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  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act,
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  • Article 142 of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two connected appeals arise from a suit for possession of 5 annas, 8 pies odd of zamindari property. The original owner, Azim Ullah Khan, died in 1892; mutation of the property was effected in the name of his son, Bahadur Ali. Azim Ullah Khan also left four daughters whose descendants constitute several of the plaintiffs in this suit (specific identifications between daughters and plaintiffs are set out in the record). Bahadur Ali died in 1919; the property was then mutated in the name of his widow, Mt. Bari Bahoo.

In 1913 Mt. Bari Bahoo and her three sons executed a simple mortgage in favour of Pancham Lal. By an instrument of 1919 (not on the record and of unspecified exact nature) Pancham Lal was put into possession for 15 years and his name was mutated. On 23 February 1924 Mt. Bari Bahoo and two of her sons executed a sale deed in respect of the property in favour of defendant 1 for Rs. 550. The suit was instituted by eight plaintiffs on 22 February 1936.

The trial Court dismissed the suit. The lower Appellate Court reversed in part — decreeing the suit of some plaintiffs and dismissing others. The appeals before the District Judge are S.A. No. 624 of 1938 (brought initially by plaintiffs 1, 2, 3 and 5, with others at first impleaded as pro forma respondents and later transposed to appellants by request) and S.A. No. 685 of 1938 (connected appeal concerning plaintiffs 4, 6, 7 and 8). The District Judge's disposition addressed limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act and procedural questions under the Code of Civil Procedure (Orders cited in the opinion).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act and, relatedly, whether the plaintiffs had established possession (actual or constructive) within 12 years prior to institution of the suit.
  2. Whether the possession of a mortgagee or transferee of a co-sharer can be treated as adverse possession against the non‑possessing co‑sharers in the absence of overt repudiation of title or knowledge by those co‑sharers.
  3. Whether an appeal brought by only some of several plaintiffs (where the decree proceeds on a ground common to all) can result in reversal or variation of the decree in favour of all plaintiffs under Order 41, Rule 4 CPC, and whether the transposition of pro forma respondents to appellants after an in‑court ruling could be accepted under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The plaint alleged the defendant obtained possession in 1934 (when the mortgagee vacated under the 1919 instrument) and that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the 1924 sale deed until the defendant took possession in 1934; this timing was asserted to bring the suit within the period permitted by Article 142.
  • Implicit in the plaintiffs' position (as reflected by the court's discussion) was that the possession by the mortgagee and any earlier transactions did not operate as adverse possession against them because they lacked knowledge of any repudiation or assertion of exclusive title.

Defendants (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The defendant-appellant admitted that possession by the defendant began in 1934 (the year the mortgagee vacated) — this fact was not contested.
  • The defence inter alia pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation (the principal point argued before the District Judge).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1934 ALJ 9731 (Full Bench decision) Authority that, where Article 142 applies, the plaintiffs who assert title must prove that they had been in possession (actual or constructive) within 12 years before institution of the suit. The court relied on this authority to state the onus is on the plaintiffs to prove possession within the statutory 12‑year period under Article 142.
AIR 1932 All 393 Principle that a transferee (including a mortgagee) of a co‑sharer can acquire no more than the transferor; possession by such transferee is regarded, in relation to title, as that of a co‑sharer and will not be adverse to the other co‑sharers unless the transferee repudiates title and that repudiation is brought to the knowledge of the other co‑sharers. The court applied these passages to hold that the mortgagee's possession from 1919 to 1934 was, absent proof of repudiation or knowledge by the plaintiffs, possession on behalf of all co‑sharers and therefore did not establish adverse possession against the plaintiffs.
1937 ALJ 11113 Authority cited as supporting the proposition that an appeal by some plaintiffs may operate for all where the decree appealed from proceeds on a common ground. The court cited this decision in connection with Order 41, Rule 4 CPC to justify allowing the appeal of S.A. No. 685 and decreeing the suit for all plaintiffs (except plaintiff 3), finding it proper to exercise the discretion to bind or benefit non‑appealing plaintiffs where the decree proceeded on a common ground.
AIR 1922 Lah 574 Decision cited as in point on the same procedural issue regarding appeals by some plaintiffs affecting all plaintiffs. The court relied on this authority alongside 1937 ALJ 11113 to support its conclusion that the appellate court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all plaintiffs under Order 41, Rule 4 CPC where appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two related parts corresponding to the two appeals.

