Sulaiman, C.J:— This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The plaintiff alleged that the parties were married in 1923 and the defendant No. 1 was sent to the plaintiff's house in October, 1926, and began to live with him as his wife and gave birth to a daughter; but that about two years ago the other defendants took her away from the plaintiff's house to their own house for a week under the pretext of attending a ceremony; that, when after the expiry of the week, the plaintiff went to bring his wife, the defendants made excuses and ultimately refused to send her, although they sent the plaintiff's daughter to the plaintiff's house. He accordingly prayed that the defendant should be ordered to come to the plaintiff's house and that a perpetual injunction should be granted against the other defendants from interfering with the defendant No. 1's returning to the plaintiff's house.
The defendant No. 1 in her written statement asserted that the plaintiff became immoral and contracted illicit connection with one Mst. Hibia who was kept in the same house and at her instigation the plaintiff began to ill-treat the defendant and ultimately turned her out of his house. She did not admit the paragraph containing the allegation that the daughter was sent to the plaintiff's house afterwards. She pleaded that when the plaintiff neglected her and did not pay her dower debt, she was obliged to file a suit to recover Rs. 15,000 as her prompt dower and that the plaintiff's suit was filed by way of reply to her suit. She pleaded that so long as the plaintiff does not pay the prompt dower due to the defendant, he is not competent to maintain the suit, and she also urged that the suit should be dismissed on the ground of the plaintiff's cruel acts in ill-treating her and in contracting illicit connection with Mst. Hibia, and that the defendant's refusal to go to his house is through fear of life and honour. She admitted that she was staying away from the plaintiff's house at her own instance and no other defendant is exercising any influence over her. The other defendants denied that they were in any way preventing the defendant from going to the plaintiff's house.
The learned Subordinate Judge framed four issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff had been guilty of cruelty towards the defendant? (2) Whether any prompt down was due to the defendant, and if so, can the plaintiff get a decree without paying it? (3) Whether the plaintiff has any cause of action against the other defendants? (4) To what relief was the plaintiff entitled and against whom? He decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and decreed the claim. All the defendants have accordingly appealed.
It may be here stated that the suit for dower brought by the defendant against the plaintiff succeeded in the court below and the defendant, in spite of contest, obtained a decree for Rs. 15,000, which decree has become final. Thus neither the amount of the dower debt due to the defendant nor the fact that it has not been paid is now in question.
The learned Subordinate Judge, relying very properly on certain reported rulings of this Court, hag held that after the consummation of her marriage the defendant's right to resist the claim for restitution of conjugal rights was destroyed. Finding that legal cruelty was not established, he has decreed the suit. He does not appear to have considered whether apart from legal cruelty there are any circumstances justifying the passing of a decree conditional on the payment of the dower debt.
I propose to consider first of all the question whether under the Muhammadan law the right of a wife to insist on the payment of the prompt portion of her dower subsists even after consummation of marriage.
The leading case of this Court is undoubtedly that of Abdul Kadir v. Salima. The judgment of Mahmood, J., was adopted by the Full Bench. It has since been regarded as a detailed survey of the Muhammadan law with particular reference to the points noted on page 154, viz., (1) the exact nature and effect of marriage upon the contracting parties; (2) tile exact nature of the liability of the husband to pay the dower; (3) the matrimonial rights of the parties as to conjugal cohabitation; and (4) the rules of general law as to the decree of the court in such cases. But the only point that had been referred to the Full Bench for an answer was “Whether under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff had the right to maintain the suit.” In that case the dower debt had not been paid before the suit for restitution of conjugal rights, though the marriage had been consummated, but the amount was tendered in the trial court. That court held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed in his claim for bringing his wife to his house. On appeal, the District Judge accepted the defendant's contention that the payment into court after the institution of the suit was insufficient because the husband had no cause of action when he brought the suit, and it was on this ground that he dismissed the suit in toto. The main point which was for consideration before the Full Bench was, therefore, whether the non-payment of the dower before the institution of the suit was fatal to the suit because without such payment there was no cause of action for suing for restitution of conjugal rights. The opinion of the court was that it is not correct to say that there was no cause of action and that non-payment of the dower before the suit was not a fatal defect. That opinion is binding upon us. I am not aware that this view has ever been questioned in any other court.
But although we are bound to respect the expression of opinion on the other points mentioned in the judgment of that learned Judge, some of the observations made by him are obviously in the nature of obiter dicta which he had to make when surveying the whole law. It is, therefore, not possible for one to hold oneself bound by all the observations that have been made or all the opinions expressed in connection with all the four fields of inquiry enumerated by the learned Judge at the outset. Nor would it be convenient to refer to a Full Bench of five or more Judges whenever any observation made therein is called into question. Much less would such a course be necessary if the observation of the learned Judge is followed, though the reasoning on which it is based is not accepted.
Now at page 166 it was observed: “I take it as a general rule of interpreting that law, that whenever there is a difference of opinion, the opinion of the two” (out of the three Masters, namely, Imam Abu Hanifa and his two disciples) “will prevail against the opinion of the third.” A similar observation was made by the same learned Judge in Agha Ali Khan v. Altaf Hasan Khan. I do not think that the learned Judge meant to lay down any inflexible rule which would have universal application. Presumably, what he meant was that ordinarily the opinion of the majority has been accepted. But it would be easy to cite instances in which the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa alone has prevailed, particularly in matters of prayer and ritual, or of Imam Yusuf in matters of worldly affairs, or of Imam Muhammad in matters of inheritance. There appears to be no such invariable rule which would make the decision depend on the majority of votes only.
