Collister and Bajpai, JJ.:— This is an appeal by the defendant Dharam Narain. The plaintiff Suraj Narain brought a suit for “possession of the entire wakf property, movable and immovable, and all the funds of the wakf created under a document dated the 14th of May, 1900, executed by Mst. Bibi Savitri, and of the office of mutwalli and amin of the aforesaid wakf by dispossession of the defendant”. It was also prayed that the defendant may be ordered to render all accounts of the funds and income of the property appertaining to the wakf from 1926 up to the institution of the suit and that a decree for the amount found payable by the defendant for the period of his possession with reasonable interest may be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the person and property of the defendant.
The court below decreed the plaintiff's suit “for possession over the office of trustee and over the property, movable and immovable, belonging to the trust”. A preliminary decree for account was also passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant directing the latter to render accounts relating to the trust from 1926 onwards up to the date of the judgment (17th of September, 1958) and the plaintiff was allowed full costs against the defendant.
The allegations on which the plaintiff brought the suit may be stated, but in order to appreciate them it would be fetter to give the following pedigree:
The common ancestor of the parties was Mool Chand, and one of his sons, Salig Ram, was possessed of considerable property. His two sons, Jagannath and Chhotey Lal, died in his lifetime and Salig Ram on the 7th of January, 1896, gifted his property absolutely to his widowed daughter-in-law Bibi Savitri and the latter on 14th May, 1900, created an endowment of some of her properties in favour of three idols, Sri Savitri Swami Ram Chandraji, Sri Savitri Swami Jankiji and Sri Savim Lachmanji by means of a formal deed of gift and constituted herself as the first mutwalli of the wakf property during her own lifetime. She died on 17th April, 1917, and then, according to the plaintiff, Lachhmi Narain as the heir of the founder became the mutwalli and remained in possession of the wakf property during his lifetime, although the endowed estate was managed by one Puttu Lal, the mukhtar-i-am of Bibi Savitri and an employee of Lachhmi Narain. Lachhmi Narain died on the 30th of September, 1921, and then the plaintiff succeeded to the mutwalliship, but he was a minor and his estate was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards. Puttu Lal, however, continued to manage the endowed property up till 1926 on behalf of the plaintiff and then mutation was effected in favour of Dharam Narain in August, 1926, but he had absolutely no title and his possession was the possession of a trespasser. During his time he was guilty of gross mismanagement and waste. The defendant was, therefore, liable to be dispossessed and was liable to render accounts. The plaintiff was entitled to obtain actual possession of the endowed property.
In defence it was pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to the mutwalliship and therefore he had no cause of action. The plaintiff's suit was said to be barred under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by the 12 years' rule of limitation. The defendant alleged that Lachhmi Narain never obtained possession over the wakf property, but on the death of Bibi Savitri the defendant and his brother Shiv Narain under an oral will became the mutwallis of the wakf property and according to the same oral will Puttu Lal was authorised to carry on the management during the minority of Shiv Narain and Dharam Narain. The defendant took up the management in his own hands on attaining majority and his management throughout had been satisfactory and honest. The plaintiff was said to have attained his majority more than three years prior to the institution of the suit.
The court below decided every issue in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit in its entirety….
The defendant in this appeal has raised several contentions and we shall notice them as we proceed with our judgment.
