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  • section 386 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu
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  • section 386 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Shah, J.; Macleod, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal concerns the validity of an adoption effected by Parvati (also referred to as Parvatibai), the widow of Govind, after the death of her grandson Dattu. The family relationships relevant to the dispute are these: Govind had a son Anant (predeceased) whose wife Annapurnabai also predeceased Govind. When Govind died he left a widow Parvati and grandchildren including a grandson Dattu. On Govind's death Dattu succeeded to the property. Dattu subsequently died unmarried and Parvati succeeded him as his heir. Parvati then adopted the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted suit to establish rights as the adopted son of Govind against the representatives of Hari's branch of the family.

The trial Court found the fact of adoption proved. The lower appellate Court, relying on the decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao, held the adoption invalid; that view was based on the legal principle (as understood by the lower Courts) restricting a widow's power to adopt after certain successions. The present appellate court (Second Appeal) was called upon to decide whether the adoption by the grandmother Parvati after Dattu's death was valid.

The record includes at least two Second Appeals: one in which the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's claim decreed (Second Appeal No. 465 of 1922) and another (Second Appeal No. 546 of 1922) in which the trial Court had not decided issue No. 7 and the appellate Court was directed to certify its finding on that issue within three months, with liberty to the parties to adduce evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the adoption of the plaintiff by Parvatibai (Parvati), who succeeded to her grandson Dattu's property upon his death unmarried, is legally valid (i.e., whether a grandmother in that position has the power to adopt to continue her husband's line).
  2. Whether the decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao and the Privy Council authorities relied upon therein apply to the present fact situation, or whether those authorities distinguishably restrict the widow's power to adopt only where certain intermediate vestings of estate have occurred.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (plaintiff) urged that the case before this Court is distinguishable from Ramkrishna v. Shamrao because, in the present case, Parvati's position on Dattu's death was analogous to that of a mother who inherits on the death of her son when there are no nearer heirs. In other words, the estate had not vested in any intermediate heir such as the son or that son's widow; the succession here had only two steps (from husband to grandson and from grandson to grandmother), so the widow's power to adopt was not extinguished.
  • The appellant relied on a liberal interpretation of the widow's power to adopt as understood in the Presidency and on the illustration in Mulla's work which describes the present fact pattern.

