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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns whether the plaintiff-appellants may treat Survey No. 76 as still subject to a mortgage arising from documents dated 24 January 1906 (Exhibits 28 and 32). The respondents assert that under an agreement reached in March 1908 (Exhibit 34) they acquired the equity of redemption in Survey No. 76 and, in exchange, reconveyed or removed the mortgage charge from the other property originally included in the mortgage (Survey No. 394 or 894 as variously described in the record).

The 24 January 1906 paperwork included one document purporting to be a sale-deed for Rs. 1,200 (Exhibit 28) and a contemporaneous document which provided for repayments by the plaintiff of Rs. 125 per annum for ten years and contemplated a re-sale deed upon repayment (Exhibit 32). The lower courts held that these two documents together constituted a mortgage and not a sale.

The parties litigated the effect and admissibility of the March 23, 1908 document (Exhibit 34). The appellants challenged Exhibit 34 as inadmissible for want of registration and contended that, properly construed, it only put defendants into possession of one plot rather than transferring the equity of redemption. The matter proceeded through trial and appeal and culminated in the present second appeal considered by the court in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to treat Survey No. 76 as still subject to the mortgage created by the 24 January 1906 documents (Exhibits 28 and 32).
  2. Whether the March 23, 1908 document (Exhibit 34) amounts to a transfer (conveyance) of the equity of redemption requiring registration, or whether it is only an agreement to transfer (not requiring registration), and therefore admissible in evidence.
  3. Whether the equitable doctrine of part-performance (as explained in Maddison v. Alderson and applied in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar) can be invoked to supply defects in formal conveyancing or registration and so preclude the plaintiffs' claim.
  4. Whether, if Exhibit 34 is held to be an unregistered transfer falling within Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, the defendants can nevertheless succeed by showing acts of part-performance or possession that prevent the plaintiffs from enforcing their claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Exhibit 34 is inadmissible because it was not registered and therefore cannot be used to affect title to immovable property.
  • On a true construction Exhibit 34 did not transfer the equity of redemption in Survey No. 76 but merely put the defendants into possession of one plot; it did not effect a substantive conveyance extinguishing the plaintiffs' equity.
  • The plaintiffs relied on precedents (including Kurri Veerareddi v. Kurri Bapireddi and Ramanathan v. Ranganathan) that suggest the equitable doctrine of part-performance does not operate to validate an unregistered sale required to be in writing under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The parties entered into an agreement in 1908 (Exhibit 34) under which the respondents acquired the equity of redemption in Survey No. 76 and reconveyed or caused the mortgage burden to be removed from the other plot.
  • Even if Exhibit 34 is not a formal registered conveyance, it is admissible as an agreement (or as evidence of an agreement) and, in any event, the equitable doctrine of part-performance applies: the defendants were put in exclusive possession of Survey No. 76 from 1908, have paid assessments, and the parties' conduct is referable only to the alleged arrangement.
  • Precedents (including Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar and the Full Bench decision in Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath) support the proposition that a purchaser in possession under an agreement can resist a vendor's action even where no registered conveyance was executed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bapu v. Kashinath (1916) 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. Full Bench holding that a contract for sale capable of specific performance may be set up in answer to a vendor's claim for possession. Relied on as authority that Section 54 does not preclude a purchaser in possession under an agreement from resisting a vendor; treated as binding and applicable to the present case.
Venkatesh v. Mallappa (1921) 24 Bom. L.R. 242 Holds that where a purchaser has obtained possession, it is immaterial that more than three years have elapsed since the date for completion of the original contract. Used to support the view that lapse of time does not necessarily defeat a purchaser's rights arising under an agreement put into possession.
Shridhar Ballal Kelkar v. Chintaman Sadashiv Mehendale (1893) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 396 Authority that an agreement to sell an equity of redemption need not be registered. Relied on to show a distinction between conveyances that require registration and mere agreements which do not; supports admissibility of Exhibit 34 as an agreement.
Vani v. Bani (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 553 Construction of a particular document as creating a charge in the nature of a mortgage (not merely creating a right to demand another document). Distinguished: the court found Exhibit 34 did not create a mortgage-like charge but was, on true construction, an agreement to transfer or to obtain a formal conveyance; Vani v. Bani therefore did not govern the present document.
Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar (1914) L.R. 42 I.A. 1 : 17 Bom. L.R. 420 (P.C.) Privy Council recognition that the English doctrine of part-performance (Maddison v. Alderson) applies in India to prevent fraud in land transactions; equitable relief may supply formal defects. Adopted and applied as an alternative ground for the defendants' success: the court preferred the effect of Mahomed Musa over contrary Madras authorities and treated part-performance as available in India.
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467 English exposition of the doctrine of part-performance. Referenced as the explanatory authority for the doctrine of part-performance which Mahomed Musa applied in India; used to explain when part-performance can operate to supply formal defects.
Hiralal v. Shankar (1916) Bombay decision following Mahomed Musa after the Transfer of Property Act came into operation. Noted as a local decision that followed Mahomed Musa, reinforcing application of part-performance in this Court.
Kurri Veerareddi v. Kurri Bapireddi (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 336 F.B. Madras Full Bench view that part-performance principle has no operation to validate an unregistered sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Relied on by the plaintiffs; the court considered but preferred the contrary authorities (Mahomed Musa and the Bombay Full Bench) in this jurisdiction.
Ramanathan v. Ranganathan (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1134 Madras decision (not unanimous) holding that part-performance does not validate an unregistered sale under Section 54. Cited by plaintiffs but distinguished or found less persuasive than the Privy Council and Bombay Full Bench authorities relied on by the defendants.
Salamat-Uz-zamin Begam v. Masha Allah Khan (1917) I.L.R. 40 All. 187 Allahabad decision applying the equitable principle of part-performance to a transfer falling under Section 64 of the Transfer of Property Act; contrary to the Madras view. Noted as a decision to the contrary of the Madras authorities; the court expressed preference for the effect of Mahomed Musa as reflected in this and other decisions.
Chunilal Panalal v. Bomanji Mancherji Modi (1883) I.L.R. 7 Bom. 310 Discusses whether a document that contemplates creation of an interest by a subsequent instrument nonetheless creates an interest by its express terms. Used to assess whether Exhibit 34 "merely creates a right to obtain another document" or itself creates/declares a transfer; informed interpretation of Section 17(2)(v) questions.
Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath Sadoba (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 438 : 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. Full Bench decision considering Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and holding that a defendant in possession under an agreement of sale without a registered conveyance can resist an action in ejectment by the plaintiff-vendor. Treated as binding on the present court and held to govern the present case; it supported the proposition that possession under agreement can defeat a vendor's claim despite lack of registration.
Venkayamma Rao v. Appa Rao (1916) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 509 Authority supporting that Indian law is not inconsistent with the equitable doctrine of part-performance. Cited as supportive of the view that part-performance principles can operate in India to prevent fraud and supply formal defects.
Maung Shwe Goh v. Maung Inn (1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 542 P.C. Concerned the English rule that a contract for sale makes the purchaser owner in equity; distinguished as not affecting the present reasoning. Distinguished: it did not alter the court's view that part-performance as applied in India (Mahomed Musa) remained applicable to prevent fraud despite Section 54 formalities.
Mithiram Bhat v. Somanatha Naickar (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 397 Prior case in which part-performance/equitable principle was treated as applicable in a suit for redemption (not merely possession). Referenced to show part-performance had been applied in suits other than for possession and that a bar to specific performance did not necessarily preclude the equitable defence.
Nilkanth v. Hanmant Appears as a supporting case cited in the lower court's reasoning on extinguishment of an equity of redemption by conduct and part-performance. Referred to in combination with Mahomed Musa in the lower court's reasoning that acts of the parties could supply formal defects.
Lalchand v. Lakshman (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 466 Earlier Bombay decision adopting the Madras view (that part-performance does not validate an unregistered sale under Section 54). Mentioned as having been virtually overruled by the later Full Bench Bapu Apaji decision; thus of limited continuing application.
Bai Gulabbai v. Shri Datgarji Authority for the proposition that an inadmissible document may still be looked at for collateral purposes. Cited by the court to explain that while Exhibit 34 might be inadmissible to affect title, it could be looked at for collateral purposes (though the court limited such use in this case).
Muthukaruppan v. Muthu (1914) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1158 Authority suggesting limits on using an unregistered document even to prove the nature of a party's possession. Invoked to support the proposition that Exhibit 34 should not be used even to prove the nature of the defendant's possession if it is treated as an inadmissible instrument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two coherent lines of reasoning which converge upon the same practical result (dismissal of the appeal with costs).

