Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiffs filed this suit for redemption and possession of the plaint property alleging that the mortgage-deed was passed by one Anna Dhondiba deceased to the grandfather of the 1st defendant on the 10th January, 1854. The period for the payment of the mortgage was ??? years, and the suit wan filed on the ??? of January, 1916, four days before the ??? to redeem was barred by the law of ???. The heirs of Anna, the ??? appear in the pedigree at p. 6, and ??? the purposes of this second appeal it must be taken as proved that Limba and ??? daughters of Renuka, are two ??? the heirs of Anna, and were, therefore, interested in the equity of redemption, they were not parties to the suit, and accordingly an issue was raised whether ??? plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the ??? without making Limba and Sugandha parties. That issue was found in the ???. The plaintiffs then presented an application under Order I, rule 10, asking ??? Court to make them co-plaintiffs. The ??? Judge in the trial Court dismissed ??? application, and accordingly dismissed ??? suit. Undoubtedly the rights of Limba ??? Sugandha at the time this application is made to redeem the mortgaged property ??? barred. But the learned Judge does ??? seem to have considered whether they ??? have been added as co-defendants, however, this point was considered in leal, and apparently the learned District ??? considered that the plaintiffs made application for their being brought on ??? but that they asked the Court to raise its powers under Order 1, rule 10, ??? add Limba and Sugandha as party ???. The learned Judge, therefore, considered the plaintiffs' case from that point of view, and came to the conclusion that Limba and Sugandha could not be added as defendants under Order 1, rule 10, sub-rule (2) because the suit was barred so far as they were concerned at the time the application for adding them was made, so they could not be added as parties having regard to section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned Judge thought that the ruling in Guruvayya v. Dattatraya (1) was not applicable. It was perfectly clear that any one of several parties entitled to the equity of redemption of mortgaged property was entitled to file a suit to redeem, but owing to the provisions of Order XXXIV, rule 1, all other parties who were interested in the equity of redemption were necessary parties to the suit. Therefore the suit as framed was defective, and as long as Limba and Sugandha ware not brought on the record, the plaintiffs' suit was bound to fail.

2. Then it was said that owing to the provisions of section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act they could not be brought on the record as co-defendants. All that section 22 says is this: “When, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party.” We are entitled, therefore, to look to what would be the state of affairs after Limba and Sugandha had been brought on the record, apart from the Indian Limitation Act, if the plaintiffs are entitled to bring them there. If the plaintiff was seeking any relief against them clearly his claim to such relief would be barred, But it does not follow in all cases where a party is added as defendant to the record after the period when the main relief claimed by the plaintiff against the other defendants would be barred, that by adding that defendant the whole of the plaintiffs' claim becomes barred by limitation. That point was considered in the case I have already referred to, viz. Guruvayya v. Dattatraya , and it was held there that:

“Section 32 (of the Limitation Act) does not is itself purport to determine directly whether the joinder of the parties after the institution of a suit shall in all cases necessarily involve the bar of limitation, it the period prescribed for such a suit has then expired. Such a result must depend upon consideration of the question whether the joinder was necessary to enable the Court to award each relief as might be given in the suit as flamed…If fresh parties ace merely joined for the purpose of safeguarding the rights subsisting as between them and others claiming generally in the same interest, the determination (by application of the previsions of section 23 of the Limitation Act) of the date of institution of the suit as regards such freshly joined parties does not ordinarily affect the anginal plaintiff to continue the suit, and would not therefore attract the application of the general provisions of the Limitation Act.”

3. No doubt the facts in that case were entirely different from the facts in this case. The question is whether the principle laid down there can be applied to this case. We start with this fact that the plaintiffs' right to redeem against the heirs of the mortgagee was not barred when they filed the suit. The suit was defective by reason that when they filed it, they did not make Limba and Sugandha parties. But must it follow, if they are now put on the record, that the plaintiffs' claim against the mortgagee's heirs is barred owing to the provisions of section 22 of the Limitation Act? I do not think that will be the proper result to follow, or that the plaintiff's right, which he had when he filed this suit, should be lost by his omission to make those persons parties. They are only necessary parties to save multiplicity of suits, and to prevent the mortgagee being subjected to suits being filed against him in succession by various parties entitled to the equity of redemption. Admittedly in this case these persons could not file hereafter a suit to redeem the mortgaged property if the plaintiffs' suit failed, and, therefore, they are merely necessary for the record in order to satisfy the provisions of Order XXXIV, rule 1, and I do not think it was ever intended that the plaintiffs in a case like this were liable to lose their rights to redeem because they had omitted to make a person party to the suit who ought to have been made a party. I think it was clearly within the discretion of the Court under Order I, rule 10, sub-rule (2) to make these parties co-defendants, and then to consider after they had been made co-defendants, what would be the legal result of such addition. I think, therefore, that the case must go back to the trial Court with a direction that Limba and Sugandha should be placed on the record as co-defendants, and that as they are purely formal parties, (there being no relief claimed against them) and they are only on the record to prevent the possibility of any attempt being made by them in the future to redeem the mortgaged property, a decree for redemption can safely be made in favour of the plaintiffs.

