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  • provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 of the CPC
  • recorded.4. Section 47 of the Tenancy Act
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Citation Codes
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  • provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 of the CPC
  • recorded.4. Section 47 of the Tenancy Act

    Santu v. Abhainandan Prasad

    1. This appeal arises on a suit brought for arrears of rent for the years 1326 and 1327 Fasli against Lochan his four, nephews Jamna, Jaisri, Santu and Chatardhari. The two last named are minors. The plaintiff claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 275-8 a year basing his claim on a compromise entered into between the parties in a previous suit brought by him for the ejectment of the defendants in the Revenue Court in 1919. Until that year the rent of the holding had been Rs. 95. But in this compromise it was agreed that, if the ejectment proceedings were given up, the defendants would in future pay at the rate of Rs. 275-8.

    2. The principal argument adduced in this Court on behalf of the appellants is that the compromise was invalid, inasmuch as two of the present appellants were at the time minors and the provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 of the CPC were not observed by the Court before the decree was passed. It is contended that, though it appears that Jaisri acted as guardian ad litem in the first suit for his younger brothers Santu and Chatardhari, lie did not obtain the leave of the Court to enter into the compromise on their behalf, and the Court's leave was not expressly recorded in the proceedings. It is further contended that the compromise was not for the benefit of the minors. A further point taken is that the compromise is in, admissible in evidence, inasmuch as it is unregistered and was not incorporated in the decree of the Revenue Court.

    3. It is not clear whether Jaisri was ever actually appointed guardian ad litem of his younger brothers by the Court, but the compromise has been signed by Lochan on behalf of all his nephews and it is specifically stated that he also signs on behalf of Jaisri, who was acting as guardian of Santu and Chatadhari. The lower appellate Court has taken the view that, as Lochan and his nephews formed a joint Hindu family of which Lochan was the manager and head, he sufficiently represented all his nephews including the minors. The learned pleader for the appellants refers to Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row (1) in which their Lordships of the Privy Council held that in a case where the father and manager of a joint Hindu family was appointed by the Court guardian ad litem of one of his minor sons, he could not without leave of the Court do any act in his capacity of father or managing member of the joint family which he was debarred from doing as guardian ad litem, and that, therefore, a compromise made without the leave of the Court by the father was not binding on his minor son. In that case, however, their Lordships declined to express any opinion on the extent to which the acts of a father or managing member might affect a minor who was a party to the suit represented by another person as next friend or guardian ad litem. The ruling, therefore, does not directly cover the facts of the present case. In Badri Prasad v. Gopul Bihari Lal (2) it was held that, where a compromise in a suit is entered into on behalf of minors appearing by a next friend, it is necessary to the validity of such compromise that there should be on the record a specific order giving leave to the next friend to enter in to the compromise on behalf of the minors. Here again it was the next friend appointed by the Court who executed the compromise. In the present case it would seem from the way in which the compromise was signed by Lochan that he recognized that the minors were being represented for the purposes of the litigation by their elder brother, and that he did not profess to be representing them as manager and head of the family. In these circumstances the leave of the Court should certainly have been obtained and recorded.

    4. Section 47 of the Tenancy Act requires that any document recording an enhancement of rent shall be registered. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that this necessity it dispensed with as the terms of the compromise were incorporated in the decree of the Revenue Court. This, however, does not appear to have been the case. All that the Court did was to dismiss the suit. In Dat Prasad Singh v. Gopal Ram (3) the facts were similar, and it was there held that the necessity for registration had not been dispensed with. The mere fact that the decree directed that entries should be made in the revenue papers, of the rent provided in the compromise, cannot be regarded as equivalent to the embodiment of the terms of the compromise decree.

    5. The lower Appellate Court has held that the compromise was for the benefit of the minors as they escaped ejectment.

    6. On the other hand, they were penalized by an enhancement of rent to the extent of nearly 300 per cent for in excess of what could have been obtained by a regular procedure under the law.

    7. The appeal will succeed to this extent that the decree granted by the Courts below is altered to one for rent at the rate of Rs. 95 for the two years in suit with proportionate costs. Interest pending and future on this amount is allowed at the rate already decreed. The appellant's costs will Seclude fees in this Court on the higher scale.

    8. Appeal allowed partially.

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    Santu v. Abhainandan Prasad
    (Jun 24, 1924)