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  • section 244(c) in the Code of 1882
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  • section 244(c) in the Code of 1882
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed Darkhast No. 138 of 1918 seeking a stay of execution proceedings for the decree in Suit No. 69 of 1915. This stay was sought pending the disposal of the plaintiff's Suit No. 110 of 1918, in which he prayed for a declaration that the decree in Suit No. 69 of 1915 was void and incapable of execution against him. The First Class Subordinate Judge of Poona granted the stay of execution on the condition that the plaintiff furnish security of Rs. 11,000. The matter before the court was whether the order granting the stay of execution was appealable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order granting a stay of execution in Darkhast No. 138 of 1918 is an appealable order under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the omission of the words "or to the stay of execution thereof" from section 244(c) of the Code of 1882 affects the appealability of such an order.
  3. Whether a stay of execution order can be considered in the nature of a decree and thus be appealable under the definition provided in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the appealability of the stay of execution order by examining the relevant statutory provisions. It noted that section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not explicitly mention orders for stay of execution as appealable. The court observed that the corresponding provision in the earlier Code of 1882 (section 244(c)) included the phrase "or to the stay of execution thereof," which was omitted in the current Code. This omission suggested that the legislature did not intend for stay of execution orders to be treated as appealable under section 47.

Further, the court referred to the definition of "decree" in section 2, which includes certain orders under section 47 but does not extend to orders for stay of execution. The court reasoned that such orders are discretionary and not in the nature of decrees, and thus should not be appealable unless explicitly authorized.

Justice Fawcett concurred and added that the omission of the express reference to stay of execution from the present section likely reflected a legislative assumption that suits would not be brought solely on such questions, making an appeal unnecessary in this context.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS, holding that the order granting a stay of execution is not an appealable order under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The direct effect of this decision is that orders for stay of execution cannot be challenged by appeal under the said section, limiting appealable orders to those explicitly recognized by statute. The opinion does not establish any new precedent beyond the immediate parties.

    Janardan Triumbak Gadre v. Martand Triumbak Gadre

    Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff applied in Darkhast No. 138 of 1918 for a stay of execution proceedings for the execution of the decree in Suit No. 69 of 1915 pending the disposal of his Suit No. 110 of 1918 in which he prayed for a declaration that the decree in Suit No. 69 of 1915 was void and incapable of execution as against him.

    2. The First Class Subordinate Judge of Poona made an order for stay of execution in Darkhast No. 138 of 1918 pending the disposal of the plaintiff's suit on the plaintiff's furnishing security to the extent of Rs. 11,000.

    3. The question now arises whether that is an appealable order. It can only be appealable if it is an order under section 47. In section 47 no mention is made of an order for stay of execution. The words which appear at the end of section 244(c) in the Code of 1882 “or to the stay of execution thereof” have been omitted. It is argued that the words are omitted, because they are unnecessary, the question regarding the stay of execution being a question regarding the execution of a decree. Reference must be made to section 2 in which “a decree” is defined.

    4. It is provided that “decree shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 47.” It is, therefore, intended that orders made under section 47 as being in the nature of decrees should be appealable as decrees. It is difficult be imagine that the Legislature thought that an order for the stay of execution would be considered in any way as in the nature of a decree, and that therefore, it should be deemed to be included within the term “decree”. A question relating to the stay of execution is within the discretion of the Court to which the application is made, and it is certainly not desirable to extend the number of appealable orders unless there is distinct authority for such an extension. I note this is the view taken by Mr. Mulla in his Commentary while the opposite view is taken by Mr. Woodroffe.

    5. The appeal therefore must be dismissed with costs.

    Fawcett, J.:— I concur. I would only add one further argument in favour of the view that no appeal lies. No doubt the words “questions relating to the execution of a decree” are very wide and prima facie cover a question regarding stay of execution of a decree. But in construing the words of section 47 the Court is entitled to have regard to the fact that the corresponding, section of the old Code contains an express reference to a stay of execution, which has been omitted in the present section. I do not think that this omission is necessarily due to its being considered that the previous words of the section were wide enough to cover this particular question. I think it is very likely that it was considered that a suit would never be brought in regard to the mere question of a stay of execution and that it was, therefore, unnecessary to make the section cover such a question.

    6. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Janardan Triumbak Gadre v. Martand Triumbak Gadre
    (Jun 30, 1920)