Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 4 of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2
  • Code of Civil Procedure by Act XXI of 1929,
  • clauses (a), (b), (c), (i) of sub-rule (1) of rule 2,
  • rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Act No. XXI of 1929. Rule 4 sub-rule (1)
  • provision of sub-rule (2) of rule 4
  • XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil
  • provisions of rule 5, sub-rule (3).
  • sub-rule (2) of rule 4,
  • sub-rule (1) of rule
  • rule 5 of the Code
  • Sub-rule 5(3)
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (1)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 4 of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2
  • Code of Civil Procedure by Act XXI of 1929,
  • clauses (a), (b), (c), (i) of sub-rule (1) of rule 2,
  • rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Act No. XXI of 1929. Rule 4 sub-rule (1)
  • provision of sub-rule (2) of rule 4
  • XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil
  • provisions of rule 5, sub-rule (3).
  • sub-rule (2) of rule 4,
  • sub-rule (1) of rule
  • rule 5 of the Code
  • Sub-rule 5(3)
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference arises from an application under Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure presented by Mr. Panna Lal in First Appeal No. 101 of 1930. The application asked that the preparation of the final decree in a mortgagor suit between Sat Parkash v. Bahal Rai be stayed until the appeal was decided. The application was opposed. During the hearing Mr. Panna Lal contended that because an appeal had been preferred against a preliminary decree, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to pass the final decree. That contention gave rise to the present reference to the Bench (Banerji, Kendall and King, JJ.) for clarification on whether a trial court may prepare a final decree in a mortgage suit when an appeal from a preliminary decree is pending.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a mortgage suit in which a preliminary decree has been passed and an appeal has been preferred against that preliminary decree, the trial court can prepare (pass) a final decree at the end of the period allowed for payment of the mortgage debt.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Panna Lal (applicant)

  • Submitted that under the Code of Civil Procedure no preliminary decree for sale on foot of a mortgage can be made final when an appeal has been preferred against that preliminary decree.
  • Relied on the definition of “decree” in Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which defines a decree and explains that a decree is preliminary when further proceedings are required before the suit is completely disposed of) to argue that the preliminary decree becomes inconclusive once an appeal is filed.
  • Contended that rulings such as Lalman v. Shiam Singh and the Full Bench decision in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (and approvals in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh and Fitzholmes v. Bank of Upper India) support the proposition that only one final decree can be passed in a mortgage suit and that the trial court's jurisdiction to pass a final decree ceases once an appeal against the preliminary decree is filed.

Respondent (as represented)

  • The learned advocate for the respondent relied on the case of Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank.
  • The opinion does not record further detailed or separate factual or legal submissions from the respondent beyond that reliance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal Held that where the High Court has decided an appeal against a preliminary decree for sale, it is the decree of the High Court which must be deemed to be the preliminary decree that may be made final under Order XXXIV, Rule 5; and that "there can be more final decrees than one" should be read with reference to the date when the application for final decree is made. The court interpreted this decision to mean that if on the date the application for a final decree is presented the trial court's preliminary decree has been superseded by an appellate decree, the trial court could not make final the original preliminary decree which had ceased to exist. The Bench distinguished that factual circumstance from the present one when a preliminary decree has not been superseded.
Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh Quoted with approval by the Privy Council; concerned whether a plaintiff's right to apply for a final decree had ceased by limitation when the preliminary decree had been superseded by an appellate preliminary decree. The court noted that in that case the application for a final decree was presented after the trial court's preliminary decree had been superseded; therefore the trial court could not pass a final decree on a preliminary decree that had ceased to exist.
Fitzholmes v. Bank of Upper India Follows Jowad Hussain; clarifies that where an appellate court's preliminary decree supersedes the trial court's preliminary decree, it is the appellate court's decree that can be made final. Also discussed the position where an appellate court confirms the trial court's decree but grants further time. The court cited this as authority for the proposition that if the preliminary mortgage decree of the first court is superseded by the appellate court's preliminary decree, the appellate decree alone can be made final; it also observed how granting further time by the appellate court may affect whether the final decree can be prepared.
Lalman v. Shiam Singh Referred to by the applicant as supporting the contention that the trial court's jurisdiction ceases on appeal. The court stated that the correctness of Lalman v. Shiam Singh had been doubted in Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank and that in the opinion of the present Bench Lalman should not be accepted as a correct statement of the law.
Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank Relied on by the respondent; also noted in the opinion as a case where Lalman had been doubted. The court referred to this case as having doubted Lalman and used that fact to support the conclusion that Lalman is not a correct statement of the law.
Anmol Singh v. Hari Shankar Referenced for the proposition that a suit does not end when a preliminary decree is passed and that the passing of a final decree is a further proceeding in the same suit. The court relied on this authority to support the view that preparation of the final decree is a continuation of proceedings under the same suit and therefore falls within "proceedings under a decree" for the purposes of Order XLI, Rule 5.
Sat Parkash v. Bahal Rai (Underlying suit in which the application to stay preparation of the final decree was made.) This is the subject suit discussed in the appeal/application; the court's analysis concerns the procedure and jurisdiction in that context. The opinion records that the stay application concerned preparation of the final decree in that suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench proceeded through statutory interpretation, precedent analysis, and consideration of the amendments to Order XXXIV made by Act XXI of 1929. The court's reasoning can be summarized in the following steps:

  1. Statutory definition: The court began with Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which defines "decree" and explains that a decree is preliminary when further proceedings are necessary. The court rejected the applicant's broad submission that a preliminary decree becomes inconclusive as regards the court that passed it simply because an appeal has been preferred; it emphasized the phrase "so far as regards the court expressing it" in the definition, observing that a preliminary decree is conclusive as regards the court that passed it and is subject to alteration only by the appellate court.
  2. Examination of Order XXXIV (as amended by Act XXI of 1929): The court set out Rule 4(1), Rule 4(2) and Rule 5(3) of Order XXXIV, emphasizing that:
    • Rule 4(1) directs that a successful plaintiff in a suit for sale is to be given a preliminary decree and further directs that, in default of payment, the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree.
    • Rule 4(2) empowers the court, on good cause shown and on terms, from time to time and at any time before a final decree for sale is passed, to extend the time fixed for payment.
    • Rule 5(3) requires the court, where payment has not been made, to pass a final decree on application by the plaintiff.
    From these provisions the court concluded that the trial court was bound to proceed to pass a final decree under Rule 5(3) unless a legally sufficient reason prevented it.
  3. Interaction with Order XLI, Rule 5: The Bench noted that Order XLI, Rule 5 (appeals) provides that an appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings under the decree or order appealed from unless specifically ordered. The court reasoned that the proceedings relating to passing a final decree in a mortgage suit fall within "proceedings under a decree." Therefore the mere filing of an appeal does not automatically oust the trial court's jurisdiction to proceed to a final decree.
  4. Precedent analysis and limits: The Bench analyzed the Full Bench decision in Gajadhar Singh and related Privy Council authorities (Jowad Hussain; Fitzholmes). It accepted the narrow holding of Gajadhar Singh that, on the date the application for final decree is presented, only one final decree can exist — and that if the trial court's preliminary decree has been superseded by an appellate preliminary decree by that date, the trial court cannot make final the superseded preliminary decree. But the court distinguished those facts from the present situation where the preliminary decree had not been superseded at the time the trial court was called upon to act.
  5. Rejection of complete ouster view: The Bench rejected Mr. Panna Lal's contention that the filing of an appeal always strips the trial court of jurisdiction to prepare a final decree. The court observed that had the Legislature intended to remove that jurisdiction on the mere filing of an appeal it would have explicitly provided that no final decree should be passed when an appeal against the preliminary decree has been filed. The court also noted that the amendment to Order XXXIV by Act XXI of 1929 (specifically Rule 4(2)) contemplates that the trial court may extend payment periods and deal with practical difficulties that may arise in passing the final decree.
  6. Treatment of conflicting precedent: The court observed that Lalman v. Shiam Singh — relied upon by the applicant — had already been doubted in Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank and stated that Lalman should not be accepted as a correct statement of the law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative: the trial court can, in appropriate circumstances and consistent with the Code and its rules (including Order XXXIV as amended and Order XLI, Rule 5), prepare (pass) a final decree in a mortgage suit even where an appeal has been preferred against the preliminary decree.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the filing of an appeal against a preliminary decree does not automatically oust the jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed to a final decree; the trial court remains empowered to extend time for payment and, where payment has not been made and an application is properly presented, to pass a final decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 5(3).
  • The decision distinguishes factual situations where the trial court's preliminary decree has been superseded by an appellate preliminary decree (in which event only the appellate decree can be made final) from situations where no such supersession has occurred. The court relied on the amendment by Act XXI of 1929 to confirm legislative intent that the trial court retain procedural powers to manage payment periods and to proceed in the suit.
  • The Bench indicated that the earlier decision in Lalman v. Shiam Singh should not be treated as a correct statement of the law, thereby narrowing contrary precedent.