Respondent/Defendant's Arguments

  • The respondents (defendants) relied on Ramkrishna v. Shamrao as authority for invalidating the adoption. The lower appellate Court's view was that the fact that Parvati's son Anant never succeeded to Govind's estate did not affect the applicability of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao.
  • Implicit in the respondents' position was an argument that when a widow ultimately succeeds to property that once vested in descendants, her power to adopt to continue her husband's line is extinguished (as derived from the Full Bench decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao and the Privy Council authorities considered there).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramkrishna v. Shamrao Full Bench held (as interpreted) that a widow's power to adopt is extinguished where the husband's line continues through the son or through other intermediate heirs (so that the widow cannot thereafter adopt to her deceased husband in circumstances where the estate had vested in other heirs). The court closely examined this decision and concluded that its ratio, as pronounced there, did not deal with the specific fact situation of an estate passing directly from the husband to a grandson and then back to the grandmother without any intermediate heir. Therefore Ramkrishna was held not to be applicable to the present facts.
Hasabnis's case Interpreted by the Full Bench in Ramkrishna as correctly reflecting the Privy Council's decisions on a widow's power to adopt. Cited in the analysis of Ramkrishna and the scope of the widow's power; treated as part of the line of authorities establishing limits to adoption by a widow when intermediate succession occurs.
Bhooban Moyee's case (Privy Council) Provides the foundational hypotheticals and principles (as summarized by Lord Kingsdown) regarding when a widow's power to adopt is extinguished by intervening succession. The court used the hypothetical framework derived from the Privy Council to show that the present case was not covered by those hypotheticals; specifically the Court treated the present facts as falling into the category where the widow's power is not extinguished.
Pudma Coomari's case (Privy Council) Reaffirmation of principles limiting a widow's adoption power when the line continues through intermediate heirs. Referred to as part of the authorities examined in Ramkrishna; considered in determining the proper scope of a widow's power to adopt.
Thayammal's case (Privy Council) Another Privy Council decision reaffirming principles about the widow's power to adopt in certain successions. Referred to in the chain of authorities; used to explain the rule that a widow's power may be extinguished when the line is continued through other heirs.
Dhondi v. Radhabai Holds that a grandmother, like a mother, takes only a widow's estate (i.e., not an absolute estate) when she succeeds as heir. Used to reject the argument that the grandmother took an absolute estate that would preclude her power to adopt; the court relied on this to show the grandmother's position is analogous to a widow's estate.
Bharmappa v. Ujjangauda Authority for the proposition that a widow is entitled to adopt where her husband died sonless (i.e., where there is no son, grandson or great‑grandson). Cited to demonstrate that Parvati would certainly have had the power to adopt if Govind had died sonless, and to frame the contrast with the present fact pattern.
Gavdappa v. Girimallappa Records an observation (by Ranade, J.) about the practical consequences of denying a mother's power to adopt after the death of her son in all circumstances. The court cited this observation to note that while the mother's case carries strong practical considerations, those considerations do not have identical force when applied to a grandmother; nevertheless the court found the grandmother's position indistinguishable from a mother's in the present fact situation.
Madana Mohana v. Purushothama Later decision in which the Full Bench decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao was referred to with approval. Noted by the Court to show that Ramkrishna had later judicial support, although the present case was held to be factually distinct.
Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, sec. 386, illustration (f) (treatise) Illustration states the precise fact situation of the present case and supports the proposition that where succession occurs from husband to grandson and then to the widow grandmother (with no intermediate heir), the widow may adopt a son to her husband. The court expressly relied on Mulla's illustration as corroborative authority for holding that, in the Presidency's understanding, a grandmother in the present factual position can validly adopt to continue her husband's line.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by close examination of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao and the Privy Council decisions relied upon in that case to determine whether those authorities govern the present facts. The analysis unfolded in these steps:

  1. The court identified the precise factual posture of Ramkrishna and observed that the Full Bench there considered whether a grandmother succeeding to her grandson (in the particular chain of succession in that case) could adopt; the Full Bench answered the narrowly framed question in the negative but did not consider the factual variant presented here (where the estate passed directly from husband to grandson and then to grandmother without intervening heirs).
  2. The court distilled from the Privy Council authorities (as interpreted in Ramkrishna) the general principle that when a husband dies leaving a widow and a son, and the son's line continues (via natural-born or adopted sons or via the son's widow), the former widow's power to adopt is extinguished and cannot be revived. That principle, however, presupposes the existence of an intervening vesting or continuation of the line which terminates the widow's power.
  3. The court rejected the argument that the grandmother took an absolute estate which would foreclose adoption; it relied on Dhondi v. Radhabai to show that the grandmother takes a widow's estate and hence her position can be treated analogously to a mother's or a widow's estate in the relevant scenarios.
  4. The Court observed that the precise factual pattern before it — husband -> grandson -> widow (grandmother) with no intermediate heir — was not previously decided and was a case of first impression. The court therefore considered Mulla's authoritative illustration (section 386, illustration (f)), which exactly described the present scenario and supported the proposition that the widow (here, grandmother) may adopt to continue her husband's line.
  5. Applying these principles, the court concluded that Parvati's power to adopt had not been extinguished because the stage at which the widow's power would be considered ended (i.e., vesting in an intervening heir or continuation of the line through other heirs) had not been reached. In short, when the inheritance involved only two steps (from husband to grandson, and from grandson to the widow grandmother), the widow could validly adopt to continue the husband's line.
  6. Macleod, C.J., added a complementary analysis setting out Lord Kingsdown's hypothetical cases derived from Bhooban Moyee's case and showed that the present fact pattern corresponds to the hypothetical in which a widow's adoption power survives (the case where an intermediate heir did not intervene), reinforcing the conclusion that Ramkrishna and the related hypotheticals did not cover this precise situation.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court held that, on the facts before it, the adoption by Parvati (the grandmother/widow) after the death of her grandson Dattu was valid and the appeal was allowed. The court concluded that a grandmother placed, by the course of succession in this case, in the position occupied by a mother inheriting on the death of her son without a nearer heir, could validly make an adoption to continue her husband's line.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • In Second Appeal No. 465 of 1922 the decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside and the plaintiff's claim was decreed with costs throughout against defendants Nos. 1 and 2.
  • In Second Appeal No. 546 of 1922 the trial Court had not decided issue No. 7; the appellate Court directed that the lower appellate Court certify its finding on that issue within three months and permitted the parties to adduce evidence on that point before a decree could be passed.

