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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for revision of an order of the Judge, Small Cause Court, Ballia dated 3 March 1928. The Judge below had refused an application made on behalf of a defendant judgment-debtor to set aside an ex parte decree that was made against him on 1 November 1927. The application to set aside the ex parte decree had been presented on 15 December 1927. Instead of depositing the decretal amount in court with the application, the applicant filed a security bond hypothecating immovable property. The Small Cause Court disallowed the application on two grounds: (1) no direction of the Court had been obtained at the time of presenting the application as to whether the applicant should deposit the decretal amount or give security as required by the proviso to Section 17, sub-section 1 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act; and (2) the security offered was not such as to satisfy the Court on the date the application was presented. The present Court was asked to determine whether the learned Judge was correct in dismissing the application for these reasons, and in particular to construe the proviso to sub-section 1, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How is the proviso to sub-Section 1, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to be construed: does an applicant who seeks to set aside an ex parte decree have to either (a) deposit the decretal amount in court or (b) give security to the satisfaction of the Court, and is the choice between those alternatives for the Court or for the applicant?
  2. Do the words "as the Court may direct" in the proviso require an applicant, who proposes to furnish security instead of depositing the decretal amount, to obtain the Court's prior direction at the time of presenting the application as to the character/kind of security to be furnished?
  3. Must the Court be satisfied as to the sufficiency of the security at the time the application is presented, or can satisfaction as to sufficiency be recorded at a later stage after further evidence?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Revision Petitioner) Arguments

  • The applicant contended that no direction of the Court was necessary regarding whether he should deposit the decretal amount in cash or furnish security under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
  • It was further argued that it was not necessary to adduce evidence of the sufficiency of the security at the time the application was presented; the applicant should be permitted to satisfy the Court of the adequacy of the security at a later stage.
  • Mention was made (as urged) that where a judgment-debtor is prepared to deposit the decretal amount in court, it would be an unnecessary formality for the Court to give a direction permitting such a deposit.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, point-by-point account of any respondent's (successful plaintiff's) arguments or additional party submissions beyond the applicant's contentions summarized above.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram [(1906) 28 All. 470] Authority for the proposition that an applicant to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes must either deposit the decretal amount in cash or furnish security. The Court observed that this authority supports the view that the applicant has the option to deposit the decretal amount or give security, and that if the applicant elects to give security it must be "to the satisfaction of the Court and subject to the Court's directions." The Court noted, however, that Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram did not decide the distinct point whether the Court's satisfaction as to the sufficiency of security must be expressed at the time the application is presented.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Two judges delivered reasons. The Court's analysis focused on the proper construction of the proviso to sub-Section 1, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which reads (in relevant part):

"Provided an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte ... shall, at the time of presenting an application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or ... give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the Court may direct."

Mukerji, J.: He adopted a plain-construction approach. His key points were:

  • The proviso requires the applicant to do one of two things: (1) deposit the decretal amount in Court, or (2) give security to the satisfaction of the Court. The choice between these alternatives is for the Court to dictate and not for the applicant to make unilaterally.
  • The words "as the Court may direct" are not ambiguous in his view and do not refer to the nature of the security; the nature and sufficiency are controlled by the phrase "to the satisfaction of the Court." The Court must, when giving any direction that security other than cash may be furnished, ensure that the proposed security will be to its satisfaction.
  • He illustrated with a factual example (a disputed heirloom gun): in cases where the subject-matter of the decree is a specific movable or immovable thing, deposit of money (i.e., the assessed compensation) might not be an adequate substitute for security that ensures the item itself will remain available; thus a court may properly require non-cash security of a specified character to be furnished.
  • He concluded that the proper procedure is that the applicant should present a petition seeking the Court's specific order as to what must be furnished; the Court will consider circumstances and direct whether cash deposit or some other security is required. The applicant must invite the Court's direction at the time of presenting the application.
  • On that basis he agreed that the order below was correct as to interpretation of S.17 and dismissed the revision application with costs.

