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  • Act XL of 1858, section 18, and Act VIII of 1890, sections 29 and 30.
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
  • section 25 of the Indian Contract Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act XL of 1858, section 18, and Act VIII of 1890, sections 29 and 30.
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
  • section 25 of the Indian Contract Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by seven of nine defendants against whom an action was instituted by Dal Chand (the mortgagee) seeking enforcement of a mortgage by sale of a property that belonged to a Hindu joint family (descendants of Munga). After Munga's death his surviving sons continued as members of the joint family. On 1 June 1915 a mortgage in suit was executed by four adult sons (Chokha, Shyama, Bhimma and Bhundi) and by Mt. Mehro (the mother) for herself and as natural guardian of two minor sons (Gutti and Gunni). The mortgage purportedly secured Rs. 400 with interest; the consideration included Rs. 327 alleged to be due on a bond dated 28 May 1915 (which the defendants contested as actually dated 28 May 1912) and Rs. 73 said to have been paid before execution.

Defendants raised several defences, of which the material ones for this appeal were: that the Rs. 73 earlier payment lacked legal necessity and family benefit; that there was no 28 May 1915 bond executed by Munga and that the bond relied upon was actually dated 28 May 1912; that by 1 June 1915 the 1912 debt was time-barred; and that the executants were not competent to bind the joint ancestral estate in consideration of a time-barred debt. The trial court sustained these defences and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court reversed, decreeing the plaintiff's suit in full. The defendants (appellants) appealed to the present court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Rs. 73 said to have been paid prior to execution of the mortgage was shown to have been incurred for legal necessity or for the benefit of the joint family, such that the executants could bind the joint ancestral property for that sum.
  2. Whether the executants were competent to hypothecate the joint ancestral property on account of Rs. 327 alleged to be due under a bond (disputed as to date) which, if dated 28 May 1912, was time-barred by 1 June 1915.
  3. Whether a guardian (the mother as natural guardian) could properly represent the minors' share in the joint undivided Mitakshara estate and bind that estate by executing the mortgage.
  4. Whether the karta or manager of a joint Hindu family (or other adult members) can revive or charge the joint ancestral estate for a debt of the deceased father that is already barred by limitation, in circumstances where some members are minors.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The Rs. 73, allegedly paid prior to the mortgage, was not shown to be for legal necessity or for the benefit of the joint family; therefore the executants lacked competence to charge the joint ancestral estate for that amount.
  • There was no bond executed by Munga dated 28 May 1915; instead a bond of 28 May 1912 for Rs. 180 existed (alleged by the defendants), and by 1 June 1915 that debt was time-barred.
  • Executants of the mortgage were not legally competent to bind the joint ancestral estate to satisfy a time-barred debt.
  • The mortgagors were illiterate and were subjected to trickery or misrepresentation by the mortgagee (trial court so found), undermining the plaintiff's claim.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position

