Mukerji, J.:— The question of law raised by this application in revision is whether an acknowledgement of a debt made after the expiration of the three years' period prescribed by schedule 1 for a suit on a promissory note but made before a suit on the note was actually barred by limitation, was a good acknowledgement.
It appears that the acknowledgement in this case was made while the right of institution of suit was still subsisting owing to holidays having come in. The limitation was to expire on the 17th of October, 1923, on the promissory note on which the suit was brought, but the suit could be instituted on the 23rd as the period between the 17th of October and the 22nd of October, 1923, was a holiday.
The court below has decided against the defendant, hence this application in revision.
The answer to the question must depend on the correct reading of section 19 and section 4 of the Limitation Act. Section 19 says:—
“Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.”
The period prescribed for a suit is not necessarily the period prescribed by schedule 1 of the Limitation Act. “The period prescribed” would mean, in the ordinary sense of the words, the period prescribed by law, that is to say, the period prescribed by the entire-body of the Limitation Act. The schedule 1 read with section 4 of the Limitation Act would mean that the period prescribed for a suit on this particular promissory note, which was executed on the 17th of October, 1920, was between the 17th of October, 1920, and the 23rd of October, 1923. In my opinion there is no reason to limit the sense of the expression “the period prescribed” to the period prescribed in the schedule alone. Where such idea is meant to be expressed, adequate words have been used for that purpose; for example, in section 3 of the Limitation Act we find the words “by the first schedule” added to the word “prescribed.” In the case of Sheo Partab Singh v. Tajammul Husain a Division Bench of this Court considered whether an acknowledgement made within the period prescribed by section 31 of the Indian Limitation Act was a good acknowledgement. Their Lordships held that it was. This is, in my opinion, with respect, good law. I do not agree with the view taken in Bai Hemkore v. Masamalli.
I hold that the acknowledgement was within time and did operate to extend the period of limitation.
The application fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Application dismissed.