On limitation (S.A. No. 624 of 1938):

  1. The court accepted that Article 142 of the Limitation Act applied and that the plaintiffs therefore bore the onus of proving that they had been in possession (actual or constructive) within 12 years before the suit, citing the Full Bench decision reported at 1934 ALJ 9731 for that proposition.
  2. The court applied the well‑established rule that possession by one co‑sharer is, in law, possession on behalf of all co‑sharers unless there has been ouster or repudiation of title brought to the knowledge of the other co‑sharers; mere non‑receipt of profits by non‑possessing co‑sharers does not establish adverse possession.
  3. With respect to the period after 1919, when the mortgagee Pancham Lal was put into possession, the court applied the principle in AIR 1932 All 393: a transferee or mortgagee stepping into the mortgagor's/co‑owner's shoes cannot, in the eyes of law, acquire more than the transferor's share, and his possession is regarded as that of a co‑sharer unless the transferee or transferor repudiated the title to the plaintiffs and that repudiation was known to them.
  4. The record did not show who placed Pancham Lal into possession in 1919 (the court presumed the mortgagors) and there was a concurrent finding of fact by the learned Judge below that the plaintiffs did not have knowledge that their shares had been mortgaged or that Pancham Lal was occupying in a manner other than as a co‑sharer. In the absence of proof of repudiation or knowledge, the mortgagee's possession could not be treated as adverse.
  5. On that basis the court concluded that the lower Appellate Court's view (which had decreed the suit in favour of certain plaintiffs on limitation grounds) was correct as to the limitation question and thus dismissed the appeal S.A. No. 624 of 1938 with costs.

On the procedural point of who may appeal and effect of an appeal by some plaintiffs (S.A. No. 685 of 1938):

  1. The District Judge addressed the contention that plaintiffs 4, 6, 7 and 8 (who had been impleaded as pro forma respondents and later sought transposition to appellants) could not have their claims allowed because they applied after the judge had delivered an in‑court ruling on the limitation point in favour of the other appellants, and that Order 1, Rule 10 CPC did not apply to such circumstances.
  2. The court examined Order 41, Rule 4 CPC, which permits one of several plaintiffs to appeal where the decree proceeds on a common ground and allows the Appellate Court to reverse or vary the decree in favour of all plaintiffs if appropriate.
  3. The court found that the decree appealed from proceeded on a common ground and that the memorandum of appeal in the lower Appellate Court had attacked the whole decree ("the claim of the plaintiffs be decreed") rather than only the claim of the original appellants. The valuation of the appeal was the same as the valuation of the suit, and the memorandum explained why the other plaintiffs had not joined earlier (they were away and had been impleaded pro forma).
  4. Given these circumstances, and because there was no suggestion that the non‑appealing plaintiffs had any fuller information about Mt. Bari Bahoo's transactions than the appealing plaintiffs, the court considered it proper to exercise the discretion under Order 41, Rule 4 CPC to decree the suit in favour of all the plaintiffs. The burden to show otherwise lay on the defendant, and no attempt had been made to discharge it.
  5. The court therefore allowed S.A. No. 685 of 1938 (setting aside the portion of the lower Appellate Court's decree adverse to appellants 5–8) and decreed the suits of all plaintiffs except plaintiff 3. The court awarded costs to the appellants in the appeal and refused leave to appeal under the Letters Patent.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • In S.A. No. 624 of 1938: The appeal is dismissed. The court upheld the lower Appellate Court's decision on the limitation issue and found that the plaintiffs had not established knowledge of repudiation or adverse possession sufficient to defeat the co‑ownership presumption during the period in question; costs were awarded against the appellants.
  • In S.A. No. 685 of 1938: The appeal is allowed (in part) and the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside quoad appellants 5 to 8. The practical result declared by the court is that the suit of all the plaintiffs except plaintiff 3 is decreed; the appellants are entitled to their costs in the appeal; leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The plaintiffs (all except plaintiff 3) succeed in the possession suit; the defendant's limitation defence failed as applied to the circumstances shown on the record. The mortgagee's possession from 1919 to 1934 did not, on the record, constitute adverse possession against the non‑possessing co‑sharers because there was no proof that repudiation or denial of title was brought to their knowledge.
  • Procedurally, the court reaffirmed that where a decree proceeds on a ground common to several plaintiffs, an appeal by some plaintiffs can be effective for all under Order 41, Rule 4 CPC, provided the appeal challenges the whole decree and the facts do not show unequal knowledge or prejudice that would make such an exercise of discretion inappropriate.
  • The opinion applies and relies upon existing authorities (as cited) to resolve both the substantive limitation question and the procedural question; the court did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond the cited authorities and their application to the facts of this case.

