prasad Gupta and Kajorimal Kalyanmal to justify this procedural step.
  2. Characterisation of the Company: The Commissioner had found, and the Court accepted, that the Company is a mutual association — a company limited by guarantee with no share capital — and that Article 6 of its Articles makes every participating policy-holder a member. This factual characterisation is central to the legal analysis.
  3. Application of Styles principle: The Court identified the central principle from New York Life Insurance Co. v. Styles that in a mutual insurance company premiums paid by policy-holders who share in the whole profits do not constitute taxable profits or gains of the company (summarised as "a man cannot make a profit out of himself"). The Court saw no reason why that principle should not apply to the assessee Company and concluded that premiums paid by participating policy-holders are not profits of the Company liable to income-tax.
  4. Identification of taxable income: The Court considered what parts of the Company's receipts should be taxed. It adopted the Styles approach that the Company is taxable on its income derived from sources other than contributions by participating policy-holders — for example, profits on annuities, profits from non-participating policies, income from investments of premiums, and any other profits not represented by the participating contributions. The Court noted the territorial limitation of Indian income-tax (liable only as to income accruing, arising, or received in India).
  5. Statutory obligations and absence of return: Under section 22(1) the Company was obliged to make a return of its total income (with "total income" defined in section 2(15)). The Company did not make such a return; its solicitors' letter asserting a narrower tax liability was insufficient and no return was filed. Consequently, section 23(4) required the Income-tax Officer to assess to the best of his judgment.
  6. Application and scope of rules 25 and 35: The Commissioner invoked rule 25 (relating to life insurance companies incorporated in British India and actuarial valuation) and rule 35 (which permits deeming the Indian branch's total income to be the proportion of total income corresponding to the ratio of Indian premium income to total premium income, in the absence of more reliable data). The Court found rule 25 inapplicable because the Company was not incorporated in British India. Rule 35, however, applied because the Commissioner had stated there was no reliable data; the Court agreed that, on the materials available, the Commissioner could not assess in the more detailed manner the Court thought appropriate.
  7. Use of triennial valuation as best available data: To find the total income of the Company for applying rule 35 the Commissioner (and the Court for purposes of review) used the triennial valuation to approximate average annual profits. The triennial account disclosed specific taxable receipts (consideration for annuities, interest, fees, consideration for reinsuring liabilities, etc.) whose aggregate exceeded the profit shown, implying that some expenses had been charged against those taxable receipts.
  8. Expense allocation and assessment result: The Court accepted that the Commissioner had not taxed participating premiums, had taken other taxable sources, and had deducted the balance of expenses remaining after the participating premiums were treated as having borne the initial expense burden. Using that calculation and then applying rule 35 (by taking the proportion of Indian premium income to total premium income), the Commissioner reached an assessment figure. The Court concluded that an assessment equal in amount to the existing assessment was binding on the Company, though the Court described reaching that conclusion by a different analytical route.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • First question: The premium income received by the Association from its members under participating policies (or any part thereof) is not liable to be assessed to income-tax as profits or gains of a business under section 6(iv) and section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act XI of 1922. (Answer: negative.)
  • Second question: Such income (premiums from participating policies) is not liable to be assessed to income-tax or super-tax under any other provision of the Act. (Answer: not liable.)
  • Third question: An assessment equal in amount to the existing assessment is binding on the Company. The Court concluded that the existing assessment (arrived at by the Commissioner applying rule 35 on the available data and the triennial valuation) is substantially binding on the Company.

Consequences: The direct practical effect is that premiums under participating policies are excluded from taxable profits of the Company, while the Company remains liable to taxation on other sources of income (annuities, non-participating policy premiums, investment income, etc.), as represented by the existing assessment now held binding. The Court made no order as to costs. The opinion follows established precedent (notably Styles and the cited Allahabad decisions) and does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts; the decision therefore resolves the assessment dispute between the Revenue and the Company without announcing a novel departure from existing case law.

Answers accordingly

Reported bench: Beaumont, C.J. (delivered reasoning and conclusion); Murphy, J. concurred.

