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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 326 of 1989 of P. S. Cannot. Faizabad under Sections 147/148/149/302/323/308, I. P. C.
  • Section 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code)
  • Section 437 as also Section 439 of the Code
  • Section 439. Section 437 (1) states:- "437(1).
  • provisions of Section 437 of the Code,
  • Section 167 (1) and (2) of the Code
  • SECTION 60 EXCISE ACT
  • Section 437 (1) of the Code
  • Sections 302/120-B, I.P.C,
  • Section 439, Cr. P. C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 326 of 1989 of P. S. Cannot. Faizabad under Sections 147/148/149/302/323/308, I. P. C.
  • Section 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code)
  • Section 437 as also Section 439 of the Code
  • Section 439. Section 437 (1) states:- "437(1).
  • provisions of Section 437 of the Code,
  • Section 167 (1) and (2) of the Code
  • SECTION 60 EXCISE ACT
  • Section 437 (1) of the Code
  • Sections 302/120-B, I.P.C,
  • Section 439, Cr. P. C.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Virendra Saran, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused in this application is Ranjeet Kumar Singh alias Laddo Singh, who is implicated in Crime No. 496 of 1994, P.S. Aliganj, Lucknow under Sections 302 and 120-B, I.P.C. The deceased, Sri Susheel Kumar Misra (Chief Engineer, Mandi Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow), was shot on the morning of 7-8-1994 while on a walk with his seven-year-old daughter; two scooter-borne miscreants fled the scene and the deceased later died of his injuries. The FIR was lodged by Vinod Kumar Misra (younger brother of the deceased), who stated that the deceased had earned the wrath of certain persons and contractors; the assassins were not named in the FIR. The applicant’s complicity emerged during investigation.

At the time of this application the applicant was confined in Faizabad Jail in connection with another pending murder case (Crime No. 326 of 1989, P.S. Cannot, Faizabad under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 323, 308 I.P.C.), which was pending committal to the Court of Sessions. Although a production warrant was issued under Section 267 Cr.P.C. by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 30-8-1994 for production of the applicant for remand in the present Lucknow case, the officer-in-charge of Faizabad Jail had not executed that order and the applicant was not brought to Lucknow. The applicant moved a bail application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 5-9-1994; that application was rejected on 7-9-1994 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on the ground that the applicant had not been remanded to custody in the present case and therefore the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the bail application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Magistrate (or the court before which a bail application is presented) has jurisdiction to consider and decide a bail application under Sections 437/439 Cr.P.C. in respect of an offence when the accused is physically in custody in another case and has not been remanded, produced, or appeared before the court in the case in which bail is sought.
  2. How the term "custody" in Section 439 Cr.P.C. should be construed in relation to the concepts of arrest, detention, physical presence before the court, and submission to the court's jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as presented)

  • Learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Raza Zaheer, submitted that it is not necessary that the accused must be remanded to custody in respect of the specific offence for which bail is sought; if the accused is already in custody in another connection (even at a distant place) the bail application should nonetheless be entitled to be considered on its merits.
  • The applicant relied on Chaudhary Jitendra Nath v. State of V. P. (1991 ACC 498; 1991 JIC 497 (All)), in which N. L. Ganguli, J., relying on the Supreme Court decision in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote (1980), directed the Sessions Judge to hear and dispose of the bail application of an accused who was confined in another jail.

