AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, and not article 62,
  • Pensions Act, the terms of section 4 of that Act
  • article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act.
  • SECTION 4 PENSIONS ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, and not article 62,
  • Pensions Act, the terms of section 4 of that Act
  • article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act.
  • SECTION 4 PENSIONS ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a suit in which the plaintiff sought account and recovery in respect of several items (referred to as "Babs" and by item numbers, including items 12, 14, 19, 26 and 33). The trial Court made a preliminary decree for taking accounts but disallowed the plaintiff's claim as to item 12 on the ground of an earlier admission by the plaintiff's father. The defendant/respondent contended that four items (14, 19, 26 and 33) related to money granted by the British Government and that a certificate under section 4 of the Pensions Act was necessary for maintenance of the suit as to those items. The defendant/respondent also raised limitation and exclusion (prescription/abandonment) defences. The appellate Court (opinion delivered by Shah, A.C.J., with Fawcett, J. concurring) considered these contentions, the evidence (including documents Exhibits 48 and 92 and a letter of July 26, 1920), and prior litigation between branches of the family. The appellate Court confirmed the trial Court's decree with a reservation about the four items for which a Pensions Act certificate must be produced before any final decree is entered in respect of them. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the appeal, and the cross-objections were dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a certificate under section 4 of the Pensions Act was necessary for the maintenance of the suit in respect of the four items numbered 14, 19, 26 and 33.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation, and if so, which article of the Limitation Act applied (Article 89, Article 120 or Article 62), having regard to the nature of the relationship between the parties (principal-agent, constructive trustee, or trustee and cestui que trust) and the 1897 arrangement and the death of Shivdeorao in 1918.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's right to recover certain items was extinguished by exclusion or non-use (alleged long non-rendering of accounts and non-payment after 1890) such that the plaintiff's claim was lost.
  4. Whether the trial Court correctly disallowed the plaintiff's claim as to item 12 on the ground of an earlier admission by the plaintiff's father.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • It was urged on behalf of the respondent that due to arrangements in 1869 and 1897 the defendant (or her husband as intermediary) was effectively holding money as soon as it was received for the other sharers, so that the money ceased to be a grant from the Government; on that basis the respondent contended the suit did not relate to a government grant within the meaning of section 4 of the Pensions Act.
  • The respondent relied on decisions bearing on the point — specifically Damodar v. Satyabhamabai and Raghavendra Ayyaji v. Gururao Raghavendra — to support contentions about whether the relevant items were government grants and the need for a Pensions Act certificate.
  • On limitation and prescription, the respondent argued that the plaintiff's right was extinguished because there had been no rendering of accounts and no payments by the defendant after 1890, and that this non-use/exclusion should bar the plaintiff.
  • As to the ownership/character of the Babs, the respondent suggested that the defendants' Kulmukhtyar's statement that the Babs were private ancestral properties might have been mistaken because the witness spoke without reference to the account books; the respondent sought to use that to challenge the trial Court's conclusions.

Plaintiff's / Other Contentions (as recorded)

