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  • provisions of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present Limitation Act is Act IX of 1908,
  • article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. Article 182
  • article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  • article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act.
  • section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of article 182,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present Limitation Act is Act IX of 1908,
  • article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. Article 182
  • article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  • article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act.
  • section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of article 182,

    Faqir Chand And Another (Decree-Holders) v. Kundan Singh And Others (Judgment-Debtors).

    Mukerji and Bennet, JJ.:— This is an appeal from an order in execution dismissing an application of the decree-holder for execution. The application has been dismissed by the lower court on two grounds, firstly that the execution was barred by time, being more than 12 years from the date of the decree, and secondly that the decree-holder was not entitled to execution against the property which is in the present application for execution. As regards the second point the facts are as follows. Mauza Suawala was divided at some period not stated into four mahals of 5 biswas each. One of these mahals was called mahal Jahan Singh, otherwise mahal Safed. A person called Jahan Singh owned half that mahal, that is 10 biswas out of 20 biswas of that mahal, and as the mahal comprised 5 biswas of the village, Jahan Singh owned 2½ biswas of the entire mauza Suawala. A mortgage was made by ??? the son of Jahan Singh, on the 25th of October, 1809, in favour of the predecessor of the decree-holder, the property mortgaged being expressed as 2½ biswas out of 20 biswas of mauza Suawala. On the 15th of March, 1913, a suit was brought on this mortgage, the plaint naming the property mortgaged as 2½ biswas of Suawala which has become 10 biswas. In August, 1913, a preliminary decree was passed on a compromise granting instalments, the property being expressed as “Mahal Safed 2½ biswas which has become 10 biswas”. There was a default in payment of instalments, and a final decree was prepared on the 18th of August, 1916. In the final decree there was an error, as it stated that the property was Suawala 2½ biswas jiske ‘teen’ bisiva ho gaye hain”. The error was that, on account of the omission of a letter, instead of the word “das” the decree read as if the word was “teen”, that is three biswas. Now it was the duty of the decree-holder to see that his decree was in accordance with the judgment, and negligence on the part of the decree-holder led to this error appearing in the final decree. It has not been shown to us that there was any negligence whatever on the part of the judgment-debtor which contributed to the error in the decree. This error was perpetuated in a sale certificate of the 20th of October, 1924, by which the decree-holder bought the property at an auction sale on this decree, and the error was further extended by expressing the property as “2½ biswa minjumla 10 hima khata khewat No. 1, mauza Suawala, mahal Safed”, that is 2½ biswas out of 10 biswas in khata khewat No. 1, mauza Suawala, mahal Safed. The decree-holder finding the error in the sale certificate made a further application for execution sale of 7½ biswas out of 10 biswas in khata khewat No. 1, mahal Safed. The judgment-debtor made an objection that he was not entitled to do so by the terms of the final decree, and that objection was allowed on the 30th of November, 1926. The decree-holder brought an appeal, and the High Court held on the 4th of May, 1928, that the execution must take place in accordance with the final decree, that is that the final decree was for 3 biswas and a further half biswa could be brought to execution sale. It is claimed by the memorandum of the present appeal that there was fraud on behalf of the judgment-debtor, and learned counsel’ stated that the fraud consisted in this objection, but we do not consider that the objection was fraudulent or frivolous, because it was upheld by this Court in appeal in regard to 7 biswas out of 7½ biswas. No other fraud was alleged to have been perpetrated by the judgment-debtor.

    On the 31st of July, 1928, the decree-holder applied for amendment of the final decree of the 18th of August, 1916, that is the application was made 18 days before the period of 12 years allowed by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure expired. Notice was issued, and on the 15th of September, 1928, after the period of 12 years had expired the court ordered amendment of the final decree by the introduction of the letter which had been omitted, that is that the final decree read 10 biswas instead of 3 biswas. On the 8th of April, 1929, the decree-holder applied for execution in accordance with the amended decree, and this is the present application. The lower court has made a series of errors in confusing the mauza with the mahal, and the lower court is not correct in holding that the final decree does not entitle the decree-holder to proceed against the remaining 7½ biswas, mahal Safed, so far as the area goes. We now proceed to consider the merits of the question of limitation. There are two provisions of law dealing with limitation for applications for execution One of these is contained in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other is contained in article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. Article 182 states that a period of three years is allowed, time beginning to run from the date of amendment of a decree where the decree has been amended. Learned counsel contends that his client should receive the benefit of this provision, but article 182 states in the first column as follows: “For the execution of a decree or order of any civil court not provided for by article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” Now the language used is somewhat peculiar, as it states “not provided for”, an expression which applies very well to article 183, which deals with decrees of High Courts or orders of His Majesty in Council. The words “provided for” do not apply so clearly to section 48, as section 48 does not deal with decrees of courts to which article 182 does not apply. But the meaning of the words “provided for”, in our opinion, is that where execution is barred by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, execution cannot be allowed under article 182 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. In other words article 182 is subject to the provisions of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present Limitation Act is Act IX of 1908, and by that Act the provision in question in regard to amendment of decrees was introduced, and it did not exist in the previous Limitation Act of 1877. In the same year of 1903 the Code of Civil Procedure at present in force was enacted. Now no change was made in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for the extension of the period of 12 years in that section from the date of the amendment of a decree. We consider that the legislature advisedly omitted that provision for extension from section 48, and that the omission was not accidental. In our opinion the effect of the omission is that an amendment of a decree does not give a new date for starting a period of limitation, if the application for execution is beyond the period of 12 years allowed by section 48; that is the period of 12 years under section 48 is final and cannot be extended by any amendment of the decree, whether that amendment is made before the expiry of the period of 12 years or whether that amendment is made after the expiry of the period of 12 years. The reason who no amendment was made in section 48 is that probably the greater period of 12 years is allowed by that section, and it is probably the intention of the legislature that period of 12 years should be final, and that within that period a decree-holder should amend his decree and obtain all consequent remedies. If a decree-holder neglects to amend his decree within a sufficient period before the expiry of 12 years to allow him to obtain his remedy by execution, then he has only himself to blame. In Narsingrao Konher Inamdar v. Banolo Krishna (1) it has been laid down on, page 323 as follows: “It is the duty of a successful plaintiff to see that the decree is drawn up correctly against the defendant. I fail to see how the defendant should be held to blame if the decree does not correctly represent the judgment, unless he has been a party to inducing the error in the decree. The Subordinate Judge cannot repeat his judgment so as to give a fresh starting point for limitation. I therefore think that the 17th of November, 1897” (the date of the unamended decree) “must be taken as the date of the decree sought to be executed.” We also note that a decree bears the date of the original judgment, and an amendment does not alter the date of the decree.

    Learned counsel refers to ruling of a single Judge of the Patna High Court in Baldeo Shukul v. Sued Yusuf . In that ruling it was laid down that where a decree is amended, the date of amendment is the date of the decree within the meaning of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An application for execution in that case was made more than 12 years after the date of the original decree, but within 12 years of the date of an amended decree. The court held as follows: “But it has been argued before me that, in so far as section 48 does not embody the provisions of article 182, time must begin to run from the date of the decree. I am unable to agree with this contention.” The learned Judge did not refer in his judgment to the fact that article 182 specially excludes cases provided for by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and apparently this fact was not brought to his notice. We therefore consider that the ruling in question is no authority for the issue in this case, because the ruling does not deal with the point which we consider is vital to the question.

    Accordingly we hold that the present application in execution, having been made more than 12 years after the date of the final decree, is barred by limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

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    Faqir Chand And Another (Decree-Holders) v. Kundan Singh And Others (Judgment-Debtors).
    (Feb 27, 1932)