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Case Number

Appeal No. 45 of 1926 under the Letters Patent

Attorney(S)

H.C Coyajee, with J.R Gharpure, for the appellant.
W.B Pradhan, for the respondents.

Judges

Mr. Patkar
Mr. Murphy, JJ.

Acts

section 4 of Act VI of 1892, which declared section 647 of the old Civil Procedure Code corresponding to section 141 of the present Code
section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 13, of the Civil Procedure Code,
section 103 of the old Civil Procedure Code, corresponding to Order IX, rule 9,
SECTION 5 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
SECTION 122 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
section 3, clause (17), of the General Clauses Act,
Order IX, rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code.
section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act,
INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
clause (3) in rule 9 of Order XXII
Order IX, rule 9.In Republic
Order IX, rule 13,
Order IX, rule 9,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs originally brought Suit No. 197 of 1918 to recover possession of certain properties. They allege their pleader, Mr. Dev, compromised that suit without their authority and a decree was entered in terms of that compromise. The plaintiffs filed Suit No. 25 of 1922 seeking to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that their pleader had no authority to compromise. That second suit was dismissed on January 15, 1923, for default because their pleader, Mr. Shidore, was absent. On advice of counsel they appealed the dismissal, but the appeal was dismissed on June 30, 1925 as not being appealable.

On June 18, 1925 the plaintiffs applied to restore the suit to the file under Order IX, rule 9, C.P.C. The learned Joint First Class Subordinate Judge of Dhulia rejected the application as time‑barred under Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act and held that under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act the delay could not be excused. The plaintiffs appealed from that rejection; this opinion arises from the appeal (and subsequent Letters Patent appeal) challenging the lower court's rejection of the restoration application.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court, under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code, could validly make a rule applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 9 (i.e., whether the rule is intra vires).
Whether a rule made by the High Court that applies Section 5 to applications under Order IX, rule 9 should be given retrospective effect so as to apply to pending proceedings (and thus permit the court to excuse delay in the plaintiffs' application).
Whether the change effected by the High Court's rule constitutes an alteration of a rule of limitation or merely an alteration of procedure such that retrospective application is appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

The rule made by the High Court under Section 122, C.P.C., was ultra vires; the High Court had no power to frame a rule that modified, expressly or by necessary implication, a rule of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act.
The word “rule” in the phrase “by any enactment or rule” in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has been dropped by the amending Act X of 1922, so the High Court could not extend Section 5 by a rule.
The rule should not be given retrospective effect because doing so would affect vested rights of the defendants under the decree; they relied on authorities that changes affecting substantive rights should not be retrospective.