The first question that we have got to decide is whether the title to shebaitship vested in Lachhmi Narain or not on the death of Bibi Savitri. At this stage it will be convenient to discuss the scheme of the endowment created by Bibi Savitri on the 14th of May, 1900. This document is styled as a deed of gift. The lady says that the property given at the foot of the document was owned and possessed by her and she was making a gift of the same in favour of Sri Thakur Savitri Swami Ram Chandraji, Sri Savitri Jati Lachhmanji and Sri Savitreshwari Jankiji Maharani installed in the temple. The property made a gift of was to remain in her possession as amin and the income of the property was to be spent according to the directions in the deed for the benefit of Sri Thakurji, donee aforesaid, Sanskrit Pathshala and daily sadabart. She reserved to herself and to the succeeding amins the right of appointing karindas and servants for realising the income of the property and spending it according to the instructions contained in the deed. She appointed the following residents of Farrukhabad as managing amins: (1) Maharaj Prag Narain, (2) Maharaj Behari Lal, (3) Maharaj Chandra Sen, (4) Jhangri Lal, (5) Pandit Prag Datt, (6) Sita Ram and (7) Jwala Prasad…… In paragraph 7 she said that after her or in her lifetime when she wanted to give up the work of amin, Maharaj Prag Narain, son of Mangala Charan, her son-in-law, was to be appointed amin by means of a document, and in paragraph 8 she reserved to herself the power to renew, cancel or amend the terms relating to the appointment of an amin by means of a registered deed of amanat, but after her death her heirs and representatives were not to have the said power. In paragraph 9 it was said that if the amin acted contrary to the terms and directions (which were to be given out under a separate document which would be executed) — this is clear from paragraph 3. — it would be the duty of the managing amins to force the amin to carry out the said terms and directions, and if the amin adopted any fresh course of action contrary to Dharamshastra, the managing amins shall have power to remove him from the office and to appoint another amin. In his place and to execute a deed of amanat and have it registered. It was also provided that if any one out of the managing amins died or wanted to give up the work, another person was to be appointed a managing amin in his place under a document with reference to a majority of opinion of the remaining amins. But it was to be kept in mind that the managing amin appointed was to be a Brahman or Vaish by caste who was a believer in idol worship. In paragraph 11 it was provided that ff the amin acted contrary to the terms or misbehaved or acted dishonestly or did not discharge the duties of an amin properly or wanted to resign the office of amin or died, then it would be the duty of Bibi Savitri herself, so long as she lived, and after her of the managing amins to appoint, in place of the deceased or unfit amin or the amin who might refuse to work, another person who might be a Hindu, a Kanaujia Brahman, a follower of Hindu Dharamshastra, a firm believer in idol worship and an honest and Godfearing man as amin. It is clear that this last provision contemplated the retirement of Bibi Savitri while she was alive. We have quoted the relevant paragraphs of the endowment.
A number of properties were mentioned at the foot of the document as being dedicated to the deities, but by virtue of another deed of wakf by way of tamliknama dated 10th March, 1916, several properties were transferrred to a Pathshala about which also a scheme of management was laid down, and it is of some importance to note that one Puttu Lal, son of Raghubir Dayal, caste Khattri, her general attorney was appointed as one of the members of the managing committee. After this diversion of some of the properties to the Pathshala the endowment of 1900 was confined to certain shops, houses and malikana allowance of Rs. 1,100 in the 10 Biswa muafi share situate in mauza Aseha.
On 30th July, 1900, she cancelled the appointment of Maharaj Prag Narain as the trustee in succession to herself and as also a member of the managing committee and she further directed that Prag Narain should never be appointed a trustee and manager. It would thus appear that the managing amins now became six instead of seven, and Bibi Savitri remained the amin or mutwalli or shebait during her lifetime.
It is admitted by Dharam Narain defendant that Behavi Lal, Chandra Sen, Pragdat and Jhinguri Lal, four out of the six amins, died in the lifetime of Mst. Savitri and nobody was appointed in their place as they died one after the other. In fact, the managing committee of the six persons did not function at all — these are the very words of Dharam Narain. When, therefore, Bibi Savitri died on 17th April, 1917, only two “members, namely, Sita Ram and Jwala Prasad, of the managing committee were in existence and nobody seem to have taken any trouble whatsoever to fill the vacancies caused by the death of the other four.
The principles applicable to a case where the shebait is dead are as follows:
(a) If there is a provision in the deed of endowment about the mode in which the office is to be filled up, the next shebait is to be appointed in pursuance of the provision, that is, the devolution of the trust depends upon the terms on which it was created.
(b) If there are no such provisions, then it depends on the usage of a particular institution.
(c) In the absence of all these, the office of shebait reverts to the heirs of the founder.
In Gossami Sri Gridhariji v. Komanlalji Gossami(1) their Lordships of the Privy Council held that “According to Hindu law, when the worship of a Thakur has been founded, the office of a shebait is held to be vested in the heir or heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, provided that there has not been some usage, course of dealing, or circumstance, showing a different mode of devolution.”