    Mulla Haider Husain v. Mohammad Subhan Khan

    1. These two appeals arise out; of one and the same judgment. I will first take up S.A No. 624 of 1938. The suit was for possession of 5 annas, 8 pies odd of zamindari property. The defence inter alia was that the suit was barred by limitation. Azim Ullah Khan was the original owner of a 7 annas share including the shares which are now in dispute. He died in 1892 and on his death mutation was affected in the name of his son, Bahadur Ali. Azim Ullah Khan also left four daughters. These were: (1) Mt. Aniam, plaintiff 3, (2) Mt. Mabi, deceased, whose daughter is Mt. Bahiman, plaintiff 5, (3) Mt. Ullahi Bibi, deceased, whose son and daughter are Subhan Khan and Mt. Ghafuran, plaintiffs 1 and 2 respectively, (4) Mt. Shahzadi, deceased, whose grandson is Nawab Khan, plaintiff 4. The father of this plaintiff is dead. Although Bahadur Ali had four sisters, his name alone was mutated against the property. Bahadur Ali died in 1919, leaving a widow, three sons and two daughters. The widow was Mt. Bari Bahoo, and she survived until 1930. The three sons were Sardar Ali, deceased, Kasim Ali, plaintiff 7, and Akbar Ali Khan, defendant 2, and the two daughters were Mt. Hashmat Bibi, plaintiff 6, and Mt. Habiban, plaintiff 8. On the death of Bahadur Ali, the property was mutated in the name of Mt. Bari Bahoo.

    2. In 1913 Mt. Bari Bahoo and her three sons executed a simple mortgage in favour of a man named Pancham Lal. In 1919, under an instrument executed by Mt. Bari Bahoo alone, which is not on the record and the exact nature of which is not disclosed Pancham Lal was put into possession of the property for a period of 15 years and his name was mutated. On 23rd February, 1924 Mt. Bari Bahoo and her sons Akbar Ali, defendant 2, and Sardar Ali, executed a sale deed in respect to this property in favour of defendant 1 for a consideration of Rs. 550. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the eight plaintiffs on 22nd February, 1936. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court, but the lower Appellate Court has reversed that decree and has decreed the suit of some of the plaintiffs while dismissing the claim of others. The appeal before the District Judge was actually filed by four plaintiffs only, namely plaintiffs 1, 2, 3 and 5. The other plaintiffs were impleaded as pro form respondents and during the pendency of the appeal they were transposed at their request to the array of appellants. The learned Judge has dismissed the suit as against plaintiff 3 for reasons which it is unnecessary to set out for the purposes of this appeal. He has also dismissed the suit of plaintiffs 4, 6, 7 and 8, and that part of the judgment and decree is the subject of the connected appeal (S.A No. 685 of 1938.)

    3. The decision of the appeal with which I am now dealing rests upon the question of limitation, this being the only point which has been argued before me. It is conceded by learned counsel for both parties that Article 142 of the Limitation Act, was applicable to this suit. In the plaint it was stated that the defendant-appellant obtained possession of the property in 1934, in which year it was vacated by the mortgagee in accordance with the terms of the instrument of 1919; and this fact was admitted by the defendant-appellant. The plaintiffs alleged that they had no knowledge of the sale deed of 1924 until the defendant took possession of the property in 1934, in which year they were dispossessed. There can, I think, be no doubt that in a suit to which Article 142 of the Limitation Act, applies the onus lies on the plaintiffs having established their title, to prove that they had been in possession, whether actual or constructive, within 12 years before the institution of the suit. The authority for this is the Full Bench decision in 1934 ALJ 9731

    4. Now it is a well-established proposition of law that the possession by one co-sharer is possession on behalf of all the co-sharers in the absence of ouster or repudiation of title, and the fact that the non-possessing co-sharers were not in receipt of profits will not suffice to establish adverse possession as against them. Up to the year 1919, Mt. Bari Bahoo's name alone stood against the property in the revenue records and up to that year at least no adverse possession as against the plaintiffs is established, for it is not suggested that Mt. Bari Baboo at any time up to 1919 repudiated the title of the plaintiffs and set up exclusive title in herself. The difficulty begins from 1919 when the mortgagee under the simple mortgage of 1913 was put into possession. There is nothing to show who put him into possession, but presumably it was the mortgagors, namely Mt. Bari Bahoo and her three sons. As I have already said, the mortgagee remained in possession until 1934, when the mortgage was liquidated. In AIR 1932 All 3932, the members of two branches of a Muslim family owned a certain property. The members of one branch, Ewaz Ali and others, executed a usufructuary mortgage in 1910 in favour of a certain person and in 1913 they sold the property to the mortgagee. The members of the other branoh instituted a suit in November 1924 for possession. There was a difference of opinion between Mukerji, J. and Niamatullah, J. and the matter was referred to Sulaiman, J. who agreed with the view which had been expressed by Niamatullah, J. At page 397 Niamatullah, J. observes:

    …. the transferee of a co-sharer can acquire no more than what belongs to his transferor. By the mortgage in favour of the appellants, no more than the share of Ewaz Ali and others passed to him. At the date of the mortgage his possession, in the eyes of the law and as regards title, was that of a cosharer in relation to the plaintiffs. Of course, if the fact that he claimed to be in possession in denial of the plaintiff's title was known to the plaintiffs, his possession would be adverse to them, just as the possession of his mortgagor would have been so if he had repudiated the plaintiffs' title to their knowledge. In the absence of repudiation of the plaintiff's title to their knowledge either by Ewaz Ali and others or by their mortgagees, the possession of neither can be adverse.