State's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chaudhary Jitendra Nath v. State of V. P., 1991 ACC 498; 1991 JIC 497 (All) Directed a Sessions Judge to hear a bail application of an accused confined in a different jail; relied on the principle that physical submission/presence before the court gives jurisdiction to consider bail. The Court considered this authority but distinguished it because its reliance ultimately rested on the facts of Niranjan Singh, where the accused had physically submitted to the court. The judgment was acknowledged by the Court as supporting the applicant's submission but not ultimately determinative in the present facts.
Niranjan Singh and another v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and others, 1980 (SCC Cri. ?) Held that jurisdiction to grant bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. arises only when the accused is in custody; "custody" includes physical presence before the court coupled with submission to its jurisdiction. The Court relied on the principle that a person who physically submits to the court or is under judicial control is in custody for Section 439 purposes; it noted that Niranjan Singh's facts were different from the present case (the accused there had appeared before the Court).
C.B.I. v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, 1992 S.C.C. (Cri) 554; 1992 JIC 720 (SC) Elucidated the meaning of "custody" and recognised that an accused in custody in one case can be remanded afresh in relation to a distinct case; discussed remands under Section 167(1) and (2) Cr.P.C.; cautioned against stretching the concept of custody beyond reasonable limits. The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as authoritative on the meaning of "custody" and remand principles and applied it to reject the applicant's broader contention that mere custody elsewhere (without remand or submission) suffices for jurisdiction to consider bail in a different case.
S. Harsimran v. State of Punjab, 1984 Cri LJ 253 (Punjab High Court) Observed that there is no inflexible bar against re-arrest or re-arrest for investigation of an altogether different offence; a second arrest in a different case is not necessarily beyond the law. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in C.B.I. (supra) approved this view and used it to show that remands or re-arrests in distinct cases are legally permissible, but that such remands must be granted in specific cases and do not allow an accused to claim bail in one case merely because he is in custody in another without submission or remand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the contention that an accused being physically in custody elsewhere should be sufficient for a Magistrate to consider a bail application in a separate case. It began by analysing the line of authorities relied upon by the applicant, particularly the Chaudhary Jitendra Nath decision and Niranjan Singh, which emphasised that jurisdiction to grant bail under Section 439 arises when an accused is "in custody" — a concept that the courts have interpreted to include physical presence before the court and submission to its jurisdiction.

The Court then turned to the Supreme Court's later and controlling exposition in C.B.I. v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, which clarified the meaning of "custody" and observed that remands must be granted in relation to specific offences in which the accused is involved. The Supreme Court's approval of the view expressed in S. Harsimran (that re-arrest or second arrest in a different case is not necessarily beyond the law) was noted, but the Court emphasised that such re-arrests/remands do not permit an overbroad reading of "custody" for the purpose of allowing bail applications when the accused has neither been remanded nor has submitted to the court's jurisdiction in the case for which bail is sought.

The Court harmonised the terms "custody" in Section 439 with the provisions of Section 437(1) Cr.P.C., observing that Section 437(1) permits bail when a person "is arrested or detained without warrant" or "appears or is brought before a court" — thereby indicating that physical arrest/detention or appearance before the court are core elements of custody relevant to bail jurisdiction. From these provisions and the authorities, the Court deduced that both Sections 437 and 439 presuppose some form of submission to the court's jurisdiction (by arrest, detention, appearance or remand).

Applying those legal principles to the facts, the Court found that the applicant had not been arrested or detained without warrant in the present case, nor had he been brought or made to appear before the Court in the present case; a production order issued under Section 267 had not been executed. Consequently, the requisite condition for the Magistrate to have jurisdiction to consider the bail application under Section 437/439 had not arisen. The Court further reasoned that accepting the applicant's submission — that custody elsewhere suffices without remand or submission — would open the door to evasion of legal process, which the statutory scheme does not permit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for bail is rejected. The impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow (refusing to entertain the bail application on the ground that the applicant had not been remanded to custody in the present case) was held to be justified.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the applicant's bail application is dismissed and the Chief Judicial Magistrate's refusal to consider bail on the stated jurisdictional ground stands upheld.
  • The Court applied authoritative precedent (including C.B.I. v. Anupam J. Kulkarni and Niranjan Singh) to clarify that for the purposes of Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. custody must involve arrest/detention or appearance/submission to the court's jurisdiction; mere custody in a different case, without remand or submission in the case for which bail is sought, does not vest jurisdiction to grant bail.
  • The opinion contains no discussion of any broader rule-making or novel precedent beyond the application of established authorities to the facts; no new legal principle was formulated beyond the application of existing case law as described above.