Implications for legal principle: The Court described the question as one of first impression and, after distinguishing Ramkrishna v. Shamrao, adopted a view consistent with the illustration in Mulla's treatise and with a liberal interpretation of a widow's power to adopt as understood in the Presidency. The decision articulates that where succession follows only two steps (from husband to grandson and then from grandson to the widow/grandmother, with no intervening heir), the widow/grandmother's power to adopt to continue her husband's line survives. The Court therefore applied that interpretive principle to uphold the adoption in this case.

Disposition: Appeal allowed.

    Narhar Govind Navathe v. Balwant Hari Nawathe

    Shah, J.:— The question of law in this Second Appeal is whether the adoption of the plaintiff by Parvatibai after the death of her grandson Dattu is valid. The relationship of the parties may be indicated by the following table:—

    Govind and Hari were divided: Govind's son Anant and Anant's wife Annapurnabai predeceased Govind. Govind died leaving a widow Parvati and a grandson Dattu and a granddaughter Anasuya. On Govind's death Dattu became the owner of the property. Dattu died unmarried: and his grandmother Parvati succeeded him. She adopted the plaintiff, who has filed the suit to enforce his rights as the adopted son of Govind against the representatives of Hari's branch. The fact of the adoption was held proved by the trial Court and not challenged in the lower appellate Court. Both the lower Courts have held the adoption to be invalid on the authority of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that the fact that Parvati's son Anant never succeeded would not make any difference as to the applicability of the said decision.

    In the appeal before us the correctness of this view is questioned. It is urged that in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao the grandmother adopted after the estate had vested in her son and had descended to the grandson on the death of the son, that, while the grandmother would have no authority in such a case to; adopt on the death of the grandson, the present case is essentially different in so fay as her position was exactly the same on Dattu's death as that of a mother who would inherit the estate on the death of her son, who has left no other nearer heirs.

    There is no decided case so far as I have been able to ascertain, and none has been cited to us at the bar, dealing with the question of the power of the grandmother to adopt to her husband under circumstances such as we have in this case.

    The decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao requires to be closely examined in order to see whether it can apply to a case of this kind. In that case the essential facts were that Sitabai's husband Ramchandra died in the lifetime of his father Anandrao leaving a son Sakharam. On Anandrao's death the estate passed to his grandson Sakharam. Then Sakharam died leaving a widow Gangabai and a son Dattatraya. Then Gangabai died and subsequently Dattatraya died unmarried. On his death his grandmother Sitabai succeded to his property. Sitabai then adopted a boy: and the question that was referred to the Full Bench was “whether a grandmother succeeding as heir to her grandson dying unmarried is entitled to adopt in the circumstances of the present case Unfortunately the question referred to the Full Bench has not been accurately stated, and the words ‘in the circumstances of the present case’ have been omitted in the report at p. 527. The judgment of the Full Bench delivered by Chandavarkar J. makes the position clear. After stating the case the learned Judge has pointed out as follows (p. 528):—

    “The real question which we have to decide is whether, apart from the general principles of Hindu law bearing on the subject of a widow's power to adopt a son to her deceased husband, the decision of this Court in Hasabnis's case has interpreted the law correctly as expounded by the I Privy Council in Bhooban Moyee's case and reaffirmed in their later decisions in Pudma Coomari's case(3)) and Thayammal's case(4).”