  • The plaintiff contended (and the trial Court found) that the various Babs were private/ancestral properties of the Vinchurkar family and that all family members were interested in them; this contention was supported by documents (Exhibits 48 and 92) and by a letter written by the defendant's Kulmukhtyar on July 26, 1920.
  • The plaintiff relied on prior suits and adjudications or compromises (including a decree by arbitrators in 1906 and a compromise in 1914) as evidence that rights had been asserted earlier and that the theory of exclusion was not sustainable.
  • With respect to item 12, the plaintiff's earlier admission (made by the plaintiff's father) that he had given up claim to that item was relied upon by the trial Court and accepted on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Damodar v. Satyabhamabai The judgment (Chandavarkar, J.) is cited on the question whether particular receipts constitute a grant from Government within the meaning of section 4 of the Pensions Act; supports strict construction but also recognition of plain words. The Court relied on Damodar to conclude that, as to the four items, the suit did relate to the grant of money by the British Government within the meaning of section 4, and therefore a certificate under the Pensions Act was necessary before relief could be given as to those items.
Raghavendra Ayyaji v. Gururao Raghavendra Contains observations to the contrary on the same point (i.e., whether the receipts are governmental grants for the purpose of section 4). The Court noted contrary observations in Raghavendra but preferred Damodar and allowed the respondent's contention that section 4 applied to the four items.
Babaji Sari v. Rajaram Ballal Cited as a similar ruling illustrating the wide terms of section 4 of the Pensions Act. Fawcett, J. referenced this case to support the view that the terms of section 4 are very wide and that the four items fell within its scope.
Gapu v. Zipru Supports the proposition that where one party collects the whole revenue and parts are due to several co-sharers, a principal-agent relationship may exist for the recovery of a particular portion, making Article 89 of the Limitation Act applicable. Fawcett, J. relied on Gapu v. Zipru in concluding that article 89 (not article 62) was the proper article to apply if the relationship was that of principal and agent.
Dhanpat Singh Ehettry v. Mohesh Nath Tewari Used to support the proposition that a person who intermeddles and collects revenue contrary to an arrangement becomes a constructive trustee under section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act and remains liable to account. Fawcett, J. cited this case to show that where the defendant collected revenue in contravention of the arrangement, she could be treated as a constructive trustee and remain liable to account under section 94.
Muhammad Habibullah Khan v. Safdar Husain Khan Illustrates that where the relationship is of trustee and cestui que trust, Article 120 of the Limitation Act is the appropriate article (as opposed to article 62). Fawcett, J. cited this decision (along with Subba Rao v. Rama Rao) to explain that if the relationship is trustee-cestui que trust, article 120 would apply; however, he nevertheless held article 89 was the proper article in the present facts.
Subba Rao v. Rama Rao Similar support for the proposition about choice of limitation article when trustee-cestui que trust relations exist (relating to Article 120). Fawcett, J. invoked this case to back the principle that trustee-cestui que trust relations attract Article 120; used to contrast with the present finding that article 89 applied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds along several clearly identified lines:

  1. Pensions Act (section 4) point:
    • The Court recognised conflicting considerations on whether the receipts in question were governmental grants within section 4.
    • Shah, A.C.J. noted the defendant's argument that under the arrangements of 1869 and 1897 the defendant (via her husband) held money for the other sharers and that the money ceased to be a government grant. The Court considered decisions on the point (Damodar and Raghavendra) and, giving weight to Damodar (Chandavarkar, J.'s judgment), held that the plain words of section 4 must be given effect and that the suit, as to the four items, did relate to a grant from the British Government for the purposes of section 4.
    • Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff must be given time to produce the necessary certificate under the Pensions Act before any decree can be passed in respect of items 14, 19, 26 and 33. However, the Court also held there was no need to delay the taking of accounts — the decree could provide that after accounts are taken, the plaintiff must produce the certificate prior to any decree for those items, failing which no relief would be awarded as to them.
  2. Limitation:
    • The Court examined whether article 89 or article 120 (or article 62) of the Limitation Act applied. The learned trial Judge had overruled the plea of limitation, considering either article 120 (six years) or article 89 (three years) might govern, with the period running from termination of agency or refusal to render accounts.
    • Shah, A.C.J. preferred article 89 having regard to the terms of the agreement between the parties, and observed that the suit was brought within three years of Shivdeorao's death in 1918; therefore, the claim was not barred. Shah expressly declined to decide whether the arrangement of 1897 made Shivdeorao's widow an "agent" within article 89, but accepted that the timing made the suit timely.
    • Fawcett, J. elaborated on the relationship between the parties: if the defendant, as eldest representative, collects the whole revenue of which the three brothers were tenants-in-common, a principal-agent relationship exists in respect of the portion due to each, bringing article 89 into play (relying on Gapu v. Zipru). If the 1897 arrangement had broken that relationship and the defendant nevertheless collected revenue which the plaintiff could have collected, the defendant would be a constructive trustee under section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act and liable to account (citing Dhanpat Singh Ehettry v. Mohesh Nath Tewari). If the relationship were trustee-cestui que trust, article 120 would be applicable (citing Muhammad Habibullah Khan v. Safdar Husain Khan and Subba Rao v. Rama Rao).
    • On balance Fawcett held there is a presumption of continuance of the principal-agent relationship and that the facts were consistent with such continuance; accordingly article 89 was the correct article to apply and the claim was not time-barred.
  3. Exclusion / Non-use:
    • The defendant's contention that the plaintiff's right was extinguished because of long non-use (no rendering of accounts and no payments after 1890) was considered. Shah, A.C.J. observed that although this point was mentioned in the plaint, no specific issue on exclusion was raised and that the matter would require a further opportunity for evidence and investigation.
    • Shah rejected the contention on the basis of the factual matrix: prior suits and compromises in which rights had been asserted, and a 1920 letter from the defendant's Kulmukhtyar, were sufficient to negative the suggestion of exclusion.
    • Fawcett similarly found no substance in the exclusion argument, noting prior successful claims and compromises, and the Kulmukhtyar's admissions, which cut against the theory of exclusion.
  4. Merits and specific items:
    • As regards item 12, Shah accepted the trial Court's disallowance of the plaintiff's claim because of an unequivocal admission by the plaintiff's father in earlier proceedings; accordingly that part of the decree was not disturbed.
    • On the bulk of the other items, the trial Court had accepted (after examining documents Exhibits 48 and 92 and witness evidence) that the Babs belonged to the family and that members were interested. The appellate Court found no sufficient reason to reverse those conclusions, though it noted the practical possibility that some items might prove non-existent or to have existed only for limited periods when accounts are taken; such matters can be handled in the account-taking process.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree of the trial Court is confirmed, subject to the specific reservation that no final decree shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of items 14, 19, 26 and 33 unless the plaintiff produces the necessary certificate under the Pensions Act before such decree is entered.

