Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Blanche Edith Cates, a qualified midwife and sick nurse, sued Mongini Brothers (owners of a Bombay restaurant) for damages after an electric ceiling fan suspended over the table where she and her daughter were seated fell when a waiter switched it off on 4 May 1916. The fall caused severe injury to her left hand and shoulder; she received medical treatment and alleged permanent impairment of her left hand, loss of earning capacity (claimed at Rs. 2,000 per year prior to injury), pain and medical expenses, and claimed Rs. 15,000 in total damages.

The defendants admitted the fall but denied negligence, asserting the cause was a latent defect or flaw in the suspension rod (a gas pipe with a slot and split pin) which could not have been detected by due diligence. They also described acts of sympathy and offers to contribute to medical costs without admitting liability. The defendants had a contract (from May 1915) with Messrs Osier & Co. under which fans were examined weekly.

The suit proceeded on three formal issues (see Legal Issues Presented). Evidence included testimony from both plaintiff and defendant expert witnesses about the construction, installation, inspection history, and cause of the rod's failure. The trial court analyzed burden of proof principles, expert evidence, and the routine inspection arrangement before dismissing the suit with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the fall of the fan was due to any negligence on the part of the defendants as alleged in the plaint.
  2. Whether the fall was due to a latent flaw in the material of the suspension rod which could not be seen or discovered by exercise of due diligence, as alleged in the written statement.
  3. Whether the defendants are liable and, if so, in what damages.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Counsel contended that the onus lay on the defendants to prove absence of negligence.
  • The plaintiff alleged negligence in the installation or maintenance of the fan such that the fan fell; she called two expert witnesses (Mr. R.G. Hyams and Mr. Wise) who attributed the accident to defects in the rod/fitting, emphasizing the thinness of the metal and the slotted method of suspension (slot and split pin) as primary or contributing causes.
  • Through cross-examination of defence witnesses the plaintiff suggested alternative causal possibilities: rainwater ingress into the rod, repeated screwing/unscrewing weakening threads, rough handling during relocation, improper leverage when screwing, and the presence of a dent on the broken piece.
  • The plaintiff alleged substantial and permanent loss of earning capacity, medical expenses and pain, and quantified claimed damages (itemised in the plaint).

Defendants' Arguments

  • Counsel argued the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove negligence.
  • The defendants admitted the fan fell but denied legal liability, asserting the cause was an internal latent flaw in the material of the suspension rod (manufacturing defect) that could not have been detected by reasonable inspection or due diligence.
  • Defendants called three expert witnesses (Mr. J.H. Simkins, Mr. H.M. Watson, and Mr. John A. Minnit) who attributed the breakage to a latent internal flaw (scale/defect in manufacture) and stated that the slot and split pin were not the primary cause and that the rod was of standard dimensions and had been safely installed and inspected.
  • They relied on the weekly inspection contract with Messrs Osier & Co., and testimony of the inspector (Ganpat) who inspected the fans (including the subject fan) on 29 April 1916 and found it tight and in order.
  • Defendants disputed the quantum of claimed damages and the alleged lifelong incapacity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hammack v. White Authority cited in context of burden of proof in negligence actions (plaintiff bears primary burden). Used with Manzoni v. Douglas to state the general rule that the plaintiff must show injury caused by defendant's act or omission.
Manzoni v. Douglas See Hammack v. White — general rule on burden of proof in negligence suits. Reinforced the general proposition that the burden lies on the plaintiff except in cases where law presumes liability.
Byrne v. Boadle Example of law presuming liability from an act (res ipsa loquitur) where the facts give rise to an immediate inference of defendant's negligence. Contrasted with the present case to explain that res ipsa loquitur applies only where the circumstances themselves point directly to defendant's negligence.
Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. Another leading res ipsa loquitur authority. Used to illustrate the exception where the burden may shift because the facts themselves indicate negligence.
Macfarlane v. Thomson Authority for the proposition that where injury is caused by the use of tackle or machinery there is no immediate inference that the defendant is at fault. Cited to support the conclusion that the mere use of machinery (a fan) does not automatically invoke res ipsa loquitur; therefore the onus remained on the plaintiff absent other immediate inferences.
Walker v. Oslen Authority that where injury is traced directly to defect in tackle or machinery, the defendant must show the defect was not his fault. Court applied the distinction: if defect in machinery is proved, burden shifts to defendant to show non-liability; the court considered whether the defect was latent and not discoverable by due diligence.
Fawkes v. Poulson Authority cited regarding the standard of care expected (that more than ordinary caution and skill was not required in comparable facts). Applied to conclude that defendants, as restaurant keepers and invitees, were not required to exercise more than ordinary care under the circumstances.
Great Western Ry. Co. v. Davies Authority establishing that a person is not bound to supply the latest designs or inventions. Applied to reject any contention that the defendants were obliged to use a different (allegedly safer) suspension design; the court held the defendants were not required to supply the latest design.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by addressing the legal burden: the general rule is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence, except in cases where the facts themselves give rise to an immediate inference of negligence (res ipsa loquitur). The court observed that when injury arises from tackle or machinery, an immediate inference of negligence does not automatically follow (citing Macfarlane v. Thomson); hence the initial onus remained on the plaintiff in this matter. However, if the injury can be directly traced to a defect in the machinery, the defendant must then show the defect was not its fault (citing Walker v. Oslen).