Mr. Ameer Ali in his Mahommedan Law, volume II, 5th edition, chapter XII, section III, page 460 has pointed out that there is no such fixed rule, as over and over again the opinion of only one has been adopted for fatwas and decrees. In volume I, at pages 16-17, he has quoted Hamadia, Jamaa-ul Fusalain and Kazi Khan for the proposition that the joint opinion of the two disciples can be preferred to that of Imam Abu Hanifa if the difference is due to a change of circumstances and alterations in the conditions of mankind.
The learned advocate for the appellants has adopted as part of his argument a well known judgment of 1891 delivered by Maulvi Sami Ullah, District Judge of Rae Bareli, in which original authorities were quoted to challenge the opinion of Mahmood, J., both as regards this rule of preference and also the distinction of the right of the wife whose prompt dower remains unpaid to resist restitution of conjugal rights even after consummation. This judgment has been referred to by Mr. Ameer Ali as well as Sir Roland Wilson in their learned treatises. These authorities were subsequently incorporated in the judgment of an Oudh Bench in Wajid Ali Khan v. Sakhawat Ali Khan. On pages 144-7 of the report in that case some of the texts have been reproduced to show that, even in the case of a difference, the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa is to be preferred. Of course, there is no such general rule either. As a matter of fact, there does not appear to be any fixed rule: See Irfan Ali v. Bhagwant Kishore(2). Different doctors have followed different rules of preference. Those who were more orthodox and, generally speaking, more ancient, in many cases preferred the solitary opinion of Abu Hanifa to even the joint opinion of his disciples. There are later text-book writers who have preferred the opinion of two as against that of one. But such rules are helpful only when there is no clear consensus. In the early days when new points arose and the decision had to depend on an inference drawn from other fatwas or from analogy, it was open to the learned doctors to prefer one opinion over the other which they considered more correct and consonant with the other principles, inasmuch as the three Imams were not law givers but merely interpreters of the law. But if one finds a question well threshed, out and in later centuries a particular interpretation adopted by the leading doctors and text-book writers, it would not be proper for us in the twentieth century to go behind such a consensus of opinion and decide a point contrary to such opinion, on the ground that the majority of the three Imams favoured that view in the earlier centuries. Such a course of action would unsettle the Muhammadan law. Rules of preference were for the guidance of ancient jurists, and they are of no help when there is a clear preponderance of authority in support of one view. It would be ton late now to resort to such rules in support of a new conception as to how a point ought to have been decided, though contrary to accepted opinion. Maulvi Abdul Hai of Lucknow, the most renowned and learned Hanafi jurist of his time, has in his Introduction to Sharah Wiqavah dealt with this matter at considerable length. A good deal of that matter is to be found in Radd-ul-Muhtar summarized in Sir Abdur Rahim's Muhammadan Jurisprudence at pages 187-8, which can be conveniently referred to. He has rightly pointed out that there is no accepted rule that when there is a difference of opinion amongst the founders of schools and their disciples, opinion or ruling of a lawyer ought to be given according to the opinion of Abu Hanifa, even if all his disciples differ from him; and in the absence of any dictum of his in accordance with the opinion of Abu Yusuf, then Muhammad, then Zufar and then Hasan Ibn Ziyad. If the authorities were examined it will generally be found that in some matters the solitary view of Abu Hanifa has been preferred whereas in other matters the view of Abu Yusuf, Muhammad or Zufar has been followed. According to Al-Hawi the correct rule was that in cases of difference of opinion regard should be had to the authority and reasons in support of each view and the one which has the strongest support should be followed. “But according to the modern interpretation of Taqlid as above stated a lawyer of the present day should, in such cases, accept the view which according to the jurists of the fourth, fifth, and sixth degrees is correct and has been acted upon. But if in any case the later doctors have not adopted in clear language any one of the conflicting opinions, the law is to be ascertained by proceeding on the view which is most in accord with the habits and affairs of men.” (p. 188).
The Radd-ul-Mubtar, volume I, page 73, states that if on any matter no clear answer from any one of the early jurists were to exist, and the later doctors have one opinion, then that should be adopted; but if they differ, then the view of the majority of those on whom well known doctors like Abu Hafs, Abu Jafar, Abul Lais, Tahawi and others have relied should be accepted. And if a clear answer wire not to exist from any one of these later jurists, then the Mufti should consider the question carefully and try his best to arrive at a correct conclusion so that he may be relieved of the charge of not having considered it fully.
It would follow that if jurists of the first rank have differed among themselves but the jurists of the second, third and fourth ranks have followed the opinion of one of them, it would not be proper in later times to go behind the opinion of these later jurists and prefer the opinion of the majority of the jurists of the first rank which has been discarded by those of subsequent periods.
The proper course undoubtedly is to abide by the opinions which have been adhered to in the commentaries which are of recognized authority in India and not to decide the point on any general rule of interpretation based on the majority of votes of the ancient jurists.
Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindanim v. Koolsom Beebee, remarked: “But it would be wrong for the courts on a point of this kind” (the right of the widow to inherit) “to attempt to put their own construction on the Quran in opposition to the express ruling of commentators of such, great antiquity and high authority” (as the Hedaya and the Fatawa Alamgiri). It is the practice of the great commentators to state the difference of opinion which at one time prevailed on a particular point and then to add on which view is the fatwa, or which is the more correct or stronger view, or to use other expressions of like import. But where the learned commentators content themselves with a mere statement of the conflict or opinion without expressing any definite opinion of their own in favour of one or the other view and without saying anything about the consensus of opinion or the fatwa being in accordance with a particular view, they imply that the conflict of opinion was still continuing and that no unanimity or general concurrence had till then been obtained. This would have the effect of leaving the question open. The Qazi would then be free to choose whichever of the two opinions appears to him to be the sounder and better adapted to the conditions and the needs of the times.
The Radd-ul-Muhtar, volume I, page 80, when reproducing the text of the Durr-ul-Mnkbtar has quoted from Quduri as follows: “And if you said that they (jurists) have sometimes quoted several opinions without giving preference and have differed as to their correctness: Then I would say that we should act as they, having regard to the change in the habits and conditions of men, did what was more convenient, practicable and better. And people who can discriminate are not extinct. This is a fact and not an imagination. But those who cannot discriminate should refer to those who can, so that they will be free from responsibility.”
Now before Mahmood, J., in the case of Abdul Kadir v. Salima, no texts other than those of Durr-ul-Mukhtar, Fatawa Alamgiri (and possibly Hedaya) which all state the conflict of opinion, without saying which view should be preferred were cited. The learned Judge accordingly felt compelled to make a deduction from certain principles governing sale of goods, and applying them to the contract of marriage observed, at page 167 of the judgment in Abdul Kadir's case, “after consummation of marriage, non-payment of dower, even though exigible, cannoli be pleaded in defence of an action for restitution of conjugal rights; the rule so laid down having, of course, no effect upon the right of the wife to claim her dower in a separate action”.
If the observation was intended to mean that the plea of non-payment of dower would not result in the dismissal of the suit, it has never been questioned. If it was intended to lay down that under the Muhammadan law the right to demand payment of dower before restitution of conjugal rights is destroyed completely after the marriage has once been consummated, then it was an obiter dictum in that case and though it must be treated with all respect it may not be of binding authority. That it was an obiter dictum is apparent from the very next sentence which is to the effect: “But the rule enunciated by me need not be applied in its fullest extent to the present case, because, etc.” The line of reasoning based on the analogy of sale has naturally been very severely criticised at pages 148-9 in Wajid Ali Khan's case by the Oudh Bench, and so also by Mr. Ameer Ali in his Mahommedan Law, volume II, pages 459-60. No doubt the Muslim commentators have, by way of illustration, applied certain principles governing a contract of sale of goods to the contract of marriage, but that was by way of analogy only. The similarity cannot be pushed too far, nor can the principles governing the sale of goods be applied in all their details. Indeed, if one were to pursue the analogy far enough there would be a reductio ad absurdum. The contract of sale of goods can be cancelled if a portion of the price has not been paid. Even if the goods have been once delivered they may in such an event be returned. But if consummation of marriage has taken place and a part of the dower remains unpaid, it would be absurd to suppose that the marriage could be cancelled by the wife at her will. Similarly, I do not think that the learned Judge, when he referred to the right of stoppage in transitu at page 166, at all intended to apply that rule to the restitution of conjugal rights. Such a right is exercised when the goods are in the possession of a carrier or agent and are in the course of transit, when the original owner of the goods has only a constructive and not actual possession. That doctrine can, by no stretch of the imagination, be applied to the refusal of the wife to go to her husband, as there can be no question of transit or carrier at all.
It is quite obvious that the analogy of sales cannot be carried too far. The marriage cannot be regarded as purely a sale of the person by the wife in consideration nor the payment of dower and even if such a grotesque analogy were to be carried to its fullest extent, it would not necessarily result in support of the observation made in Abdul Kadir's case. The answer will depend on whether the dower is the consideration for the first consummation of marriage only or whether it is the consideration for the society of the wife during the married life. The mere fact that the whole dower becomes due after consummation is no conclusive ground for holding that the dower is consideration only for the first consummation. The lien on goods sold may be lost when possession is lost, but that lien is revived when possession is again recovered. Again, if part of the goods have been delivered and part of it is still retained, the lien on the part retained continues. It may therefore be well argued that if the wife after the consummation returns to her own house she can still resist restitution of conjugal eights so long as her dower is not paid, because her right has been revived after the cohabitation ceased. It may also be pointed out that a prompt dower does not become payable unless a demand is made. Prompt dower is dower payable on demand. It follows that no demand might have teen made, and in most cases it is not made before the consummation of marriage. The consent of the wife before her dower became due should logically not destroy her right to recover her dower after it has become due, though previous to it consummation had taken place. She should have the right to insist upon its payment before further cohabitation. I have not mentioned these points in order to base any conclusion on the analogy of sales, but merely to emphasise that the analogy cannot be carried too far, and even if carried very far, it does not necessarily clinch the matter. It may not be out of place to mention here that Maulvi Samiullah collected some authorities showing that a marriage is not regarded as a mere civil contract, but as a religious sacrament.