  • The plaintiff asserted that the mortgage secured in total Rs. 400 with interest; that part of the consideration (Rs. 327) related to a debt due on a bond (the plaintiff alleged the relevant bond existed and supported the claim).
  • The plaintiff contested the defendants' contentions regarding the absence of a 1915 bond and the source/use of Rs. 73; the lower appellate court accepted the plaintiff's case and decreed the suit (the opinion records this outcome but does not detail all of the plaintiff's specific arguments).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gajadhar … Defendant v. Jagannath … Plaintiff Held that where a joint family consists of father, sons and grandsons, the father can revive a time-barred debt payable by himself and transfer joint ancestral property to pay it. The court stated it is bound by this decision but distinguished the present case: the father's power to revive a time-barred debt is not equivalent to the manager's power when minors are present; the present transaction was not by the deceased father.
Shib Nath v. The Alliance Bank of Simla Under Hindu law, payment of a father's time-barred debt is a pious duty; a revived time-barred debt stands on same footing as one not time-barred and can bind sons/grandsons if not taken for illegal or immoral purpose. Quoted in support of the principle that a father's revival of a debt can bind descendants; used as authority for the father's special position, which the court contrasted with the manager's limited powers.
Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree Described the manager's power for an infant heir as limited and qualified — exercisable only in case of need or for the benefit of the estate; a prudent-owner test for charges to benefit estate. Relied upon to show that a manager or guardian cannot charge joint estate except for genuine necessity or benefit; supported holding that Rs. 73 lacked such proof here.
Narain Prasad v. Sarnam Singh Held that a mortgage of a Mitakshara joint family's property by its karta is void unless necessity or an antecedent debt is proved; mortgagee gains no rights against the karta's interest absent such proof. Applied to support the proposition that absent family necessity or an antecedent debt, the karta (or manager) cannot bind the joint ancestral estate — used against the plaintiff's claim.
Anant Ram v. Collector of Etah Held that where debt was not incurred for family necessity, the manager's interest with respect to mortgages in Mitakshara province could not be sold in enforcement. Used as corroborative authority that non-necessity defeats the manager's power to bind the joint estate for antecedent or time-barred debts.
Venkata Row v. Tuljaram Row Observed that a manager/Raja could only deal with joint property for certain limited purposes; where these purposes are not suggested, arrangement fails to convey joint estate. Quoted to show the limited competence of a manager to alienate joint property and to support the conclusion that the transaction could not bind the joint estate.
Gharib Ullah v. Khalak Singh Held that where the karta, with concurrence of adult members, mortgaged for necessity and family purposes, the mortgage deeds could be valid even if one brother was a minor and his mother executed a deed as guardian with required court sanction under specified statutory provisions. Referred to when discussing the role of the mother as natural guardian and statutory requirements; the court used it to explain that Mt. Mehro, as natural guardian, nevertheless had no locus to represent the minors' undivided estate in this case because the mortgage lacked necessity/benefit.
Gopal Narain Mozoomdar v. Muddomutty Guptee Stated that onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the mortgage was valid and that if some debts were shown to be barred the mortgage fails to meet requirement to pay a subsisting charge upon the estate. Applied to hold that the plaintiff bore the burden to prove that the debts secured were not barred — supporting the conclusion that time-barred debts undermine the mortgage's validity.
Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti Held that the manager of a Hindu family had no power, without special authority, to revive a claim already barred by limitation against the family. Relied on to support the proposition that the manager cannot revive a time-barred debt for the joint family without special authority.
Sadhu Saran Prasad v. Brahmdeo Prasad Singh Ruled that a manager of a joint Hindu family had no power to enter into any agreement to pay a statute-barred debt. Used as further authority confirming that managers cannot bind the family to time-barred debts.
Jhabbu Ram v. Bahoran Singh Held that a mere manager, distinct from the Hindu father, had no power to alienate property in lieu of a time-barred debt and that such alienation cannot be supported by legal necessity where legal remedy is time-barred. Applied to reinforce the rule that the mortgage was not supportable as legal necessity when the debt was statute-barred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequential analysis anchored to the facts and established authorities:

  1. On the Rs. 73 payment: The mortgage bond contained no recital of necessity for this sum and the record contained no evidence that the Rs. 73 was borrowed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the joint family. Consequently, the executants lacked competence to charge the joint ancestral estate for that amount.
  2. On the alleged bond dated 28 May 1915 / 28 May 1912: The court found no bond dated 28 May 1915 on the record and accepted that the plaintiff himself alleged that no bond of that date had ever existed. The lower appellate court suggested a clerical error and treated the bond as dated 28 May 1912. Even accepting that view, the 1912 bond represented a simple money bond which by 1 June 1915 was time-barred; thus the claimed Rs. 327 related to a debt barred by limitation.
  3. On the legal capacity to revive a time-barred debt: The court acknowledged the general contractual principle (section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act) that a written promise to pay a statute-barred debt can be valid consideration. But it emphasized that this principle applies generally and cannot be mechanically applied where the executants do not have the ownership rights required to bind the joint ancestral estate. Specifically, the special position of the Hindu father (who may revive his own time-barred debts and bind descendants) is distinct from the powers of the manager/karta or other adult members when minors are present.
  4. On the role of the karta/manager and guardian: The court reviewed authorities establishing that the manager's power to charge joint estate is limited to legal necessity or benefit to the estate and that a guardian/mother cannot in her natural guardian capacity represent the minors' interest in an undivided Mitakshara estate for the purpose of binding the joint estate. The mortgage here was not executed for legal necessity or the benefit of the family; the revival of a time-barred debt during the minors' minority conferred no family benefit.
  5. On application of precedent and onus: The court cited prior decisions to show the plaintiff bore the onus of proving the mortgage's validity and that the presence of time-barred debts undermined that validity. Having found the consideration defective (no proof of necessity/benefit for Rs. 73 and reliance on a time-barred debt for Rs. 327), the transaction could not bind the joint ancestral estate.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored, with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit to enforce the mortgage is dismissed; the trial court's decision in favour of the defendants is restored and the appellants are entitled to costs throughout.
  • Legal significance stated by the court: The decision reaffirms established principles distinguishing the special power of a Hindu father to revive his own time-barred debts (and bind descendants) from the limited powers of a manager/karta or other adult members of a joint Mitakshara family where minors are present. The court found no basis to treat the present mortgage as supported by legal necessity or family benefit, and therefore did not allow the mortgage to be enforced against the joint ancestral estate.
  • No novel precedent was announced; the court applied and followed existing authorities to reach its conclusion.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not include information beyond that text.

