Fulton, J:-
In this case the accused was found guilty by Mr. French. First Class Magistrate, of receiving bribes in three instances from cultivators to whom tagai advances had been made. On appeal the conviction was confirmed by the Sessions Judge.
The first objection made was that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case under section 190 © of the Criminal Procedure Code and had omitted to inform the accused as required by section 191 that he was entitled to have the case tried by another Magistrate. It was not seriously pressed. The Sessions Judge who dealt with it considered that the information on which Mr. French commenced his enquiry was in fact a complaint. We think this view was correct. The accused was defended by pleaders who appear to have taken no objection to the procedure.
Secondly, it was contended that the evidence was insufficient as the convictions were baaed entirely on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices- and the cases of Queen-Empress v. Maganlal and another (I) and Queen-Empress v. Ckagan Dayaram and another (2) were referred to. The leading case on this subject is that of Elahee Buksh (3) decided in 1866 by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court presided over by Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J. "That case may well be studied by all Judges and Magistrates who have to deal with such evidence, for though it was decided before the enactment of the Evidence Act, the existing law embodied in section 133 and section 114 seems to be entirely in accordance with it.
Illustration (b) to section 114 directs attention to the general principle that it is unsafe to convict on the evidence of accomplices unless corroborated in material particulars. But along with this principle must be borne in mind the qualifications, taken apparently from Chief Justice Peacocks Judgment, contained in the further illustrations which the Court is directed to consider when determining whether the general maxim does or does not apply to a particular case. They show that all persons coming technically within the category of accomplices cannot be treated as on precisely the same footing. The nature of the offence and the circumstances in which the accomplices make their statements must always be considered. No general rule on the subject can be laid down. The Legislature has not done so- and the Courts, whose function it is to interpret the law, cannot do so. The decisions, however, show the principles on which Judges have acted in particular cases and it is the duty of their successors to consider those principles and determine to what extent they are applicable to the circumstances of other cases.
Now the cases of Maganlal and Chagan show beyond doubt that persons who give bribes are accomplices of persons who receive them. They also show that the learned Judges who dealt with those cases felt strongly how unsafe it usually would he to convict public servants of receiving bribes on the uncorroborated evidence of persons who said they had given them. We share that feeling. In this country false accusations are numerous and public servants who fearlessly discharge their duties are likely to make many enemies. It is, therefore, most necessary for their protection that the Courts shall be vigilant in requiring strong and convincing evidence before hastily accepting charges brought against them. The humbler classes of public servants are especially in need of this protection. But when the question arises what amount of corroboration will suffice it is obvious that the answer in each case must depend on the circumstances. In Maganlals case the convictions on certain charges were maintained while on others they were reversed.
In the case now before us the persons who say that they were persuaded to give bribes were, if their stories are true, acting quite independently of each other. There was no previous concert amongst them and there is nothing to show that they were in any sense abettors of each other. It was urged that their stories were highly improbable but neither the Sessions Judge nor the Magistrate seems to have thought so. A priori there seems nothing very incredible in their statements which moreover were supported by the evidence of persons other than those who say they were persuaded to pay money to the Kulkarni. Doubtless there may be a good deal of hostility to the accused- but the Sessions Judge and the Magistrate both considered the evidence overwhelming. With such a conclusion arrived at in both Courts after considering the inherent weak-ness of accomplice evidence it is impossible for us to interfere.
We think that on the facts found, the provisions of section 161, Indian Penal Code, were rightly applied. We reject the application.
Application dismissed.