4. As the plaintiffs have been in defaults there will be no costs in this Court or in the Court below. Costs in the trial Court will be costs in the cause.

Fawcett, J.:— The District Judge considers in regard to the question of joining these two persons under Order I, rule 10, sub-rule (2), that the suit having been barred so far as they were concerned as the time the motion for adding them was made, they could not be added as parties, having regard to section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act. I entirely disagree from this view of the law in a case like the present. The plaintiffs' suit falls under Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act.

5. It was, so far as the provisions of Order I, rule 3 of the CPC, are concerned, properly constituted as filed. Plaintiff alone could sue for redemption, and ??? the defendants against whom the relief ??? redeeming and recovering possession was and could be claimed were actually joined. Therefore the suit, which was brought within the prescribed period of limitation was not barred under section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. This section 3 ??? the only operative enactment which renders it obligatory on the Court to dismiss a suit which is barred by limitation under the First Schedule. Section 22 mere says that, as regards these two person the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted when they have been made parties. But that in no way affects the preses suit under section 3. No relief is claim by the plaintiff against these two person and the previous non-operation of section remains unaffected, because the suit still one brought within the prescribe period of limitation. There is no provision in either the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Limitation Act which say that a party cannot be added after he right of suit or liability to be sued (a the case may be) is barred by ??? provisions of the Limitation Act. Accordingly I think it is absurd to ??? that the plaintiffs' right of redemption entirely lost because he has not complete with the provisions of order xxx rule 1. That, in my opinion, would subordinating justice to a technicality of ???. We have in Order I, rule 9, a ??? provision that no suit shall be defeated by ??? of non-joinder of parties, and therefore, if parties can be added, they ??? should be added in order to meet valid objection to the suit on the ground ??? non-joinder of parties.

6. One of the reasons why Limba and ??? as heirs interested, in the equity ??? redemption, should be joined is no doubt order to safeguard the interests of the mortgagee, against whom they might otherwise bring separate suits. But in ??? present case, as they have lost any ??? right to bring a suit against the mortgagee by limitation, this reason does it really operate. I venture to think that ??? main reason why they should be ??? is that, under section 95 of the ??? of Property Act, the plaintiff ??? require them as co-heirs of the mortgagor to contribute towards the ??? incurred by him in obtaining ??? of the land, and that they could therefore have an opportunity of ??? heard in regard to any account that drawn up for the purpose of passing a ??? for redemption. Thus in Hall v. ??? ward (2) the executrix of a mortgagor for redemption, and although the ???-at-law of the mortgagor is ordinarily necessary party, yeti as he was unknown, Court allowed a decree for redemption issue, safeguarding at the same time the ??? of the heir-at-law. In the judgment in that case, it is said that the only ??? in favour of the objection that raised about want of parties was that heir-at-law would not be bound by an ??? taken in his absence. This ??? however, was held not to be ??? enough to prevent the Court ??? the decree which it did. Therefore ??? two heirs are added mainly for ??? the rights subsisting between them ??? the plaintiff, and that being so the ??? falls clearly within the principle laid ??? in Guruvayya Gouda v. Dattatraya ??? , which, I think, is obviously act and should be followed in the ???. It has been adopted in several ??? by the other High Courts, and is ??? approved of by the Privy Council ??? Prasad v. Har Narain Singh (3). In Shahasaheb v. Sadashiv (4), it was held that the provisions of Order XXXIV, rule 1, were not of an imperative character. In this case it is not necessary to go so far as that, nor does section 98 of the cpc come into play here, as it did there, in support of the view taken in that decision. In the present case there has been an application to add these two co-heirs as parties, and the application is one which, in my opinion, should have been assented to by the trial Court. I, therefore, concur in the order remanding the case.

7. Decree reversed; case remanded.