    5. At p. 400 Sulaiman, J. says:

    The other co-owners, if they have actually no knowledge of the extent of the share transferred, are entitled to presume that their co-owner has transferred his own interest only and that the transferee by virtue of his right to that share is enjoying possession of the whole property. The mere fact that a transferee by virtue of his right to that share is in possession would not put them on inquiry, for the transferee has just as much right to enjoy the whole property as his transferor had. The principle of law based on the mere fact of co-ownership would apply with equal force to a transferee from a co-owner, who steps into the shoes of his vendor. A co-owner has no duty cast upon him to watch the conduct of another co-owner and be on the look-out to find out the extent of the share purported to be transferred by him, and to intervene if more than the real share has been transferred. He is entitled to assume that the permissive nature of the possession has passed on to his co-owner's transferee who has now become the co-owner in place of the original co-owner. Of conrse, if the assertion of title to the whole is brought to his knowledge and it is accompanied by his ouster and exclusion, adverse possession would then commence as against him. The burden therefore would be on the transferee to establish that the denial of title and ouster were brought to the knowledge of the other oo-owner and in the absence of such proof he would not be able to perfect his adverse possession.

    6. The observations which I have cited are directly applicable to the case which is now under appeal. There is nothing to show that the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that their shares in the property left by Azim Ullah Khan had been mortgaged to Pancham Lal and that the latter was in possession otherwise than as a cosharer on behalf of all the cosharers and there is a finding of fact by the learned Judge of the Court below that such knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs has not been established. In my opinion, the view taken by the lower Appellate Court is right and I accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. I will now deal with Second Appeal No. 685 of 1938. This is an appeal by plaintiffs 4, 6, 7 and 8. They did not originally join in the appeal, but were impleaded as pro forma respondents. During the pendency of the appeal their names were transposed at their own request to the array of the appellants. The learned Judge has declined to decree their claim, and his reasons for doing so are expressed as follows:

    On 22nd December, 1937, I held in Court that the question of limitation was decided in favour of appellants 1, 2 and 4 but against appellant 3. The respondents' pleader then produced an application on which I noted to this effect on the same day. On 26th January, 1938 four other members of the appellants' family who were pro form respondents applied to me to be made appellants. On 29th January, 1938 I ordered the appeal to be amended accordingly. I continued hearing of the appeal on 16th February, 1938 and first of all took up the claim of the new appellants 5 to 8. In my opinion their claim cannot be allowed because it was made subsequent to my decision in Court that the appeal must succeed on the point of limitation in favour of appellants 1, 2 and 4. In other words appellants 5 to 8 waited until they knew that the question of limitation had been decided in favour of appellants 1, 2 and 4 before applying to be made appellants. Obviously O. 1, R. 10 of the CPC, does not apply to these circumstances.

    7. I do not think the position of plaintiffs 4, 6, 7 and 8—appellants 5 to 8—is necessarily affected by the circumstance that the learned Judge had delivered his ruling on the plea of limitation. O. 41, R. 4 of the CPC, provides:

    Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.

    8. It is true that the plaintiffs have separate interests in the property, but there can be no doubt that the decree which was appealed against proceeded on a common ground; and the memorandum of appeal in the lower Appellate Court shows that the whole decree was being appealed against. The prayer thereon was that “the claim of the plaintiffs be decreed,” not “the claim of the appellants.”

    9. The valuation of the appeal was the same as the valuation of the suit, and in para. 5 of the memorandum of appeal it was stated that the reason why the other plaintiffs had not joined in the appeal was that they were away and so they had been impleaded as pro forma respondents. In my opinion the circumstances of this case were such that it was proper for the learned Judge to exercise his discretion under O. 41, R. 4 of the CPC, and decree the suit in favour of all the plaintiffs. It is not suggested that the non-appealing plaintiffs had any fuller information about Mt. Bari Bahoo's transactions than was possessed by the appealing plaintiffs. The burden was on the defendant in this respect and no attempt has been made by his learned counsel to show that he has discharged it. The following decisions are in point: 1937 ALJ 11113 and AIR 1922 Lah 574 I allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court qucad these appellants. The result is that the suit of all the plaintiffs except plaintiff 3 is decreed. The appellants in this appeal will be entitled to their costs, throughout. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.

    D.S/R.K

    10. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Mulla Haider Husain v. Mohammad Subhan Khan
    (May 3, 1940)