Niamatullah, J.: He addressed an apparent ambiguity created by the concluding phrase "as the Court may direct." His analysis emphasized grammatical construction and pragmatic effect:

  • If the phrase "as the Court may direct" were read as applying to the two alternatives (deposit or give security), grammar would compel the result that an applicant must obtain the Court's direction as to which of the two alternatives to adopt — a formality that would be absurd because courts do not, and would not, refuse cash deposits.
  • He preferred an interpretation that the applicant has the option to deposit the decretal amount in cash or to give security to the satisfaction of the Court. The direction contemplated by the words "as the Court may direct" more sensibly relates to the character or kind of security that the Court may direct should be furnished when the applicant elects to give security (for example, hypothecation of immovable property, pledge of ornaments, etc.).
  • He distinguished two separate requirements: (a) the requirement to obtain the Court's direction as to the character of the security at the time of presenting the application if one proposes to give security instead of depositing cash; and (b) the separate requirement that the security ultimately be to the satisfaction of the Court. He held that it is not necessary for the Court to be able to record its satisfaction as to sufficiency of the security at the very time when the application is presented; the applicant may later satisfy the Court on that question at a convenient subsequent stage.
  • Applying this construction to the facts, although he disagreed with the lower Court on the point that a prior direction was needed merely to choose between depositing cash and giving security, he agreed that the applicant failed to obtain the Court's direction as to the character of the security he proposed to offer and that omission was fatal. For these reasons he maintained the order below and dismissed the revision application with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application in revision is dismissed with costs.

Consequences and immediate implications:

  • The Court upheld the order of the Small Cause Court refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. The direct effect on the parties is that the applicant's revision is unsuccessful and the lower court's refusal to set aside the ex parte decree stands; costs were awarded against the applicant.
  • The Court interpreted the proviso to sub-Section 1, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to mean that an applicant seeking to set aside an ex parte decree must, at the time of presenting the application, either deposit the decretal amount in court or seek the Court's direction as to the character of security to be furnished if he proposes to give security. While the character of security must be directed by the Court at that stage, the Court's ultimate satisfaction as to sufficiency of the security need not necessarily be recorded at the moment the application is presented and can be established at a later but suitable stage.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a novel rule beyond this interpretation of the statutory proviso; the decision enforces the procedural requirement that an applicant who opts for security must obtain the Court's direction as to the nature of that security when presenting the application, and that failure to do so may be fatal to the application.

    Jhabboo Misir v. Havaldar Tewari

    Mukerji, J.:— This is an application to revise the order of the Judge, Small Cause Court, Ballia, dated 3rd March 1928 by which that learned Judge refused an application on behalf of a defendant judgment-debtor to set aside the ex parte decree made against him on 1st November 1927.

    2. The only point that requires decision in this Court is whether the learned Judge was right in dismissing the application on the ground (inter alia) that no direction of the Court was taken as to whether the judgment-debtor should deposit, along with his application, the decretal amount or should furnish security to the satisfaction of the Court. We have to construe the proviso to sub-Section 1, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. It reads as follows:

    “Provided an applicant for an order to sat aside a decree passed ex parte …… shall, at the time of presenting an application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment or give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the Court may direct.”

    3. The plain construction of the above proviso would be that the applicant has to do one of two things and that he has to do such of the two things as may be dictated to him by the Court. The choice of the alternative lies, as to the performance on the part of the applicant with the Court and not with the applicant himself. The two things that the applicant is required to do are (1) deposit of the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment and (2) giving of security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree or the compliance with the judgment. It has been urged that where the judgment-debtor is prepared to deposit in Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, it would be an unnecessary procedure on the part of the Court to solemnly signify that the security in cash may be deposited. Let us see if this is universally true.

    4. A Court of Small Causes, as constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, takes cognizance of all suits of a civil nature except those specifically exempted from its cognizance; (S. 15 of the Act). Thus there may be cases in which the deposit of what has been called the decretal amount may not be enough to satisfy the need of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Take for example, this particular case. A father, by his will leaves his gun, as an heirloom, to the elder of his two sons. The younger son, being desirous of keeping the gun used by his father in his lifetime, takes possession of it. The elder brother sues for recovery of the gun. Ordinarily, he would be required to value the gun both for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court and also for the purpose of enabling the Court to assess a money value for the gun in case the same was not forthcoming? as required by R. 10, O. 20 of the CPC. Suppose the Court directs the younger son to pay Rs. 250 as compensation if the gun is not forthcoming. The defendant may be perfectly willing to pay Rs. 250 to the elder brother and keep the gun. Under the provision of O. 21, R. 31 the decree for recovery of the gun would be executed by actual seizure of the gun and the delivery of it to the successful plaintiff. It is only in the case of all effort at getting hold of the gun failing that the compensation will be awarded to the plaintiff. Suppose that a decree is passed, ex parte, in favour of the elder brother against the younger brother. Then the younger brother presents an application to the Court for setting aside the ex parte decree, the Court may very well say to the applicant:

    “I won't accept the deposit of Rs. 250 as a condition precedent to setting aside of the ex parte decree. The decree may be executed today and the gun may be recovered this afternoon. You must produce two gentlemen of honor and means as security to see that nothing short of the gun itself is forthcoming after the retrial of the restored suit is over.”

    5. Such a case, to my mind, would be a case in which the Court may very well say that security to the satisfaction of the Court shall be given and the decretal amount shall not be deposited as a condition precedent to the entertainment of the application.

    6. As I read the proviso to S. 17, I find no ambiguity whatsoever in it. The rule of law has to provide for all sorts of cases. In cases where the decree is of the simplest character, namely, where it directs payment of money by one party to another, the Court would surely prefer a deposit of the decretal amount to furnishing of any other kind of security. But where the Court, on the representation of the applicant agrees to accept security other than cash security, it shall see, when it gives the direction that security other than cash security may be furnished, that such security is to the satisfaction of the Court. The words “may direct” in my opinion have no reference to the nature of the security. The nature of the security is sufficiently defined by the words, “to the statisfaction of the Court.”

    7. In my opinion; the proper procedure when an application is made for the setting aside of an ex parte decree passed by a Small Cause Court or when an application for review of judgment of such Court is made is, to present a petition to the Court, asking for its specific order as to what the applicant should do, in the nature of furnishing security. The Court will then, on considering the entire circumstances of the case, decide whether a certain and what amount should be furnished as cash security or whether it should, in suitable cases, in spite of offer of cash security require any other kind of security or whether, in the case of the decree being for money only, the Court will allow the applicant to furnish any security other than cash security and, in that case, will tell the party, after hearing what sort of security he is prepared to furnish, whether the security proposed will satisfy it or not. I do not suggest that evidence as to the security being to the satisfaction of the Court may not be taken on a date subsequent to that on which the application itself is presented. It may be that the consideration of the question before the Court will require more time than the Court is able to give on the day the application is presented. All that is a subsidiary matter. The main thing is that, with the presentation of the application the applicant must invite the attention of the Court to his application and seek the Court's direction.

    8. In my opinion the order appealed against is correct, so far as the interpretation of the proviso to S. 17 goes. On this ground alone, I will dismiss the application with costs.

    Niamatullah, J.:— This is an application for revision of an order passed by the Court of Small Causes at Ballia refusing to set aside an ex parte decree passed against the application on 1st November 1927. The application for order to set aside the ex parte decree was made on 15th December 1927. On the face of it, the application was made more than 30 days after the passing of the ex parte decree; but the applicant sought exemption on certain grounds mentioned in his application, which, as I read the judgment of the lower Court have not been disposed of. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to this aspect of the matter any further. The application for order to set aside the ex-parte decree was not accompanied by a deposit in Court of the amount due under the decree; but a security bond hypothecating immovable property, prima facie duly executed, was filed. It was disallowed by the Court below on the grounds (1) that:

    “the direction of the Court at the time of the presenting of the application as to whether he should deposit in Court the amount due from him under the decree or give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree, as required by the proviso of Section 17, Clause 1 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,”

    had not been obtained, and (2) that the security offered with the application was not such as satisfied the Court on the date on which the application was presented.

    9. It is contended in revision that no direction of the Court was necessary as regards the deposit of the decretal amount in cash or the security to be furnished under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, nor was it necessary to adduce evidence of the sufficiency or otherwise of the security on the date on which the application was presented if subsequently the applicant could satisfy the Court that the security offered was adequate.

    10. The proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is somewhat ambiguously worded. Omitting words with which we are not concerned, it runs thus:

    “Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree, as the Court may direct.”