Applicants' / Plaintiffs' Arguments

The rule framed by the High Court does not expressly or impliedly alter the period of limitation; it applies a provision of the Indian Limitation Act (Section 5) which itself contemplates such application.
The change effected by the rule is procedural — it governs the procedure for applications under Order IX, rule 9 — and therefore should be applicable to pending proceedings and may relax the rigour of the time bar by enabling the court to excuse delay.
There is precedent where High Court rules applying Section 5 to similar provisions were held intra vires (for example, the Madras Full Bench decision in Krishnamachariar v. Srirangammal relating to Order IX, rule 13).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Manibhai v. Nadiad City Municipality	That rules made under a statutory rule‑making power may be as effectual as if they were part of the statute itself.	Used to support the view that High Court rules under Section 122 can have statutory effect and so the rule applying Section 5 is validly framed.
Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood	Authority for the proposition that certain court rules may be treated as effectual as statute.	Cited alongside other authorities to show similar rules have been treated as effective to supplement statute.
Shankarlal v. Dakor Temple Committee	Same general principle as above concerning effect of rules made under statutory authority.	Referred to support the validity of High Court rule‑making under Section 122.
Krishnamachariar v. Srirangammal	Held that a High Court rule applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 13, was intra vires.	Direct precedent supporting that a similar rule (applying Section 5 to Order IX proceedings) is within High Court power.
Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Iyer	Cited by respondents for the proposition that courts should not give retrospective effect where rights are altered.	Not applied to sustain respondents' position; the court distinguished these authorities because they affected vested rights.
Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass	Cited similarly for the non‑retrospective principle when vested rights are affected.	Not applied to defeat retrospective effect because the court treated the High Court rule as procedural rather than affecting vested rights.
In re Joseph Souche & Co., Limited	Statement of general rule that legislative changes altering parties' rights do not affect pending actions unless expressly so stated, with the exception for changes affecting procedure.	Quoted to support the distinction between substantive changes and procedural changes; used to justify retrospective operation of procedural amendments.
Gajanan v. Waman	Observation casting doubt on whether limitation law is purely procedural because limitation may create prescriptive rights (vested rights).	Cited as a cautionary authority acknowledging that limitation can, in some circumstances, create vested rights and thus affect retrospective application.
Gurupadapa Basapa v. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa	Held that the law of limitation applicable to execution is the law in force at the date of the application for execution; procedural laws apply immediately after coming into force.	Used to support the proposition that procedural changes in limitation law apply to subsequent steps after enactment.
Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram	Supports the view that limitation law may operate as procedural law depending on the context.	Cited to show that changes in limitation law have in some instances been treated as procedural and applied to subsequent proceedings.
Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal	Privy Council decision referred to in relation to Shib Shankar Lal on limitation law.	Referred to in support of the treatment of limitation law as procedural in certain contexts.
Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger Mellish	Authority for the proposition that no suitor has any vested interest in the course of procedure.	Used to support retrospective application of procedural changes.
Warner v. Murdoch	Held that no one has a vested right in any particular form of procedure.	Cited to reinforce that procedural changes may be applied retrospectively.
Wright v. Hale	Held that alterations in proceedings generally apply to pending suits if no provision to the contrary.	Invoked to support the general proposition that procedural amendments operate retrospectively unless contrary reason exists.
Hajrat Akramnissa Began v. Valiulnissa Begam	Considered whether a statutory provision excluding a section deprived a party of a remedy under a provision corresponding to Order IX, rule 9; held that alterations in forms of procedure are retrospective.	Applied to support that procedural changes restoring or regulating applications to restore orders can have retrospective effect.
Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhsh	Similar authority supporting retrospective effect of procedural changes.	Used to reinforce the conclusion that procedural amendments apply to pending proceedings.
Ratanchand Shrichand v. Hanmantrav Shivbakas	Decision treating suit and all appeals therein as one legal proceeding.	Applied to hold that the High Court rule would apply during the pendency of an appeal because the suit and appeals are one proceeding.
Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna	Same principle as above regarding the continuity of suit and appeals as one proceeding.	Used to support retrospective application during the pendency of appeal.
Chinto Joshi v. Krishnaji Narayan West	Observation that suit, appeal and subsequent steps are steps in a series connected by intrinsic unity.	Relied upon to treat the application to set aside dismissal as part of the same proceeding and thus within reach of the new rule.
Mahadeo v. Lakshminarayan	Previous ruling mentioned that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be held to apply to applications under Order IX, rule 9 (the earlier position).	Cited as the authority whose limitation the Court suggested to remedy by making a rule; background for the rule‑making decision.
Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving	Authority for the proposition that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure (i.e., is a vested right).	Referred to caution that changes affecting rights of appeal should be treated differently from mere procedural amendments.
Delhi Cotton Co. v. Income Tax Commissioner	Similarly cited for the proposition that right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure.	Invoked to distinguish changes affecting appeal rights from ordinary procedural changes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains reasoned analyses by two judges (Patkar, J., and Murphy, J.) who reach the same outcome. Their reasoning follows two principal strands: (1) the validity (intra vires) of the High Court rule applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 9; and (2) whether that rule may be given retrospective effect so as to apply to the plaintiffs' pending application.

On intra vires of the High Court rule:

The court observed that Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code grants the High Court power to frame rules regulating procedure of civil courts and to annul, alter or add to rules in the first schedule to the Code. The rule in question was made under that power and published pursuant to the statutory process.
The court rejected the respondents' contention that the High Court could not, by rule, modify a rule of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act. It reasoned that the High Court's rule did not purport to change the period of limitation itself but only applied an existing provision (Section 5) that permits courts to excuse delay, to applications under Order IX, rule 9.
The court relied on authorities indicating that rules made under a statutory power can be as effectual as statute and on a Madras Full Bench decision (Krishnamachariar v. Srirangammal) which sustained a similar amendment as intra vires.

On retrospectivity:

The court reiterated the well‑established principle that statutes which take away or impair vested rights are presumed not to operate retrospectively, but that the presumption does not apply to enactments affecting procedure or practice because no one has a vested interest in procedure.
Applying that distinction, the court concluded that the High Court rule effects a change in procedure — it relaxes the rigour of Article 164 by extending the exceptional power in Section 5 to Order IX, rule 9 applications — and does not create a new period of limitation or interfere with vested rights. Therefore the rule is procedural and may be given retrospective effect to pending proceedings.
The court considered authorities showing that procedural changes are ordinarily retrospective and distinguished cases relied upon by respondents as involving changes that affected vested rights or rights of appeal (which are not mere procedural privileges).
The court also reasoned that a suit together with appeals are parts of "one proceeding", and so the rule, once made, applies during the pendency of appeals connected to the suit; consequently, the plaintiffs' application, though made in the context of an appealed dismissal, remained within the scope of the rule.