The original authorities on the main question before us may be grouped under three heads. For the sake of brevity I am not quoting the original texts or their translations if they have already appeared in the reported judgment of Wajid Ali Khan v. Sokhawat Ali Khan
Under the first head come some of the ancient textbooks called Matan. These are very terse and concise and generally state the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa on this point without even mentioning the difference of opinion between him and his two disciples and consequently without saying which opinion is to be preferred. These are (1) The Bedaya, (2) The Tanvirul Absar, (3) The Kanz-ud-Dakaik and (4) The Waqayatar-Rewaya. These are all quoted in Wajid Ali Khan's case. No doubt in the early days there was a recognized rule that the texts should be preferred to commentaries and that commentaries should be preferred to collections of fatawas; but when centuries passed, the consensus of opinion, of jurists and doctors was often found to be contrary to some of the ancient texts. Accordingly the commentaries which stated both the opinions and then preferred one over the other on the strength either of reason or ijma gained greater strength. So much so that in later centuries the ancient text-books or matan came to be regarded as elementary treatises in which the law is only concisely and tersely laid down and the statement of the law contained therein required further explanation. The Kanz-ud-Dakaik (though of much later date) is particularly a book of this description, as it is extremely concise. This matter is discussed at length in Radd-ul-Muhtar, a reference to which is also found in Sir Abdur Rahim's Muhammadan Jurisprudence on pages 189-190. The author of Radd-ul-Muhtar goes so far as to suggest that even the Durr-ul-Mukhtar on which he was writing his commentary should not be readily accepted on account of its brevity.
Under the second group may be put the great commentaries which discuss the law, state the difference of opinion and do not clearly indicate a preference for one view and so in a way leave the point open.
(1) The Hedaya, which is the commentary on the Bedaya by the same author, first quotes the text of the Bedaya and then notes the difference of opinion between the Imam and his disciples, but omits to say which of the two should be preferred. (Hamilton's Translation, volume I, book II, chapter III, page 52).
(2) The Durr-ul-Mukhtar which is the commentary on the Tanvir-ul-Absar quotes the text of Tanvir-ul-Absar and comments on it, giving some reasons. It does not in express terms state its own opinion as to what is to happen if consummation has taken place, but by implication it adopts the text, particularly as it does not even mention the difference of opinion between the Imam and the disciples. In Wajid Ali Khan's case the text of Tanvir-ul-Absar has been correctly quoted, but there has been a little confusion is quoting the text of the Durr-ul-Mukhtar. What has been quoted includes again the words of the text of Tanvir-ul-Absar interspersed with the comments of the author of the Durr-ul-Mukhtar. The author merely attempts to explain the obscure words. He does not purport to discuss them.
(3) The Bahr-ur-Raik which is an elaborate commentary on the Kanz-ud-Dakaik (volume 3, at page 191, Egyptian edition) quotes the difference of opinion, but does not clearly express the view that the opinion of the disciple is to be preferred. But on page 192 it quotes Bazdavi, who attained the position of a mujtahid of the third rank (Sir Abdur Rahim's Muhammadan Jurisprudence, page 183), to the effect that Abul Qasim Saffar gave fatwa against the right of the wife to resist restitution after consummation and says that Bazdavi considered that opinion to be good.
(4) The Shara Wiqaya, which is a commentary on the Waqayatar-Rewaya, quotes the text on which it comments, and then just mentions the difference of opinion, but omits to express any preference of its own.
(5) The author of Fath-ul-Qadir, which in its turn is a great commentary on the Hedaya, also states the difference of opinion, but omits to give his own opinion as to which view should be preferred Although it is an exhaustive commentary, it deals with this point rather briefly, and does not even refer to Saffar or Bazdavi.
(6) Tahtawi, a great commentary on the Durr-ul-Mukhtar, also quotes the difference of opinion and refers to the fatwa of Saffar, and says that Bazdavi considered it better, but does not express its own preference (Book on Marriage, chapter on Dower, page 99, Calcutta edition).
(7) The author of the Radd-ul-Muhtar (more commonly known after its author Shami), another and more exhaustive commentary on the Durr-ul-Mukhtar, curiously enough deals with the matter briefly, gives the difference of opinion between the Imam and the disciples, without mentioning Saffar or Bazdavi. He does not state his own conclusion as to which of the two opinions should be preferred.
(8) Under this category I may also mention the following fatawas in particular: (i) Fatawa Kazi Khan. It quotes the difference of opinion, but omits to express any preference (15 Oudh Cases, at page 134); (ii) Fatawa Alamgiri. Baillie's Muhammadan Law, volume I, page 125 gives a correct translation of the relevant passage in the fatawa except perhaps the last sentence in which the original word “Ba'z” has been translated as ‘several’, though it would be more correct to say ‘some’; but here, too, after quoting the practice of Shaik-us-Saffar, the compilers omit to add on which view the fatawa should he given.
Other ancienttext-books like Qaduri do not refer to the difference of opinion at all.
In the third group may be placed some books which prefer the opinion of the disciples. I am not quoting them as books of overriding authority but merely to point out that the fatawas have not been all one way.