Again in Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi(2) they observed that there being no reliable evidence as to the terms or conditions of a religious endowment, the legal inference was that the title to the property or to its management or control followed the line of inheritance from the founder.
Now in the present case Bibi Savitri did not nominate anybody as the next shebait, although she had reserved that right in herself, nor did the managing committee to whom she had given such right nominate anybody as the shebait. Indeed the managing committee never took the slightest interest in this endowment and they did not care to fill the vacancies as they occurred and so it is argued that when their number was reduced to two it could not be said that they retained any such power because it was not the intention of the author of the trust that a committee of two should have the light to nominate a shebait. The appellant argues that either these two could have appointed four more members to act on the managing committee and then could have appointed a shebait by a majority of vote or that these two alone could have appointed a shebait. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that the committee of two had lapsed almost into nothingness and they lost all power in the matter inasmuch as the directions of the author could not be reasonably carried out. The fact, however, remains that even these two did not exert in this direction, and we are of the opinion that the title to the property and its management and control followed the line of inheritance from the founder, and Lachhmi Narain; who was the next heir-at-law of Bibi Savitri became the shebait. Such a vesting could not be prevented by the likelihood of any power — if there was any such power left outstanding in the committee of two — being exercised. At best it may be said that the vesting could be defeated when the power was exercised, supposing the power was outstanding. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to say whether the reasonable exercise of any power was left outstanding in view of the next circumstance, namely the death of Sita Ram on 10th May, 1921…. Lachhmi Naraindied on 30th September, 1921, and as long as he was alive Sita Ram and Jwala Prasad did nothing in the matter and after the death of Sita Ram on 10th May, 1921, the matter was not capable of being argued that Jwala Prasad, the solitary member of the managing committee, could have exercised any power reasonably according to the wishes of Bibi Savitri. In any event no such power was ever exercised by any member of the committee. The learned Judge of the court below has discussed this matter with great thoroughness. The position, therefore, is that Lachhmi Narain did succeed to the shebaitship on the death of Bibi Savitri and remained a shebait till his death on 30th September, 1921.
This is what took place as a matter of law and we shall have to revert to this aspect later when we shall discuss whether he did succeed as a matter of fact also or whether somebody else usurped that position. We further hold the view that as a matter of law Suraj Narain, his son, succeeded to the shebaitship on the death of Lachhmi Narain. The only remaining member of the managing committee, Jwala Prasad, died on 15th November, 1925, as is clear from the copy of the extract of a death register produced in this case and thus all the members of the committee died. Jwala Prasad as the sole surviving member of the committee could not constitute the committee and Suraj Narain obtained an indefeasible title from the very start, and, in any event, after the death of Jwala Prasad his title became absolutely indefeasible. In Kunjamani Dassi v. Nikunja Bihari Das, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that “when a founder has given valid directions as to the devolution of the shebaitship, upon the death of the last shebait the office vests in persons who at the time constitute the heirs of the founder, provided the last shebait has not taken it absolutely; when the office has so vested in them, upon the death of each member of the group it passes by succession to his heir….”. If this is a correct exposition of law, as we think it is, Suraj Narain, the plaintiff, succeeded to the shebaitship on the death of Lachhmi Narain. It will of course be a question of fact whether he did, as a matter of fact, so succeed, because if somebody else took possession the plaintiff's suit might be held to be barred by time.