    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay Presidency, Bombay Referor v. The National Mutual Life Association Of Australasia, Limited Assesses

    Beaumont, C.J:—

    This is a reference to this Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The matter originally came before this Court consisting of Sir Amberson Marten C.J and Mr. Justice Blackwell on December 13, 1929, and it was then referred back to the Commissioner to find further facts and it was suggested by the Court that the questions raised should be amended by asking three questions which are specified in the judgment. The first two questions are really subsidiary and the third one is, whether in law the existing assessment is valid and binding on the Company. The Commissioner of Income-tax declined to raise that question taking the view that he had no power to do so. The case having been argued before us, it appears to us that is the real question which arises, and we propose, therefore, to amends the questions raised by raising that question in addition to the two questions actually raised in the case. In doing so, we are following the view expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in Shiva Prasad Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P, and in the later case of Kajorimal Kalyanmal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P, that the Court has power under section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act to amend the questions asked by the Commissioner by raising the real question and then answering that question.

    The two questions which are originally raised in the case really involve determining whether the principle of the decision of the House of Lords in New York Life Insurance Company v. Styles applies to the assessee Company.

    The Commissioner has found the nature of the Company, and I think it is only necessary to say that it is a Company limited by guarantee, has no share capital, and under Article 6 of the Articles of Association every person who insures his life with the Company under a participating policy is to be deemed to be a member of the Company. The principle which the House of Lords laid down in Styles' case was this, that where you are dealing with a mutual Insurance Company, the premiums paid by the policy-holders who are to share in the whole of the profits of the Company do not amount to profits or gains of the Company which are liable to tax. The principle at the bottom of the decision is that a man cannot make a profit out of himself: if a number of persons contribute to a common fund which immediately or later is to come back to the subscribers then there is no profit which can be liable to tax, and I see no reason why the principle of that case should not apply to the assessee Company in this case. I therefore think that any premiums paid by those entitled to participate in policies who become thereby the members of the Company are not profits of the Company.

    But then the question arises, on what income ought this assessee Company to be assessed? Now, in Styles' case the Commissioners of Inland Revenue whose decision was upheld by the House of Lords, had decided, first, that no part of the premium income of the Company received under participating-policies was liable to be assessed to income-tax as profits or gains, and, secondly, that the Company was liable to be assessed (a) in respect of profits made on annuities granted, (b) on profits made from premiums paid under non-participating policies, (c) on all income derived by or from investment of all premiums paid to them in the United Kingdom or abroad, and as to the latter when such money was received in the United Kingdom, and (d) on all profits, if any, derived in any manner other than by the annual premium contributions of the participating policy-holders. It seems to me that is a finding that the whole of the income of the Company derived from sources other than contributions by the participating policy-holders was liable to tax, and that seems to me to presuppose that the premiums paid by the participating policy-holders must be the first fund to bear the expenses of management and so forth. That, I think, is borne out by the opening argument of Mr. Finlay, as he then was, in which he says (p. 387):—“The question is whether where members of a mutual insurance company make contributions towards the expected expenses, and there is a surplus after paying the expenses, income-tax is payable upon the surplus which is returned to the contributors”. Clearly in that case the House of Lords was only dealing with the actual surplus of the premiums after payment of expenses, but the principle upon which the decision rests covers, I think, the whole of the Premiums. It seems to me, therefore, that in this case the Company ought to have been charged upon its income derived from investments and on profits from non-participating policies or any other sources except the contributions from the participating policy-holders. So far as Indian income-tax is concerned, it is of course only chargeable prima facie on those sources of income in so far as they accrue or arise or are received in India.