(1) Fataawa Ghiyasia (chapter on marriage, page 65, line 19, Egyptian edition) says: “If a wife were to submit her person without obtaining her dower and then wish to refuse to cohabit with him until she recover her dower when he has cohabited with her, then in this there is a well known difference. But the opinion to be adopted is that she has not this right, but she can demand from her husband the prompt dower.”
(2) The Jami-ul-Rurouz which is a commentary on Mukhtasar-ul-Waqayah by Sadrus-Sharava, says (volume II, page 211, Nawal Kishore edition): “And Abul Qasim-us-Saffar gave fatawa on the absence of the right to refuse cohabitation, and according to his (Imam's) opinion on the right to refuse to go out on journey, and on this is the fatawa as is mentioned in the Haqaiq.” It is possible to urge that the language of the text is capable of the interpretation that “this” refers only to the refusal to go out on journey.
(3) Fatawa Himadya quotes Umdatul Fatawa which does not refer to the case of consummation. Similarly, the quotation from Fatawa Mufti has no reference to consummation (see, 15 Oudh Cases, page 135). The learned Judges of Oudh thought that Himadya quotes a passage from Tahzib which states that “although she has once cohabited willingly with her husband, she has a right of refusal contrary to the view of the Sahabain”. But the learned Judges seem to have overlooked that the passage goes on to refer to the opinion of Qasim Saffar and then the opinion of the author of Tahzib is stated in the following terms: “The approved view according to me is that the wife possesses the right of refusal if there has been ill-treatment on the part of the husband, and if it be the fault of the wife, then she has no such right.”
It would, therefore, follow that the Tahzib is against there being any absolute right of refusal in the wife. On the other hand, she is given that right only when the husband has been ill-treating her. This might be a very commonsense view to take, but there does not appear to be any further support for it. But in any case Tahzib cannot be cited as an authority in favour of the wife's right. If anything, it is an authority against such right.
(4) In this connection I ought to mention Fatawa Maul and Abdul Hai, who was undoubtedly the most learned Hanafi doctor in India in his time. His fatawas cannot be put on a par with the recognized commentaries or fatawas. I propose to cite his fatawa in order to show the trend of opinion that has prevailed in this country. His fatawas are even now freely referred to and relied upon by Maulvis when easy access to the original authorities in Arabic is not to be had.
Fatawa No. 197 (1296 A.H corresponding to 1878) volume I, page 240, is particularly important. It may be briefly summarised as follows:
A Sunni woman, Hinda, was married to a Shia husband. Zaid, and the marriage was performed according to the Shia form. After having cohabited and lived with her husband for some days, Hindu returned to her mother's house with her husband's permission and then remained there demanding her prompt dower. Zaid feared that she might become immoral. The question put to the Maulana was whether Zaid could, according to his religion, bring her to his house without payment of prompt dower in accordance with the opinion expressed in the Shia text-book, Sharay-ul-Islam, although according to the Hedaya there appeared to be some difference of opinion. The answer was that the husband can take away the wife without payment of her dower debt, and for authority Bahr-ur-Raiq was cited which quotes the opinion of Bazdavi who referred to the fatwa of Abu I Qasim Saffar.
It thus appears that the older text-books no doubt preferred the opinion of Abu Hanifa as against those of his disciples, so much so that they did not even care to mention the difference of opinion: but the later commentators pointed out that the disciples had differed from the opinion and also noticed that jurists like Bazdavi and Saffar had not followed Abu Hanifa strictly but these commentators omitted to express their own definite opinion as to which view should be preferred. On the other hand there are, at any rate, some authorities which definitely preferred the opinion of the disciples to that of Imam Abu Hanifa. It is obvious that though in the earlier centuries the view of Abu Hanifa was generally accepted, the divergence from it became more pronounced in later times. Even down to the time of Aurangzeb in India, when the Fatawa Alamgiri was compiled, the conflict of opinion continued and no definite consensus of opinion seems to have been reached, otherwise it was most probable that the approved opinion would have been mentioned.
This being the state of the authorities, the question is whether the obiter dictum of Mahmood, J., which has been accepted by so many other High Courts, is to be followed.
Had I been sitting as a Judge in the times of the East India Company, I might then possibly have been inclined to prefer the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa, because although a conflict ensued afterwards no eminent commentator expressly dissented from that view. But if another Judge had been prepared to take the contrary view, I would not have been in a position to say that he was necessarily wrong. The two considerations which might well justify the acceptance of the view of the disciples in India are: First, that owing to the prevalent practice, the amounts of dower fixed in this country are often unduly high and beyond the means of the husband. To allow to the wife the right of refusing to live with her husband, even after consummation, so long as any part of the prompt dower remains unpaid would, in many cases, where the husband and wife quarrel, amount to an absolute option to the wife to refuse to live with her husband and yet demand a maintenance allowance. This would dislocate domestic life. Secondly, as will be shown hereinafter, under the Anglo-Muhammadan law as administered in this country a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, though brought for the enforcement of a right under the Muhammadan law, is in the nature of a suit for specific performance, and there is accordingly a certain amount of discretion in the courts of justice which can impose a condition of previous payment of the dower debt, or, at any rate, a portion of it, in the decree.
And now the position is still stronger. For nearly 40 years the observation of Mahmood, J., even though an obiter dictum, has been accepted in this Court, and indeed it has been followed by all the other High Courts excepting Oudh: Kunhi v. Moidin; Hamidunnessa Bibi v. Zohimddin Sheikh; Bai Hansa v. Abdulla Mustafa(3); Ashia Khatoon v. Abdul Hakim Maistry(4) and Mst. Saleh Bibi v. Rafi-uddin(5).
