| Khudiram v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550 |
The order of detention must be communicated so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. |
The Administration relied on Khudiram to argue the detaining authority need only communicate grounds; the Court distinguished this reliance and held that Khudiram does not negate the separate statutory obligation to "afford" the opportunity to make a representation. |
| Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 679 |
The canon that matters affecting personal liberty are to be strictly construed; procedural safeguards in Article 22(5) must be enforced. |
The Court used Shaik Hanif to support strict construction of MISA and the necessity of literal compliance with procedural safeguards. |
| Thomas Pelham Dale (1881) 6 QB 376 (Brett L.J.) |
English rule that imprisonment procured irregularly will not be allowed to continue; steps must be followed with extreme regularity. |
Quoted to underline the principle that procedural regularity is essential before depriving liberty. |
| Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 S.C. 318 |
Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and judicial safeguards must be jealously watched and enforced. |
Cited to show the gravity of preventive detention and the duty of courts to enforce procedural safeguards. |
| Punkaj Kumar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 97 |
The appropriate Government must consider representations even if the case has been referred to the Advisory Board. |
Relied upon to show dual obligation: Government must consider representation in addition to the Advisory Board's consideration. |
| Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 1028 |
All procedural requirements of Article 22 are mandatory; failure to comply renders detention illegal. |
Quoted for the proposition that omission of mandatory procedural requirements invalidates detention orders. |
| Bhut Nath Mete v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 806 |
Orders based on uncommunicated material are unfair and illegal; the decision-maker's mind takes in impressions from all sources. |
Applied to hold that detention was vitiated because the detaining authority relied on police material not communicated to the detainee. |
| Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952 SCR 135 (AIR 1952 SC 16) |
If a public authority acts under dictation of another body its exercise of power is bad. |
Used to support the conclusion that the detaining authority's acting under instructions from higher authorities rendered the order defective. |
| Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service, (1946) 2 All ER 201 |
Example of an officer acting under dictation; such exercises of power are invalid. |
Referred to as authority illustrating that satisfaction must be that of the detaining authority itself. |
| Emperor v. Shib Nath Banerji, AIR 1943 FC 75 |
Where the authority has not applied its mind at all it cannot be said to be satisfied for purposes of exercising detention power. |
Cited to support the proposition that the detaining authority must apply its own mind. |
| Machinder v. King, AIR (1950 FC 129) |
Satisfaction must be based on material which is of rationally probative value. |
Used to require that approving authorities be furnished with materials so they can judge whether satisfaction is grounded on probative material. |
| Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736 |
It is an abuse of power to exercise it for purposes other than those for which it is entrusted. |
Quoted to show that detention cannot be a pretence for other purposes. |
| R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Soblen, (1963) 2 QB 243 |
The test is the purpose with which the act is done: if done for authorised purpose, lawful; if not, unlawful. |
Applied to test whether the detaining authority acted for authorised ends or for ulterior purposes/dictation. |
| Raj Prakash Varashney v. Additional District Magistrate, Criminal Writ No.13 of 1977 (decided Aug 5, 1977) |
On similar facts the detaining authority was held to have acted mechanically on orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs, rendering detention a sham. |
The Court relied on that division bench decision (one judge being on the present bench) to support its view that mechanical obedience to higher authority invalidates detention. |
| John Martin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 775 |
The Central Government can revoke a detention order of a State Government and has overriding power under the Act. |
Invoked to show the Central Government's role and why it must be furnished with material to apply independent mind. |
| Liversidge v. Anderson, (1942) A.C. 206 |
Quotation used: every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful and the person directing imprisonment must justify it. |
Quoted to underwrite the principle that the State must justify detention to the Court. |
| Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1950) S.C.R. 88 |
Procedure established by law must be strictly followed before depriving life or personal liberty. |
Used to reiterate that statutory procedure for detention must be strictly complied with. |
| Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria, 1928 A.C. 459 (PC) |
Judges must insist the executive support the legality of imprisonment before a court and not shrink from deciding issues against the executive. |
Quoted to emphasize the judicial role in protecting liberty against executive encroachment. |
| A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 |
Constitution makers recognised the sinister theory of preventive detention and therefore provided procedural safeguards. |
Referred to for the historical context and warning about the nature of preventive detention. |