Learned counsel for the respondent strenuously contended that even if Lachhmi Narain be deemed to have succeeded to the shebaitship, on his death we have to go back to the founder and see who her heirs would be, treating Lachhmi Narain as non-existent, and if that be so, Suraj Narain, Shiv Narain and Dharam Narain succeeded jointly to the shebaitship for they are all removed in the same degree from Bibi Savitri, and then in no circumstances could the plaintiff sue for dispossession of the defendant and at best he would be entitled to joint possession. We do not feel inclined to agree with this contention because this will mean that on the death of Bibi Savitri the shebait who took an absolute estate would not form a fresh stock of descent, but the reversion would open as from the death of the original founder and this process would lead to endless complications. No authority has been cited by learned counsel for the respondent in support of his proposition of law and his proposition would be contrary to the dictum of Mr. Justice Willes who in delivering the judgment in Tagore v. Tagore, observed that “If an estate were given to a man simply without express words of inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry by Hindu law an estate of inheritance.” In the present case the estate vested in Lachhmi Narain (we are assuming that an estate does vest in a Hindu shebait in this way for it is only the managership that really vests, the ownership of the property being vested in the idol) and in the absence of everything else it carried an estate of inheritance.
We have now got to see as to what was the state of affairs on the death of Bibi Savitri. The definite case set up by the defendant was that in her last illness Bibi Savitri orally gave directions that the defendant and Shiv Narain, brother of the defendant, should be managers of the wakf and that during their minority Puttu Lal should remain the manager, but Shiv Narain did not like to be the manager and during the minority of the defendant Puttu Lal carried on the management of the wakf property on behalf of the defendant according to the oral directions of Bibi Savitri.
There is really only one witness to prove this oral will, and he is the defendant himself…. On this evidence the court below rightly came to the conclusion that the oral will had not been established.
When Bibi Savitri died, Dharam Narain was fifteen and Shiv Narain was seventeen, as stated by Dharam Narain, and Lachhmi Narain was a major. Shiv Narain became major soon after and if there was any truth in the oral will he would have in 1918 or 1919 asserted his rights and would have taken up the management, but it is said he disclaimed all interest in the wakf and that is why he did not stir in the matter. Shiv Narain has not however, been called as a witness in the case. Further it is not likely that Mst. Savitri would have left an important matter like this to her last illness and that too by way of oral directions when in the endowment deed she had said that if she wanted to nominate an amin she would do so by means of a document. Puttu Lal was the general attorney of Bibi Savitri and a partner of hers in the firm Salig Ram Jagannath. He was further in the managing committee, of the Pathshala endowment. We have already said that a great deal of property was diverted to the Pathshala on the 10th of March, 1916, from the property which had originally been endowed on the 14th of May, 1900, to the temple, and by another document, dated the 29th of September, 1916, some more property was transferred to the Pathshala. Puttu Lal was managing the property of the Pathshala even during the lifetime of Mst. Savitri and also after her death, and it is no wonder that he took up the management of the present endowment also, not in any assertion of his claim as a shebait but on behalf of Lachhmi Narain, the real holder of the title.
On the death of Bibi Savitri her personal property was taken possession of by Mst. Jumna, the sister of Savitri's husband, under the averment that Bitji Savitri had adopted a boy by the name of Paras Ram and she was her guardian. Lachhmi Narain instituted on the 7th of December, 1918, suit No. 177 of 1918 against Mst. Jumna. The suit was decreed in favour of Lachhmi Narain under a compromise on the 27th of March, 1919. Lachhmi Narain's hands were, therefore, full during this period, and we have no documentary evidence of the circumstances under which Puttu Lal's name was recorded as sarbarahkar of Sri Thakurji.
From the statement of Puttu Lal and from the other circumstances of the case it is quite clear that Puttu Lal did not assert any title in himself but he was obviously acting on behalf of somebody else, and if, as we have held before, he was not acting on behalf of the defendant in pursuance of the alleged oral will of Mst. Savitri he must in law be deemed to be acting on behalf of Lachhmi Narain, the rightful heir.
