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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Rule 2. Order 21, Civil P.C., and Article 174, Limitation Act,
  • Article 174, Schedule 2, Lim. Act,
  • Sub-clause (1), Rule 2, Order 21,
  • Rule 1(5), Order 21, Civil P.C.,
  • Order 21, Rule 16, Civil P.C.,
  • Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C.,
  • 590. Rule 16, Order 21
  • Rule 16, Order 21
  • Rule 2, Order 21,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Rule 2. Order 21, Civil P.C., and Article 174, Limitation Act,
  • Article 174, Schedule 2, Lim. Act,
  • Sub-clause (1), Rule 2, Order 21,
  • Rule 1(5), Order 21, Civil P.C.,
  • Order 21, Rule 16, Civil P.C.,
  • Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C.,
  • 590. Rule 16, Order 21
  • Rule 16, Order 21
  • Rule 2, Order 21,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by Murari Lai, the assignee of a decree, against an order of the Court below which held that the decree he had purchased had been satisfied by payments made by the judgment-debtors.

Background facts as stated in the opinion:

  • A partition suit was contested between Sahu Raghubir Saran and others, and Raja Ram and others.
  • On 28 February 1929 the parties compromised; one stipulation required Sahu Raghubir Saran and others to pay Rs. 5,000 to decree-holders Raja Ram, Raj Kishan and Bhagwati Sarup.
  • After the decree Bhagwati Sarup separated from the other two decree-holders. Raja Ram and Raj Kishan assigned their rights in the entire decree to Murari Lai by deed dated 23 June 1931; that deed recited that Rs. 700 had been realized and a balance remained due.
  • On 4 February 1932 Murari Lai applied to substitute his name for the original decree-holders and to recover the balance he claimed was due: Rs. 4,300 (principal) and Rs. 731 (interest).
  • The judgment-debtors resisted, asserting they had paid the entire amount to the original decree-holders; one payment was said to have been made in cash on 28 February 1929, another payment of Rs. 1,700 was alleged (date unspecified).
  • It was common ground that these alleged payments had not been certified as required by Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C.
  • The Subordinate Judge accepted the judgment-debtors' proof of payment and dismissed Murari Lai's application on the ground that the decree had been satisfied. Murari Lai appealed against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether uncertified payments or adjustments alleged to have been made to the original decree-holder can be recognized by the Court in execution proceedings where the decree has been assigned and the assignee has applied for execution under Order 21, Rule 16, Civil P.C.
  2. Whether the judgment-debtors' failure to seek certification of the alleged payments within the 90-day period prescribed by Article 174, Schedule 2, Limitation Act prevents any Court executing the decree from recognizing those payments.
  3. Whether there is any legal distinction, for purposes of execution and recognition of uncertified payments, between an application made by an original decree-holder and an application made by an assignee/transferee of the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Murari Lai)

  • The judgment-debtors did not make an application to have the alleged payments certified within 90 days as required by Article 174, Schedule 2, Limitation Act; consequently the Court below was wrong to investigate and accept their claim of payment.
  • By necessary implication, a judgment-debtor who fails to comply with the certification procedure and time-limit cannot later prove such payments in execution proceedings against an assignee.

Respondents' Arguments (Judgment-Debtors / Opposing side)

  • The respondents contended that when an assignee makes an application to the Court which passed the decree (seeking substitution and execution), the judgment-debtors may still contend that the decree has been satisfied by uncertified payments — i.e., that uncertified payments could be shown in opposition to an assignee's execution application.
  • They relied on prior authority, notably a Bombay decision (Baghunath/Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404) and some Madras High Court decisions, to support the proposition that a distinction exists between an original decree-holder's application and an assignee's application that permits such uncertified payments to be relied upon by judgment-debtors.
  • It was conceded that had there been no transfer, Article 174 would prevent recognition of uncertified payments; the contention depended on the legal effect of the transfer and the choice of forum for execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baghunath (Raghunath) Govind v. Gangaram Yesu, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404 Supported the view that a distinction exists between an application by a decree-holder and by his assignee; held that where an assignee applies, judgment-debtors may show an uncertified payment as satisfying the decree. The Court rejected the view in this Bombay decision, stating it "does not appear to be correct," and declined to follow it.
Ponnusami Nadar v. Letchmanan Chettiar (1912) 35 Mad. 659 One of two Madras rulings relied upon to support recognition of uncertified payments in certain circumstances. Referenced as part of authorities taking the view favouring recognition; the Court did not adopt this reasoning and instead followed the Full Bench later cited.
B. Bamayya v. N. Krishna Murti, A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 590 Another Madras ruling cited as supporting the permissibility of pleading uncertified adjustments in opposition to an assignee's application. Not followed; the opinion noted divergence of views in Madras decisions and preferred the Full Bench ruling that disallowed such pleadings.
Subramanyam v. Ramaswami, A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372 (Full Bench) Full Bench ruling that in an application under Order 21, Rule 16 by a transferee decree-holder, judgment-debtors could not plead an uncertified adjustment of the decree as an objection to its execution. The Court expressly followed this Full Bench decision and applied its rule: uncertified payments not certified within the procedural regime could not be recognized in execution against a transferee.
Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu (spelled earlier as Baghunath Govind), A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404 Repeated reference to the Bombay view (see first row) that permitted uncertified payments to be set up against an assignee. The Court stated that this view "does not appear to be correct" and did not follow it, preferring the Full Bench authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by close textual and purposive reading of the relevant procedural provisions and the Limitation Act:

  1. The opinion begins with Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C., which requires that where money payable under a decree is paid out of Court, the decree-holder shall certify such payment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree; the Court must record certified payments. Clause (2) allows the judgment-debtor to apply for a notice to be issued to the decree-holder to show cause why an alleged payment should not be recorded; Clause (3) provides that uncertified or unrecorded payments "shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree."
  2. Article 174, Schedule 2, Limitation Act prescribes a 90-day period within which the judgment-debtor must make an application in respect of an alleged payment. If the application is not made within 90 days, "no Court executing the decree will recognize the payments said to have been made."
  3. The appellant argued, and the Court accepted, that because the judgment-debtors did not seek certification within 90 days, the Court below erred in entertaining and accepting their plea of payment.
  4. The respondents' contrary contention rested on Rule 16, Order 21, Civil P.C., which provides that where a decree has been transferred the transferee may apply for execution to the Court which passed it, and the decree "may be executed in the manner and subject to the same conditions, as if the application were made by such decree-holder." The respondents argued that certain authorities (Bombay and some Madras decisions) permitted uncertified payments to be shown against an assignee in the circumstances of an assignee's application to the Court which passed the decree.
  5. The Court read Rule 16 as making two points clear: (a) an assignee's application to the Court which passed the decree is an application for execution, and (b) the decree is to be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by the original decree-holder. From this, the Court concluded there is to be no distinction, with respect to execution, between a decree-holder and his assignee.
  6. The Court rejected the reasoning of the Bombay decision and those authorities that would permit uncertified payments to be used against an assignee. It relied on and followed the Full Bench ruling in Subramanyam v. Ramaswami (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372), which held that in an application under Order 21, Rule 16 by a transferee the judgment-debtors could not plead an uncertified adjustment as an objection to execution.
  7. The Court emphasized the equitable point that a judgment-debtor's position should not be better against an assignee than it would have been against the original decree-holder; but where a plea (such as uncertified payment) is barred by limitation and procedural rules as against the decree-holder, it cannot be allowed against the assignee. Thus the statutory regime (Rule 2, Order 21 and Article 174, Limitation Act) bars recognition of the alleged uncertified payments in execution proceedings whether the application is by the decree-holder or his assignee.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER SET ASIDE; NAME OF MURARI LAI TO BE SUBSTITUTED AND HE MAY EXECUTE THE DECREE.

Specific directives given by the Court:

  • The order of the Court below (which had dismissed Murari Lai's application on the ground that the decree had been satisfied) is set aside.
  • Murari Lai's name is to be substituted in place of the decree-holders, and he is to be permitted to execute the decree for the amount due.
  • The alleged payments made by the judgment-debtors, which were not certified under Rule 2, Order 21 and for which no timely application under Article 174 was made, shall not be taken into consideration in the execution proceedings.
  • Costs awarded to the appellants (Murari Lai) against the judgment-debtors in both Courts.

Implications (as stated or necessarily reflected in the opinion):

  • The Court affirmed that Rule 16, Order 21 requires that an assignee's application for execution is to be treated like the application of the original decree-holder; therefore the same procedural conditions (including certification under Rule 2, Order 21) and the same limitation constraints (Article 174, Limitation Act — 90 days) apply.
  • The opinion rejects the contrary view expressed in the cited Bombay decision (A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404) and follows the Full Bench ruling in Subramanyam v. Ramaswami (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372).
  • The direct effect is limited to the parties: Murari Lai obtains substitution and the right to execute the decree; the judgment-debtors cannot rely on uncertified payments in execution proceedings because they failed to comply with Rule 2, Order 21 and Article 174. The Court did not purport to create a broader novel doctrine beyond applying and reconciling existing statutory rules and authority.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been added.

