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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit on a mortgage-bond said to have been executed on 25 January 1881 by Nathu Singh and Kallu, who are now represented by Musammat Amarti (defendant No. 1). The suit was filed on 8 August 1910 (the 7th August being a Sunday). The original bond was not produced; the plaintiffs alleged the original was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 and filed a copy of the bond.

Musammat Amarti pleaded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue without first obtaining a succession certificate and that the original bond had been paid off. In the court of first instance the plaintiffs produced a succession certificate to collect a debt of Rs. 500 in respect of the bond. No evidence was adduced by either party at trial. The court of first instance held that the execution of the bond was admitted (on the basis that it was not specifically denied in the written statement) and decreed the plaintiffs' suit.

Defendant No. 1 appealed to the lower appellate court. Grounds in that appeal included that the plaintiffs had not shown entitlement to produce secondary evidence of the bond and that the suit was barred by limitation. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that the debt due on the bond exceeded Rs. 2,000 while the plaintiffs' succession certificate covered only Rs. 500; accordingly, the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit. On limitation, the lower appellate court held that because the courts were closed on 7 August 1910 (the last day for filing) and the suit was filed on 8 August 1910, the filing was within time. The lower court also held that execution of the bond was admitted by implication.

The plaintiffs appealed to the court giving the present opinion (a second appeal), challenging the dismissal based on the succession certificate and raising the related issues of secondary evidence and limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to produce secondary evidence (a copy) of the mortgage-bond in the absence of the original and, if so, what preliminary evidence was required to permit reliance on secondary evidence.
  2. Whether the succession certificate produced by the plaintiffs (for Rs. 500) was sufficient to entitle them to maintain a suit for a debt substantially in excess of that amount, or whether the suit should be dismissed for want of a properly proportioned succession certificate.
  3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation when filed on 8 August 1910, given that section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 fixed a two-year period expiring on 7 August 1910 (a Sunday), and whether section 4 of the Limitation Act or section 10 of the General Clauses Act entitled the plaintiffs to file on the next open court day.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Position

  • The plaintiffs relied upon a copy of the bond and asserted that the original was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4.
  • The plaintiffs produced a succession certificate authorizing collection of a debt of Rs. 500 in respect of the bond now in suit.

Defendant's Position (Musammat Amarti / Respondent)

  • It was pleaded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue without first obtaining a proper succession certificate (and that the bond had been paid off).
  • The respondent's vakil argued before this Court that the suit was barred by limitation as at the date of filing (8 August 1910) the prescribed period had expired.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shevdas Daulatram Marwadi v. Narayenvalad Asaji (Bombay High Court decision) Held (by the Bombay High Court) that section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided a period of grace and that section 10 of the General Clauses Act and section 4 of the Limitation Act did not apply to such cases. The Court expressly disagreed with that decision, stating it had arrived at an opposite conclusion and that section 4 (or alternatively section 10 of the General Clauses Act) should operate to permit filing on the next open day when the prescribed period expired on a day the court was closed.
23 All., 277 Authority cited for the proposition that section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1877 (now section 4 of the present Act) may be applied to proceedings not governed by the ordinary limitation law. Used as supporting authority for the view that the rule permitting filing on the next open day can be applied beyond matters appearing in the schedule — i.e., to the period prescribed by section 31 of the 1908 Act.
28 All., 48 Another authority cited alongside 23 All., 277 to support application of the rule in earlier Limitation Act cases to proceedings not governed by ordinary limitation law. Referred to as part of the collected authorities supporting the applicability of the rule allowing filing on the next court day when limitation expires on a closed day.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a structured analysis addressing three interlinked aspects: (1) the adequacy of the succession certificate and appropriate procedural relief, (2) the admissibility of secondary evidence in the absence of the original, and (3) the question of limitation arising under section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and the interaction of section 4 of that Act with section 10 of the General Clauses Act.

On the succession certificate point, the Court concluded that the lower appellate court erred in dismissing the suit solely because the succession certificate covered only Rs. 500 while the bond debt exceeded Rs. 2,000. The appropriate course, the Court held, was to allow the plaintiffs time to obtain an extension or amendment of the certificate rather than dismissing the suit.

