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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two second appeals arise from a suit by Lachmi Narain (a minor) against his father Munni Lal (defendant 2) and Ganpat Rai (defendant 1, purchaser). The plaintiff sought possession (understood in the opinion as joint possession with the father) of a house sold by the father to Ganpat Rai by a sale-deed. The plaintiff alleged that the sale was not binding on him because (a) his father was insane when executing the deed, and (b) alternatively, the property was ancestral joint family property and the sale was not legally necessary. The defence claimed the father was sane and competent and that the sale was for legal necessity; it was also stated that the purchaser expended money on improvements.

The opinion as provided contains inconsistent factual particulars as to dates and some monetary figures: paragraph 0 refers to a sale-deed dated 29th April 1927, while the separate judgment of Mukerji, J. refers to a sale on 24th April 1917 and a suit instituted on 27th June 1923 (with the plaintiff then being six years old). Monetary totals are described variously as Rs. 1,850 and Rs. 1,350 in different passages. The summary below reproduces the factual assertions as they appear in the opinion without resolving these inconsistencies.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale executed by the father was void or voidable as the father was insane at the time of execution.
  2. Whether the sale of ancestral joint family property by the father (a manager/guardian) was supported by legal necessity to bind the minor plaintiff.
  3. If the sale was avoidable, whether the purchaser (transferee) who made improvements can recover compensation under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act by showing he believed in good faith that he was absolutely entitled.
  4. What is the meaning and scope of the words "in good faith" in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, particularly as applied to a transferee from a guardian/manager of a Hindu joint family?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The sale by the father was not binding on the plaintiff because the father was insane when he executed the deed.
  • Alternatively, the property was ancestral joint family property and the father could only sell it if the sale was necessary; here the sale was unnecessary and the consideration inadequate.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The father was sane and competent to execute the transfer.
  • The sale was for legal necessity and/or for adequate consideration.
  • The purchaser (defendant 1) had built or rebuilt on the property at considerable cost (claimed about Rs. 25,000) and was entitled to compensation for improvements.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in the following main strands (as expressed by the two judges, Ashworth, J. and Mukerji, J.):

Ashworth, J. — Principal Reasoning

  • The appellate findings of fact by the lower appellate Court (in particular that the father was not insane and that only Rs. 425 of the consideration was a debt binding on the family) are findings of fact binding on this Court in second appeal and are not impugned.
  • The first instance Court had held the sale necessary and dismissed the suit; the lower appellate Court disagreed on necessity except to the extent of Rs. 425 and found part of the purchase money had been used by Munni Lal for his own purposes and certain recitals (e.g., Rs. 700 to Bawan Das) were false or unsupported by evidence.
  • As to compensation for improvements, the lower appellate Court relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which was not pleaded and lacked supporting evidence). Ashworth, J. concluded that relying on equitable estoppel was not justified, but that Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act independently justified crediting the purchaser with the present value of improvements.
  • On the applicability of Section 51: that provision protects a transferee who makes improvements believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled and is subsequently evicted by a person with a better title. Ashworth, J. distinguished between a defeasible title (one that is valid until avoided by the person wronged) and a defective title — and observed Section 51 applies to defective but not to mere defeasible transfers. Nevertheless, because a transfer by a father/manager of a joint family is valid until avoided by the son, the purchaser was the absolute owner at the time improvements were made and could be held to have believed in good faith that he was owner.
  • Ashworth, J. referenced Section 65 of the Contract Act to the effect that where a contract becomes voidable and the plaintiff has received an advantage, the plaintiff is bound to restore the advantage or make compensation. That principle supports requiring the plaintiff to account for the purchaser's improvements.
  • On the meaning of "in good faith": Ashworth, J. observed that the later definition in the General Clauses Act S.3(20) (meaning "honestly") did not apply to Acts passed before 1897, and that when Section 51 was enacted the available statutory definition (in the Indian Penal Code, S.52) meant "not done or believed without due care and attention." He held that the legislature had that meaning in mind and that if the transferee was party to a false recital in the sale-deed, the necessity for inquiry had occurred to him and he could not claim "good faith" in the protective sense; on the facts, however, the lower appellate Court's application of Section 51 was not impugned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's appeal thereby failed.
  • Consequently Ashworth, J. dismissed both the plaintiff's appeal and the purchaser's cross-appeal with costs.