Additional orders and consequences:

  • The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent in the appeal.
  • The cross-objections were dismissed with costs.
  • Item 12 remains disallowed on the basis of the admitted earlier concession by the plaintiff's father.
  • The Court permitted accounts to be taken immediately; the requirement of producing the Pensions Act certificate is staged to apply after accounts are taken and before any decree is entered in respect of the four specified items — failure to produce the certificate bars relief as to those items.

Implications for precedent: The Court applied existing authorities (as recorded in the opinion) to the facts. The opinion applies and reconciles prior rulings (e.g., Damodar v. Satyabhamabai, Gapu v. Zipru, Dhanpat Singh Ehettry v. Mohesh Nath Tewari and others) to the present facts; it does not announce a novel legal principle beyond that application.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Girjabai Shivaeorao Vinchurkar v. Narayan Rao Ganpatrao Vinchurkar

    Shah, A.C.J:— [His Lordship after stating of acts and discussing evidence, referred to the contention that a certificate under section 4 of the Pensions Act was necessary for the maintenance of the suit and observed:—]

    2. There are no doubt conflicting considerations, one favourable to the contention and the other against it.

    3. In the present case, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that really in virtue of the two arrangements, one in 1869 and the other in 1897, the defendant must be taken to be in the position of a person who, as soon as the a money was received, held the money for the other sharers so far as those sharers' were concerned and that the money then ceased to be a grant from the Government. The decisions bearing on this point which have been referred to are Damodar v. Satyabhamabai(1) on the one hand, and Raghavendra Ayyaji v. Gururao Raghavendra(2) on the other. Looking at the point for the moment, apart from the decisions, it is difficult to say that the suit, so far as these four items are concerned, does not relate to the grant of money by the British Government within the meaning of section 4. It is true that there was an arrangement between the parties, whereby the defendant's husband was to receive the money and then distribute it among the sharers according to their respective shares. But that by itself does not afford a sufficient basis for holding that the suit does not relate to those four items. The judgment of Chandavarkar, J., in Damodar v. Satyabhamabai in which the earlier decisions on this point have been referred to, is very clear on this point, and, though there are observations to the contrary in Raghavendra v. Gururao Raghavendra I think that the contention of the defendant on this point must be allowed. It is true that the section must be strictly construed; but we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the words used. This conclusion necessitates giving time to the plaintiff to produce the necessary certificate. But it would not be necessary in any way under the circumstances of this case to delay the further proceedings in this snit. There is at present only a preliminary decree for taking accounts, and it can be provided in the decree of this Court that after the accounts are taken, before any decree in respect of these four items is; passed, the plaintiff must produce the necessary certificate under the Pensions Act, and, if he fails to do so, he cannot get any relief in respect of these items.