On the secondary-evidence issue, both judges expressed that some preliminary evidence should have been required from the plaintiffs before admitting secondary evidence (a copy) of the mortgage-deed. Specifically, the Court required evidence to support the plaintiffs' assertion that the original was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 before permitting use of a copy.

The principal and most detailed portion of reasoning concerned limitation. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 created a special two-year window for suits for foreclosure or sale by a mortgagee, which expired on 7 August 1910. That day fell on a Sunday; the suit was filed on the next day the courts were open (8 August 1910). The Court examined section 4 of the Limitation Act (which permits institution of a suit on the day the court reopens where the period of limitation expires on a day when the court is closed) and found authority and rationale for applying it to periods prescribed outside the schedule. The Court also noted the similarity of section 4 of the Limitation Act and section 10 of the General Clauses Act (which provides that where a period prescribed by any Act expires on a day the court is closed, the act may be done on the next open day), and considered both provisions applicable in the absence of any clear legislative indication that they should not apply.

The Court explicitly disagreed with the Bombay High Court's contrary conclusion in Shevdas Daulatram Marwadi v. Narayenvalad Asaji. One judge (Chamier, J.) discussed and rejected the respondent's contention that the proviso to section 10 (which references the Indian Limitation Act, 1877) should be read as if it referred to the Limitation Act, 1908; he explained that section 31 of the 1908 Act was an entirely new provision and that section 8 of the General Clauses Act did not permit reading the proviso as if it referred to the 1908 Act. He concluded that, if section 4 of the Limitation Act did not apply, section 10 of the General Clauses Act nonetheless covered the case. For these reasons the Court held that the filing on 8 August 1910 was within time.

The Court therefore (a) allowed the appeal from the lower appellate court's dismissal on the succession-certificate ground, (b) held that plaintiffs should be allowed time/opportunity to produce evidence entitling them to rely on secondary evidence of the bond, and (c) held that the suit was within time under either section 4 of the Limitation Act or section 10 of the General Clauses Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed and the cause is remanded to the court below for decision in light of the observations in the judgment. The plaintiffs will be allowed an opportunity to adduce evidence entitling them to produce secondary evidence of the bond. Costs in this appeal will be costs in the cause. Defendants are entitled to produce rebutting evidence.

Implications:

  • The dismissal by the lower appellate court based on the insufficiency of the succession certificate was set aside; the proper remedy is to permit the plaintiffs to seek an amendment or extension of the succession certificate or otherwise to adduce evidence rather than striking out the suit at that stage.
  • The plaintiffs must provide some evidence that the original mortgage-deed was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 before they may rely on a copy (secondary evidence) of the deed; the Court remanded to afford the plaintiffs that opportunity and to permit the defendants to offer rebutting evidence.
  • On the question of limitation, the Court held that filing on the next open court day (8 August 1910) was within time under either section 4 of the Limitation Act or section 10 of the General Clauses Act, and explicitly disagreed with the contrary view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Shevdas Daulatram Marwadi v. Narayenvalad Asaji.
  • The immediate legal consequence is a remand for further proceedings consistent with these directions; the Court ordered costs in the cause. The Court's reasoning interprets section 4 of the Limitation Act and section 10 of the General Clauses Act as applicable to the statutory period created by section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908; the opinion records a rejection of the contrary view of the Bombay High Court but the judgment itself confines relief to the present parties by remanding the cause for further proceedings rather than disposing of the substantive suit on the merits.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; cause remanded.