Primary analysis (first opinion, paragraphs 1–11)

  1. Characterisation of 1906 instruments: The court accepted the lower courts' conclusion that the two January 24, 1906 documents (Exhibits 28 and 32), when read together, constituted a mortgage rather than an absolute sale.
  2. Construction of Exhibit 34 (March 23, 1908): The court examined Exhibit 34 and concluded that the parties intended the mortgagee (defendant) to take Survey No. 76 free from redemption while the mortgagor (plaintiff) would take Survey No. 394 free from the mortgage debt. In other words, the parties intended an effective sale of Survey No. 76 to satisfy the mortgage debt and a re-conveyance of the other plot.
  3. Admissibility and legal character of Exhibit 34: The court considered whether Exhibit 34 was a conveyance requiring registration or merely an agreement to transfer. On the whole it concluded that Exhibit 34 did not effect an actual transfer of the equity of redemption but only amounted to an agreement to transfer (or to cancel Exhibit 32). Consequently, Exhibit 34 was admissible in evidence as an agreement and could be relied on by the defendants.
  4. Distinguishing contrary authority: The court distinguished Vani v. Bani on the ground that Vani concerned a document creating a charge in the nature of a mortgage rather than one which merely created a right to obtain another formal document.
  5. Alternative ground — part-performance: The court applied the equitable doctrine of part-performance (as explained in Maddison v. Alderson and applied in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar) as an alternative basis for the defendants' success. It found that the defendants had been in exclusive possession of Survey No. 76 since 1908, had borne assessments, and that the plaintiffs had been in exclusive possession of the other plot — facts consistent with the 1908 arrangement. The delay in bringing the suit until 1919 further reinforced the inference of an agreed reallocation of rights.
  6. Conclusion of this opinion: On both constructions (Exhibit 34 as an admissible agreement and the alternative part-performance ground) the court concluded that the lower courts' result was correct and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Separate/concurring analysis (subsequent opinion, paragraphs 12–23)

  1. Different construction of Exhibit 34: The subsequent opinion observed that Exhibit 34 contains language that purports to transfer ownership of Survey No. 76 and to treat it as sold, and that it recites the cancellation (to that extent) of the kararnama (Exhibit 32). On that textual basis, the judge considered Exhibit 34 to go beyond "merely creating a right to obtain another document" and to be a document that created or declared a transfer of ownership.
  2. Registration requirement and admissibility: If Exhibit 34 is so construed, it falls under Clause (v) of Section 17(2) of the Indian Registration Act and thus required registration; being unregistered it would be inadmissible to affect the land under Section 49 of the Registration Act. The judge cited Vani v. Bani and Bai Gulabbai v. Shri Datgarji in discussing collateral uses of inadmissible documents and Muthukaruppan v. Muthu regarding limits on such uses.
  3. Independent evidential basis and equitable principle: Despite considering Exhibit 34 to be, on its face, a conveyance requiring registration, this judge concluded that the lower court had other clear evidence of a 1908 arrangement. Moreover, the judge considered the binding Full Bench decision in Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath and the Privy Council decision in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar and held that the equitable principle of part-performance is applicable in India and could supply defects in formal conveyancing where the parties' conduct established the arrangement. The judge therefore found that, even if Exhibit 34 were inadmissible as a conveyance, the defendants could succeed on the ground of part-performance and possession.
  4. Statutory interaction: The judge analysed competing authorities from Madras and other Presidencies but concluded that the Full Bench Bombay authority (Bapu Apaji) and Mahomed Musa entailed that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act does not exclude the equitable principle relied upon in the present facts.
  5. Final conclusion: For these reasons the judge agreed that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Direct effect on the parties: The judgments below (which treated the 1906 documents as a mortgage and accepted the defendants' case that the 1908 arrangement effected an allocation of the properties) were upheld. The defendants prevail: Survey No. 76 is treated under the 1908 arrangement as released from the plaintiffs' mortgage burden in favour of the defendants, and the plaintiffs' attempt to treat Survey No. 76 as still subject to the mortgage has been rejected.

Broader legal implications: The court relied on and applied established authorities (notably the Privy Council decision in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar and the Bombay Full Bench in Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath Sadoba) to confirm that the equitable doctrine of part-performance can operate in India to prevent reliance on technical formal defects in conveyancing where parties' conduct and possession make the arrangement clear. The court did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law but applied and reconciled existing precedents in reaching its decision.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information not contained in that opinion has been added.