    4. The next point relates to limitation. As regards that question the learned Judge has overruled that plea on the ground that the suit would be governed either by Article 120, in which case the period of six years would apply or article 89 in which case no doubt) the period would be three years; but it would run from the termination of the agency or from the date of the refusal to render accounts. In the present case it is not suggested that there was any demand and refusal to render accounts, and preferably it seems to me that article 89 would apply having regard to the terms of the agreement between the parties. It may be said, however, that when Shivdeorao died in 1918, the arrangement of 1897 came to an end. Without expressing any opinion as to whether or not in virtue of that very arrangement Shivdeorao's widow was in the position of an agent within the meaning of article 89, as the suit is brought within three years from Shivdeorao's death, it is clearly not barred.

    5. It has been urged farther in connection with this point, that as after 1890 there has been no rendering of accounts and no payments made by the defendant in respect of those items, the plaintiff's right to recover those items is extinguished. In the first place, though this point is mentioned in the plaint, no issue as to exclusion to the knowledge of the co-sharer for over twelve years from enjoyment of certain immoveable property was raised. It is assumed by the defendant for the proposes of this argument that these Babs should be treated as Immoveable property, and it is urged that the right of the plaintiff is extinguished. This point would require investigation on different time altogether, and without allowing the plaintiff a further opportunity to adduce evidence on the point, it could not possibly be decided as desired by the defendant. There is no reason why such farther opportunity should be allowed, and having regard to the facts in the case, it seems to me that the point is without any substance. I have already referred to the various suits, in which the right was asserted by one branch or the other and either allowed by the Court or compromised by the parties. Under the circumstances it would be difficult to hold that there has been exclusion. The letter written by the defendants' Kulmuktyar on July 26, 1920 to the present plaintiff is sufficient to negative the suggestion of such exclusion.

    6. The next question relates fed the merits of the plaintiff's claim. As regards item 12 the lower Court has disallowed the plaintiff's claim as it was admitted by the plaintiff's father in an earlier proceeding that he had given up claim to that item. In spite of the contention of the respondent against this conclusion, it is clear it must be accepted. The admission of the plaintiffs father is unequivocal, and there is no reason why the decree oil this point should be altered. Apart from that the learned Judge hag considered in his judgment the different items id respect of which various arguments were urged, and has come to the conclusion on a consideration of the two documents, Exhibits 48 and 92, that all these Babs really belonged to the family, and that all the members of the family were interested therein. The wording of the letter written by the defendant's Kulmukhtyar in July, 1920, affords corroboration of the plaintiff's claim: and indeed in the evidence of the defendant's Kalmakhtyar, it has been practically admitted that all the suit Babs are the private properties of the Vinchurkar family, that they are their ancestral properties, and that they belonged, to three brothers Ragunabharao, Ktishnarao and Madhavrao. It is urged on behalf of the defendant, as against the statement of his own Kulmukhbyar, that was a mistaken statement as the witness was speaking without reference to the account books. That does not appear to me to afford sufficient ground for not accepting the statement of the witness. It is hardly necessary to deal with all these Babs separately. It seems to me that it spite of the contentions urged before us on behalf of the defendant, the conclusion of the trial Court on the point must be accented. I only desirs to add with reference to this point that these Babs are of such a nature that it is possible that some of them may be found to be non-existent on taking accounts, or they may have existed only for a time during the period in respect of which the accounts are to be taken. That however will be taken into consideration when the accounts are taken. All that; we decide now is that any items in respect of these Babs, if received by the defendant, should be accounted for.