    Hira Singh v. Musammat Amarti

    Griffin, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit on a mortgage-bond alleged to have been executed on the 25th January, 1881, by Nathu Singh and Kallu, who are now represented by Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1. The suit was filed on the 8th August, 1910, the 7th August being a Sunday. The original bond was not produced. The plaintiffs alleged that it was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 and filed a copy. Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1, pleaded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue without first obtaining a succession certificate, and that the original bond had been paid off. In the court of first instance a succession certificate to collect a debt of Rs. 500 in respect of the bond now in suit was filed by the plaintiffs. No evidence was adduced by either party. The court held that, as the execution of the bond was not specifically denied in the written statement, it must be held to have been admitted and decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1, appealed to the lower appellate court. One ground taken in appeal was that the plaintiffs had not shown that they were entitled to produce secondary evidence of the bond in suit. Another was that the suit was barred by limitation. The lower appellate court held that as the debt due on the bond in suit was over Rs. 2,000, whereas the plaintiff had obtained a succession certificate in respect of a debt of Rs. 500 only, the suit could not be maintained by the plaintiffs and must be dismissed. On the question of limitation the lower appellate court held that as the courts were closed on the 7th August, 1910, the last day of limitation, the suit having been filed on the 8th August, 1910, the day to which the courts reopened, was within time. The court further held that the execution of the bond was admitted by implication. The question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to produce secondary evidence of the bond in suit does not appear to have been argued before the court below. The appeal to that court having been allowed, the plaintiffs come here in second appeal.

    I think the suit should not have been dismissed on the ground that the succession certificate held by the plaintiffs was not sufficient to cover the amount due on the bond in suit. The proper procedure for the court to have adopted was to allow the plaintiffs sufficient time within which to obtain an extension of the certificate.

    I also think that some evidence should have been required of the plaintiffs before admitting secondary evidence of the bond in suit. The learned vakil on behalf of the respondent supports the decision of the court below on the ground that on the date on which the suit was filed—the 8th August, 1910—the suit was barred by limitation.

    The question of limitation is one of some importance and is not free from difficulty. The Limitation Act No. IX of 1908 became law, so far as section 31 was concerned, on the 7th August, 1908. By section 31 of that Act it was enacted that a suit for foreclosure or a suit for sale by a mortgagee may be instituted within two years from the date of the passing of the Act or within sixty years from the date when the money secured by the mortgage became due, whichever period expires first. The two years expired on August 7th, 1910, which was a Sunday. The suit was filed on August 8th, 1910, the present Limitation Act being then in force.

    Sections 3 and 4 of the Limitation Act No. IX of 1908 are as follows:—

    3. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of Limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule, shall be dismissed, although limitation his not been set up as a defence.

    4. Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application, expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the court reopens.

    At first sight it appears as if ‘prescribed’ in section 4 should be understood as ‘prescribed in the schedule’. There is, however, ample authority for holding that section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1877 (now section 4 of the present Act) may be applied and proceedings not governed by the ordinary limitation law. I need only refer to 23 All., 277, and 28 All., 48, and to the authorities collected at page 297 of Mitra's Limitation Act. If the rule laid down in section 5 of Act No. XV of 1877 may be applied to cases not governed by that Act, it should also be held to apply to cases under the Limitation Act itself.

    section 10 of the General Clauses Act lays down the same rule as section 4 of the Limitation Act. It would appear that it was the intention of the Legislature that the rule should be of universal application. In the case before us, in the absence of any clear and unmistakable provision that the rule does not apply, I would hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of section 4 of the Limitation Act.

    I regret I am unable to agree with the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court who in Shevdas Daulatram Marwadi v. Narayenvalad Asaji have arrived at an opposite conclusion. They were of opinion that section 31 of the Limitation Act of 1908 provided a period of grace, and that the special statutory provisions, section 10 of the General Clauses Act and section 4 of the Limitation Act, did not apply to the case.

    In my opinion the time fixed for the institution of suits under section 31 is as much ‘prescribed’ as if suits under that section found place in the schedule. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and remand the case for decision to the court below, having regard to the observations set out above. The plaintiffs should be allowed an opportunity of producing evidence of facts which would entitle them to produce secondary evidence of the bond.

    Chamier, J.:— I agree that the suit should not have been dismissed upon the ground that the succession certificate produced by the plaintiff was not in order. The plaintiff should have been given time to get the certificate amended or extended.

    I agree also that some evidence should have been required of the plaintiff that the mortgage-deed was in possession of defendants 2 to 4 before the plaintiff was allowed to use a copy of the deed.

    On the question of limitation, I should like to say a few words. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908, provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in that Act or in the Limitation Act, 1877, in the territories mentioned in the second schedule (which include the United Provinces) a suit for foreclosure or a suit for sale by a mortgagee may be instituted within two years from the date of the passing of the Act.