    Gunni v. Dal Chand

    Sen and Niamat-Ullah, JJ.:— This is an appeal by seven-out of nine defendants against whom an action was lodged by Dal Chand, mortgagee, for enforcement of a mortgage by sale of the property. The property in dispute belonged to a joint family consisting of Munga gujar and his sons.

    We have abstracted the following genealogical table, which may be referred to for the elucidation of the facts of the case:—

    After the death of Munga his surviving sons continued as members of a joint family. On the 1st of June, 1915, the mortgage in suit was executed by Chokha, Shyama, Bhimma and Bhundi, adults, and by Mt. Mehro, their mother, for self and as natural guardian of her minor sons, Gutti and Gunni. The mortgage was for Rs. 400 and the stipulated rate of interest was one rupee per cent. per mensem compoundable half-yearly.

    The details of consideration were as follows: (a) Rs. 327 due on a mortgage bond, dated the 28th of May, 1915, which was executed by Munga for Rs. 180 in favour of Dal Chand; (b) Rs. 73 received prior to the execution of the document. In the account annexed to the plaint the mortgagee admitted that he had received Rs. 203 from the mortgagors some time about the year 1921. The balance sought to be recovered by this suit was Rs. 1,200.

    Various defences were raised by the defendants Nos. 2, 4, 8 and 9. Most of these pleas are not material for the purposes of this appeal. The pleas which call for decision are that the sum of Rs. 73, said to have been paid prior to the execution of the document in suit, was not supported by legal necessity and was not obtained for the benefit of the joint family; that there was no bond executed by Munga in favour of Dal Chand on the 28th of May, 1915; that, as a matter of fact, a simple money bond had been executed by him in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 180 on the 28th of May, 1912; that, on the 1st of June, 1915, this debt had become time-barred and that the executants of the bond were not legally competent to bind the joint ancestral estate in consideration of this time-barred debt.

    The court of first instance sustained the aforesaid defence in its entirety and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court by its judgment, dated the 3rd of May, 1928, which is neither clear nor convincing, has reversed the decision of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit in its entirety; hence this appeal.

    The mortgage bond in suit contains no recitals as to the necessity for borrowing Rs. 73 which was said to have been taken prior to the execution of the document. There is not a scintilla of evidence on the record to show that this money was borrowed either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the joint family. The executants of the document, therefore, were not competent to charge the joint ancestral estate with this amount.