On the facts, the court carefully examined expert testimony called by both sides. Plaintiff experts (R.G. Hyams and Mr. Wise) testified that a slotted rod and thin metal contributed to breakage and that a rod with a hole-and-pin would generally be stronger; Hyams described the thinness of the metal as "the chief cause" and Wise said the slot and a smaller pin created jerks that could eventually cause failure, though both witnesses indicated that if metal had been of proper thickness and the rod properly screwed/tight, the accident might have been avoided.

Defendants' experts (J.H. Simkins, H.M. Watson and John A. Minnit) attributed the breakage to a latent internal flaw in the rod introduced during manufacture (e.g., scale or internal crack). Simkins reported an internal crack not visible externally; Watson (an electrical and mechanical engineer) corroborated the latent flaw theory, observed bright metal at the break and black oxide elsewhere, stated the slot alone was not enough to render the rod unsafe and affirmed that the rod was a good tight fit when tested; Minnit (a mechanical engineer) likewise opined latent defect was the probable cause and that the rod was of standard dimensions and safe when installed.

The court weighed credibility and technical detail: it accepted the defendants' expert evidence—particularly finding Mr. Watson's evidence persuasive and Mr. Simkins' evidence acceptable. The court noted that plaintiff experts conceded key points (that a properly screwed and standard rod might not have failed and that an immediate examination after the accident could have resolved whether metal defect existed).

The court also considered the defendants' maintenance regime: a contractual weekly inspection by Osier & Co., whose inspector (Ganpat) testified he examined the fans on 29 April 1916 (six days before the accident), performed routine checks (dust removal, oiling, checking blades, pins and rods, hanging on the fan to test tightness) and found the subject fan tight and in order. The court treated this inspection as evidence that ordinary care had been exercised and that the fan had been passed as sound days before the incident.

The court analyzed alternative theories suggested by plaintiff (rainwater ingress, repeated screwing, careless handling during relocation, wrong leverage, dent on piece) and found no evidence supporting any of them; it emphasized the existing evidence pointed the other way.

Conclusion of analysis: the court found the fall resulted from a latent internal defect in the suspension rod (an accident "pure and simple") and not from negligence by the defendants. Because ordinary care and reasonable inspection arrangements existed, and because the defect was latent and not discoverable by ordinary inspection, the defendants could not be held liable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The suit was dismissed. The court found no negligence on the part of the defendants and held the fall resulted from a latent defect in the suspension rod; accordingly, the action for damages failed and was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's claim for damages was rejected; no damages were awarded; the defendants were not held liable and recovered costs.
  • Broader legal implications: The opinion applies established principles on burden of proof in negligence cases, distinguishing ordinary cases from those invoking res ipsa loquitur, and reiterates that a defendant is not required to supply the latest design or technology. The court did not purport to lay down any novel precedent; it applied existing authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Suit dismissed."

    Blanche Edith Cates v. Mongini Bros.