Conclusion of analysis applied to the facts:

Because the rule is intra vires and procedural, it applies to pending proceedings and enables the court to consider excusing the plaintiffs' delay under Section 5 as extended to Order IX, rule 9. On that basis the lower court's rejection for delay was not sustainable.
Both judges concluded that the proper course was to reverse the lower court's order and remand the matter to the original court to decide the restoration application on merits, with costs in the application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court's rule applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 9, is intra vires, may be applied to pending proceedings, and the lower court's order rejecting the plaintiffs' application to restore the suit to the file is reversed and the case is remanded for disposal on the merits. Costs were awarded in the application.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The lower court's order is reversed and the matter remanded so that the original court may consider the plaintiffs' application to set aside the dismissal on its merits under the procedure as modified by the High Court rule (i.e., with Section 5 available to excuse delay).
On broader legal consequence: The court concluded that a High Court rule framed under Section 122, C.P.C., that applies a provision like Section 5 to proceedings governed by Order IX, rule 9, is valid and — being procedural in character — may be given retrospective effect to pending proceedings. The opinion distinguishes such procedural amendments from alterations that would affect vested rights or rights of appeal.
The opinion does not purport to create or state any additional substantive rule of limitation; it treats the change as an extension in procedure by rule and remits the application for determination in accordance with that procedure.

Decree reversed and case remanded.

This summary is prepared solely from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond those expressly contained in that opinion.

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Pandharinath Kikalal v. Thakordas Shankardas Vani

Patkar, J.:—

This is an appeal against the order of the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge of Dhulia rejecting an application to restore the suit to the file. The plaintiffs filed Suit No. 197 of 1918 to recover possession of the properties in suit. It is alleged that their pleader, Mr. Dev. compromised the suit without their consent and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise. The plaintiffs filed Suit No. 25 of 1922 to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that the pleader had no authority to compromise the suit, and, therefore, the decree was not binding on them. This suit was dismissed on January 15, 1923, as their pleader, Mr. Shidore, was absent, and on the advice of their pleader they filed an appeal against the order of dismissal. The appeal was dismissed on June 30, 1925 on the ground that the order was not appealable. The plaintiffs, therefore, made an application on June 18, 1925, to restore the suit to the file under Order IX, rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the application was beyond time under Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act, and that under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act the delay could not be excused. An appeal is filed against the order rejecting the application to restore the suit to the file.

The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, were made applicable to applications under Order IX, rule 9, by a rule made by this High Court under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code and published in the Bombay Government Gazette on December 21, 1927.

It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the rule made by the High Court under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code was ultra vires, that the High Court had no power to frame a rule modifying expressly or by necessary implication a rule of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, and that the word “rule” in “by any enactment or rule” in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has been dropped by the amending Act X of 1922. The present rule does not alter expressly or by implication the period of limitation. The rule framed by the High Court applies a section of the Indian Limitation Act which itself provides for such an application. The existence of clause (3) in rule 9 of Order XXII shows that the provision of extending Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was deliberately placed in the first schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court has power under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code to regulate the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their superintendence, and has power by such rules to annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the first schedule. “Enactment” under section 3, clause (17), of the General Clauses Act, would include any provision contained in any Act. The words “by any enactment or rule” have been changed into “by or under any enactment.” The words. “by or under” are more extensive than the mere word “by”. The words “under any enactment” would mean under any provision contained in any Act; and would not be covered by the words “by any enactment,” and would cover the rule making power under any provisions of the Act, e.g, Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code: see Manibhai v. Nadiad City Municipality. Such rules are to be as effectual as if they were part of the statute itself. See Institute of Patent A gents v. Lockwood and Shankarlal v. Dakor Temple Committee. Similar contentions were considered and overruled by the Madras High Court in the Full Bench decision in the case of Krishnamachariar v. Srirangammal, where it was held that the rule framed by the High Court applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under Order IX, rule 13, of the Civil Procedure Code, is intra vires.

It is further urged on behalf of the respondents that Suit No. 197 of 1918 having been dismissed, the change effected by the rule should not be given retrospective effect as it affected the rights of the defendants under the decree, and reliance is placed on the decisions in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Iyer and Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass. In In re Joseph Souche & Co., Limited, it was held by Jessel M.R (p. 50):—

“It is a general rule that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. [But] there is one exception to that rule, namely, that, where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, …..”