Mukerji, J. — Concurring Reasons

  • Mukerji, J. agreed in result (dismissal of the appeals) but offered different emphasis: he treated the question whether the transferee believed in good faith that he was absolutely entitled as primarily a question of fact to be determined in each case.
  • He noted Section 51's text and rejected the automatic application of any particular statutory definition of "good faith" (e.g., from the General Clauses Act of 1897) to the Transfer of Property Act; he also considered the Indian Penal Code definition (requiring due care and attention) and regarded both definitions as not straightforwardly transplantable into Section 51.
  • Mukerji, J. expressed the view that "good faith" should have a meaning intermediate between the narrow/heavily care-focused IPC sense and the broader "honestly" definition, but recognized the inherent difficulty in laying down a universal rule; he treated much of that discussion as obiter dictum.
  • On the facts he concluded that (despite findings that only Rs. 425 represented legal necessity) there was sufficient justification for the purchaser to believe in good faith he was absolutely entitled: the purchaser had received the consideration in cash before the Sub-Registrar, the vendor was found sane, a sarkhat in favour of Bawan Das existed according to some findings, and the purchaser had expended a large sum (about Rs. 25,000) on improvements. In the absence of a clear finding by the lower Court on the transferee's belief, Mukerji, J. would himself find that the purchaser held sufficient belief in good faith to qualify under Section 51.
  • Given the plaintiff's poverty (stated in the judgment), Mukerji, J. accepted the lower appellate Court's approach (effectively requiring the plaintiff to sell his interest rather than to buy out the enhanced property) as the only possible decision on the facts.
  • He therefore dismissed the plaintiff's appeal with costs and found no substance in the defendant's appeal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court dismissed both appeals with costs. The lower appellate Court's findings of fact (that the father was not insane and that only Rs. 425 of the purchase price represented a debt binding on the family) were treated as binding, and the Court upheld the lower appellate Court's application of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act to credit the purchaser for improvements.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The plaintiff's appeal seeking possession on payment limited to the Rs. 425 found to be valid consideration was rejected.
  • The purchaser (defendant 1) is entitled to be credited for improvements under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, subject to the application of the principle that a transferee who in good faith believes himself absolutely entitled and is subsequently evicted can recover for improvements.
  • The Court emphasized that the question whether a transferee acted "in good faith" under Section 51 is a question of fact and that, on these facts, the purchaser had sufficient justification for such belief (Mukerji, J.), while Ashworth, J. treated the transferee as absolute owner until the transfer was avoided and hence within Section 51's protection in the circumstances of this case.
  • The opinion contains notable observations (some described as obiter) regarding the meaning of "in good faith" and the difference between defeasible and defective titles; the decision itself does not purport to lay down a new sweeping precedent beyond the application of Section 51 to the facts before the Court.

Direct effect on the parties: both appeals dismissed with costs. No broader binding precedent beyond the facts and statutory interpretation in this opinion is asserted by the Court as setting final law.

    Lachmi Prasad v. Lachmi Narain

    Ashworth, J.:— These two second appeals arise out of a suit brought by Lachmi Narain, minor, against his father, Munni Lal, defendant 2 and Ganpat Rai, purchaser of house 1 property from the father, by a sale-deed, dated the 29th April 1927, for possession (by which must be meant joint possession with the father) of the property. The plaintiff alleged that the sale by his father was not binding on him on the ground that the father was insane at the time of execution of the deed. Alternatively he pleaded that the property being ancestral joint property, his father could only sell it if the sale was necessary, and that the sale was unnecessary. The defence was that the father was never insane but competent to execute the deed, and that the sale was necessary. It is to be noted that the sale purported to be executed by the father both on his own account and also as guardian of the plaintiff.