    1. The plaintiff, Blanche Edith Cates, a qualified midwife and sick nurse, has filed this suit against Mongini Brothers, owners of a restaurant in Bombay, for damages for the injuries sustained by her. It appears that on 4th May 1916 the plaintiff and her daughter went to defendants' restaurant at about 1-30 p.m for lunch. They took seats at a table, whereupon a waiter switched on the electric fan which was suspended from the ceiling over that table. The plaintiff not requiring the fan asked the waiter to stop it and as the watter switched it off, it fell down with the motor dynamo and severely injured her-left hand and shoulder. The plaintiff alleged that the fall of the fan must have been due to negligence for which the defendants are responsible. After she received the injuries it appears that the plaintiff was under skilled medical treatment for a month, but inspite of such treatment the injury to her left hand permanently affected her use of it. The fingers of that hand had thickened and the joints had become stiff and some of the fingers had been fractured, with the result that she was unable to use her left hand. She was thus not only incapacitated from carrying on her profession but was further inconvenienced by being deprived of the use of her left hand. Before receiving the injuries the plaintiff alleges that she earned as a midwife and nurse about Rs. 2,000 a year. She also said she suffered great physical and mental pain at the time she received the injuries and a month thereafter. Under the circumstances she claimed Rs. 15,000 as damages and she has arrived at that figure according to the following particulars:

    1. On account of bodily injury sustained, the pain undergone and shattering of plaintiff's health, Rs. 7,500.

    2. On account of medical expenses incurred, Rs. 330.3 On account of pecuniary loss for not being able to carry on her profession for the rest of her life, Rs. 7,200.

    2. The defendants, while admitting the fall of the fan, denied that it was due to any negligence on their part. They said that the fall was entirely due to an accident for which they were not in any way legally liable to the plaintiff however much they regretted the injury caused be the plaintiff's hand. The defendants said that the accident was due to some latent flaw in the material of the suspension rod, which could not be seen and could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence and skill Immediately after the accident it appears that the defendants sent the plaintiff with an assistant of theirs to the E.G Hospital, where the plaintiff's hand was dressed and she thereafter voluntarily left the hospital to go home. The next day after the accident the plaintiff, her husband and daughter and some relations called at the defendants' restaurant and the plaintiff informed the defendants that her hand had been dressed and her husband told the defendants that he was not a rich man and the defendants, without admitting their liability and out of sympathy for her offered to share the medical expenses that might be incurred by her. A week or ten days after, the plaintiff's husband called again and informed the defendants that the plaintiff was going to Uran and that she would be attended to by a doctor there. At that time the husband had a piece of paper in his hand, in which there appeared certain figures which showed a total of about Rs. 220 as the expenses incurred. The defendants on that occasion offered to contribute Rs. 150 without admitting any legal liability on their part. The following evening the husband called again and asked for Rs. 300. The defendants told him that the amount was excessive and again off erred Rs. 150 without prejudice. The offer however was not accepted and the husband left the place. The defendants further disputed the amount of the damages and did not admit that the earnings were Rs. 2,000 a year as alleged by her. They further contended that the injury to the plaintiff was not of such a nature as would incapacitate her from carrying on her profession for life and that the plaintiff had very much exaggerated her injuries. Hence the present suit. The following issues were raised:

    1. Whether the fall of the fan was due to any negligence on the part of the defendants as alleged in para. 3 of the plaint? 2. Whether the fall was not due to the latent flaw in the material of suspension ??? which could not be seen or could not be discovered by the exercise of due diligence, as alleged in para. 3 of the written statement? 3. Whether the defendants are liable in any and if so, in what damages?

    3. On this Counsel for the plaintiff contended before me that the onus lay on the defendants to prove that there was no negligence on their part, whilst Counsel for the defendants contend that the onus lay on the plaintiff. The burden of proof in an action for damages for negligence rests primarily upon the plaintiff, who in order to maintain the action must show that he was injured by an act or omission for which the defendant is in law responsible: see Hammack v. White (1) and Manzoni v. Douglas (2), except in the cases where law presumes liability from an act or omission immediately upon proof of its occurrence. That is to say, an exception to the general rule that the burden of proof for the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff, occurs whenever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference immediately arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant's negligence: see Byrne v. Boadle (3) and Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (4). To these cases the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies. But in cases where the injury is caused by the use of tackle or machinery for which the defendant is responsible, there is no immediate inference that the defendant is at fault: Macfarlane v. Thomson (5); Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 21, p. 441. On this I held that the onus was on the plaintiff. But if the injury is traced directly to some defect in the tackle or machinery, then the defendant must show that the defect was one for which he is not to blame: see Walker v. Oslen (6). Therefore the question which I have to consider is are the defendants Mongini Brothers, guilty of any negligence? The fan in question was originally purchased from Jost & Co. It was of German make. It weighed about 50 lbs., and had four wooden blades. This was first fitted up about nine years ago on the ground floor premises of the defendant in Church Gate Street. When the defendants extended their premises to the first floor also the original rod was found short, so Messrs Osier & Co., who had the installation, supplied another rod 3½ ft. long, one in dispute, and fixed the same fan to it. It remained there till March 1914 when it was removed to Esplanade Road premises by Cromptons and it remained there till the accident. At first Messrs Cromptou & Co. looked after the fans at Mongini's. But since May 1915 this contract was given to Messrs Osier & Co., whose men went once a week on a Saturday to examine the fans. The rod in question was an iron gas pipe, a slot being diametrically cut at the end 7/32 inch, and a ⅛ inch split pin passed through the hole drilled in the fan shield and passed through the slot. There was 3/32 inch for play between the slot and pin. How does the plaintiff attempt to prove that the defendants were guilty of negligence? They have called two expert witnesses. The first is one Mr. R.G Hyams, Assistant Electrical Engineer, Public Works Department. He in his evidence says:

    “I have seen thousands of fans; never seen a fan like the one in suit with a slot in the shaft. The method of boring a slot is not as good as the method of boring a hole. I am not surprised at the break, it was to be expected owing to the thinness of the metal. Pipe is too thin for the weight of the far. Ordinary mode of suspension is pin through a hole. Owing to the extreme thinness of the metal the break took place. This is the chief cause, no other cause. If the metal had been of proper thickness and the slot had not been, then most probably accident would not have occurred. I cannot see any defect in the metal of the rod. I would have noticed the defeet if I had seen immediately after the break. I consider it unsafe for a person to use a fan like one in suit because metal of the rod is too thin. This is the primary cause. A fan with, a hole and pin is much stronger.”

    4. So according to this expert, thinness of the metal is the primary and only cause of the accident. It will be observed that according to him if the metal had been of proper thickness for the weight which is 50 lbs., then most probably the accident would not have occurred. It must be observed here that Mr. Watson and Mr. Simkins and Mr. Minnit, the expert witnesses for the defendants, all depose that the metal of the rod and threads in it are of the standard dimensions and that according to the evidence of Mr. Temple, the Foreman in the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Workshop who had made certain experiments with rod similar to the rod in dispute, it would require a weight from 3 tons and 15 cwts. to 1½ tons to wrench the socket from the pipe. The second expert witness for the plaintiff, Mr. Wise, General Manager of Messrs Jost & Co., in his evidence says: “I have not seen in Bombay or elsewhere a fan with a rod and a slot.” His reasons for happening of the accident are: 1. Weakening of the parts ??? to there being slot. 2. Movement that takes place in starting and stopping which brings the split pin up with a jerk against one of the two pieces, i.e, sides of the slot. 3. Broken pieces work out its original position in the thread towards the pin there being clearance then that action slackens the other side and the whole fan body can slip off. According to him the accident would not have happened if the rod had beers without a slot:

    “Cause of the breakage is a slot at the end of the rod and the pin which is smaller than the slot. It brought jerk every time and one day it gave way. I say the thinness is a contributory cause. Thinness of metal is not the only primary cause of break. If the rod is very properly screwed and tight fit it will not move. If it was properly screwed and fit the pin would remain dormant notwithstanding the play. It is difficult to make out now if the breakage was due to the defect in the metal. It could have been detected if it had been examined at the date of the accident.”

    5. Prom the evidence both of Mr. Hyams and Mr. Wise, this surely is clear that if they had examined the rod immediately after the accident, they would have been in a position to say whether breakage was due to the defect in the metal. Further it is also clear that if the metal is not thin for the weight or is of standard dimensions and that if the rod was properly screwed and tight fit, the pin would remain dormant and the rod with a slot would be of no consequence. Further they would consider a rod without a slot and split pin better and stronger. But this proposition is conceded by all, but the question for determination is not what is better or stronger or both, but whether the rod in dispute, suspended and attached as it was, was not perfectly and reasonably safe. Can Mongini Brothers, the defendants, be blamed for having allowed such a rod to be put up on their premises? Mr. Wise, as I have said above, has admitted that if the rod was properly and tightly screwed and tight fit, then the pin would not affect the slot in any way at all. Then why assume that the rod was not properly screwed in? This fan was put up in 1914 by Cromptons' people, and Mr. Watson says he had tested it after it was put up and the fan stood there for three years before the accident. Mr. Simkins says in his evidence that the screw was not disturbed for eight years. Short rods are taken down from the ceiling instead of from the motor. Mr. Simkins in his evidence further says that short rods are never unscrewed from the motor. Bod in question was never unscrewed as far as he remembered. Mr. Mongini in his evidence also states that the rod had not been taken out when the fan was removed from the old to the new premises. Therefore I hold that the fan in dispute was properly put up in 1914. New in order to prove that the breakage was due to latent defect in the metal of the rod and not to the negligence of the defendants, they have called three expert witnesses: first is Mr. J.H Simkins, Manager of Messrs Osier & Co., Electrical Contractors of repute in Bombay. He in his evidence says:

    “I know the fan in suit. I was in Poona on the day of the accident. On the second day I returned. I went to see it at Mongini's. I found that the one side of the slot had broken of and remained in the motor. The portion broken showed on the other side of the pipe at the root of the thread a thin line of newly broken clear metal. The portion about the centre on the inside of the break showed about a quarter of an inch what was apparently an old crack or flaw in the metal. I concluded that was an old flaw of the manufacturers of the pipe as it was inside without being on the outside. The flaw could not have been detected by any skilful engineer even if the rod had been unscrewed. It would not have been visible as it was on the inside; even if it was on the out side it could not have been visible without magnifying glasses. I do not know if anything could have been done to have prevented breaking. It could not have been detected by any method that the suspension rod was at fault. In my opinion the breakage is due to flaw in the metal in the inside of the pipe.”

    6. Mr. Simkins' reasons for coming to the conclusion that there was a latent flaw in the rod are these: The portion broken showed a new break of clean metal. Near the centre and inside of the rod the width of the clean metal was reduced to just a few specks of white metal. These few specks showed on the outside at the root of the threads. In the inside of the rod the metal was of a dark oxydized rusty colour, the same as it was then. The flaw might have been due to an old crack or to a faulty piece of metal. It is true that Mr. Simkins is an Electrical and not a Mechanical Engineer, but has practical experience in mechanics. He struck me as a truthful witness and his evidence I am prepared to accept. The most important witness for the defendants is Mr. H.M Watson, General Manager of Messrs Crompton & Co. He is an Electrical and Mechanical Engineer. He examined the fan within a week of the accident. He supports Mr. Simkins. According to him the accident was due to a latent flaw in the fan. An examination of the broken part showed bright metal over the part of the break and black oxide over the rest. The latent flaw could not have been discovered by any ordinary method of examination if the rod had been unscrewed from the motor. There was nothing to put one on the track that there was flaw if he was ordinarily examining. The factor of safety would in case of 50 lbs. weight work out at 60 to 1. Slot in itself is not enough to make it unsafe. A split pin prevented the motor from being unscrewed and did not make it the least unsafe. He does not think that the primary cause of the breakage was due to the thinness of the metal. It had absolutely nothing to do with it. The latent flaw was probably due to a piece of scale. According to Mr. Watson, whose men supervised the installation in Esplanade Road and he was present when it was tested, the rod in suit when it was originally fitted up was a good tight fit. There was a play, but it was unobjectionable. If the dent had been caused by the pin there would be a mark on the pin. There is no mark on the pin. The deat on the piece had absolutely nothing to do with the break. Mr. Davar for the plaintiff has suggested that Mr. Watson never examined the fan within a week after the accident as alleged by him and asks that his evidence not only relating to this but the whole of it should not be believed. Having regard to the evidence of Joseph, an assistant of the defendants, I hold that Mr. Watson examined the fan as deposed to by him and I see no reason to disbelieve his evidence, but I must add that Mr. Watson impressed me most favourably. In my opinion his evidence should be accepted without any reservation.

    7. The third and last expert called on behalf of the defendants was Mr. John A. Minnit. He is a Mechanical Engineer pure and simple. He has examined the rod and fan in suit. He says:

    “In my opinion the cause of the breakage is probably due to defect in the material which occurred during course of manufacture of the rod. The primary cause of the breakage is due to flaw in the material probably caused by a scale in process of manufacture. The rod is not unsafe for the motor in suit because of the slot. I consider that the rod was absolutely safe when screwed to the motor in suit. The split pin had nothing to do with the accident. Split pin is put in as a precaution from the motor unscrewing from the rod. Split pin is not put for any other reason. The dent in the broken piece is not caused by the split pin. Thinness of the metal of the rod had nothing to do with the breakage. It is more than sufficient. The method of suspension of rod in suit is not unsafe. It would be too safe to have a rod with a hole and pin.

