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  • Section 14 of the Lim. Act, where O. 23, B2 of the CPC,
  • Section 269 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
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citation codes
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  • Section 14 of the Lim. Act, where O. 23, B2 of the CPC,
  • Section 269 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiff-appellant for arrears of rent for the years 1329–1334 F and for appointment of a receiver. The suit was first instituted in the Court of the Munsif, Fatehpur. Defences raised included want of jurisdiction of the civil Court and res judicata. The Munsif did not decide the jurisdiction point but dismissed the suit on the ground of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Judge, who held that the suit was exclusively cognizable by a Revenue Court and returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court.

The plaintiff's claim for 1329 to Kharif 1330 was time-barred when first instituted and was subsequently abandoned by the plaintiff. On presentation in the Revenue Court, claims for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F were held to be barred by limitation unless Section 14 of the Limitation Act could be extended to the plaintiff. The Assistant Collector decreed the suit except for the years 1329 to Kharif 1331-F and decided some ancillary questions. Both parties appealed to the District Judge, who confirmed that decree with slight modifications, held that the claims for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F were barred by limitation, and concluded that Section 14 did not apply. The plaintiff filed the present second appeal against that part of the lower appellate decree; the defendant filed cross-objections.

Factual allegations in the plaint included that Sheoratan Singh and Dayashankar Singh had granted a lease to the defendant Phool Singh; they thereafter assigned proprietary rights to Mrs. Rampati Kuer (plaintiff). The plaint challenged the validity of the lease (alleging one lessor was a minor and the other incapacitated) and alleged non-payment of interest due to one Dwarka Prasad under the lease. The plaintiff claimed recovery of sums due under the theka and sought appointment of a receiver; the right to sue for possession was reserved to a subsequent suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to exclude from computation of limitation the time during which the plaintiff prosecuted another civil proceeding in a wrong forum that was returned for presentation to the proper Court (i.e., whether S.14 applies where the plaint was returned rather than the earlier suit being dismissed).
  2. Whether the plaintiff prosecuted the earlier civil proceeding in good faith, such that the period spent prosecuting it should be excluded under Section 14.
  3. Whether Order 23, Rule 1 and B.2 of Order 23, Civil Procedure Code (as interpreted in cited authorities) preclude the application of Section 14 where a suit is withdrawn under O.23 R.1 with liberty to bring a fresh suit.
  4. Whether the lower appellate Court correctly held that the claims for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F were time-barred and that Section 14 did not apply.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff)'s Position

  • The plaint originally filed in the civil Court was the selfsame plaint that was later presented in the Revenue Court; the plaintiff did not withdraw the suit under O.23 R.1 with liberty to institute a fresh suit.
  • The earlier proceeding in the civil Court was instituted in good faith and, because the civil Court (by defect of jurisdiction or similar cause) was unable to entertain it and returned the plaint, the time spent prosecuting that proceeding should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, making the claims for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F within time.

Respondent (Defendant)'s Position

  • The defendant's counsel referred to cases holding that where a suit is withdrawn under Order 23, Rule 1 CPC with liberty to bring a fresh suit and the second suit is instituted after expiry of limitation, Section 14 cannot apply. That view is based on the language of B.2, O.23 CPC which provides that in any fresh suit instituted on permission under the previous rule, the plaintiff is bound by the law of limitation as if the first suit had not been instituted.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the interplay between Order 23 (particularly B.2, O.23 CPC) and Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It accepted that where B.2, O.23 CPC is applicable (i.e., a suit is withdrawn under O.23 R.1 with liberty to bring a fresh suit and a fresh suit is instituted), Section 14 cannot apply because the law is mandatory and treats the subsequent suit as if it were the only suit instituted. The court therefore recognized that there is "no room" for application of S.14 where B.2, O.23 is applicable.

The critical factual and legal distinction in this case, however, was that the plaintiff did not withdraw the suit under O.23 R.1 with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Instead, the Subordinate Judge, acting on the parties' admissions (including an admission by the plaintiff before him), held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction and returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the Revenue Court. The plaint presented in the Revenue Court was the same document previously filed in the civil Court.

The court examined the language of Section 14, observing that it excludes from computation of limitation "the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding" where that proceeding was prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other like cause, is unable to entertain it. The court held there is nothing in S.14 restricting its application to cases where the previous suit was dismissed; such a restriction would exclude cases in which plaints are returned without dismissal — a familiar and significant category.

The court focused on whether the plaintiff prosecuted the previous proceeding in good faith. It noted that the plaint could plausibly be construed either as a civil Court matter (avoidance of lease and compensation for use and occupation) or as a Revenue Court matter (simple suit for arrears). Given the plausible competing constructions, the presence of an honest belief and due care in instituting the suit in the civil Court could not be denied. The court therefore concluded that there was no want of good faith on the part of the plaintiff or her legal adviser up to the time the plaint was returned by the Subordinate Judge.