    Sandu Valji v. Bhikchand Surajmal

    1. The point on the appeal is whether the plaintiff-appellants are entitled to treat Survey No. 76 as still subject to the mortgage of January 24, 1906. The respondents contend that as the result of a contract arrived at in 1908 it was agreed that they should acquire the equity of redemption in Survey No. 76 but should re-convey the other property originally comprised in the mortgage, viz., Survey No. 894.

    2. The controversy has mainly turned on the document of March 23, 1908, Exhibit No 34, which is alleged to evidence this agreement. The appellants contend that it is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, and alternatively, that, on the true construction of it, it only amounted to putting the defendants in possession of one of the plots whereas up to that date they had not obtained possession of either plot.

    3. As to its admissibility in evidence, one main question is whether the document amounts to a transfer of the equity of redemption, or whether on its true construction it only amounts to a contract to transfer the equity. The Full Bench decision in Bapu v. Kashinath (1916) 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. establishes that in this Court a contract for sale which is capable of specific performance may be set up in answer to a claim for possession by a vendor. And Venkatesh v. Mallappa (1921) 24 Bom. L.R. 242 shows that where a purchaser has obtained possession, it is immaterial that more than three years have elapsed since the date for completion of the original contract. Further, the Indian Registration Act itself draws a clear distinction between what I will f call conveyances, which require registration, and mere agreements which do not. Broadly speaking, this may be described J as the difference between Sub-section (1)(b) and Sub-section (2)(v) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. Accordingly it was decided by Sir Charles Sargent and Mr. Justice Telang in Shridhar Ballal Kelkar v. Chintaman Sadashiv Mehendale (1893) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 396 that an agreement to sell an equity of redemption need not be registered.

    4. To understand the document of 1908 one must appreciate what was the then position under the two documents of January 24, 1906, Exhibits 28 and 32. The first of these documents purported to be a sale-deed by the plaintiff to the defendants for Rs. 1,200. The other document purported to be an agreement by which the plaintiff was to pay the defendant Rs. 125 per annum for ten years, and on such repayment the defendant was to execute a deed of re-sale, and in default of payment the annual installments were to carry interest, and if the plaintiff failed to pay off the money he should not have any right left in the property. In my opinion the lower Courts have rightly arrived at the conclusion that these two documents taken together constitute a mortgage and not a sale.

    5. Turning next to the document of March 1908 (Exhibit 34), I am of opinion that on its true construction the parties intended that the mortgagee was to take Survey No. 76 free from redemption, and that the mortgagor was to take Survey No 394 free from the mortgage debt. In effect, therefore, in my opinion, the agreement was that the mortgagor was to sell Survey No, 76 to the defendant for the amount of the mortgage debt.

    6. It will be seen, therefore, that a reconveyance or deed of resale was necessary as regards Survey No. 394. Accordingly Exhibit 34 provided as follows :-"You (the mortgagee) have agreed to effect the re-sale of that at my convenience by a regular registered deed." But as regards Survey No. 76 the parties seem to have thought, that it would be sufficient to leave the original deed of sale, Exhibit No. 28, standing, and merely to cancel the contemporaneous document, Exhibit No. 32. Accordingly Exhibit 34 provides that "Survey No. 76 from out of the properties involved in that mortgage by way of sale has been given this day to you in lien of the debt of your shop and has been given into your possession this day...and the possession of Survey No. 76 has accordingly been given to you this day. And the survey number has accordingly been transferred to your ownership itself the field of Survey No. 76 is given to you for cultivation and has been given into your possession,...the said Survey Number shall be treated as sold on the basis of that kararnama and an endorsement has been made in the said kararnama and is cancelled and has been given into your possession."

    7. Now it is common ground that no endorsement has been made on the kararnama, Exhibit 32, nor has it been cancelled formally. On the whole I am of opinion that this document, Exhibit 34, did not amount to an actual transfer of the equity of redemption, but only amounted to an agreement to transfer, or alternatively, an agreement to cancel Exhibit 32, and that consequently Exhibit 34 is admissible in evidence as an agreement and can be relied on by the defendants accordingly. The case of Vani v. Bani (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 553 is, I think, clearly distinguishable, as there the Court construed the particular document before it as creating a charge in the nature of a mortgage. It was not therefore a document which merely created a right to demand another document, Accordingly, on this point, I disagree with the lower appellate Court, and I agree with the conclusion which 1 understand the learned trial Judge to have arrived at at p. 10, lines 20-32 of his judgment, viz., that the document itself did not purport to be the sale-deed, but created a right to get formal sale-deeds if necessary.

