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  • Act IX of 1908 replaced the Limitation Act of 1877
  • Act IX of 1871 repeals the Act of 1859
  • Indian Contract Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Act IX of 1908 replaced the Limitation Act of 1877
  • Act IX of 1871 repeals the Act of 1859
  • Indian Contract Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

An idol, represented by his Paricharaks and Shebaits, sued to recover mining royalties under a lease of a colliery property in Burdwan. The Shebaits were four brothers and the property was the ijmali debottar property of their family deity. Due to quarrels, collection of rents was not always joint. While the principal defendant defaulted in paying royalties, one brother obtained from the defendant a payment of 4,000 rupees on account of his share, on terms that if his co‑sharers did not agree to similar arrangements he would be paid in proportion to the co‑sharers as they might be paid. Because of this arrangement the brother was unwilling to join as a plaintiff; he was consequently joined as a second defendant and, in his defence, made an irregular claim against the first defendant to recover pari passu with the plaintiffs, after crediting the 4,000 rupees already received.

The suit was instituted more than three and less than six years after the cause of action accrued. The principal substantive issue was whether the whole claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Procedurally, the trial court gave a decree that apportioned the recovery between plaintiffs and the second defendant; the High Court corrected the decree to make a single decree for the entire amount in favour of the plaintiffs while declaring portions attributable to the plaintiffs and the second defendant respectively. The principal defendant appealed to the Board; the second defendant did not appeal.

The lease was effected by a mokurari kabuliyat and a pottah. The defendant agreed that if he failed to cut any coal at all he would pay a minimum royalty of 4,000 rupees per annum. It is certain that no coal was cut; whether the defendant entered or took possession was unclear. The per‑maund payment was called "commission" rather than "rent," but the instrument described the right acquired by the defendant as a "settlement."

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the action to recover the minimum annual royalty (sued on a registered kabuliyat) is a suit for arrears of "rent" subject to the three‑year limitation under Article 110 of Act XV of 1877, or whether it is a suit for "compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered" falling under Article 116 and thus subject to the six‑year limitation.
  2. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to correct the Trial Judge's decree (by making one decree for the entire amount and declaring shares between parties) given that the second defendant did not appeal.
  3. Whether a point (raised by the appellant) that the claim for one kist was statute‑barred could be entertained on appeal where it had not been raised before either court below.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (lessee) — substantive limitation argument

  • The appellant contended that the suit was for arrears of "rent" and therefore fell plainly within Article 110 of the Limitation Act (Act XV of 1877), attracting a three‑year limitation period.
  • The appellant argued that the lessee did not covenant to get coal; he was permitted to pay the agreed minimum royalty and abstain from working the coal. Thus, the claim was not truly one for "compensation for breach of contract."

Respondent (lessors / plaintiffs) — substantive limitation argument

  • The respondents contended that the action fell within Article 116 as a suit for "compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered" and was therefore within the six‑year limitation period applicable to registered written contracts.

Second defendant (one brother) — procedural / pleading position

  • The second defendant had accepted 4,000 rupees on account of his share and refused to join as a plaintiff; he was joined as a second defendant and, by way of defence, claimed against the first defendant a pari passu right to recover with the plaintiffs after crediting the 4,000 rupees.
  • He had also pleaded entitlement to part of the entire arrears and prayed that the suit be ordered to be prosecuted upon making him a plaintiff (pleading which the court described as irregular).