Order: "This application is accordingly rejected. Application rejected."

    Ranjeet Singh v. State Of U.P.

    Virendra Saran, J.-

    Heard Sri Raza Zaheer on behalf of the applicant and Sri Bireshwar Nath and Sri Janardan Singh for the State.

    2. Ranjeet Kumar Singh alias Laddo Singh is involved in Crime No. 496 of 1994, P. S. Aliganj. Lucknow under Sections 302/120-B, I.P.C, The deceased Sri Susheel Kumar Misra was posted as Chief Engineer Mandi Pari-shad, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. On 7-8-1994 at about 7 a. m. he along with his 7 years' old daughter Nistha left his house for the usual morning walk. Their relation Sri Satya Dev Sharma was reading newspaper outside in the Verandah and close to him deceased's brother Ashok Kumar Misra was enjoying tea. Sri Susheel Kumar Misra and Nishtha could hardly pro­ceed a few paces when two scooter borne miscreants appeared on the scene. One of them, who was sitting on the pillion of the scooter fired shots at Sri Susheel Kumar Misra. On the arrival of the witnesses, the miscreant escaped on the scooter. Sri Misra was seriously injured and ultimately succumbed to his injuries. The FIR of the case was lodged by Vinod Kumar Misra, younger brother of the deceased. It was mentioned in the FIR that the deceased had earned the wrath of certain persons and certain contractors in the performance of his official duties. The assassins being not known to the informant were not named in the FIR. The complicity of the applicant emerged during investigation.

    3. At present the applicant is confined in Faizabad Jail in connection with another murder case, that is, crime No. 326 of 1989 of P. S. Cannot. Faizabad under Sections 147/148/149/302/323/308, I. P. C. The case at Faizabad is still pending committal to the Court of Sessions. Learned counsel for the applicant has informed that the applicant had earlier granted bail in the murder case at Faizabad, but after the present incident he himself got his bail bonds cancelled and surrendered and since then he is confined in Faizabad Jail and on 30-8-1994 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow passed order under Section 267 of the Code of Criminal Proce­dure (for short, the Code) for the production of the applicant before him at Lucknow for the purpose of remanding him to custody in the present case. Production warrant has also been sent to the of Beer-in-charge of the Faizabad Jail, but the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow has not been carried out so far by the officer-in-charge of Faiza­bad Jail with the result that the applicant could not be brought to Lucknow and remanded to custody in connection with the present murder case at Lucknow. The applicant moved a bail application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 5-9-1994 but his application has been rejected on 7-9-1994 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Luck-now on the ground that the applicant has not been remanded to custody In the present case and, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to entertain bail application.

    4. Sri Raza Zaheer, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that for considering the bail application of an accused, it is not necessary that he should be remanded to custody in respect of the offence in which he seeks bail and even if he is in custody in any other connection, may be in a distant place, as in the present case, he is entitled for the consideration of his bail application on merits. Sri Raza Zaheer has relied on the case of Chaudhary Jitendra Nath v. State of V. P., 1991 ACC 498: 1991 JIC 497 (All), in which N. L. Ganguli, J. relying on the case of Niranjan Singh and another v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and others, 1980 SCC (Cri) SOS, had directed the Sessions Judge of Mirapur to hear and dispose of the bail application of an accused who was confined in Naini Central Jail at Allahabad in connection with another case under Section 60 of the Excise Act. The observations of the Supreme Court taken note by Ganguly, J. read thus:

    "When a person is in custody within the meaning of Section 439, Cr. P. C. when he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court's jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence. No lexical dex­terity nor presidential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is of elastic, semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibbling and hide-and seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straight forwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady face there because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit before the Session Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus.

    Custody, in the context of Section 439 (we are not, be it noted, deal­ing with anticipatory bail under Section 438) is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court."