    These cases are then examined in the judgment and the principle deduced therefrom is stated as follows:— “Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving natural born son or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never after be revived.” The argument based on the consideration that the grandmother took an absolute estate as heir of her grandson was advanced but negatived: and the basis of that argument is not well founded as it has been held by this Court in a later decision that the grandmother like the mother takes only a widow's estate: see Dhondi v. Radhabai(5). In the result the Full Bench held that the decision of this Court in Hasabnis's case correctly interpreted the law as laid down in the Privy Council with reference to the power of a widow to adopt and answered the question referred to that Bench in the negative. It is clear that the question of the grandmother's power to make a valid adoption when the estate has passed directly from her husband to the grandson and has come back to her directly from her grandson without the intervention of any other heir did not arise and was not considered in the case.

    The question that we have to decide is really one of first impression. In the very nature of things such a case could not frequently arise. It is clear that Govind's widow Parvati would have been entitled to adopt if Govind had died sonless, i.e, without a son, grandson or great-grandson. (See Bharmappa v. Ujjangauda.) If he had left only a son and if that son died too without leaving any heir nearer than his mother Parvati, Parvati would have been entitled to adopt according to the decisions of this Court. In the present case, however, the son and his wife predeceased I Govind. When Govind died he had a grandson. So he did not die sonless. The grandson continued the line: but on the death of the grandson without leaving any son or widow behind him, i.e, without any nearer heir, the estate went to Parvati as his grandmother. The line of Govind became extinct on Dattu's death and the considerations which apply to a mother in that position in favour of letting her continue the line apply to the case of a grandmother. Mr. Justice Ranade has observed in Gavdappa v. Girimallappa, with reference to the case of a mother that “if a widow cannot adopt after the death of her natural or adopted son under any circumstances, half the adoptions that take place would have to be declared invalid”. This observation cannot apply with the same force or anything like it to the case of a grandmother. But on principle her position is not distinguishable from that of a mother where the devolution of the estate has followed the course as in this case. On the other hand it is urged that the case of a mother is an exception to the general rule and it is not proper to extend the exception in favour of the grandmother. In this Presidency no express power enabling the widow to adopt to her husband is essential. The mother inheriting the estate of her son, who has left no son or widow is placed exactly in the same position as a widow of a Hindu who has died sonless. On the facts of the present case it seems to me that Parvati was placed on Dattu's death exactly in the same position as a mother would be on the death of her son without any nearer heir. On the whole it seems to me that it would be in keeping with the liberal interpretation of the widow's power to adopt, accepted in this Presidency, to hold that a grandmother could make a valid adoption to continue the line of her husband under circumstances such as we have in this case.

    I may add that I have not been able to find anything in modern works on Hindu law which can throw any light on this question except in Mr. Justice Mulla's work on Hindu law. In the 4th Edition of this book at page 430 we find illustration (f), which is exactly the present case.

    I may add that the Privy Council decisions, referred to in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao, and the later case of Madana Mohana v. Purushothama in which the decision of the Fall Bench is referred to with approval, all deal with the question of the power of the mother to adopt, on the death of her son, when the son has left no nearer heir than the mother. There is no decision bearing on the question that we have to decide: and I am of opinion that the view taken by Mr. Justice Mulla in his book on Hindu law accords with the powers of the widow to continue her husband's line as understood in this Presidency. If the ratio decidendi of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao is to be applied to this case it may be stated that on the facts the stage when Parvati's powers to adopt can be held to be extinguished has not been reached. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and decree the plaintiffs claim as prayed with costs throughout on defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

    In Second Appeal No. 546 of 1922 the trial Court hast not decided issue No. 7. It is necessary to have a finding on this issue before a decree could be passed. The lower appellate Court to certify its finding on that issue in three months. The parties to be at liberty to adduce evidence.