Appellant (procedural) — objection to High Court correction

  • The appellant argued that because the second defendant did not file a separate appeal, the High Court had no jurisdiction to award to the plaintiffs (for the second defendant's benefit) the sum which the Trial Judge had awarded directly to the second defendant; in other words, the second defendant, by not appealing, stood by the Trial Judge's (allegedly erroneous) decree and thereby should lose the right to have that part corrected by the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Narain v. Kamta Singh (1903) I.L.R. 26 All. 138 Held that Article 110 (for arrears of rent) applied rather than the article for registered written contracts (i.e., Article 116 as later numbered). The opinion records this decision as an earlier authority that supported the view that Article 110 applied, but notes that it was later disapproved and treated as not following the later current of decisions.
Lalchand Nanchand v. Narayan Hari (1913) I.L.R. 37 Bom. 656 Held that the later current of decisions should be followed and that Ram Narain (1903) must be disapproved; it arose in the context of re‑enactment of the Limitation Act provisions. The High Court of Bombay's decision to disapprove Ram Narain was cited as authority for following the established current of decisions; the present High Court treated the matter as settled law in the same sense.
Pate v. Pate [1915] A.C. 1100 Principle that, where the terms of a statute are clear, even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation may be overruled if that interpretation is contrary to the enactment. The Board noted this principle but held it did not apply: the construction urged by the appellant was not clearly right and the long course of judicial interpretation in India was consistent enough with the statute to be followed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, using only the materials and arguments presented in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of the right and the instrument: The kabuliyat sued on was a registered instrument. The minimum royalty payable (4,000 rupees per annum if no coal was cut) was treated by the Courts below as "rent" within Article 110 of Act XV of 1877; the Board accepted this characterization as the starting point of analysis.
  2. Identification of competing articles in the Limitation Acts: The opinion traces the legislative history (Act of 1859, Act IX of 1871, Act XV of 1877 and later re‑enactment by Act IX of 1908) and explains that the Limitation Acts drew a distinction between suits on unregistered instruments and suits on registered instruments, the latter being advantaged by a longer limitation period. Under Act XV of 1877 the relevant articles were Article 110 (arrears of rent) and Article 116 (compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered).
  3. Nature of the dispute over classification: The core dispute was whether a registered written contract claiming a minimum royalty (described as rent in some places and commission in others) should fall under the short period for arrears of rent (Article 110) or under the longer period for registered written contracts (Article 116). The appellant argued the claim was simply for rent (Article 110); the respondents argued it was compensation for breach of a registered written contract (Article 116).
  4. Precedent and judicial practice: The Board reviewed the existing Indian decisions on the point. While Ram Narain (1903) had held Article 110 applied, subsequent decisions—culminating in Lalchand Nanchand v. Narayan Hari (1913)—had treated the weight of authority as favoring the application of the provision for registered written contracts (i.e., the longer period). The Board regarded the long and uniform Indian judicial interpretation as sufficiently cogent to be followed.
  5. Applicability of the Pate v. Pate principle: The Board acknowledged the House of Lords decision that a long judicial construction can be overruled if contrary to the plain meaning of a statute, but found that the appellant's construction was not clearly right and that the established Indian interpretation should not be disturbed.
  6. Procedural correction of decree: The Trial Judge's original decree formally allocated parts of the recovery to plaintiffs and to the second defendant; the High Court corrected the admitted error by making a decree for the entire amount in favour of the plaintiffs and declaring the proportions attributable to plaintiffs and to the second defendant. The appellant's objection that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to make this correction because the second defendant did not appeal was examined; no statutory provision was cited to support the appellant's submission and, since the appellant had brought the entire decree before the High Court, the High Court was authorized to make the decree that should properly have been made at trial.
  7. New point on one kist and appellate review: A contention that the claim for one kist was statute‑barred had not been raised in either court below or in the appellant's notice of appeal or grounds for special leave. Because it depended on a construction of the kabuliyat not submitted to the lower courts, the Board declined to entertain it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Board advised His Majesty to dismiss the appeal. The core ruling can be summarized as:

APPEAL DISMISSED — the appeal is to be dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The High Court's correction of the Trial Judge's decree (making a single decree for the entire recoverable amount in favour of the plaintiffs while declaring the respective shares attributable to the plaintiffs and the second defendant) stands; the appellant's objections to the High Court's jurisdiction to make that correction were rejected.
  • Limitation point resolved in line with long‑standing Indian jurisprudence: the opinion endorses the long course of Indian decisions that treat registered written contracts as falling within the provision for compensation for breach of a registered contract (i.e., the article providing a longer limitation period), rather than applying Article 110 in the circumstances described — the Board declined to disturb that established interpretation.
  • Points not entertained on appeal: The Board refused to consider the newly raised contention about a kist being statute‑barred because it had not been presented to the courts below.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion follows and affirms the existing current of decisions in India on the point; it does not purport to establish a new deviation from that course of authority.