    8. But there is an alternative way of putting the defendant's case. In Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumara (1914) L.R. 42 I.A. 1 : 17 Bom. L.R. 420 it has been held by the Privy Council that in effect the English doctrine of part performance as explained in Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467 applies in India as being a principle of natural justice, viz., to prevent the success of fraud in land transactions. No doubt in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar the documents in question were before the date when the Transfer of Property Act came into operation. But their Lordships were fully aware of that fact (see page 6), and yet in no way qualified the principles which are there laid down. Further, in Bombay that decision has been followed in Hiralal v. Shankar by Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Shah in a case arising in 1916 long after the Act came into operation in this Presidency.

    9. No doubt to establish the application of that principle, it must be shown that the respective parties have so changed their respective positions that the change can only be referable to the contract alleged, A mere payment of purchase money, for instance, is insufficient (see Halsbury, Vol. XXV, pp. 294-295). In the present case I think the defendants satisfy that test. Since 1908 they have been in exclusive possession of Survey No.76 : they have paid the assessment: no accounts have ever been demanded by the plaintiffs, nor have the plaintiffs made any payments. On the other band the plaintiffs have been in exclusive possession of Survey No. 394 and no demand for payment has been made on them. This is exactly in accordance with the views I have expressed as to the intention of the parties under Exhibit 84. But it seems to me a complete variation of the original agreement Exhibit 32 of 1906 under which the plaintiffs were to pay Rs. 125 every year for ten years, and under which, as we know, the mortgagors remained in possession till 1908 of both plots of land. Further, the suit was not brought till 1919 and this length of time strengthens the inference that otherwise I would be prepared to draw.

    10. The plaintiffs relied on Kurri Veerareddi v. Kurri Bapireddi (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 336 F.B. and Ramanathan v. Ranganathan (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1134 but the decision in Salamat-Uz-zamin Begam v. Masha Allah Khan (1917) I.L.R. 40 All. 187 is to the contrary effect, and under the circumstances I would prefer to adopt what appears to me to be the true effect of Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar followed as it is in this Court by Hiralal v. Shankar, Accordingly, if necessary, I think that the defendants are also entitled to succeed upon this alternative ground.

    11. In my opinion, therefore, the result arrived at by the lower Courts was correct, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Fawcett, J.

    12. The document, Exhibit 34, recites that Survey No. 76 has not only been given into the possession of the defendant mortgagee, but also that its ownership has been transferred to him. It also says that Survey No. 76 is to be treated as sold, and the kararnama, Exhibit 32, is cancelled to that extent. In view of these provisions I do not think the document can be treated as falling under Clause (v) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act 1908. Even if the document is taken to contemplate a further document cancelling Exhibit 32 to the extent mentioned, this makes no difference: see Vani v. Bani. (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 553.

    13. The teat is whether the document does not itself by its express terms create a certain interest in immoveable property, but expressly contemplates the creation of that interest by a subsequent instrument : cf. Birdwood J.'s remarks in Chunilal Panalal v. Bomanji Mancherji Modi (1883) I.L.R. 7 Bom 310 315, a decision approved in Shridhar Ballal Kelkar v. Chintaman Sadashiv Mehendale (1893) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 396. Otherwise proper effect is not given to the words "not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right," &c. and "merely creating a right to obtain" etc. in Section 17(2)(v). Here it seems to me the parties clearly intended Exhibit 34 to be the main document evidencing the sale of the equity of redemption, and the endorsement on Exhibit 32 as a subsidiary affair. In my opinion it goes beyond "merely creating a right to obtain another document" to effect the Bale, and itself purports to create or declare a transfer of ownership. I regret, therefore, I do not agree with my learned brother's view that the document can be treated as a mere agreement for sale.

    14. Accordingly, I think the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the document required registration, and is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of affecting the Survey Number in question under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. It can no doubt be looked at for a collateral purpose; but that must be one other than that of creating or extinguishing a right to the land : see Bai Gulabbai v. Shri Datgarji . I think this excludes looking at it even for the purpose of evidence as to the nature of defendant's possession, which he obtained under the arrangement of 1908 : cf. Muthukaruppan v. Muthu (1914) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1158.

