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  • Tenancy Act by section 4(13) and read with section 49 of the Revenue Act
  • section 165 of the Tenancy Act.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Tenancy Act by section 4(13) and read with section 49 of the Revenue Act
  • section 165 of the Tenancy Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case is a second appeal that was referred from a single Judge to a Bench of two Judges because of an apparent conflict between the decisions in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo on the one hand and Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup and Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai on the other.

The central factual situation presented in the pleadings was that a lambardar (the plaintiff) brought a suit claiming, in effect, the whole excess in value of the defendants' khudkasht and sir land over the amount due to those defendants by reason of their fractional share in the mahal; the plaintiff also credited himself with lambardari haq. The plaintiff thus sued in the capacity of lambardar rather than as an ordinary co-sharer, as shown by the account filed with the plaint.

At trial the court treated the suit as if it were brought by the lambardar in his capacity as an individual co-sharer and ascertained the plaintiff's individual share, thereby changing the nature of the suit in the course of hearing. The lower appellate court upheld the trial court's decree. On appeal to this Court the judges examined whether (a) the suit was properly entertained as one by the lambardar against co-sharers holding land yielding income in excess of their fractional shares, and (b) whether the lower courts erred in allowing the plaintiff to claim the whole excess income of particular defendants without joining or accounting for other co-sharers similarly entitled.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a lambardar can sue, in his capacity as lambardar, one or more co-sharers who occupy land producing annual income in excess of the sum due to those co-sharers according to their fractional interest in the mahal.
  2. Whether a decree allowing a single co-sharer to recover the whole excess income enjoyed by another co-sharer is maintainable where other co-sharers who may have similar claims were not made parties or included in the accounts.
  3. Which of the conflicting precedents—Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo or Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup (and the subsequent Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai)—should be followed on the point of a lambardar's capacity to sue co-sharers.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff (the lambardar) attempted to show that the suit was not of the character in which a lambardar sues co-sharers for excess income arising from khudkasht and sir held by those co-sharers.
  • The plaintiff also sought to show that the suit was not treated by the lower courts as a suit of the description that would preclude him from suing as lambardar; however, the account filed with the plaint demonstrated that he was claiming the whole excess from the defendants and was crediting himself with lambardari haq, indicating he was indeed suing as lambardar.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the other parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo Held that a lambardar is not the agent of the co-sharers generally so as to be entitled to sue on behalf of some co-sharers against other co-sharers; a lambardar might represent all co-sharers against a non-co-sharer but cannot represent some co-sharers against others. The Court preferred and followed this decision. It applied its principle to hold that a lambardar cannot sue as lambardar one or more co-sharers for sums due by reason of their holding sir or khudkasht in excess.
Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup Permitted a suit by certain co-sharers against a lambardar for profits, holding that in suits under section 165 it is necessary to take into account the amount of sir and khudkasht owned by the parties and suggesting a lambardar might be treated as agent in some respects. The Court examined this decision and found it, in part, inconsistent with Bishambhar Nath. The Court declined to follow Ganga Singh so far as it dissents from Bishambhar Nath, and distinguished Ganga Singh on the ground that it was unclear whether the excess in question had actually been realized by the lambardar.
Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai A single Judge relied on and quoted with approval the passage from Ganga Singh that suggested a lambardar could sue on behalf of certain co-sharers against other co-sharers holding excess land. The Court noted that Kundan Lal followed Ganga Singh. Having preferred Bishambhar Nath, the Court held that Kundan Lal (to the extent it follows Ganga Singh) should not be followed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-wise analytical fashion, applying the facts as pleaded and the relevant legal principles and precedent:

  1. Character of the suit: The Court examined the account filed with the plaint and concluded that the plaintiff was suing in the capacity of lambardar. The account claimed the whole excess in value of the defendants' khudkasht and sir land over the amount due to those defendants by reason of their fractional share, and credited the plaintiff with lambardari haq.
  2. Change in nature of the suit at trial: The trial court had treated the suit as if brought by the lambardar in his capacity as an individual co-sharer, and it ascertained the plaintiff's individual share—thereby effecting a change in the nature of the suit from that actually brought. The appellate court affirmed this approach, but the present Court found additional objections to the decree beyond that procedural change.
  3. Defect in allowing recovery of whole excess from particular defendants: The lower courts allowed the plaintiff to claim the whole of the excess income in the hands of two defendants because the plaintiff's total share in the mahal approximately equalled that excess. The Court held this reasoning to be erroneous: one co-sharer cannot claim the whole of the excess income enjoyed by another co-sharer merely because the claiming co-sharer is short to that extent of his fractional share of income. Other co-sharers similarly short are entitled to share in any excess and therefore must be made parties to the suit.
  4. Requirement of proper accounts under section 165: The Court emphasized that under section 165 of the Tenancy Act a suit must be one for accounts primarily and must present accounts showing entitlement to the sum claimed. It is not sufficient that some co-sharers (called as witnesses, not parties) admitted nothing was due, or that the plaintiff asserts he paid other co-sharers out of his own pocket. Payment by one co-sharer does not, of itself, give a right to recover the paid amount from third co-sharers under section 165 unless a valid legal transfer of the actionable claim is pleaded. The plaintiff did not set up such a transfer; accordingly the accounts before the trial court did not show the plaintiff's entitlement to the sums decreed.
  5. Analysis of precedent conflict: The Court analyzed the apparent conflict between Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo and Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup (and the subsequent Kundan Lal decision). Bishambhar Nath held a lambardar could not represent some co-sharers against others. Ganga Singh had allowed co-sharers to sue a lambardar for profits and suggested that consideration of sir and khudkasht was necessary under section 165; an obiter passage in Ganga Singh suggested that if the lambardar is agent for rent suits he may equally be agent to sue co-sharers holding excess sir/khudkasht. The Court found Ganga Singh unclear on whether the excess claimed was already realized by the lambardar; it also distinguished between (a) suits to collect rent from a tenant (where the lambardar represents all co-sharers) and (b) suits to recover excess income from a co-sharer who holds sir/khudkasht in excess, where the co-sharer is not an outsider but a member of the co-sharing body. The statutory definition of "lambardar" (as applied by section 4(13) and section 49 of the Revenue Act, and the Board Rules) did not authorize a lambardar to represent only some of the co-sharers against other co-sharers.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: For these reasons the Court preferred the reasoning in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo over Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup where the two decisions were in conflict, and concluded that a lambardar cannot sue as lambardar one or more co-sharers for sums due by reason of their holding as sir or khudkasht excess land.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court reached the following dispositive conclusions:

  • DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed.
  • RELIEF: The plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.
  • LEGAL RULE: A lambardar cannot sue as lambardar one or more co-sharers for any sum due from them by reason of their holding as sir or khudkasht excess land; this Court follows Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo in preference to Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup where the two decisions conflict.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's claim (brought as lambardar to recover the whole excess in the defendants' hands) was rejected and the suit dismissed; the lower courts' decree in favour of the plaintiff could not be upheld on the grounds explained (inadequate accounts under section 165 and lack of necessary parties/co-sharers).
  • Precedential effect: The Court expressly prefers and follows the earlier decision in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo and declines to follow Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup to the extent that it dissents from Bishambhar Nath. The judgment therefore clarifies that a lambardar's authority to represent co-sharers does not extend to suing some co-sharers on behalf of others for excesses arising from sir or khudkasht holdings.
Appeal allowed.

    Koka v. Chunni

    Ashworth and Kendall, JJ.:— This second appeal which came up before a single Judge of this Court has been referred to a Bench of two Judges on account of the apparent conflict between the case of Bishambkar Nath v. Bhullo, on the one side, and Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup and Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai, on the other hand. The whole question involved is whether a lambardar can sue as lambardar any co-sharer who has occupied land bringing in an estimated yearly income in excess of the sum due to that co-sharer according to his fractional interest in the mahal.

    An attempt has been made by the plaintiff lambardar is counsel in this second appeal to show that the suit was not one of this description, and, secondly, that it was not treated by the lower courts as one of this description. The former attempt must fail in view of the account filed by the plaintiff with his plaint. That account does not show the plaintiff's share in the mahal as a co-sharer. It claims from the defendants the whole of the excess in value of their khudkasht and sir land over the amount due to the defendants by reason of their fractional share in the mahal. It also credits the plaintiff with lambardari haq. It is, therefore, quite clear that the plaintiff is suing as a lambardar.

    The trial court, of which the decision has been upheld by the lower appellate court, does appear to have treated the suit as one by the lambardar in his capacity as a co-sharer. The trial court has ascertained the plaintiff's individual share and worked out what sum was due to him as an individual co-sharer. This involves a change in the nature of the suit from that actually brought. We might have been disposed to permit of such a change being made and uphold the decree of the lower courts, if it were not open to objection on another ground than that the plaintiff's case had been changed in the course of hearing. But the lower courts have, in our opinion, erred in one material point. They have allowed the plaintiff to claim the whole of the excess income in the hands of the two defendants, because the plaintiff's share in the total profits of the mahal does not exceed (except by a few rupees) that excess. One co-sharer is not entitled to claim the whole of the excess in the bands of another co-sharer merely because he is short to that extent of his fractional share in the income of the mahal. All the other co-sharers who are similarly short are entitled to share in the excess income enjoyed by any one co-sharer and they must be made parties to the suit by the one co-sharer. This fact was ignored by the trial court. It was perceived by the lower appellate court which attempted to meet it in the following way. The District Judge has stated that four of the other co-sharers admitted as witnesses (not as parties) that there was nothing due to them and later on he states that the plaintiff's case is that he has paid off the other co-sharers what was due to them. This will not, however, satisfy the requirements of section 165 of the Tenancy Act. A suit under section 165 must be one for accounts primarily. It is necessary that there should be accounts showing that the plaintiff is entitled to the sum claimed. For this purpose it must be shown by figures that the other co-sharers have no claim to the excess which the particular co-sharer, who is plaintiff, is claiming. The fact that the plaintiff may have paid off another co-sharer out of his own pocket will not give the plaintiff a right to recover the money so paid from a third co-sharer under section 165. Section 165 is confined to a claim for a share of money collected in excess which is due to the plaintiff on the ground of its being so collected. One co-sharer cannot claim on behalf of another co-sharer merely by reason of making a payment to that other co-sharer, without some transfer of the actionable claim which would be valid in law. No such transfer is set up in this case. So far, then, as the decree appealed against may be regarded as a decree in favour of an individual co-sharer, it may he impugned on the ground that the plaintiff respondent was not shown by the accounts prepared by the trial court to be entitled to the sums decreed him, inasmuch, as the claims of the other co-sharers were not included in that account. We are unable, therefore, to uphold the decree of the lower courts.