    5. In the case of Niranjan Singh (supra) the accused had been granted bail by the learned Session Judge after the accused had appeared before the Court of Sessions and it was in that context the Supreme Court held that judicial jurisdiction of granting bail arises only when the accused is already in custody and no person can move the court for bail under Sec­tion 439 of the Code unless he is in custody. The Supreme Court further held that If the accused was in physical control of the Court or at leas physically present in Court coupled with his submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court, he was entitled for consideration of his bail. The facts of the case of Niranjan Singh (supra) were quite different. The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the law laid down in Niranjan Singh's case (supra) has been extended by Ganguli, J. when he gave direction to the Session Judge, Mirzapur to consider the bail application of an accused who was confined in Allahabad jail in a different case.

    6. The law on the point has been subsequently elucidated and farcified by the Supreme Court in the case of C. B. I. v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, 1992 S. C. C. (Cri) 554: 1992 JIC 720(SC). The Supreme Court recognised the principle that even if the accused is in custody in one, he can be allowed to be remanded afresh in respect of a distinct case. The Supreme Court was considering the continuation in custody in the context of Section 167 (1) and (2) of the Code and it held that remands are to be granted in speci­fic cases in which the accused is involved. The Supreme Court approved the view of Punjab High Court in the case of S. Harsimran v. State of Pun-jab, 1984 Cri LJ 253, where it had been observed:

    "We see no inflexible bar against a person in custody with regard to the investigation of a particular offence being either re-arrest­ed for the purpose of investigation of an altogether different offence..........Therefore, re-arrest or second arrest in a different case is not necessarily beyond the ken of law."

    7. The question that arose before the Supreme Court in the case of C. B. I. (supra) was slightly on different question, but it has its bearing on the construction of the word "custody", occurring in section 439 of the code. In view of the elucidation of law by the Supreme Court, it is no more possible to stretch the meaning of word "custody" beyond the reasonable limits of elasticity and it is not possible to lay down that even if the accus­ed has not appeared before Court nor has been remanded to custody, in the case in hand, his bail may be considered. No doubt, even if the accused is physically present in Court, the Court will have jurisdiction to con­sider the bail application on merits and it is not necessary to remand him to jail or other custody. The provisions of Section 437 of the Code, which empower a Magistrate to grant bail in non-bailable offences also throw light on the real meaning of the "custody" used in Section 439. Section 437 (1) states:-

    "437(1). When any person accused of, or suspected of the commis­sion of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a court other than the High Court or Court pf Session, he may be released on bail, but."

    (Emphasis is supplied by me)

    Thus, the accused who have either been arrested or detained without warrant by a Police Officer or who appear or are brought before the Court can apply for bail to the Magistrate. The word offence" occurring in Section 437 (1) of the Code no doubt means offence in which he seeks bail. The word "custody" occurring in section 439 of the code has to be construed in harmony with section 437 of the code. At the risk of repetition, I would like to emphasise that even if the accused appears before the Court and submits to its jurisdiction, he can be said to be in custody for the purpose of section 439 of the code. Even if, an accused once appears or surrenders and is released on interim bail or short bail in an offence, the Court will have jurisdiction to consider his bail application in respect of the same offence because an accused continues to be in custody of the Court through sureties. But Section 437 as also Section 439 of the Code do not envisage granting of bail to a person who has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. In modern times, crimes are committed in a most pre-planned man­ner and the criminals outwit the law enforcing agencies. If argument of Sri Raza Zaheer is accepted, the accused will always remain illusive and will make a mockery of the process of law.

    8. In the case in hand, the accused has neither been arrested nor detained without warrant by the officer-in-charge of the police station nor has he appeared or brought before the Court. In these circumstances the jurisdiction to consider his bail application on merits did not arise under section 437 of the code and the impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, is justified.

    9. This application is accordingly rejected. Application rejected.

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    Comments

    Ranjeet Singh v. State Of U.P.
    (Dec 7, 1994)