    2. Both the lower Courts have decided that the father was not incompetent on the score of his mental condition to make the transfer, and in second appeal we are bound by this finding of fact which is not impugned. The first Court found that the sale was necessary and for adequate consideration. It, therefore, dismissed the suit. In appeal the District Judge of Ghazipur set aside this finding of the first Court. It held that the sale of the house by the father was not necessary, and that of the total sale price Rs. 1,850, the only consideration binding on the plaintiff was Rs. 425 due for principal and interest on a bond, dated the 24th October 1916 due by the family to one Mukund Lal. He held, however, that the defendant 1 had spent Rs. 25,000 in rebuilding the house or houses and was entitled to this sum for improvements under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. Without giving the option to the plaintiff to recover the property by payment of the present increase in the value of the property by reason of these improvements, he assumed that the plaintiff would not or could not pay this compensation, and accordingly he, in effect, required the plaintiff to sell his interest in the property to the transferee. He held that the plaintiff's interest was the total purchase-money Rs. 1,350 minus the Rs. 425 required to pay the joint family debt existing at the time of the sale. Against this decision there are cross-appeals. The plaintiff in Appeal No. 1312 maintains that he should have been given a decree for possession of the property on payment of the Rs. 425 found to be valid consideration, and that no account should have been taken of the improvements. I will deal with this appeal first. I consider that in second appeal this Court is bound by the finding of the lower appellate Court that of the whole Rs. 1,350 only Rs. 425 was a debt binding on the family. The lower appellate Court has found that the circumstances were as follows:

    3. The defendant 1 was anxious to acquire this property as it was situated between other properties which belonged to him. He, in vain, during the minority of the defendant 2, attempted to get a transfer from the defendant 2's mother. As soon as the defendant 2 came of age the sale was effected. The consideration of Rs. 425 for a debt due by the family to Makund Lal he found to be good consideration. The rest of the money was paid to Munnu Lal and used by him for his own purposes. The recital in the deed that Rs. 700 was paid to one Bawan Das on an I.O.U (sarkhat) was false. This finding had no doubt some evidence to support it. In particular Bawan Dass' accounts failed to support the fact of any money being owed to him at the time by the family. As regards the liability of the plaintiff to reimburse defendant 1 for the money spent on improvements, the lower appellate Court invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel. This plea was never set up by the defendants and was clearly unsupported by any evidence sufficient to establish equitable estoppel. The lower appellate Court, therefore, was not justified in taking the improvements into consideration on the grounds stated by it. On the other hand I consider that Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, justified the plaintiff being required to credit the defendant 1 with the present value of the improvements. Section 51 applies to a transferee who makes any improvement on the property believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto. Now a transfer by a father and manager of a joint Hindu family is a valid transfer until it is avoided by the son. A defeasible title is not the same thing as a defective title, and Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, applies only to defective and not to defeasible transfers. At the date when the improvement was made this transfer had not been avoided. Defendant was, therefore, the absolute owner and must be held to have believed himself in good faith to be the owner. It makes no difference that he failed to satisfy himself at the time of the sale that it was necessary. Section 65 of the Contract Act, is a guide as to the principle to be invoked. When a contract becomes void, as it did in this case by the plaintiff repudiating the sale by his father, the plaintiff, as a person who has received advantage, is bound to restore that advantage or make compensation for it. The transfer only became voidable at the instance of the plaintiff. Consequently the lower Court was right in taking into consideration the plea of the defendant 2 under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. The method in which the lower appellate Court has applied that section is not impugned by the plaintiff in his appeal. We are not, therefore, concerned with examining that method to see if it is correct. The plaintiff's appeal must, in my opinion, fail.

    4. Defendant 1 also appeals so far as his appeal calls in question the finding of the lower appellate Court that the sale by the father was not necessary, and that only Rs. 425 of the purchase price was good consideration, I hold that we are bound by the findings of fact of the lower appellate Court. In this appeal also the, way in which the lower appellate Court has applied Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not called in question. This appellant merely says that he should not have been called on to pay anything to the plaintiff. Consequently I would dismiss his cross-appeal also.