But there is no vested right in procedure or costs. See Craies on Statute Law, p. 332. In Gajanan v. Wamanw Beaman, J., expressed a doubt (p. 883) “whether it is strictly accurate to say that the law of limitation is always a law of procedure, that is to say, a purely adjective law, for, amongst its other consequences, it certainly has the creation of rights by prescription and if those rights have vested in individuals under one law of limitation”, it cannot be “seriously argued that they can be divested by the introduction of a new law of limitation.” It was, however, held in Gurupadapa Basapa v. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa that the law of limitation applicable to proceedings in execution is not the law under which the suit was instituted but the law in force at the date of the application for execution, and that Acts of Limitation like other laws relating to procedure apply immediately to all steps taken after they have come into force except when some provision is made to the contrary. The same view was taken in Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram, which went up to the Privy Council in Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal, where it was held that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding is the law in force at the date when the suit or proceeding is instituted unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary. The extension of the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to an application under Order IX, rule 9, is not an enactment of a new period of limitation. If there had been an alteration in the law of limitation, different considerations would have prevailed. The change effected by the rule under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code related to the procedure governing applications to restore suits, dismissed for default, to the file. The application was governed by Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act, and it continued to be governed by the same Article. The application filed beyond 30 days, as required by Article 164, was beyond time. The new rule relaxes the rigour of the law by extending the provisions of section 5 to applications under Order IX, rule 9. The application was beyond time, but the procedure of the Court was amended by enabling the Court to excuse the delay in such an application. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was not in any way amended or repealed. It was extended by the rule under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code to an application under Order IX, rule 9.

In Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger Mellish, L.J, held that (p. 69) “no suitor has any vested interest in the course of procedure”. In Warner v. Murdoch it was held by James, L.J, that (p. 752) “no one has a vested right in any particular form of procedure,” and in Wright v. Hale it was held by Pollock, C.B, that (p. 231) “when an Act alters the proceedings which are to prevail in the administration of justice, and there is no provision that it shall not apply to suits then pending, … it does apply to such actions.” The general principle seems to be that alterations in the procedure are always retrospective unless there be some good reason against it: See Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, p. 401. Acts which take away vested rights ought not to be construed as having retrospective operation, but the case is different with regard to Acts regulating practice and procedure. The cases relied on behalf of the respondents affected vested rights. The case would be different where an amendment of the law takes away any vested rights or affects a right of appeal. A right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure. See Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving and Delhi Cotton Co. v. Income Tax Commissioner.

In Hajrat Akramnissa Began v. Valiulnissa Begam, where in considering the question whether section 4 of Act VI of 1892, which declared section 647 of the old Civil Procedure Code corresponding to section 141 of the present Code inapplicable to applications in execution, deprived a party of the remedy under section 103 of the old Civil Procedure Code, corresponding to Order IX, rule 9, for restoring to file an application for execution which has been dismissed for default, it was held that alterations in forms of procedure are retrospective in effect and apply to pending proceedings. A similar view was taken in Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhsh. Further, under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code, the rule was framed for regulating the procedure of the Civil Courts subordinate to the superintendence of the High Court. Having regard to the object for which the rule was enacted, namely, to relieve the rigour of the law without affecting any period of limitation or interfering with vested rights, we think that the rule made by the High Court effected a change in procedure and should be given retrospective effect so as to apply to pending proceedings.

It follows, therefore, that the rule is intra vires and would apply to pending proceedings. The rule made applicable during the pendency of an appeal. A suit and all appeals made therein are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. See Ratanchand Shrichand v. Hanmantrav Shivbakas and Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna. In Chinto Joshi v. Krishnaji Narayan West, J., observes that (p. 216) “the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal, and second appeal, are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by an intrinsic unity”. The rule, therefore, framed by the High Court would apply to the application made by the plaintiffs to set aside the decree under Order IX, rule 9.

We would, therefore, reverse the order of the lower Court and remand the case for disposal on the merits. Costs in the application.

Murphy, J.:—The applicants in this proceeding had sued to have set aside the decree in Special Regular Suit No. 197 of 1918 of the Dhulia Court, on the ground that suit had unauthorizedly been compromised by the pleader representing them. This, applicants' second suit, was dismissed for default on January 15, 1923. They next appealed against the order of dismissal, but their appeal was rejected by the District Court as mistakenly undertaken. Their next step was to apply to have their suit restored to file.