Lachhmi Narain obtained possession of the personal property of Bibi Savitri after litigation with Mst. Jumna to which reference has been made already and all the books of the firm of Bibi Savitri came into his possession…. The accounts in connection with the present endowed property used to be entered in the books of the firm Bibi Savitri. When these firms and these books came into the possession of Lachhmi Narain the same arrangements continued and Puttu Lal after realisation of the malikana of Aseh used to get the amount entered in chose books, which were maintained and supervised by Lachhmi Narain… The accounts that have been printed show this state of affairs in 1919 and 1921 right up to 1924. The inference is irresistible that Puttu Lal was acting not on his own behalf but under the guidance of Lachhmi Narain. Lachhmi Narain was a man of means and he might not have taken the trouble to get his own name entered over the endowed property, but there can be no doubt that he was taking an interest in the management of the affairs of the temple and the day to day management was entrusted to Puttu Lal…. In a tamliknama executed by Lachhmi Narain on the 9th of September, 1921, there is a mention of the fact that he was the mutwalli as a representative of Mst. Savitri Bibi of the property which she had validly dedicated for charitable purposes under a deed of wakf dated the 14th of May, 1900, in favour of Sri Thakur Ram Chandra. Lachhman and Jankiji installed in the temple at Farrukhabad. Lachhmi Narain therefore, cannot be said to have disclaimed all interest in the trust, for we find him stating in this tamliknama that he was the mutwalli. We are not saying that this statement proves that he was the mutwalli, because this is after all an admission by Lachhmi Narain in his own favour, but it undoubtedly negatives the theory of disclaimer set up by the defendant. On a review of the entire circumstances we have come to the conclusion that Lachhmi Narain was, the de facto and de jure shebait after the death of Mst. Savitri and remained so till his death on the 30th of September, 1921.
Lachhmi Narain was succeeded by Suraj Narain, his son, so far as Lachhmi Narain's personal estate was concerned. Suraj Narain was a minor then an from the evidence of Mukat Behari Lal, a mukhtar-i-am in the office of the Court of Wards, it is clear that he Court of Wards had assumed control of Suraj Narain's estate in September, 1925, and the estate was released from the control of the Court of Wards in December, 1936.
It appears that after the death of Lachhmi Narain, Puttu Lal was managing the endowment on behalf of the rightful heir who, according to what we have said before, was Suraj Narain. Puttu Lal during his sarbarakkarship obtained decrees against the owners of Aseh for the malikana allowance and did everything else conducive to the well being of the endowment, but from no conduct of his does it appear that he was asserting an title in himself.
The Court of Wards presumably were not particularly anxious to take the endowed property in their hands, and we find Puttu Lal making an application on the 2nd of August, 1926, in the revenue court. The application runs as follows: “It is submitted that a 10 biswa share in mauza Aseha, pargana and tahsil Chhibramau, district Farrukha bad stands recorded in Khewat in the name of Sri Thakur Savitri Ram Chandraji. Sri Savitri Lachhmanji and Swami Jankiji Maharani in equal shares as superior proprietors under my sarbarahkarship. I do not work as such any more. Maharaj Dharam Narain, son of Maharaj Bhajan Lal, caste Brahman, resident of mohalla Lohai, Farrukhabad, nephew of Mst. Savitri Devi does the work now. It is therefore, prayed that my name may be removed from the sarbhrahkarship and the name of Dharam Narain, aforesaid, may be recorded in the khewat. I have no objection to it.” Then on the report of the patwari the khewat was rectified on the 16th of September, 1926. Puttu Lal's name was removed and Dharam Narain's name was mutated as sarbarahkar. We do not believe Dharam Narain when he says that he had started managing the endowed property from 1925. It is clear from this application that up till the 2nd of August, 1926, Puttu Lal was managing the property and it is only after this that the management of Dharam Narain commenced. It is of some importance to note that in this petition of Puttu Lal there is no assertion that Puttu Lal was managing the property on behalf of Dharam Narain but the allegation is that Puttu Lal was not working as sarbarahkar any more and did not want to work as sarbarahkar, whereas Dharam Narain wanted to do the, work and was doing the work and therefore Puttu Lal wanted to be relieved from the responsibilities of sarbarahkarship. Dharam Narain's possession, therefore, commenced some time in August, 1926, and before this Puttu Lal's possession was not adverse to the rightful owner but was in law and in fact on behalf of the rightful owner. There is no question of Dharam Narain being entitled to tack on his possession to that of Puttu Lal. Dharam Narain does not claim from Puttu Lal and cannot claim through Puttu Lal as Puttu Lal was never acting on his behalf. Puttu Lal was not even a trespasser and it cannot be said that as Puttu Lal got Dharam Narain's name mutated after him, therefore Dharam Narain should be permitted to tack on his possession to that of Puttu Lal on the hypothesis that as Dharam Narain, the second trespasser, owed his entry in the field to the action of Puttu Lal, the first trespasser, the two periods ought to be joined. We have discussed at some length before that the books of the firm Bibi Savitri contained the accounts of the endowed property, and we may now mention that the accounts such as are printed up to 16th of November, 1925, show that Puttu Lal after realising the income and meeting the expenses got them all entered in the books. After the tamliknama in favour of Purshottam Narain of 1921 the books came in the possession of Purshottam Narain and there was no real conflict between the two estates till they came under the Court of Wards in 1925 rand then, as both Suraj Narain and Purshottam Narain were wards and as the Court of Wards was not particularly interested in this endowment, Dhararh Narain got an opportunity and induced Puttu Lal to give the application, dated the 2nd of August, 1926, and the application met with no opposition from the Court of Wards.