    Now it was the duty of the assessee Company under section 22(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act to make a return of the total income of the Company during the previous year, the “total income” being defined in section 2(15) as total amount of income, profits, and gains from all sources to which the Act applies. If the Company does not make a return, then under section 23(4) the Income-tax Officer has to make the assessment to the best of his judgment. The assessee Company did not make any return of the income upon which in my view they were liable to tax. On February 10, 1927, their solicitors wrote a letter to the Senior Income-tax Officer in which they stated that they were only liable to be taxed on the interest and dividends of any securities and moneys held by them in this country and on the interest on loans made to members after making a reasonable allowance for office expenses, and they offered to make a declaration of their actual income on those lines. But that clearly was not enough, because they would have had to include in their return any profits made from non-participating policies issued in India. At any rate they did not in fact make any return. That being so, the Senior Income-tax Officer in the first instance made an assessment applying rules 25 and 35 of the rules made under section 59 of the Act, which under that section have statutory effect. Rule 25 provides:—“In the case of Life Insurance Companies incorporated in British India whose profits are periodically ascertained by acturial valuation, the income, profits and gains of the Life Assurance Business shall be the average annual net profits disclosed by the last preceding valuation”, and the proviso allows certain deductions. It is to be noticed that rule applies to Life Insurance Companies incorporated in British India, and as the assessee Company is not incorporated in British India, it is in my view plain that rule 25 has no application to the present case. Then comes rule 35 which says:—

    “The total income of the Indian branches of non-resident insurance companies (life, Marine, Fire, Accident, Burglary, Fidelity, Guarantee, etc.), in the absence of more reliable data, may be deemed to be the proportion of the total income, profits or gains of the companies, corresponding to the proportion which their Indian premium income bears to their total premium income.”

    It is to be observed that this rule is only to be applied in the absence of more reliable data. The learned Commissioner has, in his supplemental case referred to us pursuant to the judgment of this Court which I have mentioned, stated as a fact that he had no reliable data. I agree with him that it was not possible on the materials before him to assess this company in the manner in which, as I have indicated, I think it ought to have been assessed. I think, therefore, he was justified in applying rule 35. Now in order to apply rule 35 he has first of all to find out what is the total income, profits or gains of the assessee company. What he had got was a triennial valuation, and without any more reliable data, I think, he was justified in saying that he must assume that the profits for the year in question would be the average annual profits shown in the triennial valuation, that is to say, in order to make commissioner the best assessment he can under section 23(4) of the Act, he arrives at the same result as he would reach if rule 25 applied. Now, under the triennial valuation it appears that the Company has certain sources of income which are plainly taxable. As appears from page 10 of Exhibit C, it has got consideration for annuities granted £91,000 odd, interest £3,000,000 odd, fees £600 odd, consideration for reinsuring liability of other companies £1,500,000 odd. All those are sources of income which are taxable leaving out of account premiums of participating policies which, as I have already said, are not in my view taxable. The receipts from those taxable sources are greater than the profits for the period shown in the account, so that some expenses must have been deducted from those taxable sources of income. I think, therefore, that the Commissioner was justified in coming to the conclusion that the profits shown in the triennial account did in fact represent taxable profits. In doing so he has not taken into account as taxable profits premiums paid on participating policies; he has taken the other sources of income and deducted from them the balance of expenses remaining over after the premiums on participating policies have been wiped out. Having arrived in that way at the total income, profits or gains of the Company, he then under rule 35 had to find out the proportion of the Indian income, and he did this by taking the proportion which the Indian premium income bears to the total premium income. The figures are shown in the case. The result is, I think, that the existing assessment is substantially binding on the Company, though I arrive at that conclusion by a different road to that which the Commissioner took. I answer the first question—whether the premium income received by the Association from its members under participating policies or any part thereof is liable to be assessed to income-tax as profits or gains of a business under section 6(iv) and section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act XI of 1922—in the negative. I answer the second question—whether such income or any part thereof is liable to be assessed to income-tax or super-tax as income profits or gains under any other and if so under which of the provisions of the said Act—by saying that such income is not liable to assessment. I answer the third question raised—whether in law the existing assessment is valid and binding on the Company—by saying that an assessment equal in amount to the existing assessment is binding on the Company.

    As regards costs, there will be no order.

    Murphy, J.:—I also answer the questions put to us in the same way as has been done by My Lord the Chief Justice for the same reasons to which I have nothing to add.

    Answers accordingly
    J.G.R
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