In the case of Abdul Karim Khan v. Mst. Chhoti a learned Judge of this Court followed an earlier decision in the case of Wilayat Husain v. Allah Rakhi, which had been overruled by the Full Bench. But apparently the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the observation in the Full Bench case as there is no reference to it in his judgment. On the other hand, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hijaban v. Ali Sher Khan adhered to the view expressed in Abdul Kadir's case.
Numerous cases must have been decided, though not reported, on the assumption that the view of the disciples is to he preferred. When the law has been interpreted in a particular way, it may well be that in some cases the law governing the rights of the parties to a marriage was implied as a part of the terms of the contract of marriage.
No doubt, in Oudh, a Bench of that court has taken a contrary view, but the Oudh Court was not bound to follow the opinion expressed by the Full Bench of this Court; and further, in Oudh, the difficulty of a wife insisting on the previous payment of an unreasonably high dower, which is beyond the means of her husband, does not at all arise, for under section 5 of the Oudh Laws Act the courts of Oudh have power to reduce the amount of the dower debt if it is “excessive with reference to the means of the husband”, though in fact agreed upon. It also appears that; the authorities placed before the Oudh Court were those quoted in the judgment of Maulvi Sami Ullah and were all one way. The authorities in support of the contrary view were apparently not cited before them. Nor is it clear that the effect of the point having been 1 eft open in the] later commentaries was put prominently before the learned Judges.
It is true that in the other High Courts the question has not been re-examined in the light of the original authorities, but the observation of Mahmood, J., has been simply followed. It is also true that a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hamidunnessa Bibi's case, one member of which, Petheram, C.J, had been a party to the Fuji Bench of Allahabad in Abdul Kadir's case, thought that according to the Fatawa Alamgiri the practice of the later jurists was to follow the two disciples; whereas, in point of fact, the Fatawa Alamgiri also in one sense leaves the matter open. But the fact remains that throughout India, excluding Oudh, the same view has prevailed for several decades.
I therefore consider that it would now be dangerous to go back upon this course of decisions and not to adhere to the well recognized principle of stare decisis, particularly when at the time when Mahmood, J., made his observation it was to some extent open to him to prefer the view of the disciples.
In this view of the matter, I hold that the rule laid down in Abdul Kadirs case, though an obiter dictum, must be followed even though the analogy of sale may not be accepted. It may be re-stated as follows:
The absolute right of a wife to insist on the payment of the whole of the prompt portion of her dower before restitution of conjugal rights (except when the husband wants to take her out on a journey to another town) is lost after the consummation of the marriage, unless the consummation took place when she was a minor or of insane mind so as to be incapable of giving consent.
Just as we respect the observation made as regards the loss of the right of the wife on consummation, even though it be an obiter dictum, we must in the same way respect the other observation—though an equal obiter dictum.—made in Abdul Kadir's case that “Courts of justice in India, in the exercise of their mixed jurisdiction as courts of equity and law, are at full liberty to pass conditional decrees to suit the exigencies of each particular case.” (page 169). Mahmood, J., undoubtedly held that the loss of the absolute right of the wife to resist the claim for restitution of conjugal rights did not prevent the court from making the previous payment of the dower debt a condition precedent to the execution of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. At page 157 it was observed: “That the latter right” (the right of dower) “may modify and affect the former” (right of cohabitation) “cannot be doubted: how it affects and modifies it is the main subject of this reference.” The observation at page 160 shows that the contention for the wife was that the right of cohabitation does not accrue to the husband at all until he has paid the prompt dower. The observation at page 160 has already been quoted. At page 170 it was stated: “It is one thing to say that such a defence may be set up under certain conditions; it is a totally different thing to say that until the dower was paid no cause of action could accrue to the plaintiff. The payment of dower not being a condition precedent to the vesting of the right of cohabitation, a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, whether by the husband or by the wife, would be maintainable upon refusal by the other to cohabit with him or her; and in the case of a suit by the husband, the defence of payment of dower could, at its best, operate in modification of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights by rendering the enforcement of it conditional upon payment of so much of the dower as may be regarded to be prompt.” Similarly at page 171 the conclusion was: “So that, pushing the analogy of the law of sale to its fullest extent, the right of a Muhammadan wife to her dower is at best a lien upon his right to claim cohabitation, and I am unaware of any rule of Muhammadan law which would render such lien capable of being pleaded so as to defeat altogether the suit for restitution of conjugal rights.’
It is thus clear that the learned Judge was prepared to make the decree for restitution of conjugal rights conditional upon the payment of the dower debt. This, for all practical purposes, would amount to upholding the right of the widow to claim her dower, even though consummation of marriage has taken place, the only difference being that the power of the court to impose such terms is held to be based on the general rules of justice, equity and good conscience and not on the strict principles of the Muhammadan law as now interpreted.
This view was accepted by the Punjab Chief Court in the case of Mst. Saleh Bibi v. Rafi Uddin; and the passing of a conditional decree was approved by a Bench of this Court in the case of Hijdban v. Ali Sher Khan. No doubt no conditional decree was passed in the case of Kunhi v. Moidin nor in the case of Hamidunnessa Bibi v. Zohiruddin Sheik. But the point does not appear to have been raised in those cases. Nawab Wazir Jahan Begam v. Nawab Haidar Raza Khan was apparently a Shia case.