We have arrived at the conclusion that Puttu Lal was acting all along on behalf of the rightful owners, namely on behalf of Lachhmi Narain up till his death and on behalf of Suraj Narain up till the 2nd of August, 1926.
This brings us to the question as to whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by time or not, and we have already repelled the contention advanced on behalf of the defendant that he and his predecessor — if Puttu Lal can be called his predecessor — were in adverse possession for more than twelve years. The plaintiff's suit cannot therefore be held to be barred under article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. Learned counsel for the defendant, however, argues that as the plaintiff alleges that he was in possession for some time and was dispossessed subsequently the proper article of the Indian Limitation Act applicable to the facts of the present case is article 142. Even if we were to assume that article is applicable, we have already held that Suraj Narain was in possession through Puttu Lal up to about the 2nd of August, 1926, and the suit instituted on the 5th of January, 1937, would be within twelve years. The proper article, however, which is applicable to the present case is article 124 of the Limitation Act. That article deals with possession of an hereditary office and provides a period of twelve years from the time when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff. The present suit deals with the possession of an hereditary office. The article is not applicable where the appointment to the office is made by nomination and applies only when the appointment is by succession through inheritance. It is true that in the present case when Bibi Savitri created the endowment she intended the office of amin to go by nomination, but neither sire nor the members of the managing committee made any nomination ever, and the property, according to the law that we have discussed above, came into the possession of Lachhmi Narain, when it became hereditary.
We have already repelled the contention of the appellant that after the death of Lachhmi Narain we have again to go back to the original founder and see as to who would be his or her heirs and in that connection we have, referred to the case of Kunjamani Dassi v. Nikunja Bihari Das. When the management once reverted to the representative of the founder on her death and a certain person succeeded as the heir-at-law, it would be in contravention of the Hindu law of inheritance to say that the endowment should be held in a series of successive life estates by the heritors. The office became, therefore, hereditary in the hands of Lachhmi Narain. The decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandora Sannadhi v. Vein Pandaram supports the above conclusion. In Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh(3) their Lordships say: “In the present case the late shebait Rani Ananda Moye, not having appointed her successor as provided in the will of the founder, Rani Annapurna, and there being no other provisions for the appointment of shebait, the management of the endowment must revert to the heirs of the founder and the office of shebait henceforth must be hereditary in the founder's family.”
When the plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1937, the office had already become hereditary, and we hold the view that the proper article applicable to the facts of the present case is article 124 of the Indian Limitation Act.
There is no distinction as regards limitation between a claim to an office and a claim to the property of endowment. This was held in the case of Gnanasambanda Pandara Samiadhi referred to above, and the plaintiff's suit for possession of the office and for possession of the immovable property appertaining to the endowment cannot be said to be barred by time. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, argues that some distinction must be drawn between immovable property and movable property, but the expression used in the Privy Council decision referred to just now is “property” and not “immovable property” only. Moreover, in principle there can be no distinction between movables and immovables in a matter of this kind. Both are the properties of the temple and both are intimately connected with the office. What are the movables that are after all claimed in the present case? They are gold and silver ornaments, utensils of silver, brass, iron, etc., glassware, gold singhasan and gold chhatra, etc. etc., ornaments and articles used for the decoration of the idols, and the other things have a direct connection with the idols.