    11. The last five words, “as the Court may direct” give rise to an ambiguity which makes certain provisions in the proviso a little obscure. If they are intended to refer to the two alternatives mentioned in it, namely, (1) either to deposit the decretal amount, or (2) give security to the satisfaction of the Court, the grammatical construction would lead to the result that the applicant must obtain the direction of the Court at the time of presenting his application as to whether he should adopt one or the other of the two alternatives. It is obvious that no Court will refuse, to accept deposit in cash; but the section as it stands, makes the observance of the formality to obtain the Court's direction necessary. If, in the absence of the direction of the Court, sufficient security is given and the applicant cannot be deemed to have complied with the requirements of the proviso, it is equally arguable that a deposit without a specific direction does not comply with the requirements of it. It seems to me that the words in question have no grammatical relation to the two alternatives already mentioned. The applicant has been given the option either to deposit in cash, or to give security to the satisfaction of the Court; and in the latter case, provided the security is to the satisfaction of the Court, no permission of the Court to furnish security is needed. The question then arises as to whether the direction contemplated relates to the security being to the satisfaction of the Court. I do not think this is the case.

    To give security to the satisfaction of the Court, as the Court may direct”

    12. Would be a very clumsy language to use and I do not think the framers of the proviso intended that construction. If we were at liberty to insert the word “such” between “give” and “security” so as to make that particular part of the proviso to be:

    “to give such security to the satisfaction of the Court, as the Court may direct,”

    13. No ambiguity would be left, and the proviso would be capable of an obviously sensible interpretation, namely, that the direction of the Court is necessary as regards the kind of the security which, when furnished, should satisfy the Court as regards its sufficiency. I am inclined to think that, even without inserting the word “such,” as suggested above the proviso in capable of that interpretation, in which case:

    “to give security to the satisfaction of the Court, as the Court may direct,”

    means that the nature and kind of the security must be according to the direction of the Court, which should also be satisfied as regards its sufficiency. In this view of the matter, which I accept, it is necessary for an applicant, who is not ready and willing to deposit the decretal amount with his application for an order to set aside the ex parte decree and desires to give security instead should “at the time of presenting his application” obtain the direction of the Court as regards the character of the security, i.e whether it should be by hypothecating proprietary tenure, fixed rate tenancy house property, pledge of ornaments, or the like. Of course, in every case the Court should be satisfied as regards the sufficiency of the security to be furnished according to its directions. This is a separate requirement altogether. It is not, in my opinion, necessary that the Court should be placed in a position to express its satisfaction as regards the sufficiency of the security at the time of presenting the application. If the Court is not satisfied on that question on the evidence which the applicant can produce forthwith, it is open to the applicant to satisfy the Court on that point at a later but convenient stage, and if the Court is then able to record its satisfaction, I think the requirement of the section is made out.

    14. The only case decided by this Court, to which reference has been made in course of arguments, is Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram . [1906] 28 All. 470 which is an authority for the proposition that an applicant for an order to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes must either deposit the decretal amount in cash or furnish security. It does not decide the second point which arises in the case before us. The learned Judges have expressed an opinion on the second point which supports the view which I have taken. They observe:

    “We think that the meaning of the section is that the applicant has the option either to deposit the amount of the decree in cash or give security. But if be elects to adopt the latter course the security must be to the satisfaction of the Court and subject to the Court's directions.”

    15. They were not called upon to say, and have not said, that the Court should express its satisfaction as to the sufficiency of the security at the time when the application is presented. Having taken the view that the applicant has the option either to deposit the amount in cash or to give security, direction of the Court could have only been meant to refer to the character of the security. For the reasons already stated, while I do not agree with the Court below that any direction of the Court is necessary as to whether the applicant for an order to set aside the ex parte decree should furnish security instead of depositing the decretal amount in cash, or that the applicant must obtain a certificate, so to say, as regards the sufficiency of the security at the time of presenting his application, I maintain the order sought to be revised on the ground that the applicant should have obtained the direction of the Court as regards the character of the security which he proposed to offer, and that an omission to obtain such direction was fatal to the success of his application.

    16. By the Court:— The application in revision is dismissed with costs.

    R.M/R.K

    17. Application dismissed.

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    Jhabboo Misir v. Havaldar Tewari
    (Jul 4, 1929)