Because the period from institution to the date of return of the plaint should be excluded under Section 14, the plaintiff's claims for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F fell within time. The court also addressed and rejected the District Judge's narrower view that S.14 applies only where the previous suit was dismissed by the court, finding no support for such a limitation in the section's language.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding:

  • The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in respect of the period during which she prosecuted the suit in the civil Court that was returned for presentation to the Revenue Court, because that earlier proceeding was prosecuted in good faith in a Court unable to entertain it.
  • Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F is within time and should be decreed.
  • The decree of the lower appellate Court is modified in two respects: (1) the plaintiff's suit is decreed for all the years to which it relates (including Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F); and (2) Rs. 100 a year (rather than Rs. 100 for all the years in suit) should be deducted from the amount found due to the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff-appellant shall have her costs from the contesting defendant Phool Singh in all the Courts.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is restoration of the plaintiff's entitlement to rent for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F and adjustment of the deduction methodology, together with an award of costs in favour of the plaintiff against the contesting defendant.
  • The opinion interprets Section 14 as applicable where a plaint is returned for presentation to the proper forum (not limited to cases where the earlier suit was dismissed). The opinion does not, however, state that it establishes any wider precedent beyond its reasoning in the present facts; the immediate consequences are as set out above for the parties to this litigation.

S.N/R.K

    Mt. Ram Pati Kunwar v. Phool Singh

    Niamatullah, J.:— This appeal has arisen out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-appellant for arrears of rent for 1329-1334-F and for the appointment of a receiver in terms of the relief claimed in the plaint. The suit was originally instituted in the Court of the Munsif, Fatehpur. One of the pleas taken in defence was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction. Another plea was that the plaintiff's suit was barred by res judicata. The Munsif did not decide the question of jurisdiction raised by the defendant, but held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by res judicata. Accordingly, he dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of the Subordinate Judge who held that the suit was cognizable exclusively by a Revenue Court. Accordingly, the plaint was returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. The claim for 1329 to Kharif 1330 was time barred when the suit was instituted in the civil Court. It was subsequently abandoned by the plaintiff. When the plaint was presented in the Revenue Court, the plaintiff's claim for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F was also barred by limitation unless the benefit of Section 14 of the Lim. Act, could be extended to her. The plaintiff's suit was decreed by the Assistant Collector except for the years 1329 to Kharif 1331-F. He also decided some subsidiary questions. Both parties appealed to the District Judge, who confirmed the decree of the first Court subject to slight modifications, which it is not necessary to mention at this stage. He upheld the view of the first Court that the plaintiff's claim for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F was barred by limitation. He further held that Section 14 of the Lim. Act, did not apply to the circumstances of the case. The plaintiff has filed the present second appeal against that part of the decree of the lower appellate Court which relates to the arrears for Rabi 1330-F and Kharif 1331-F. The defendant has filed certain cross-objections, the nature of which will be stated in a later part of this judgment.

    2. The plaint, as originally framed, was very complicated. It recited the facts that Sheoratan Singh and Dayashankar Singh, plaintiffs 1 and 2, granted a lease to the defendant Phool Singh who agreed to pay a certain rent for the theka. Sheoratan Singh and Dayashankar Singh assigned their proprietary rights to Mt. Rampati Kuer, plaintiff 2, the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh, plaintiff 1.

    3. It was alleged in the plaint that one of the lessors was a minor at the time the lease was executed, while the other lessor was devoid of common sense and not capable of understanding matters. It was further alleged that the lessee did not pay out of the rent interest due to one Dwarka Prasad as he was bound to do under the lease. The whole plaint contains allegations challenging the validity of the lease. The plaintiff claimed the right to recover possession of the property to which the lease related, but she reserved liberty to sue for that relief in a subsequent suit. The relief claimed in the present suit was for recovery of what the lessee was liable to pay under the theka and for the appointment of a receiver, who, it was prayed, should be directed to take possession of the property and to manage it during the term reserved by the lease and make payments in accordance with the stipulations contained in the lease. We have stated in detail the allegations contained in the plaint for a proper consideration of the question, whether S. 14. Lim. Act can apply to the circumstances of the case. The learned District Judge held that Section 14 of the Lim. Act, did not apply to cases in which the plaintiff himself withdraws a suit instituted in the wrong Court and subsequently institutes it beyond limitation in the right Court. It should be explained in this connexion that the Subordinate Judge, who disposed of the appeal from the decision of the Munsif, directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the Revenue Court, because it was admitted on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant before him that the suit, as framed, was not cognizable by a civil Court as pleaded by the defendant. There being no controversy between the parties on the question of jurisdiction, and the Subordinate Judge'himself not taking a different view, he acted on the admission of both the parties and passed his order thereon. In these circumstances it cannot be considered that the plaintiff-appellant withdrew the suit instituted in the civil Court and subsequently instituted it in the Revenue Court which ex hypothesi was the proper Court. It has not been argued before us by the learned advocate for the defendant that the civil Court had jurisdiction. We take it that the suit had been wrongly instituted in the civil Court, that both the parties admitted before the Subordinate Judge that the civil Court had no jurisdiction and that the Subordinate Judge held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction.