    15. But the mere fact that the lower Court wrongly looked at the document does not necessitate a reversal of its decision: Section 167, Indian Evidence Act. There was other clear evidence of a new arrangement in 1908, which has been considered by both the lower Courts who hold that it establishes the arrangement asserted by defendant as against that asserted by plaintiffs. The evidence seems sufficient to justify their conclusion, and no sufficient ground has been shown for our taking a different view of the facts in second appeal.

    16. But it is contended that in law this arrangement is invalid, because it involves a sale of plaintiffs' equity of redemption which (as it is worth more than Rs. 100) can only be effected by a registered instrument under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.

    17. The answer to this is suggested in the lower Court's judgment which refers to the two cases of Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar P.C. and Nilkanth v. Hanmant . In the former case an equity of redemption was held to be extinguished, because, even if a regular conveyance was necessary, or if some other formal defect had occurred, the acts of the parties had been such as to supply all defects, on the equitable doctrine of performance or part-performance of an agreement. In this case, on the findings of the lower Court, the agreement to make defendant complete owner of Survey No. 76 and to cancel the mortgage of 1906, had been acted on by the parties for some eleven years prior to the suit; and if the equitable principle in question can be properly applied to this case it gives a clear answer to plaintiffs' contention.

    18. No doubt the Madras High Court has held that this principle has no operation in the case of a sale governed by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act : see Kurri Veerareddi v. Kurri Bipireddi (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 336 F.B. and Ramanathan v. Ranganathan (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1134. The latter decision was not, however, unanimous, Wallis C.J. and Abdur Rahim J. dissenting. It has also been dissented from by the Allahabad High Court (Salamat-uz-zamin Begam v. Masha Allah Khan (1917) I.L.R. 40 All. 187 where the equitable principle of part performance was applied to the case of a transfer falling under Section 64, Transfer of Property Act. In this Court the Madras view was taken in Lalchand v. Lakshman (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 466, but this has been virtually overruled by the Full Bench case of Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath Sadoba (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 438 : 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is considered, and it is held that, in spite of its provisions, a defendant in possession under an agreement of sale but without a registered conveyance can resist an action in ejectment by the plaintiff, who agreed to sell him the land and put him in possession. In the argument the Privy Council case of Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar was referred to.

    19. I think it is clear that this ruling, which is binding on us, governs the present case : and personally I have the less hesitation in following it, in that the judgment in that case is based on Indian statutory provisions, which (it is held) qualify Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If that is so, the equitable principle in question is one recognised by the Legislature : and the view taken by their Lordships in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 801 818 and Venkayamma Rao v. Appa Rao (1916) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 509 525 that the law in India w not inconsistent with this equitable principle, is shown to be justified. The case of Maung Shwe Goh v. Maung Inn (1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 542 P.C. does not affect this, for that only concerned the English rule that a contract for sale of real property makes the purchaser the owner in equity of the estate, which is clearly opposed to the express provisions of section 54 regarding a contract for sale.

    20. I was at first inclined to think that Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath Sadoba (1916) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 438 451 452 : 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. would not apply to this case, as it was not a suit for possession but merely for an account. On further consideration I think the same principle applies, for in both cases a liability to account for profits arises, and defendant is entitled to show that he is not so liable : cf. the passage from Story's Equity Jurisprudence cited in Bapu Apaji v. Kashinath Sadoba (1916) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 438 451 452 : 19 Bom. L.R. 100 F.B. And both Mithiram Bhat v. Somanatha Naickar (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 397 Mad. 397 and Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 801 : 17 Bom. L.R. 420 P.C., where the principle in question was held applicable, were suits for redemption of a mortgage and not for possession.

    21. I also think that the fact that defendants' right to a decree for specific performance may now be barred, is immaterial. In Mithiram Bhat v. Somanatha Naickar (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 397 the defendant's claim was similarly barred, as pointed out in Ramanathan v. Ranganathan (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1134 1137 1153. And a similar view has also been taken in Venkatesh v. Mallappa. (1921) 24 Bom. L.R. 242.

    22. The provisions of Section 92, proviso (4), Indian Evidence Act, were also relied on; but it is not a mere case of setting up an oral agreement in modification of a registered instrument, and in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 801. : 17 Bom. L.R. 420 P.C. was similar contention was unsuccessful (see at pp. 811 and 812).

    23. I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

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    Sandu Valji v. Bhikchand Surajmal
    (Nov 20, 1922)