    The next question which emerges for decision is whether Chokha, Bhundi, Shyama, Bhimma and Mt. Mehro were entitled to hypothecate the joint ancestral property in consideration of Rs. 327 due on the bond dated the 28th of May, 1912, which was executed by Munga in favour of Dal Chand, plaintiff. There is no bond on the record, dated the 28th of May, 1915, alleged to have been executed by Munga in favour of Dal Chand. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that, as a matter of fact, no bond of this date has ever been in existence. The defendants to this action and executants of the bond in suit are illiterate rustics. The court of first instance was of opinion that the mortgagee had recourse to trickery and had deliberately imposed upon the executants of the document by representing to them that there was a debt due from Munga, under a bond of the year 1915, which was not time-barred. The lower appellate court took a more charitable view of the situation and was of opinion that by a clerical error on the part of the scribe the date of the bond was wrongly written as the 28th of May, 1915, while, as a matter of fact, the correct date was the 28th of May, 1912. The transaction is not free from suspicion, and even if we take the same view as the lower appellate court, this does not in any way advance the case of the plaintiff. The bond dated the 28th of May, 1912 was a simple money bond, and the claim on the basis of this bond was manifestly time-barred on the 1st of June, 1915. It has been strenuously contended on behalf of the defendants appellants that the executants of the bond were not competent to charge a time-barred debt upon the joint ancestral property. It may be conceded that a written promise to pay a debt which is barred by the statute of limitation is a good consideration under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. The principle which underlies this rule is obvious. A person who is master of his own actions is competent to voluntarily resign the benefit of a law made for his own protection. The rule formulated in section 25 of the Indian Contract Act is one of general application. If the executants of the bond were by themselves the exclusive owners of the joint ancestral property, there was no legal bar to their executing the mortgage bond in suit in consideration of their father's debt which had become time-barred. Where a Hindu joint family is possessed of joint ancestral property, and consists of adult male members as also minor members, the powers of the manager to transfer the joint ancestral property are very much restricted. The powers of the father of the family in such cases have to be differentiated and distinguished from those of the manager or karta of the joint family. There may be cases where the father himself is the karta, but cases are not rare, and indeed are very numerous, in which the karta of the family is not the father. In Gajadhar…Defendant v. Jagannath…Plaintiff . (1) it has been ruled that where a joint family consists of the father, sons and grandsons, the father can revive a time-barred debt payable by himself and transfer joint ancestral property for payment of the said debt. The ratio for the decision has been set out in the judgment of one of the learned Judges at page 785 in the following terms: “If a Hindu widow can validly alienate property to pay time-barred debts due by her husband, a Hindu father can similarly alienate property to pay the time-barred debts due by him in order to release himself from the sin of having left them unpaid, so as to bind his sons and grandsons. In Shib Nath v. The Alliance Bank of Simla it was accordingly held that, under the Hindu law, the payment of a debt due by the father, though time-barred, was a pious duty, and such a debt was a good antecedent debt, however old it might be. A debt which was barred by time and has been revived stands on the same footing as a debt which is not time-barred; and if it is enforceable against the father, it is also enforceable against his sons and grandsons, provided it was not taken for an illegal or immoral purpose. An alienation made to pay such a debt is, therefore, valid and can bind the interests of the sons and grandsons of the person making the alienation.” We are bound by this decision. The case of the Hindu father, however, is clearly distinguishable. The Hindu father has the power to revive a time-barred debt and can charge the joint family estate, provided that the debt is antecedent or incurred for family necessity; every other consideration must give way before the consideration affecting the pious obligation of the Hindu sons to discharge their father's debt. The manager of the joint family cannot transfer the family property for payment of any antecedent debt due from him. If there is no legal necessity or benefit to the family, the transfer cannot be supported. In Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree (2) the powers of the manager, for an infant heir have been defined and described in the following terms at page 423: “The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is, under the Hindu law, a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate. But where, in the particular instance, the charge is one that a prudent owner would make, in order to benefit the estate, the bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon it, in the particular instance, is the thing to be regarded.” In Narain Prasad v. Sarnam Singh it was held that “A mortgage of the joint family property of a Mitakshara family by its karta, unless necessity or an antecedent debt is proved, is void; and the transaction itself gives to the mortgagee no rights against the karta's interest in the joint family property.” This is an authoritative pronouncement in support of the proposition that, where the debt has not been incurred for family necessity, and is not an antecedent debt, according to its technical meaning, the karta is legally incompetent to bind the joint ancestral estate, even to the extent of his undivided interest therein, for the payment of the said debt. The same principle appears to have been enunciated in Anant Ram v. Collector of Etah and it was held that where the debt was not incurred for family necessity, the interest of the manager of the family with respect to mortgages in the province governed by the Mitakshara could not be sold in enforcement of the mortgage. In a converse case, Venkata Row v. Tuljaram Row (3) their Lordships observed at page 306 that “if it (the arrangement) failed so far as the infant was concerned, their Lordships think that in the events that have happened it must also be regarded as failing wholly to convey any of the joint estate at all. They have arrived at that conclusion for this reason. Raja Ram Row, unless he was attempting to divide the joint family, could only deal with this property with the consent of his son or in his capacity as manager of the estate. In his capacity as manager of the estate he was only able to deal with it for certain limited purposes, and none of those purposes are, or can be, suggested as the consideration why these considerable sums were released.”