The learned First Class Subodinate Judge decided that their application was not in time, and that the delay could not, in the circumstances, be excused. Their appeal to this Court, against this order was dismissed summarily, and hence the present appeal under the Letters Patent.

The learned Subordinate Judge held that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply to an application made under Order IX, rule 9, and that the delay could therefore not be excused, under that section. The real point is that at the hearing of the appeal under the Letters Patent on admission, the Bench of this Court which heard it held that in view of the ruling in Mahadeo v. Lakshminarayan, Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act could not be held to apply to an application made under Order IX, rule 9, but suggested that a rule applying it should be made, and meanwhile admitted the appeal.

The rule has since been made by this Court on December 21, 1927, under the powers conferred on it by Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code. It has been objected at the hearing, that:—

(1) The new rule is ultra vires of the powers of this Court; and,

(2) that it cannot in any case operate retrospectively.

On the first point, I think Mr. Pradhan's objection is not arguable. Under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Court has power to annul, alter or add to any of the Rules in Schedule I of the Code; and the amendment has been made after previous publication in accordance with that power. A similar amendment to Order IX, rule 13, made by the High Court at Madras, was challenged in the case of Krishnamachariar v. Srirangammal, and it was held not to be ultra vires of the power given by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The additional proviso to the rule does not, in itself, purport to give retrospective effect to the change it makes, and the next question consequently arises, whether as a mere alteration in a rule of procedure, it should be deemed to have retrospective effect; or if, as a substantial alteration of the law affecting existing rights, it should be confined in its operation to matters arising since it was made.

The general rule touching the point in question is, that every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under the previously existing law, must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective operation. But this presumption is not applicable to enactments affecting procedure, or practice; for no one has a vested right in procedure and practice. Alterations in procedure, therefore, are held to be retrospective, unless a good reason to the contrary is forthcoming. But the right of appeal is a vested right, and it is on this ground that section 154 of the code has been enacted.

Now, the present applicants had no vested right in any appeal. When their second suit was dismissed for default, they could either have applied in time to have the order set aside; or have prayed for a review. They adopted neither of these courses, but appealed to the District Court. No appeal lay to that tribunal, and the appeal necessarily failed; and since by then the time within which the remedies open to them could be prosecuted was past, the decree in their suit became final, and they are precluded from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The consequence is, that the decree in Suit No. 197 of 1918, and the compromise it affected, will stand, unless the new rule has a retrospective effect.

But from the point of view of the decree-holder in Suit No. 197 of 1918, the result is different. His decree was not appealed against and was final, subject to being set aside in a suit framed for that purpose. Such a suit was framed, and ended as already stated, and in a way it may be said that the effect of the new rule, if it is given retrospective effect to, will be to deprive his decree of the finality it would have had as not being susceptible of again being challenged in another suit.

This is more or less the situation envisaged in the remarks of Beaman, J., in Gajanan v. Waman, though it has been held in some reported cases that the law of limitation is adjective law.

The real test appears to me to be, whether the new rule is essentially an alteration of the procedure of the Court, or one of a rule of limitation, or affecting a right of appeal.

This alteration, though it may possibly have the effect of granting the applicants' prayer to have the order of dismissal set aside, if they can show sufficient ground, does not appear to me to affect any vested right in the decree-holder on the other side. It does not alter the law of limitation, or that of appeal. All it does is to invoke the general exception contained in section 5 in eases falling within Order IX, rule 9, enabling an order of dismissal to be set aside on sufficient cause being shown.

Even if looked at in its aspect of affecting the law of limitation, there is some authority for the view that alterations in it are matters of procedure. I refer to the cases reported in Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram. Again, strictly speaking, the new rule is not an alteration in the law of limitation itself, but in the application of one of the general exceptions to be found in that law to it.

I think, looking at all the circumstances, the change really amounts to one of procedure, and if so, there can be no vested right in it.

I agree with my learned brother Patkar, J., that, in the first place, the rule made by this Court, applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to proceedings under Order IX, rule 9, is not ultra vires; and also in his view that, since these proceedings are still pending and that the new rule is one affecting practice and procedure only, it applies retrospectively to the application which this appeal is about, and to the order proposed by him that the lower Court's order be reversed and that the matter be remanded to the original Court for a decision on the merits, and that the costs should be costs in the application.

Decree reversed and case remanded.

J.G.R

Pandharinath Kikalal v. Thakordas Shankardas Vani

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

Applicants' / Plaintiffs' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Pandharinath Kikalal v. Thakordas Shankardas Vani

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