    8. It is true that Mr. Minnit examined the fan eight or nine months after the accident. It is possible, but extremely difficult, to locate the flaw at the end of eight months. Theory of flaw is not a surmise. In his opinion the only feasible cause of the fall is latent flaw. The rod is of standard dimensions. Counsel for the plaintiff complained that the theory of latent defect was not put forth till the very late stage, nay, till the written statement was to be filed. It is perfectly true that it was not mentioned in the correspondence, but then it should be borne in mind that the correspondence ceased after 29th May 1916; but the suggestion that it was an afterthought has no foundation at all, as it is perfectly clear from the entries Ex. 11 put in from Mr. Darasha's diary that Mr. Mongini had told him on 27th May 1916 that Mr. Simkins' opinion was that the accident was due to latent defect and that report was called for and that Mr. Darasha had the report on 29th May 1916. I hold that it was not an afterthought. In the course of the cross-examination of defendants' witnesses, Mr. Davar for the plaintiff made several suggestions from which the Court is asked to infer negligence on the part of the defendants, and these may be shortly summarised as under:

    (1) Rainwater might have got into the suspension rod from the ceiling; (2) constant screwing and unscrewing would weaken threads; (3) workmen carried this fan from Church Gate Street to Esplanade Road carelessly and with jerks; (4) wrong leverage was put on whilst screwing; (5) dent on the piece broken.

    9. Let us consider whether there is any evidence to support any of these suggestions. Not only there is not an iota of evidence to support them, but all the evidence there is the other way. On the evidence I hold that the fall of the fan was not due to any negligence on the part of the defendants, but it was due to the latent defect in the metal of the suspension rod and that it was accident pure and simple. The question then arises: Could the defendants, who are restaurant keepers, and are in a position of invitees, have obviated this accident by exercise of any ordinary care, caution and skill? This was not a case where more than ordinary caution and skill were required from the defendants and this is clear from Fawkes v. Poulson (7). It will be remembered that the defendants had a contract with Messrs Osier & Co., dated May 1915, under which the fans in their premises had to be examined once a week and for this purpose Osier & Co. sent Moreshwar Ganpat. He went every Saturday to examine the fans at the defendants. He says:

    “First I remove the dust, then oil the fans and then see whether the carbon brushes were in good contact with the accumulator and then see if the blades were properly screwed on and whether the pin and rod were in order. After the inspection was complete I used to hang on the fan to see if it was tight. Then I started the fan. When I went to examine I did all these things. Inspection lasted an hour or an hour and a half I went once a week on a Saturday. I inspected on 29th April 1916, six days before the accident. I found threads of one or two rods of the fans in the outside room loose and I reported this. Suspension was properly examined.”

    10. From this to my mind it is perfectly clear that on 29th April 1916 six days before the accident the fan in dispute was passed as sound and found screwed perfectly tight, otherwise Ganpat would have reported it to his master as he did in respect of others. It is true that except Osier nobody imported fans with slotted rods. But such have been imported in large numbers and even put up in Government offices. They had imported very large numbers and never had a complaint. They have been discontinued by the manufacturers not because they are less safe, but because they are more expensive, and in the present state of competition it is not surprising. There is no doubt that it is easier to fit up a fan with a slotted rod than a fan with a rod and a pin according to Mr. Simians' evidence. During the last 19 years Osier have imported over 25,800 fans of this type and every fan that came from Spranges Electric Company of America had a slot in the rod. It appears that over 15,000 had been sold and fitted up and no complaint of its fall had been reported. Is a person bound to supply latest designs and inventions? Answer is no: see Great Western Ry. Co. v. Davies (8). The result is that I hold that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants and that the accident could not have been obviated by the exercise of ordinary care, skill and caution on the part of the defendants. This being the case, it is unnecessary to go into the question of damages. The result is that the suit must be dismissed with costs.

    G.P/R.K

    11. Suit dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Blanche Edith Cates v. Mongini Bros.
    (Jul 30, 1917)