    Murari Lal v. Raghubir Saran

    1. This is an appeal by the assignee of a decree against the order passed by the Court below holding that the decree which he had purchased has been satisfied by the judgment-debtors. The facts which have given rise to this appeal put briefly are as follows : There was a partition suit fought between Sahu RaghubirSaran and others and Raja Ram and others. On 28th February 1929, the dispute between the parties was compromised, one of the stipulations being that Sahu Raghubir Saran and others would pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 to Raja Ram, Raj Kishan and Bhagwati Sarup decree-holders. It would appear that after the passing of this decree, Bhagwati Sarup separated from the other two decree-holders who were allotted the decree in question under which Sahu Raghubir Saran and others were to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000. On 23rd June 1931, Raja Ram and Raj Kishan executed a deed of assignment under which they assigned the rights in the entire decree to Murari Lai, appellant. In the deed of assignment it was stated that a sum of Rs. 700 had been realized and the balance was still due on account of the aforesaid decree. On 4th February 1932, Murari Lai made an application containing two prayers. He informed the Court that he had purchased the decree and asked that his name should be substituted in place of the names of the original decree-holders. The other prayer was that he should be allowed to recover the amount due on the decree which according to him was a sum of Rs. 4,300 on account of principal and Rs. 731 on account of interest. Sahu Raghubir Saran and others, the judgment-debtors, resisted this application on the plea that the entire amount due under this decree had been paid by them to the original decree-holders and therefore nothing was due. One of the payments is said to have been made on 28th February 1929 in cash. As regards the other payment of Rs. 1,700 we do not know the date. It is agreed between the parties that these alleged payments were not certified as they should have been under Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the payments were proved by the judgment-debtors and that it was open to them to prove the payment which had not been certified. He therefore dismissed the application of the appellant on the ground that the decree had been satisfied. The present ap-paal has been preferred by the appellant against that order. Rule 2, Order 21, relates to the payments made towards the satisfaction of decreas, Sub-clause (1), Rule 2, Order 21, says that where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court, or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, tha decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and the Court shall record the same accordingly.

    2. This is applicable to the case in which the decree-holder makes an application certifying that a payment has been made to him towards the satisfaction of a decree. In such a case there is no question of limitation. It is open to the decree, holder to make an application admitting the receipt of the amount at any time he likes. Clause (2) of this rule says that the judgment'debtor also may inform the Court of sucti payment or adjustment, and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show causa, on a day to be fixed by the Court, why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified; and if, after service of such notice, the decree-holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly.

    Clause (3) says that a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid,shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree.

    3. Article 174, Schedule 2, Lim. Act, prescribes the period within which the judgment-debtor should make his application in respect of the payment alleged to have been made towards the satisfaction of the decree. Such an application has to be made within a period of 90 days. If this is not done, no Court executing the de. cree will recognize the payments said to have been made. Of course, it is open to the judgment-debtor, if his application for recognizing the payment has been dismissed, to sue the decree-holder and to recover the amount which he may have paid. But so far as the Court executing the decree is concerned, he will not be allowed to prove that he had made a payment, if the application to that effect is not made within a period of 90 days. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued before ua that as in the present case the judgment-debtor did nob make an application asking the Court to certify the payments alleged to have been made within 90 days, the Court below was wrong in going into the question as to whether or not the payments had been made. It appears to us that this contention is correct and must therefore prevail. The other side has relied ona ruling : Baghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404. This ruling is based on the view taken by the Madras High Court in two rulings reported in, Ponnusami Nadar v. Letchmanan Chettiar (1912) 35 Mad. 659 and B. Bamayya v. N. Krishna Murti A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 590. Rule 16, Order 21 enacts that where a decree has been transferred, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it or the decree may be executed in the manner and subject to the same conditions, as if the application were, made by such decree-holder.