    Macleod, C.J:— I agree, and I should like to add a few remarks with regard to the report of the decision in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao which appears to have prevented the Joint Subordinate Judge from deciding in the plaintiff's favour as he was evidently inclined to do. The pedigree in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao was as follows:—

    Ramehandra died in the lifetime of his father leaving his widow Sitabai and a son Sakharam. When Anandrao died Sakharam succeeded to his estate. Sakharam died leaving his widow Gangabai and a son Dattatraya. Then Gangabai died and lastly Dattatraya died unmarried. His grandmother Sitabai succeeded as his heir, and she adopted the plaintiff to his husband Ramchandra. On Sitabai's death her husband's cousin took possession of the property disputing the plaintiff's status as adopted son. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed in both the lower courts. In Second Appeal the Judge as reported referred the following question for the decision of a Full Bench:—

    “Whether a grandmother, succeeding as heir to her grandson, who died unmarried, can by Hindu law make a valid adoption?”

    It would have been impossible for the Full Bench to have attempted to answer so general a question and as a matter of fact the question referred was “whether in the circumstances of the case (as detailed ‘above) a grandmother succeeding as heir to her grandson dying unmarried was entitled to adopt.”

    Chandavarkar J. was of opinion that the answer to the question depended on whether the inheritance had vested in some heir of the son other than the mother. Her power of adoption did not depend upon the mere vesting of the estate in herself at any time. Reference was made to the three hypothetical cases put by Lord Kingsdown in Bhoobun Moyee's case, Really there were four cases including the one actually before the Court. These may be usefully set out as follows:—

    If A dies leaving a widow B and a son C, and C dies leaving a son D and D dies leaving a son E, B cannot adopt to A on the death of E.

    If D dies B cannot adopt, as her power came to an end when the estate passed to her grandson D.

    If C dies leaving a widow D as his heir, B the widow of A cannot adopt so as to defeat the vested estate of D.

    4. If, however, C dies without leaving a son or a widow, B's power to adopt has not come to an end.

    It is clear, therefore, that the case we have before us is not covered by the facts of the case either in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao or any other reported case or by any of Lord Kingsdown's hypothetical cases in Bhoobun Moyee's case.

    It does, however, appear as illustration (f) to section 386 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu law: “A dies leaving a widow and a grandson B. On A's death, B succeeds to the estate as A's grandson; B then dies without leaving any wife or children. On B's death, the widow succeeds to the estate as B's grandmother…. The widow may adopt a son to her husband A”.

    The learned author supports his opinion in this way. When a husband has left a son but the son dies leaving his mother as his nearest heir, she can adopt to her husband. ‘Son’ means a son, grandson or great-grandson. Accordingly if the husband dies leaving only a son, or a grandson or a great-grandson, and the son or grandson or great-grandson dies leaving the first widow his nearest heir, her power to adopt has not been extinguished. It is otherwise if any intermediate estate intervenes, as that brings the first widow's power of adoption to an end. I see no reason why we should not accept this argument.

    If there are only two steps in the inheritance (1) from the husband to the grandson and (2) from the grandson to the widow grandmother, she can adopt to her husband.

    In Second Appeal No. 465 of 1922 the decree of the lower appellate Court must be set aside and the plaintiff's claim decreed with costs throughout on defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

    In Second Appeal No. 546 of 1922 I agree with the order mentioned in the judgment of my brother.

    Appeal allowed.
    J.G.R
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    Comments

    Narhar Govind Navathe v. Balwant Hari Nawathe
    (Apr 4, 1924)