    7. In the result, therefore, I would confirm the decree of the trial Court, subject to the reservation that on taking accounts no decree in respect of anything payable in respect of items 14, 19, 26 and 33 should be passed in favour of the plaintiff, unless he produces the necessary certificate under the Pensions Act before that time.

    8. The appellant to pay the oosts of the respondent in this appeal. The cross-objections are dismissed with costs.

    Fawcett, J.:— I concur in the judgments just delivered. With regard to the objection raised under the Pensions Act, the terms of section 4 of that Act are very wide, and in view of the ruling of this Court in Damodar v. Satyabhama Bai and similar rulings such as Babaji Sari v. Rajaram Ballal(3). I do not think we can possibly say that this suit, so far as it relates to the four items 14, 19, 26 and 33, does not fall under section 4.

    9. In regard to the points of limitation which have been urged, the first question to consider is the nature of the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant. So far as the defendant, as the eldest representative of the family, collects the whole revenue, of which the three brothers were tenants-in-common there clearly, in my opinion, is a relationship of principal and agent, the defendant being the agent of the plaintiff in respect of the recovery of the particular portion of that revenue, in regard to which he has a one-third share, and if that is the case, then article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act, and not article 62, is the proper article to apply. In support of that I may refer to the ruling of this Court in Gapu v. Zipru(4). But supposing that the relationship of principal and agent was broken by the arrangement of 1897, under which the plaintiff's father and the defendant's husband Shivdevrao agreed that the plaintiff might collect his share of certain items of revenue direct, then, if in contravention of that arrangement the defendant has collected the revenue that the plaintiff might have collected on his own account, the relationship becomes one of the defendant being a constructive trustee under section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act. The defendant in that case would be practically in the position of a trustee to son tort by inter meddling and collecting this revenue; and her obligation to account still remains under section 94 of the Indian Trusts Act. It is not open to her to say that she is a mere trespasser, and, therefore not liable to account. In support of that I may refer to Dhanpat Singh Ehettry v. Mohesh Nath Tewari(5). If in regard to certain items of the revenue the relationship is that of a trustee and cestui gue trust, then the right article to apply would, it seems to me be article 120 and not—article 62. Here, again, I may refer to ruling, in cases similar to this, Muhammad Habibullah Khan v. Safdar Husain Khan(6) and Subba Rao v. Rama Rao(7). But in my opinion it does not necessarily follow that, the relationship of principal and agent, that was originally between the parties was broken by the arrangement of 1897. There is a presumption of the continuance of the former relationship of principal and agent, and before we can conclude that relationship has been broken, some more definite acts than the mere passing of this agreement of 1897 are necessary. The actual facts are consistent with the continuation of the previous relationship by the mutual consent, no real effect having been given to the agreement of 1897, so far as it intended to alter the previous arrangement. Accordingly I hold that article 89 of the Indian Limitation Act is the proper article to apply to this suit, and. I understand it has been so applied by this Court in previous litigation between Shivdevrao and the representatives of the second branch of the family. That, being so, the claim is not barred, and even if article 120 is applied it would only, knock off about one year.

    10. I do not think there is any substance in, Mr. Thakor's main contention that there had been exclusion of the plaintiff, which would her his claim altogether. It seems quite clear that there have been prior claims of this nature, and the defendant's Kulmukhtyar in his evidence admitted that some of these claims have been suooessful. For instance, with regard to the suit of 1906, he says that a decree was passed in his favour by arbitrators; in regard to this suit of 1914 there was a compromise, no doubt for a small sum, but still it goes against the theory of exclusion, and, as I have already said, the defendant cannot take advantage of the arrangement of 1897 and say she is not liable to account, if as a matter of fact she acts against that arrangement and herself collects the whole revenue.

    11. Decree confirmed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Girjabai Shivaeorao Vinchurkar v. Narayan Rao Ganpatrao Vinchurkar
    (Aug 8, 1924)