There is only one other matter in connection with which limitation has been pleaded and it is that portion of the claim which relates to rendition of accounts. We shall deal with it after we have disposed of another point that was raised by the defendant.
The point might have been disposed of earlier, but it is not inappropriate even at this stage. The defendant's contention is that the plaintiff ought to have instituted a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have by this time made it clear what our view is regarding the position of the plaintiff and the position of the defendant. We have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the trustee of the endowment and the defendant is a trespasser. This was the case of the plaintiff in his plaint and on the averments made therein the defendant could not be considered to be a trustee, and a suit under section 92 is ordinarily confined to suits against trustees. In Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das their Lordships of the Privy Council observed at page 252 as follows: “By adversely taking and appropriating to his own use a share of the surplus daily income from the offerings Jhaiula Das acquired no title and no right to a share of that income. On each occasion upon which Jharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated to his own use a share of the income to which the shebait was entitled, Jharula Das committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which a suit could be brought against him by the shebait. But it did not constitute him the shebait for the time being or affect in any way the title to the office.”
The position of Dharam Narain before us is virtually the same as the position of Jharula Das in the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In Ganga Charan v. Ram Chandra it was held that: “Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reference to those cases alone where there is an allegation of breach of some express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. It has no application to suits where a plaintiff claims possession of the endowed property on the allegation that he is the duly appointed trustee and that the defendant is a trespasser.
It is true that in Ram Bilas v. Nitya Nand a Bench of this Court held that a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was competent, against a trustee de son tort, that is, against a person who without any title chooses to take upon himself the character of a trustee; and in Bihari Lal v. Shiva Narain(4) Dalal, J., one of the members constituting the Bench which decided the case also held the same view. But it has not been held in either of the above two cases that if an ordinary suit for ejectment is had by a plaintiff who calls himself a trustee against a defendant who is alleged to be a trespasser, Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be a bar. Indeed it was conceded by learned counsel for the appellant that if the defendant was a trespasser the present suit was not in competent. We do not wish to go as far as the learned Judges who decided Ganga Charan's case seem to go, but we think that the plaintiff could ignore section 92 and bring his suit in the present form.
Coming to section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, before we discuss its applicability, it is necessary to decide another issue, namely the question of the plaintiff's age. He alleged that he was born on the 3rd of July, 1913, and as his estate was taken under the Court of Wards he attained his majority on the 3rd of July, 1934, and the present suit instituted on the 5th of January, 1937 within three years of his attaining majority is in time for all purposes. His suit therefore does not in any way offend section 8 of the Indian Limitation Act which provides that “Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 (sections dealing with disabilities)…. shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability….the period within which any suit must be instituted….”
The defendant's contention, however, is that the plaintiff was born on the 30th of June, 1912, and thus he attained his majority on the 30th of June, 1933, and by reason of section 8 of the Indian Limitation Act the suit, having been instituted more than three years after the cessation of the disability of minority, is barred. It would not be necessary for the plaintiff to invoke the aid of section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act if his contention on the question of age is accepted. The learned Judge of the court below “refrained from expressing anything definitely on this point” although he was “inclined to be more partial towards the defendant on the subject.” We however, consider that it is necessary for us to give a definite finding on the point.
On the whole; after a careful comparison of the evidence tendered by the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was born on the 3rd of July, 1913. section 8 of the Indian Limitation Act therefore adversely affects the plaintiff's case. The result, therefore, is that unless section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act helps the plaintiff, his suit for rendition of accounts could not be decreed for all the period during which the defendant was in possession, that is from 1926, but for only six years prior to the institution of the suit, as is conceded by learned counsel for the defendant, the article applicable being the omnibus article 120.
We now come to a consideration of section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act. That section prior to its amendment by the Indian Limitation Act (Amendment) Act I of 1929 which came into force on the 1st of January, 1929, read as follows: “Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be batted by any length of time.”