    Sat Prakash v. Bahal Rai

    Banerji, Kendall and King, JJ.:— The question that has been referred to this Bench for decision is as follows: In a mortgage suit, where a preliminary decree has been passed by the trial court and an appeal has been preferred, can a final decree be prepared by the trial court at the end of the period, allowed for payment of the mortgage debt or not?

    An application under order XLI, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was presented by Mr. Panna Lal in First Appeal No. 101 of 1930, praying that the preparation of the final decree in a suit between Sat Parkash v. Bahal Rai be stayed till the decision of the appeal. The application was opposed, and during the hearing of the application it was submitted by Mr. Panna Lal that by reason of an appeal against the original preliminary decree having been preferred, the court that passed the preliminary decree ceased to have jurisdiction to pass the final decree. It is upon that objection being raised that the present reference was made to this Bench.

    Mr. Panna Lal appearing for the petitioner has urged before us that under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, no preliminary decree for sale on foot of a mortgage can be made final when an appeal has been preferred against that preliminary decree. In making this submission he has referred us to the definition of a decree in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2 defines a “decree” as follows: “Decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, and may be either preliminary or final.” In the explanation to the section it is stated that “a decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of.”

    Mr. Panna Lal urges that the preliminary decree in a suit for sale necessarily becomes inconclusive when an appeal is filed against that decree. It is difficult to accept that contention, because the definition of decree contains the words “so far as regards the court expressing it.” The preliminary decree is conclusive as regards the court that passed it and is only subject to alteration by the appellate court when an appeal is preferred against it.

    The learned advocate in support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the court which passed the preliminary decree ceases, has referred us to the case of Lalman v. Shiam Singh . His contention is that it was held by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal that one and only one final decree can be passed in a suit for sale on a mortgage. He states that in the cases of Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh and Fitzholmes v. Bank of Upper India the view taken by the Full Bench has been approved of by their Lordships of the Privy Council.

    The learned advocate for the respondent relies on the case of Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank . Before we decide the point raised by Mr. Panna Lal, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure as it now stands after amendment by Act No. XXI of 1929. Rule 4 sub-rule (1) is as follows: “In a suit for sale, if the plaintiff succeeds, the court shall pass a preliminary decree to the effect mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c), (i) of sub-rule (1) of rule 2, and further directing that, in default of the defendant paying as therein mentioned, the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged-property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and the proceeds of the sale (after deduction therefrom of the expenses of the sale) be paid into court and applied in payment of what has been found or declared under or by the preliminary decree as due to the plaintiff, together with such amount as may have been adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest, and the balance, if any, be paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same.” Sub-rule (2) is as follows: “The court may, on good cause shown and upon terms to be fixed by the court, from time to time, at any time before a final decree for sale is passed, extend the time fixed for the payment of the amount found or declared due under sub-rule (1) or of the amount adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest.” Sub-rule 5(3) is as follows: “Where payment in accordance with sub-rule (1) has not been made, the court shall, on application made by the plaintiff in this behalf, pass a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale be dealt within the manner provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 4”.

    In the absence of any ruling it is clear to us that the court which passed the preliminary decree was bound by these rules to proceed to pass a final decree under the provisions of rule 5, sub-rule (3). We have to examine therefore whether in view of the rulings referred to us we should hold that the court that passed the preliminary decree was precluded by reason of an appeal from passing the final decree. Whatever may have been the view before the amendment of order XXXIV by Act XXI of 1929, it is clear that under Sub-rule (2) of rule 4, the court that passed the preliminary decree could on good cause being shown postpone the date fixed by the court from time to time, before the plaintiff could be entitled to ask for a final decree under the third sub-rule of rule 5. The provision of Sub-rule (2) of rule 4 appears to us to have taken into consideration any practical difficulty that may arise in passing the final decree and enables the court that passed the preliminary decree to extend the time for payment. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to take away the jurisdiction of the court which passed the preliminary decree, we have no doubt that it would, have provided that no final decree should be passed it an appeal against the preliminary decree has been filed. There can be no question that the suit does not come to an end when the court passes a preliminary decree, and the passing of the final decree is a further proceeding in that very suit; see the case of Anmol Singh v. Hari Shankar .