    We now come to the question raised by the Judge of this Court who had this case referred to a Bench. The plaintiff sued as lambardar. Should his suit have been entertained as such? In the case of Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo it was held by a Bench of two Judges of this Court that a lambardar is not the agent of the co-sharers generally, so as to be entitled to sue on their behalf to recover profits due to some of them from other co-sharers holding sir and khudkasht lands in excess of their proper shares. The basis of this decision was that there might be a custom or rule conferring on the lambardar a power to represent all the co-sharers against a non-co-sharer, but that there could not be (or at any rate was not) any custom or rule of law entitling a lambardar to represent some of the co-sharers against others. In Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup there was a suit by certain co-sharers against a lambardar for profits. The plaintiffs claimed in that suit that the lambardar should he responsible to them for excess income enjoyed by other co-sharers by reason of the value of their sir and khudkasht exceeding their fractional share of profits. The court permitted this to be done, although it was argued that a lambardar could not be made liable for such excess profits, if, as ruled in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo, he was not entitled to realize them by a suit. This contention was rejected mainly on the consideration that a lambardar must be entitled to reply to co-sharers claiming their shares of rental collected that these co-sharers had realized all that to which they were entitled by possession of sir and khudkasht. This consideration was held to establish in suits under section 165 of the Tenancy Act the necessity of taking into consideration the amount of sir and khudkasht owned by the parties. Incidentally in this decision it was remarked that “if the lambardar is the agent of the co-sharers to bring a suit for rent, he seems to be equally their agent for the purpose of bringing a suit against co-sharers who hold sir and khudkasht in excess and who have refused to allow the sir and khudkasht which they hold to be taken into account.

    This latter passage was quoted with approval by a single Judge in the case of Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai in which case the lambardar was held to have a right to sue on behalf of certain co-sharers against other co-sharers holding land in excess of their shares. It is not clear from the recorded judgement in the case of Ganga Singh v. Ram Samp whether the plaintiffs were asking the lambardar to account for an excess which had been realized by the lambardar or not. If this excess was one not yet realized by the lambardar but which it was claimed he could realize, then it is true that the decision in Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup could not be reconciled with the decision in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhully, otherwise there would be no inconsistency between the two decisions. Again the illustration given in Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup, which led to the decision of the court that it was necessary to take sir and khudkasht into consideration, does not appear to us necessarily to have that effect. If a co-sharer sues a lambardar for his share of rental, that co-sharer must be deemed to have actually collected in excess the value of his khudkasht so far as that value exceeds his fractional share of the income of the mahal. There is no difficulty in making a co-sharer, whether plaintiff or defendant, liable for payment of what he has actually collected or must be deemed to have collected. It is quite another matter to require a lambardar to be responsible to co-sharers for excess due by other co-sharers which he has not collected. As regards a lambardar being the agent for certain co-sharers against other co-sharers, there is certainly nothing in the definition of “lambardar” in the Revenue Act as applied to the Tenancy Act by section 4(13) and read with section 49 of the Revenue Act and the Board Rules, which would authorize a lambardar to represent a few only of the co-sharers against other co-sharers. Again, the collection of rent is governed by entirely different considerations to the collection of excess income from one co-share holding land yielding an annual income in excess of his share of the income of the whole mahal. A tenant is a party outside the co-sharers; and the lambardar, when suing the tenant, will represent all the co-sharers. A co-sharer holding sir or khudkasht cannot be regarded as holding it in a capacity other than that of a co-sharer. He holds the land because lie is a co-sharer and it is impossible to set up the co-sharing body as a juristic body with interests entirely separate from the single co-sharer's interest.

    We, therefore, in accordance with the decision in Bishambhar Nath v. Bhullo, in preference to that in Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup, which decision we consider should not be followed so far as it dissents from the previous decision, hold that a lambardar cannot sue as lambardar one or more co-sharers for any sum due from them by reason of their holding as sir or khudkasht excess land.

    We have remarked above that the lower courts allowed the plaintiff's case to be varied in the course of hearing, but their decision was open to objection even on the basis of the substituted case for the reasons stated.

    For the above reasons we allow this appeal and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff with costs throughout.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Koka v. Chunni
    (Jul 22, 1927)