    The last day of the two years was Sunday, August 7th, 1910. The present suit was instituted on Monday, August 8th. The question is whether the suit was within time with reference to the provisions of section 4 of the Limitation Act or section 10 of the General Clauses Act. It is contended on behalf of the defendant that section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply, that it should be read with section 3, and that the words “period of limitation prescribed” in section 4, mean period of limitation prescribed in the first schedule to the Act. There is a good deal to be said for this view, but it has been held by this court in several cases that the provisions of what is now section 4 apply to periods of limitation prescribed by other Acts.

    Supposing, however, that section 4 does not apply to this case for the reason that the period is not “prescribed” within the meaning of section 4 of the Act, I am of opinion that the case is covered by section 10 of the General Clauses Act. The last mentioned section runs as follows:—

    “10(1) Where by any Act of the Governor General in Council or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as taken or done in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office is open;

    Provided that nothing in this section shall be taken to apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies.”

    The defendant contends that as the Limitation Act, 1877, has been replaced by the Limitation Act, 1908, the proviso should be read as if the figures in it were ‘1908.’

    She relies in the first instance upon section 8 of the General Clauses Act. It appears to me that section does not apply at all to the case in hand. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was enacted to meet a peculiar state of affairs. It is an entirely new provision and cannot in any way be regarded as the re-enactment with modifications of any provision of the Limitation Act of 1877. Sir M.D Chalmers's note to section 8 of the General Clauses Act (Edition of 1899) is as follows:—

    “This section is new and is taken from section 38(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889. It enacts as a general rule a provision which is commonly inserted in Acts (see for instance section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898), but which is sometimes forgotten. Its operation may be illustrated as follows:— Suppose the Acts amending the Indian Penal Code were consolidated and in the new Code, section 188 (disobedience to orders of public servants) became section 200. Then any Act or document which referred to section 188 of the old Code would have to be construed as referring to section 200 of the new Code.”

    This note seems to me to state accurately the object and scope of the section.

    Had the Limitation Act of 1908 contained a provision corresponding to the first few words of section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1877, as that section stood at the date of the repeal of the Act, or to section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or section 158 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, then it would have been permissible to read the proviso to section 10 of the General Clauses Act as referring to the Limitation Act of 1908. As matters stand, I am of opinion that this cannot be done. I see no reason why the words ‘prescribed period’ in section 10 of the General Clauses Act should not be held to apply to the period prescribed by section 31 of the Limitation Act of 1908. The defendants rely upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shevdas Daulatram Marwadi v. Narayenvalad Aaaji. In that case the court gave no reasons for holding that section 10 of the General Clauses Act did not apply to a case like this. The reason given in the order by which the case was referred to the High Court is that the proviso to section 10 of the General Clauses Act should now be read as referring to the Limitation Act of 1908 on account of the provisions of section 8 of the General Clauses Act. For the reasons already given by me, I am of opinion that section 8 does not apply to the case.

    It was suggested that the proviso to section 10 was and is surplusage, and that apart from it the preceding part of the section does not apply to any case governed by the Limitation Act for the time being in force. If the opening part of the section was not intended to apply to any case governed by the Limitation Act, it was because it was supposed that sufficient provision had already been made in the Limitation Act itself. The proviso to section 10 of the General Clauses Act still excludes from that section all cases which are covered by provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908, re-enacting with or without modification provisions of the Limitation Act, 1877. I see no reason for reading the provisions of the first paragraph of section 10 of the General Clauses Act in any but their ordinary and natural sense. They seem to me to be wide enough to cover the present case if it is not governed by section 4 of the Limitation Act.

    For the above reasons, I am of opinion that this suit was filed within time, whether it is governed by section 4 of the Limitation Act or by section 10 of the General Clauses Act. I agree in the order proposed by my learned colleague.

    By the Court:— The appeal is allowed. The case will go back to the court below for decision having regard to the observations made in our judgment. The plaintiffs will be allowed an opportunity of adducing evidence of the facts, entitling them to produce secondary evidence of the bond. Costs in this appeal will be costs in the cause. Defendants will be entitled to produce rebutting evidence.

    Appeal allowed. Cause remanded.

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    Comments

    Hira Singh v. Musammat Amarti
    (Feb 29, 1912)