It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the husband has a substantive right to claim restitution of Conjugal rights after consummation, even though the dower has not been paid. It is said that this right is not a matter of mere procedure but is a substantive right under the Muhammadan law which the court has no discretion to refuse. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shnmsoonnissa Begam(6) observed that a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, though in the nature of a suit for specific performance is in reality a suit to enforce a right under the Muhammadan law and the courts should have regard to the principles of Muhammadan law. The observation of their Lordships was directed to emphasising the point that courts should not exercise their discretion in complete supersession of the Muhammadan law, but that in exercise of their discretion they should refer to that law. But the principle was fully recognized that in passing a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights the court has power to take into account all the circumstances of the case and impose terms which it considers to be fair and reasonable.
The rule may, therefore, be re-stated as follows:
There is no absolute right in a husband to claim restitution of conjugal rights against his wife unconditionally; the courts have a discretion to make the decree conditional on the payment of her unpaid dower debt or to impose other suitable conditions considered just, fair and necessary in the circumstances of each case.
Applying these principles to the case before us I would hold that the condition of the previous payment of the dower debt should be imposed on the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, if passed. My reasons are as follows:
(1) There are original texts of unquestionable authority where such a condition has been directed.
(2) The amount of the dower debt is not excessive, and there is no suggestion that it is in any way beyond the means of the plaintiff who claims to be related to the late Nawab of Rampur.
(3) The present plaintiff had contested the defendant's claim for dower, and in spite of his contest the defendant obtained a decree which has now become final.
(4) The present suit was instituted after the institution of the suit for dower, and if the defendant is compelled to go to live in the plaintiff's house she may find it very difficult to realise her decree for dower which would in that event become futile.
(5) The plaintiff had remained quiet and did not suer for restitution of conjugal rights till the claim for dower had been made in court and there is ground for apprehending that the suit is by way of nullifying the decree for dower. As a matter of fact, the decree for dower was attached by the plaintiff in execution of his decree for restitution of conjugal rights when the defendant refused to obey the decree.
(6) The conduct of the plaintiff as disclosed by the finding on the next point makes it fair and just that he should be called upon to pay the dower debt before he has possession of his wife.
The next question is whether the defendant succeeded in establishing legal cruelty which would disentitle the plaintiff from claiming restitution of conjugal rights. That question is one of fact and depends mainly on oral evidence.
The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the witnesses has recorded a clear finding against the defendant. It has to be conceded that the Subordinate Judge was in a better position to judge whether the statements of the witnesses were credible, because he was in a position to mark their demeanour which we, who have to go by the written evidence only, are not. I would accordingly be most reluctant to take a view contrary to that held by the Subordinate Judge, but as it is not only a mere question of a right to property but of compelling the defendant to go and live with her husband against her will, when there may possibly be an apprehension of danger to her life or person, it is our duty to examine the evidence afresh, and satisfy ourselves that the finding of the court below is correct. The points to which the learned Subordinate Judge has not attached due weight or which he has altogether overlooked are the following:
(a) When the question is of the husband's cruel treatment towards his wife, evidence of a large number of witnesses cannot be expected to be forthcoming, and much will depend on the statement of the wife corroborated by the circumstantial evidence, particularly when the cruelty is alleged to have taken place inside the house of her husband.
(b) In the written statement the defendant had made specific allegations as regards the keeping of Musammat Hibia as a mistress inside the house and her own ill-treatment by her husband. This gave sufficient opportunity to the husband to produce rebutting evidence.
(c) Although the learned Judge has held that the defendant has failed to prove any legal cruelty against her, the positive finding recorded by him only amounts to saying that she has tried to exaggerate her allegations because her dower was not paid.
(d) Dealing with the witnesses, the learned Subordinate Judge has said * * * * [A portion of the judgment dealing with the oral evidence and the criticisms of the lower court on it is omitted here.]
(i) The most important circumstance, which has appealed to me, has been entirely ignored by the learned Subordinate Judge. There is the outstanding fact that the daughter of the parties is with her father and not with her mother. Paragraph 2 of the plaint admitted that the daughter was born after October, 1920; and the plaintiff at the end of his examination-in-chief stated that the daughter at the time was one and a half years old. Under the Muhammadan law the mother has the right to the custody of the person of her daughter till she attains puberty. The plaintiff has no female relation in his home except his mother, who admittedly has a touch of insanity. The fact that the husband and the wife are living separately and in different houses, but that, their girl, aged 1½ years, remains with the father is a startling fact, the significance of which has been overlooked by the court below.
(j) It is to be seen how the parties have tried to explain this significant circumstance. According to the plaintiff the wife was taken away by her relations on a pretext and she took her daughter with her; but later on they refused to send back the wife to the plaintiff, but returned his daughter. According to the defendant, she was ill-treated by the plaintiff and was ultimately turned out of the house by being placed in a conveyance called thela (a covered vehicle driven by one or more coolies) and sent to her house which is close by, but the daughter was taken away from her by force and not sent with her.