    We have therefore to bear in mind the following facts: (1) The mortgage bond in suit was substantially executed for payment of a time-barred debt due from Munga; (2) Munga, the father, had not in his life-time revived the aforesaid debt or executed the bond in suit in consideration thereof; (3) The debt was sought to be revived by four of the adult sons, namely Chokha, Bhundi, Shyama and Bhimma and by Mt. Mehro, mother of the two infant sons, Gutti and Gunni; (4) A guardian of the property of an infant cannot properly be appointed in respect of the infant's interest in the property of an undivided Mitakshara family; vide Gharib Ullah v. Khalak Singh ; Mt. Mehro, widow of Munga, in her capacity as mother was the natural guardian of Gutti and Gunni, but she had no locus standi to represent the estate of the minors which was a joint and undivided estate; (5) Assuming that the karta of this joint family is to be found in the person of one of the four adult sons who joined in the execution of the mortgage bond in suit, the said karta did not purport to hypothecate the ancestral property on behalf of the minors; but having joined Mt. Mehro in the execution of the document, he may be taken to have acquiesced in the transfer of the property for payment of the debt in dispute. In Gharib Ullah v. Khalak Singh, which has already been referred to, it was held by the Judicial Committee that where the karta of an undivided Mitakshara family, with the concurrence of the adult members of the family, had mortgaged for necessity family property, for family purposes, there could be no objection to the validity of the mortgage deeds as against all the members of the family, on the mere ground that one of the brothers was a minor and that one of the deeds was executed by his mother as guardian with the sanction of the court, as required by Act XL of 1858, section 18, and Act VIII of 1890, sections 29 and 30.

    In the present case the mortgage bond in suit was not executed either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family. The revival of a time-barred debt during the minority of Gutti and Gunni did not confer any benefit upon the joint family or upon the estate possessed jointly by the minors and the four adult brothers. Had Munga been alive he could have bound the estate of his sons and grandsons for payment of a time-barred debt which was due from him. But in a joint family which is composed of certain adult and certain minor members, the karta of the family is not competent to charge the ancestral estate with a debt which had become time-barred. In Gopal Narain Mozoomdar v. Muddomutty Guptee Sir Richard Couch observed as follows at page 48: “Having disposed of these minor objections, we come to consider whether any of the debts intended to be secured by the mortgage were at that time barred by the law of limitation. This objection arises on the plaintiff's case; it is not an objection which the defendants had to take in their written statements, or by way of defence to the suit. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the mortgage was a valid one; and if it appeared upon evidence that some of the debts were barred, the case would not come within the requirement that the mortgage should be made to pay off a subsisting charge upon the estate.” The principle enunciated herein is applicable mutatis mutandis to the facts of the present case. In Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti it was held by a very strong Court that the manager of a Hindu family had no power, without special authority, to revive a claim already barred by limitation against the family. In Sadhu Saran Prasad v. Brahmdeo Prasad Singh a Bench of the Patna High Court ruled that a manager of a joint Hindu family had no power whatever to enter into any agreement to pay a statute-barred debt. In Jhabbu Ram v. Bahoran Singh Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman and Mukerji, JJ., held that a mere manager of a joint family, as distinguished from the Hindu father, had no power to alienate the property in lieu of a time-barred debt and that an alienation could not be said to be supported by legal necessity where the legal remedy to recover the debt had already become time-barred.

    Both upon principles and upon authority the law seems to us to be perfectly clear. Where a joint Hindu family consists of major and minor brothers, the alienation of the joint ancestral property during the minority of some of the members of the family for payment of a time-barred debt due from the deceased father is unjustified as being neither for the benefit of the family nor supported by legal necessity.

    We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance with costs throughout.

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    Comments

    Gunni v. Dal Chand
    (Apr 22, 1931)