This summary is confined strictly to the facts, reasoning and rulings contained in the provided opinion and does not add information or inferences not present in the text.

    Tricomdas Cooverji Bhoja v. Sri Sri Gopinath Jiu Thakur

    1. In this case an idol, by his Paricharaks and Shebaits, sued to recover mining royalties under a lease of his colliery property in Burdwan. The Shebaits, who made the agreement in suit, were four brothers and the property was the ijmali debottar property of their family deity. Owing to some quarrel the collection of rents was not always joint and, at the time when the principal defendant was making default in paying the royalties, one of the brothers obtained from him payment of 4,000 rupees on account of his share, on. the terms that, if his co-sharers did not agree to give up their claim to interest and be content with like sums, he was to be paid by the principal defendant in the same proportion as the co-sharers might be paid. This brother was accordingly unwilling to join as a plaintiff in bringing the suit and so was joined as a second defendant. As such he appended to his defence a claim against the first defendant to recover pari passu with the plaintiffs, after giving credit for the 4,000 rupees already paid, in case they should make out their claim. This was, of course, quite irregular in point of pleading and gives-rise to a technical question of minor importance. The suit was begun more than three and less than six years after the cause of action accrued and the main question is whether or not the whole claim is Statute-barred.

    2. The lease was effected by a mokurari kabuliyat and a pottah expressed in similar terms. The first defendant agreed that if the failed to cut any coal at all, he would pay a minimum royalty of 4,000 rupees per annum. It is certain that he cut no coal : whether or not he even entered or took possession is not so clear. The sum to be paid per maund of coal gotten is called " commission " and not " rent," but the right acquired by the principal defendant is described as a "settlement." kabuliyat runs-

    On a proposal being made to take a settlement of the rights of your family deity in this mouzah for the purpose of raising coal from below the surface of the said mouzah by making pits, you, for the benefit of your family god and with the object of increasing the income of the debottar property, are making a settlement with me of the right and interest in the said mouzah to the extent owned by your family deity.

    3. Their Lordships accordingly take it, as seems to have been done by the Courts below, that the minimum royalty sued for would be "rent" within Article 110 of Act XV of 1877, which is the enactment applicable.

    4. The kabuliyat sued on was a registered instrument and the question is whether the suit is one for arrears of rent, as the appellant lessee says and so is barred by Article 110, or whether, as the respondent lessors contend, it falls within Article 116 as a suit for " compensation for breach of contract in writing registered," and thus was brought within time. The argument for the appellant is that the suit being for arrears of "rent" is in terms within Article 110 and is not, truly speaking, a suit for compensation for breach of contract at all, since the lessee does not covenant to get coal but is at liberty, on paying the agreed minimum royalty, to let the coal alone and commits no breach of contract if he chooses to do so.

    5. The limitation act (no. xiv of 1859) provided that the period of limitation applicable to "all suits for the rents of any buildings or lands" should be three years (§ 8); the period applicable to suits brought, "for the breach of any contract" three years, unless in the case of a contract which could have heen registered such registration had taken place within six months from the date of the contract (§ 10); and, thirdly, that the period applicable " to all suits for which no other limitation is herein expressly provided " should be six years. Act IX of 1871 repeals the Act of 1859 and adopts the present framework of a schedule subdivided into articles and columns. Schedule 2, Part VI, the part which comprises the cases to which the period applicable is three years, includes Article 110 "for arrears of rent" and Article 115 'for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for." Part VII, which included the cases to which the period applicable was to be six years, contained Article 117-"on a promise or contract in writing registered." This Act in turn was repealed by Act XV of 1877, which re-enacted Article 110 in the same terms and Article 115-almost in the same terms, viz., "for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for," and in Part VII substituted Article 116 for Article 117, thus, "for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered."