    4. It appears to us that the plain meaning of the language of Rule 16 is that there is no difference between the person who has obtained the decree and his transferee so far as the execution of the decree is concerned. Where a transfer has been made, the transferee has to make, his application to the Court which passed the decree and not to the Court which may be executing it. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that this makes a difference. It is conceded that if there had been no transfer of the decree, then the Court could not have permitted proof of those payments because of Article 174 Schedule 2, Lim. Act. But it is contended that when an assignee makes an application to the Court which passed the decree, asking that he should be permitted to execute his decree on the ground that it has been assigned to him, then it is open to the judgment-debtors to contend that the decree had been satisfied, though the payment may not have been certified as provided for under Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C. This view found favour in the three cases cited above. It has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the matter was re-considered quite recently in a Full Bench ruling reported in Subramanyam v. Ramaswami A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372. It was there held that in an application under Order 21, Rule 16, Civil P.C., by a transferee decree-holder, the judgment-debtors-could not plead an uncertified adjustment of the decree as an objection to its execution. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents was also raised in that ruling, but it did not find favour with the Full Bench which decided that case. A perusal of this case reported inSubramanyam v. Bamaswami A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372 would show that on the question which we are considering, there waa considerable divergence of opinion between the Judges of the Madras High Court. Some of the Judges took the view that where a transferee wishes to execute the decree and makes an application to the Court which passed it, then it is open to the judgment.debtor to plead payments not. withstanding the fact that they were not certified, while others took a different view and held that such payments could not be recognized even in cases where an application for execution has been made by a transferee. The Full Benoh case reported in Subramanyam v. Bamaswami A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372 was one in which the decree had been transferred to another Court and the application for execution was made by the transferee for execution to that very Court. The facts in the case before us are the same. The learned Judges held that an application made by the transferee in these circumstances was an application for execution of a decree and therefore all Hie rules relating to certification of payment were applicable to the case. The Bombay decision reported in Baghunath (lovind v. Gangaram Yesu A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372 proceeds on the view that there is a difference where a decree-holder himself applies for execution as distinguished from an application made by a transferee and holds that where an assignee of the decree.holder applies under Rule 1(5), Order 21, Civil P.C., then it is open to the judgment-debtors to show that an uncertified payment satisfied the de-croe. The reason given is that in one ciise an application for adjustment is made to the Court executing the decree while in the other an application is made not to tfio Court which is executing the decree, but to the Court which passed the decree. With the utmost possible respect we find it difficult to follow the reasoning of the iojtrnod Judges. Rule 16, Order 21 relates to oxooution of decrees by assignees. The rulu enacts that a transferee may apply for the execution of the decree to the Court which passed it and the recrod may be executed in the same manner and Hubjijot to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holders.

    5. A perusal of Rule 16 makes two points per. fectly clear. The first is that when an assignee makes an application to the Court which passed the decree his application is one for execution. The second and the most important point is that the decrees are to be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder.

    6. This makes it perfectly clear that there is to be no distinction, so far as execution is concerned, between a case where the decree holder applies and a case in which an assignee makes such an application. The view taken by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court is opposed fco the rule laid down in Rule 16 that a decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same condition as it the application were made by such decree-holder.

    7. In our opinion, the rule lays down that the assignee is entitled to execute his decree in the same manner as the decree-holder and judgment-debtors are entitled to enforce the equities which they could have enforced as against the decree-holder. If the judgment-debtors could have proved a payment as against the decree-holder, then they can equally do so as against the assignee. But no plea which is not available to them against the decree.holder can be set up by them against the assignee. There is no warrant for saying that a transfer by the decree-holder can in any manner improve the position of the judgment.debtors. If they could not prove a payment as against the decree-holder because of the Law of Limitation, it is not easy to understand why they should be allowed to do so as against his transferee. There is one other aspect of the case to be considered. Rule 2, Order 21, Civil P.C., does not refer to a Court executing the decree, but refers to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. There are cases in which the decree holder has not applied for execution. If payment is made before such execution has been asked for, then the application to have it certified has to be made to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. Similarly an application by the assignee has to be made to the same Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. Why in one case the Court must decline to hear the plea, if the payment is not certified, while in the other it should have such power, is not easy to understand. All that the judgment-debtor is entitled to ask the Court is that his position should not be worse than it would have bean if the original decree-holder had been applying for execution. But there can be no other equity in his favour. We are clearly of opinion that having regard to the provisions of Rule 2. Order 21, Civil P.C., and Article 174, Limitation Act, it is not open to a judgment-debtor to prove adjustment or satisfaction, if he did not take stepa to have the same certified within a Iperiod of 90 days from the date on which the alleged payment or adjustment was made. This rule would apply whether the payment pleaded is sought to be proved against the decree-holder or hia assignee. The view taken in Raghunath Govind v. Gangaram Yesu A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 404 does not appear to be correct. We follow the Full Bench ruling reported in Subramanyam v. Ramaswami A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 372.

    8. For the above reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the Court below and direct that the name of Murari Lai, appellant, be substituted iu place of the decree-holders and that he be allowed to execute the decree for the amount due on it. The payments alleged to have been made by the judgment-debtors will not be taken into consideration in the execution proceedings. The appellants will get their costs from the judgment-debtors respondents in both the Courts.

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    Comments

    Murari Lal v. Raghubir Saran
    (Nov 27, 1933)