    5. Inasmuch as I have held above that the purchaser of property from a guardian or from manager or from a Hindu widow in possession of her husband's property is absolute owner until the sale is repudiated by the minor, the co-parcener or the reversionary heir, as the case may be, the question as to the meaning of the words “in good faith” in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act does not arise if it did, I should hold that a finding that the impugned sale could not be sustained because the purchaser had not made sufficient inquiry as to its necessity would amount to a finding that the transferee did not in good faith believe himself to be the absolute owner. It appears tome impossible to say that a transfer which is bad for want of proper inquiry by the purchaser may still be a transfer which the purchaser may believe in good faith to make him owner, unless we invoke the reasoning adopted by me above that the transferee is absolute owner until repudiation of the transfer. I would point out that the definition of “in good faith” contained in the General Clauses Act S. 3(20) as meaning merely “honestly” does not apply to Acts passed before 1897 (see S. 4). When Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, was passed the only definition of “good faith” on the Indian statute book was that in the Indian Penal Code (S. 52), namely:

    not done or believed without due care and attention.

    6. In my opinion the legislature had this meaning of “good faith” in mind when they enacted Section 50 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been contended that the expression “in good faith” in the said. S. 51 would cover failure to make proper inquiry provided that the necessity for further inquiry did not occur to the transferee. Assuming this, it is clear that the necessity did occur to the transferee in this case, because, on the finding of the lower appellate Court, he was party to a false recital in the sale-deed. For the above reasons I would dismiss both the appeals with costs.

    Mukerji, J.:— I entirely agree with my learned brother that these two appeals should be dismissed. My reasons are, however, slightly different.

    7. A father sold for himself and as the guardian of his minor son a house to defendant 1, Ganpat Rai, who has since died and is represented by his minor son. The sale was made on 24th April 1917, and the present suit was instituted by the son, on 27th June 1923. The plaintiff was only six years old, and apparently was just born when the sale was effected.

    8. The plaintiff's case was that the property sold was ancestral, and it was sold without any legal necessity and for inadequate consideration. His case further was that his father was insane when he conveyed the property. The defence was that the father was capable of contracting, and sale was effected for full consideration and for legal necessity. The defence further said that the defendant had built on the site and had repaired a portion of the building sold all told at a cost of about Rs. 25,000.

    9. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit, holding that the sale was made for legal necessity. It framed an issue as to whether the defendant was entitled to be compensated for any expenditure made by him over the property in dispute. It was of opinion that if the question of legal necessity and the question of the sanity of the vendor had not been decided in defendant's favour, the defendant would not have been entitled to any compensation whatsoever. The plaintiff appealed, and the learned District Judge affirmed the decision of the Court of first instance on the question of the father's sanity and on the question whether the property had been sold for its full value. The learned Judge, however, held that there was no legal necessity for the sale except as to the sum of Rs. 425. The lower appellate Court framed no issue what soever as to the question of compensation unless we consider that it is included in the 5th issue which ran:

    Whether the defendant 1 built any house on any portion of the houses in dispute? If so, at what costs, and how does it affect the case?

    10. After having arrived at the conclusion that the sale was for legal necessity to the amount of Rs. 425 out of Rs. 1,850, the entire consideration, the learned Judge decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 925 being the difference between the sale price of Rs. 1,350 and the sum of Rs. 425, the amount to the extent of which the legal necessity had been established.

    11. As my learned brother has pointed out, no question of equitable estoppel was raised in the case, and if the learned Judge purported to decide the case on that basis he was wrong.

    12. The question of compensation has, however, been definitely raised in this Court, and we have to see how far it is applicable.

    13. The law on the point is contained in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, which runs (omitting less important words) as follows:

    When the transferee * * * * * * snakes any improvement on the property * * * * * believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto, and he is subsequently evicted therefrom by any person having a better title, the transferee has a right to recover from the person causing the eviction * * *

    14. The question is whether in this particular case the transferee Ganpat Rai, when he made the improvement, believed in good faith that he was absolutely entitled to the property. In my opinion it is always a question of fact whether a transferee believes or not that he is absolutely entitled to a property. As at present advised I am not prepared to hold that in every case of a transfer by a qualified owner, alleging circumstances which would enable him to give absolute title, the transferee should be treated as believing that he holds absolutely the property in good faith. I need not discuss the point, because, as I said, I consider that it is always a question of fact whether a particular man holds a particular belief. The difficulty in this interpretation may be this. A man loses his property because of a defect in it and yet he is supposed to believe that he is an absolute owner of it. But ex-hypothesi, the rule of law enacted under S. 51 applies to such a case. There should be two persons, one the transferee who has a defective title and a claimant who succeeds in establishing a better title. This state of things being accepted, we have to find out whether the man with the defective title is really a man described in S. 51.