There was some divergence of opinion in the courts in India as to whether a shebait of a Hindu endowment could be said to be a person in whom property was vested in trust, but in the year 1921 their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar made the following observations:
“The language of section 10 gives the clue to the meaning and applicability of article 134. It clearly shows that the article refers to cases of specific trust, and relates to property ‘conveyed in trust’. Neither under the Hindu law nor in the Muhammadan system is any property ‘conveyed’ to a shebait or a mutwalli in the case of a dedication. Nor is any property vested in him; whatever property he holds for the idol or the institution he holds as manager with certain beneficial interests regulated by custom and usage. Under the Muhammadan law, the moment a wakf is created all rights of property pass out of the wakif and vest in God Almighty. The curator, whether called mutwalli or sajjadanashin or by any other name, is merely a manager. He is certainly not a ‘trustee’ as understood in the English system.”
After this Privy Council decision it became clear that the shebait could not be said to be a person in whom property was “vested in trust”. In 1929 the following paragraph was added to section 10: “For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”
The statement of objects and reasons is as follows: “The (Civil Justice) Committee's recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami and Abdur Raiiim v. Narayan Das Aurora which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutwalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Muhammadan religious endowments is vested are not trustees within the meaning of the word as used in section 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in their. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person not being an assign for valuable consideration, endowments of this time are not protected. The Committee's recommendation is that section 10 of the Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Muhammadan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee. After consulting the Local Governments, the Government of India have come to the conclusion that Hindu. Muhammadan and Buddhist religious as well as charitable endowments should be included within the scope of section 10 of the Act. The Bill gives effect to this conclusion.”
Learned counsel for the plaintiff says that by reason of section 10 and more particularly by reason of the amendment the plaintiff's suit for an account of the trust property is not barred “by any length of time” as against the defendant. In our judgment, the plaintiff's contention is not sound. All that the amendment has done is to do away with the effect of the Privy Council decision in Vidya Vanithi's case and to make a Hindu shebait or a Muhammadan mutwalli a trustee in whom property may be said to have vested. But the plaintiff has to prove, according to the section as amended and unamended, that the property had vested in trust for any specific purpose so far as the defendant was concerned. The question is whether the defendant is an express trustee or only a trustee de son tort. It is the plaintiff's own case that the defendant is a rank trespasser and his position, at best, can therefore be only of a trustee de son tort. Whatever may be the view of the other High Courts as to the applicability of section 10 so far as trustees de son tort are concerned, this Court has definitely held in Bihari Lal v. Shiva Narain that in a suit for accounts against the trustee de son tort section 10 of the Limitation Act will not apply, for it applies to cases of express trust alone. The Oudh Chief Court has followed this decision in Chandrikn Bakhsh Singh v. Bhola Singh. Their Lordships of this Court then applied article 120 of the Limitation Act and directed that the defendant in that case must render accounts of the profits for the period of six years prior to the suit, and, as we said before, the defendant in the present case would be liable to render accounts only for six years. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider whether the defendant has been guilty of mismanagement or waste because under the law the defendant is accountable to the plaintiff whether he is guilty of malpractice or not. Certain actions of the defendant appeared to the court below to amount to breaches of trust and if we felt constrained to give any finding on the point we could have said that they were justified by the exigencies of circumstances and did not amount to misfeasance. Learned counsel for the defendant placed all the facts in this connection and argued that the defendant throughout acted bona fide in the interest of the trust.
Learned counsel for the plaintiff contented himself with the submission that the defendant was an accountable party and did not attempt to meet the arguments advanced by the defendant's counsel. We feel inclined to agree with the case of the defendant and hold that it has not been established that the defendant has been guilty of any grave dereliction of duty.
For the reasons given above, we confirm the decree of the court below so far as it relates to possession over the office of the trustee and over the property movable and immovable belonging to the trust. We, however, modify it so far as the decree for rendition of accounts is concerned and hold that the defendant is liable to render, accounts relating to the trust from the 5th of January, 1931. As the plaintiff has succeeded in both courts on almost all the points and has failed only so far as rendition of accounts for about five years is concerned, we direct that the plaintiff will get four-fifths of his costs from the defendant in both courts, and the defendant will bear his own costs throughout.