    6. Both these Acts draw, as the Act of 1859 had drawn, a broad distinction between unregistered and registered instruments much to the advantage of the latter. The question eventually arose whether a suit for rent on a registered contract in writing came under the longer or the shorter period. On the one hand it has been contended that the provision as to rent is plain and unambiguous and ought to be applied and that in any case " compensation for the breach of a contract" points rather to a claim for unliquidated damages than to a claim for payment of a sum certain. On the other it has been pointed out that "compensation" is used in the Indian Contract Act in a very wide sense and that the omission from Article 116 of the words, which occur in Article. 115, " and not herein specially provided for," is critical. Article 116 is such a special provision and is not limited and therefore, especially in view of the distinction long established by these Acts in favour of registered instruments, it must prevail. There is a series of Indian decisions on the point, several of them in suits for rent, though most of them are in suits on bonds. They begin in 1880 and are to be found in all the Indian High Courts. In spite of some doubts once only waa it held, in 1903, in Ram Narain v. Kamta Singh (1903) I.L.R. 26 All. 138 that in such a suit Article 110 and not Article 116 applied. Then in 1908 and in this state of the decisions, Act IX of 1908 replaced the Limitation Act of 1877 without altering the language or arrangement of the Articles and in 1913, in Lalchand Nanchand v. Narayan Hari (1913) I.L.R. 37 Bom. 656 the High Court of Bombay held that, especially in view of this re-enactment, the current of decisions must be followed and Ram Narain's case (1903) I.L.R. 26 All 138 must be disapproved. In the present case the High Court treated the matter as settled law in the same sense.

    7. Where the terms of a Statute or Ordinance are clear their Lordships have decided that even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, if it is contrary to the meaning of the enactment: Pate v. Pate [1915] A.C. 1100. Such is not the case here. However arguable the construction of Act XV of 1877 may have been when the matter was one of; first impression, it certainly cannot be said that the construction, for which the appellants argue, was ever clearly right. On the contrary, their Lordships accept the interpretation so often and so long put upon the Statute by the Courts in India and think that the decisions cannot now be disturbed.

    8. The question of limitation was not discussed at the trial. The principal defendant pleaded payment, made it his main case, failed in it and now acquiesces in his failure. The decree passed was for royalties up to a certain amount and was in favour of the plaintiffs for three-fourths and of the second defendant for one-fourth, less credit for the sum admittedly received by him on account. In form this decree was erroneous and this was admitted in the High Court. The point was doubtless not brought to the attention of the Trial Judge; otherwise the proceedings could readily have been put in proper form, all the more because the second defendant, though concluding his defence with a claim for a decree against his co-defendant, had previously pleaded that he was entitled to part of the entire arrears of royalties, the subject of the plaintiffs' claim and had prayed " that this suit may be ordered to be prosecuted upon making this defendant a plaintiff." The High Court corrected the admitted error by making a decree for the entire amount in favour of the plaintiffs and declaring that, as to a named part, it was for their share and as to the residue it was for the second defendant's share. The principal defendant by his appeal had brought the entire decree before the High Court, disputing it in toto. It was one decree, not two. The second defendant had not appealed. The now appellant argues that, for want of a separate appeal by the second defendant, the High Court had no jurisdiction to award to the plaintiffs for his benefit the sum which had been awarded to him directly by the Trial Judge. It was said that, as the second defendant, by not appealing, stood by the decree as made below and as in that form it was wrong, he must lose his right altogether. It would be unjust if this were so. Nevertheless, if the appellant could have shown any provision of the Civil Procedure Code, or of any other enactment, which showed clearly that the High Court had no such power, the objection must have prevailed. No such provision was cited. The appellant himself had brought the entire decree of the Trial Judge before the High Court for review and thus they were right in making the decree, which should have been made below, even though the second defendant had given no notice of appeal.

    9. A point was also made that as to the royalty for one kist the claim was in any case Statute-barred and that the amount of the decree should be reduced accordingly. Their Lordships think that this point is not open to the appellant. There is no trace of its having been raised before either Court below. It does not appear in either the notice of appeal to the High Court or in the grounds for applying for leave to appeal to their Lordships' Board. If it is raised at all by the appellant, in the Reasons appended to his Case, it is raised only obscurely. It depends on the construction of the kabuliyat in a respect not submitted to either Court below and their Lordships decline to entertain it.

    10. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

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    Tricomdas Cooverji Bhoja v. Sri Sri Gopinath Jiu Thakur
    (Dec 20, 1916)