    15. The words “in good faith” were not defined in the General Clauses Act of 1868. They are defined in the General Clauses Act of 1897, and the definition is as follows:

    A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not.

    16. This definition does not apply to the Transfer of Property Act. “Good faith” is defined in the Indian Penal Code; but in my opinion that definition too is not applicable. When a person is supposed to be guilty of an act, which would be an offence except for certain belief held by him, the law would require, and should require, that belief should be held on substantial grounds. It was for this reason that “good faith” in the Indian Penal Code was defined as follows:

    Nothing shall be deemed to have been done in good faith which is not done without due care and attention.

    17. If we import this definition into Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, we shall find that we shall make the section entirely unworkable. If a transferee, as in this case, from a Mitakshara father has taken a transfer with due care and attention, he is not at all liable to be evicted at the instance of his son. The son would be bound simply because the transferee had taken due care and given attention.

    18. I, therefore, think that the words “good faith” has a meaning which is somewhat between the two definitions quoted above. I would not be prepared to hold that a man who has been quite negligent as to investigation of title of the vendors, and has acquired the property recklessly should have the advantage given to him of the rule in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. This, however, is only an obiter dictum. It is always dangerous to lay down a general rule in discussing a particular case.

    19. I think I have indicated sufficiently what is in my mind as to the interpretation of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    20. The Court below has held that the transfer was made without legal necessity except as to the sum of Rs. 425. From this it does not follow that the defendant 1 had no grounds for believing that he was not holding absolutely the property purchased by him. No doubt there are certain remarks of the learned Judge, which if taken literally, would imply that the defendant 1 was a party to a fraud on the infant son and was a party to concoction of evidence for the purposes of the sale. The learned Judge was not trying the question of ‘belief in good faith’, and I am not prepared to accept his statements as a finding of a Court of first appeal on facts relating to belief in good faith.

    21. I find that the defendant 1 got the entire consideration money in cash before the Sub-Registrar. It was fonnd that the father (the vendor) was a sane person. It was found that to the extent of Rs. 425 there was a legal necessity. The Judge is prepared to believe that some money was received by the father for his own purposes. Then there was at least a sarkhat in favour of Bawan Das. If all this be true, I do not see what justification the Court below had in saying, at one place of its judgment, that the consideration money that was paid before the Sub-Registrar was returned. This finding is absolutely inconsistent with its other findings. In the absence of any finding of fact on the question of ‘belief in good faith’ I would take it upon myself to decide on the question of fact in second appeal, and would unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the defendant 1 had sufficient justification for holding the belief (good faith) that he was absolutely entitled to the property he had purchased. I need not point out that the lower Court has found that he spent the solid and large sum of Rs. 25,000 over additional buildings and improvements.

    22. Such being my finding, the question would be whether the plaintiff should be allowed to pay for the improvement and take the entire property, or whether he should be called upon to accept the price of such interest as he possessed in the property. The plaintiff's circumstances are too poor to permit of any purchase by him of the improved property. In the circumstances the lower Court's decision was the only one possible.

    23. The result is that I would dismiss the plaintiff's appeal with costs.

    24. There is no substance in the defendant's appeal. It is concluded, as pointed out by my learned brother, by the finding that the sale was supported by legal necessity only to the extent of Rs. 425. I would, therefore, dismiss these appeals with costs.

    25. By the Court:— The appeals are dismissed with costs.

    N.D

    26. Appeals dismissed.

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    Comments

    Lachmi Prasad v. Lachmi Narain
    (Jun 28, 1927)