    4. The learned advocate for the defendant-respondent has referred us to certain cases in which it was held that where a suit is withdrawn under O. 23, R. 1 of the CPC, with liberty to bring a fresh suit and a second suit is instituted after the expiry of limitation, though the first suit was within time, Section 14 of the Lim. Act, cannot apply. That view is obviously based on the language of B. 2, O. 23 of the CPC, which runs as follows:

    “In any fresh suit instituted on permission granted under the last preceding rule, the plaintiff shall be bound by the law of limitation in the same manner as if the first suit had not been instituted.”

    5. It is clear that there is no room for the application of Section 14 of the Lim. Act, where O. 23, B2 of the CPC, is applicable. The law is mandatory and the Court must start with the assumption that the subsequent suit is the only suit that was instituted by the plaintiff, so that there can be no question of any other civil proceedings having been prosecuted in good faith by the plaintiff as required by Section 14 of the Lim. Act. In the case before us the plaintiff did not withdraw her suit with liberty to bring a fresh one and the plaint filed in the Revenue Court was the selfsame plaint which she had previously filed in the civil Court. We are clearly of opinion that the class of cases to which reference has been made above is wholly inapplicable and that Section 14 of the Lim. Act, is not inapplicable on that ground.

    6. The learned District Judge seems to be of opinion that Section 14 of the Lim. Act, is applicable:

    “only to cases where the previous suit was dismissed by the Court itself, because it was unable to entertain it.”

    7. There is nothing in S. 14 which warrants the proposition of law laid down by the learned District Judge. It clearly provides that

    “in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

    8. The important question to decide is whether the plaintiff prosecuted another civil proceeding in good faith. It is perfectly immaterial whether such proceeding ended in an order of dismissal or in some other order showing that the Court refused to entertain it. Cases are easily conceivable in which a party may be in doubt as to whether a suit should be instituted in a civil or a Revenue Court. If a suit is honestly and with due care and caution instituted in one of such Courts, but at a subsequent stage it is found that a wrong forum had been chosen, it cannot be doubted that if an admission to that effect be made, and the Court which has no jurisdiction returns the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, Section 14 of the Lim Act, which is couched in comprehensive terms, will be applicable. If the section be so restricted as to apply only to cases in which a previous suit is dismissed, it will cease to apply to a familiar class of cases in which plaints are returned without the suit being dismissed for presentation to the proper Court. We are clearly of opinion that S. 14 is not so limited and that, if the plaintiff instituted the suit in good faith in the Court of the Munsif of Fatehpur, she is entitled to the benefit of S. 14. The lower appellate Court has not expressed any opinion as to whether the plaintiff acted in good faith in instituting her suit in the civil Court. It has however observed:

    “It is possible that a suit framed in this manner should have been tried by the civil Court. The point is really only of academic interest, now that the matter has reached the appellate Court, since under Section 269 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, I have clearly the power to decide the matter in controversy upon the merits.”

    9. We have already stated the salient features of the plaint as originally framed and think that the plaintiff and her pleader in the Munsif's Court might well have considered that the suit was cognizable by a civil Court. It is possible so to construe the plaint as one for avoidance of the lease and for compensation for use and occupation of land. Both the parties and the Subordinate Judge however put the construction which, to say the least, is equally plausible, namely, that it is a simple suit for arrears of rent by a landholder against her thekedar and as such it is cognizable by a Revenue Court. We are of opinion that there was no want of good faith on the part of the plaintiff or her legal adviser and that the suit was prosecuted in good faith up to the time when the plaint was returned by the Subordinate Judge for presentation to the Revenue Court. It is not disputed that if the whole of the period from the institution up to the date of the return of the plaint be excluded, the plaintiff's claim for Babi 1330 F and Kharif 1331 F is within time.

    10. The result is that the plaintiff's appeal succeeds and, in addition to the amount decreed by the lower appellate Court, rent for Rabi 1330 F and Kharif 1331 F should also be decreed at the rate allowed by the learned District Judge for subsequent years. (The judgment then considered the cross-objections of defendant Phool Singh relating to certain deductions and concluded.) In view of our findings the decree of the lower appellate Court is modified in two respects: (1) The plaintiff's suit is decreed for all the years to which it relates; and (2) Rs. 100 a year instead of Rs. 100 for all the years in suit should be deducted from the amount found due to the plaintiff. The plaintiff-appellant shall have her costs from the contesting defendant Phool Singh in all the Courts.

    S.N/R.K

    11. Appeal allowed.

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    Mt. Ram Pati Kunwar v. Phool Singh
    (Mar 14, 1932)