Patkar, J.:—
This is a suit brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that the property kept in possession of his father defendant No. 1 for he enjoyment defendants Nos. 1 and 5 is liable to be equally divided among the plaintiff and his brothers defendants Nos. 3 and 4, and that the sale deeds and deeds of gift passed unauthorizedly by defendant No. 1 are null and void. The case on behalf of the defendants was that there was a partition in 1910 and the property was divided into five equal shares and each sharer was absolute ??? of the property that fell to his share. It appears ??? in 1910 there was a partition between the brothers a their father defendant No. 1. The present plaintiff made an application in 1910 for a decree to be passed in terms of an award Exhibit 83. After the presentation of the award the plaintiff contended that there ??? an agreement in writing to be passed by defendant No. 1 to the effect that the plaint property had fallen of the share of defendant No. 1 and was to be enjoyed by him during his lifetime and by the step-mother and another of the plaintiff during their lives for maintenance. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement, Exhibit 342 dated July 19, 1910, denied the assertion of the plaintiff that the plaint property was joint and ??? that the property allotted to his share by the award belonged to him absolutely. On June 8, 1911, deed of gift, Exhibit 287, was passed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 4 and on January 20, 1913, another deed of gift, Exhibit 288, was passed favour of defendant No. 2. The present suit was ??? on June 13, 1922.
Both the Courts held that the present suit was barred under Article 120 of the Indian limitation Act. The ??? Subordinate Judge, however, was inclined to ??? that the property in suit was kept joint to be enjoyed defendant No. 1 and his two wives for their maintenance so that it may be divided equally among all the others after the death of defendant No. 1 and his wives. The lower appellate Court has not investigated ??? important question of fact. If the question had ??? gone into by the lower appellate Court and found against the plaintiff, the plaintiff's suit would have ??? liable to be dismissed on the merits. We will ??? for the purpose of this appeal that the allegation the plaintiff is true.
??? is urged on behalf of the appellant, first, that the ??? Article applicable to the suit is Article 127 of Indian limitation Act, secondly, that if Article 127 ??? not apply and even if Article 120 applies, there is continuing cause of action within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian limitation Act, and, thirdly, that Article 144 would apply as it is a suit for possession of an interest in immoveable property.
The first question, therefore, is whether the present suit is governed by Article 127 of the Indian limitation Act. Article 127 relates to a suit by a person excluded from joint family property to enforce a right to share therein. It is clear that in this case the members of the family admittedly divided the family property between themselves, and after the division they continued to be tenants-in-common and not joint tenants in the property which was to be subsequently divided in Amme Raham v. Zia Ahmad it was held that “joint family property” means the property of a joint family and not property in which the contending parties ??? interest as tenants-in-common. The same view was taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Bhavrao Rakhmin. In the case of Isap Ahmed v. Abhram Ahmadji it was held by the majority of the Judge constituting the Full Bench that the expression “joint family property” must be read as property appertain to a joint family. In Yerukola v. Yerukola it ??? observed (p. 668) that “the effect of the partial partion of certain properties, and the reference to arbitration as regards the properties undivided, as well as ??? conduct of the parties subsequently, show clearly the they had become divided in status. At the date of ??? suit the plaintiff was not a member of a joint family. It was further held that Article 127 is inapplicable cases where at the date of the suit the property ceased to be joint family property and is held by share as tenants-in-common. The same view was taken Venkatappayya v. Venkata Ranga Row. The case Gavrishankar Parabhuram v. Atmaram Rajaran which might lend some support to the contention of the appellant, has been considered, in Dagadu v. Sakubai, to have been overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj. According to the view of Macleod, C.J in Dagadu's case even if the agreement set up by the plaintiff be held proved, the jural relation of the parties inter se might be that of “joint tenants not as members of a joint family which no longer exists but under a special agreement made after the severance.” It would, therefore, follow that the property in suit is not joint family property.
The next question is, whether this is a suit to enforce right to share therein. This is a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a share at some future date in the property in suit. In Raoji v. Bala it was held that Article 127 provides for a suit to enforce a right” (not “to establish a right”) and by this phrase is intended a claim to obtain actual possession. We think, therefore, that Article 127 cannot apply to the facts of the present case.
It is urged on behalf of the appellants that there is continuing cause of action within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian limitation Act and reliance is ??? on the case in Chukkun Lal Roy v. Lolit Mohan Roy, where it was held that a suit for a declaratory relief except in cases specially provided by the Indian limitation Act cannot be held to be barred so long as declaration right to the property in respect of which the declaration is sought is a subsisting right. That case is ??? from by the Madras High Court in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Isakapalli Subbiah and by the Patna High Court in Maulavi Muhammad Fahimul Huq v. Jagat Ballav Ghosh. In Rajah of Venkatagiri's case it was held that the cause of action for a declaratory relief is the alleged wrongful denial by the defendant in each case of the plaintiff's title and possession, and the criterion is not whether the right is a continuing one but whether the wrong is a continuing one within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian limitation Act. In Maulavi Muhammad Fahimul Hug's case it was observed that the declaration obtained in a suit for possession is merely ancillary and is generally unnecessary; but where the cause of action is based upon a shadow cast upon the title of a person, who is not entitled to any consequential relief at the moment limitation must run from the date on which that challenge to his title commences. A declaratory suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act can be brought when the plaintiff's title is denied by some person, and the denial itself gives a cause of action for a declaratory relief. To such a suit section 23 of the Indian limitation Act cannot apply as it refers to a continuing wrong and not to a continuing right.
The last question is whether Article 144 of the India Limitation Act applies. This is not a suit for possession, but a suit for declaration and to such a suit Article 144 of the Indian limitation Act cannot apply. In Francis Legge v. Rambaran Singh it was held a follows (p. 36):—
“It seems to us that there is the widest possible difference between a ?? for a declaration such as is asked for in this suit and a suit for ??? possession of immoveable property. In a suit to which Article 144 would apply, there must be a prayer, express or implied, for the dispossession some one from the property or from the interest in it which the suit claim …. There is no one to be dispossessed from it or from any interest in it
According to the decision of the Privy Council Kodoth Ambu Nayar v. Secretary of State for India he proper Article applicable to such a case is Article 120 of the Indian limitation Act.
We think, therefore, that the view taken by both the owner Courts is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. The costs will be paid to respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The cross objections are dismissed. ??? order as to costs.
Decree confirmed.
B.G.R