    We have now to examine the rulings referred to by Mr. Panna Lal.

    It has been contended by Mr. Panna Lal that in the case of Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal it has been laid down that there can be only one final decree in a suit for sale on a mortgage. The facts of that case are that on the 16th of May, 1911, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary decree for sale. Six months' time was allowed to the judgment-debtor to pay up the decretal amount. That decree was appealed against and on the appeal being dismissed, a second appeal was filed in this Court, which was also dismissed. It was after the dismissal of the second appeal that the plaintiff Gajadhar Singh applied for a final decree to be passed in his favour. The defendant raised the plea that the plaintiff's application was barred by limitation as having been filed beyond time, i.e more than three years from the date when the time for payment fixed by the court of first instance had expired. It is clear to us that the point which was before the Full Bench was whether the application by Gajadhar Singh was barred by time on the date when it was made and further whether on that date Gajadhar Singh could have applied for a final decree on the preliminary decree passed by the court of first instance, or whether Gajadhar Singh had to apply for a final decree on the decree passed by the High Court in appeal. Their Lordships held that; where the High Court has decided an appeal against a preliminary decree for sale it is the decree of the High Court which must be deemed to be the preliminary decree that may be made final under order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    There was no question before this Court about any final decree being passed in pursuance of the preliminary decree for sale which had been passed by the court of first instance, and we are of opinion that the expression “It is impossible to hold that there can be more final, decrees than one in a suit for sale upon a mortgage must mean that on the date when Gajadbar Singh presented his application praying for the final decree to be passed, there could not be more than one final decree and as the preliminary decree of the trial court was superseded by the decree passed in appeal, the trial court could not possibly have made final the original preliminary decree which had ceased to exist.

    The case referred to above was quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh . In that case also the application for the final decree was presented to the court after the preliminary decree had ceased to exist by reason of an appellate preliminary decree superseding it. The question before their Lordships was whether on the date when the plaintiff applied for the preliminary decree to be made final the plaintiff's right to apply for a final decree had ceased by reason of the application being barred by time. There was no final decree passed by the court of first instance in that case, nor could the court of first instance pass a final decree when its preliminary decree, had been superseded by the preliminary decree passed by the High Court.

    In the case of Fitzholmes v. Bank of Upper India , which follows the case of Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh , the point is made further clear, as we find that in that case further time was granted by the appellate court when it confirmed the preliminary decree passed by the court of first instance. The plaintiff applied for the preliminary decree passed by the court to be made final, and as six months had not expired since the decree of the High Court; the defendant urged that no final decree could be prepared and the High Court accepted, that, contention. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that if the preliminary mortgage decree passed by the first court is superseded by the preliminary mortgage decree passed by the appellate court, it is the decree of Jibe, appellate court that can be made final.

    We have already stated that the preparation of the final decree was a continuation of the proceedings after the preliminary decree. A reference to order XLI, rule 5 of the Code makes it clear that an appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from. The proceedings relating to the passing of a final decree in a mortgage suit must be held, to be included in the words “proceedings under a decree.” If the Legislature intended to oust the jurisdiction of the trial court as soon as an appeal was filed against the preliminary decree, it would not have been necessary to provide for “stay of proceedings” by rule 5 of order XLI which specifically lays down, that, merely by reason of an appeal, further proceedings are not to be stayed. Hence we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Panna Lal that the trial court ceases to have jurisdiction to proceed with the case simply on the ground that an appeal had been filed.

    The correctness of the decision in Lalman v. Shiam Singh has already been doubted by a Bench of this Court in Khair-un-nissa Bibi v. Oudh Commercial Bank , and in our opinion the former decision should not be accepted as a correct statement of the law.

    We think that our view is confirmed by the recent amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure by Act XXI of 1929, by which a provision has been inserted in rule 4 of order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that the court in passing a preliminary decree shall “further direct that, in default of the defendant paying as therein mentioned, the plaintiff shall be a entitled, to apply for a final decree” and by which the court, i.e, the trial court has been empowered under Sub-rule (2) of rule 4 to extend the time fixed for the payment of the amount on good cause shown.

    The answer of the question is therefore in the affirmative.

    XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sat Prakash v. Bahal Rai
    (Jul 16, 1930)