(k) It seems to me that when the ordinary feelings of a mother are borne in mind and when under the law the wife is entitled to the custody of her minor daughter, particularly when she is of such a tender age as to require nursing and suckling, it is most difficult to believe that the mother and her relations would be so steel-hearted as to take away the infant from the breast of her mother and send her away to her father's house where there is no female relation who would be capable of looking after her comfort and safety. On the other hand, it is not at all improbable that if there is a serious quarrel between husband and wife and the husband in anger turns his wife out and forcibly puts her in a conveyance and sends her away, he may, in order to injure her feelings all the more, keep back their daughter, retain her in his house and not allow the mother to take her way with her. In my opinion the fact that the girl has remained with the husband strongly points to the conclusion that the wife was compelled to leave the husband's house and to leave her girl behind against her will, and not that having left her house with her girl in perfect harmony she voluntarily sent the girl back to her husband afterwards.
In view of all these circumstances I am compelled to hold that the learned Subordinate Judge has not appreciated the seriousness of the evidence that was led before him and has been led away by unjustifiable considerations to think that the defendant's story was grossly exaggerated and that there was no case of legal, cruelty.
In fairness to him it must be pointed out that there is certainly a possibility that the story told by the defendant that she was beaten with lathis and shoes might not be true, but I have no hesitation in holding that the fact that Mst. Hibia, a mistress, was kept in the same house with the wife is fully established and I do not believe the denial made by the husband nor do I accept the statements of his two brothers, who, admitting the presence of Mst. Hibia in the house, tried to explain it away by saying that she was a mere maid-servant of the insane mother. These brothers do not live in the same part of the house and are therefore not in a position to know about the relations between the husband and Mst. Hibia to the same extent as the wife living under the same roof would be able to see for herself. Further. I think that in view of the claim for dower brought by the wife these brothers are supporting the plaintiff. I have no hesitation in holding that the husband misbehaved in this way that he kept a mistress in his house along with his wife and caused mental pain to her in consequence and that he must have, when quarrels ensued, treated his wife cruelly; and that as the quarrels were not and could not be patched up, so long as Mst. Hibia remained in the house, the defendant No. 1 had reasonable apprehension of injury to her person.
I think that the wife is fully justified in refusing to go and live with her husband so long as there is no undertaking not to keep any mistress in the house; she can go to live with him only if a separate house is given to her. Further, I think that in order to protect her safety it is necessary that she should have the option of keeping one female servant and one male servant, according to her choice, in the house. Mr. Khwaja on behalf of the husband agrees to the last mentioned conditions.
As regards defendants Nos. 2 to 5, the learned Subordinate Judge has quite wrongly thrown the burden of proof upon them. The point made against them is that they did not agree to depose on oath that they had not taken away Mst. Anis Begam and that they did not produce any evidence to prove that they did not accompany her from the plaintiff's house or that they were willing to let Mst. Anis Begam return to the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge says that he does not believe that if the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 were not interfering, Mst. Anis Begam would not have returned to the plaintiff for such a long time. I think that his conclusion is quite unjustifiable. When the defendant was treated in the way she was, it is natural for the defendants to offer her protection. It is unthinkable that when a daughter comes back to her parents' house seeking protection from the ill-treatment of her husband, the parents would close their door against her, or that when the husband comes and demands back his wife they would forcibly and against the will of their daughter send her back, to her husband's house. No decree for injunction can be passed against them unless it is clear that they are not only offering protection to their neglected daughter, but that they are actually preventing her from going, or, at any rate, inducing her not to go to her husband. The evidence on this point is almost nil. There is the solitary and vague statement of the plaintiff that the defendants are keeping away his wife in order to press him to transfer his property to her. This is merely an inference or perhaps an explanation why he has impleaded these defendants. This was not put to the wife when she was in the witness box. As a matter of fact, Mst. Anis Begam distinctly stated that it was incorrect to say that her father, paternal uncle, brother or maternal uncle brought her from her husband's house and categorically stated that these people do not prevent her from going to his house. The two witnesses produced by the plaintiff do not allege that the other defendants have done anything to prevent the defendant from returning to her husband's house. The evidence against the defendants is therefore nil, and I am surprised that the learned Subordinate Judge should have decreed the claim against them by throwing the onus upon them.
I would accordingly allow the appeal in part and impose conditions on the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights.
Thom, J.:— I concur.
By the Court:— We accordingly allow this appeal and modifying the decree of the court below pass the following decree in lieu thereof:
The plaintiff's claim for restitution of conjugal rights against defendant No. 1 is decreed on the following conditions: (1) The decree shall be subject to the payment of Rs. 15,000, the amount of the prompt dower of the defendant (exclusive of costs decreed) and the decree for restitution of conjugal rights shall not be executable so long as any part of the principal amount of the dower debt remains unpaid or unrealised. (2) When the dower debt has been paid and realised in full, the plaintiff will be entitled to execute his decree for restitution of conjugal rights, provided he sets apart a house for the residence of his wife, offers to pay her maintenance allowance and allows her to keep one female and one male servant, according to her choice, at the house, and undertakes not to allow any other woman to live in his house to whom the defendant No. 1 objects.
We also think that in the circumstances of the case the defendant No. 1 should have her costs of the suit in both the courts, and that the plaintiff's claim as against the defendants Nos. 2 to 5 should be dismissed with costs in both the courts.