Palok Basu, J.:— A Division Bench while hearing the petition of Bhim Sain Tyagi found that while in Ballabh Chaubey v. A.D.M (Finance), 1997 All LJ 163 : (1997 Cri LJ 3802) a Division Bench held that:—

The judgment of the Full Bench in 1981 (7) All LR 401 : (1981 Cri LJ 1083), Ramji Pandey v. State of U.P shows that the question whether a writ petition should be entertained against a notice set at all considered. The only question which was canvassed and was considered by the Bench was whether the notice was in accordance with the requirement of S. 3 of the Act. No such argument that a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained at the stage of notice seems to have been canvassed and therefore no decision has been given on this point.…

“The Full Bench having not considered the question of maintainability of the writ petition at the stage of notice the decision rendered by it cannot be held to be an authority or binding precedent for holding the writ petition to be maintainable.

“In view of the reasons discussed above the writ petitioners are dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.”

2. And also noticed that another Division Bench in 1997 All Cri C 262 Subas Singh v. D.M Ghazipur has held that:—

“We without showing any difference and with due regard to the judgment in the case of Ballabh Chaubey, (1997 All LJ 1630) (supra), we examined this case, whether impugned notice on the facts and circumstances of this case would render the subsequent proceeding illegal or not. If yes, it would be futile to send him there to participate in the subsequent proceedings. We having perused the notice and finding, on the facts of this case, the said notice to be directly in contradiction with the judgment of the aforesaid Full Bench, which would make subsequent proceedings illegal, we feel it appropriate to exercise our discretion in this regard under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India instead of rejecting the petition as not maintainable, hold the impugned notice to be illegal.

“The petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned notice dated 16-11-1991 is quashed. However, it is without prejudice to the right of the respondents to issue fresh notice in accordance with law.”

3. And therefore on the finding that there was apparent conflict in the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions both of which proceeded to rely upon the judgment in Ram Ji Pandey, (1981 Cri LJ 1083) (supra), referred the following two questions before a Larger Bench:—

“(1) If the opportunity of show cause before the authority, who issues a show cause notice, not in conformity with the provisions of S. 3(1) of the U.P Control of Goondas Act, could be considered an alternative remedy and,

(2) if a writ petition may be refused to be entertained only on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy even though the Court finds a particular notice illegal which makes consequential acts also illegal.”

4. Under the orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice a Full Bench of three Judges was constituted in which one of us namely (Hon'ble S.K Phaujdar, J.) was a member, who happened to be the Senior Judge in Bhim Sen Tyagi's case which referred the two questions for consideration by a Full Bench as noted above. Taking due note of some of the observations in Ramji Pandey, it formulated a third point and after reframing aforesaid two questions, recommended hearing of the mater by a Larger Bench because in the opinion of the said Full Bench some observations in Ramji Pandey required reconsideration. This is how this Bench has been constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The three questions which have come up for consideration are noted in the refering order as under:—

“(1) Whether the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramji Pandey v. State of U.P, (1981 Cri LJ 1083) (supra) to the effects that clause (d) of the notice, which in fact is only the second paragraph of clause (c), under S. 3(1) of the U.P Control of Goondas Act alone intended to set out general nature of material allegations against the petitioner with a view to give him opportunity to submit his explanation and to defend himself and it is not possible to accept the contention that matters contained in column (a), (b) and (c) be read as a part of notice while looking at the contents of clause (d), is good law. In other words, whether the notice under S. 3 of the Act as a whole can be read as a composite notice, or whether part (a), (b) and (c) must be disjuncted and their contents cannot be read as part of the notice so far allegations of general nature against the person in the notice issued are concerned.”

(2) If the opportunity of show cause before the authority, who issues a show cause notice not in conformity with the provisions of S. 3(1) of the U.P Control of Goondas Act, could be considered an alternative remedy, and

(3) if a writ petition may be refused to be entertained only on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy even though the Court finds a particular notice illegal which makes con-sequential acts also illegal.”

5. Shri Taj Pal, Shri D.S Mishra and some other learned counsel for the petitioners have been heard in support of the petitioner's argument. The respondents' case has been espoused by Shri P.M.N Singh, learned Additional Advo-cate General assisted by Shri Arvind Tripathi, Addl. Government Advocate. Written arguments have also been filed by some of the learned counsellor the petitioners as well as by State which have been taken due note of. At the initiation of the hearing of the matters there was a complete agreement on the part of the learned counsel for the parties that in case this Full Bench upholds the law Laid down in Ramji Pandey subject to such clarification as may be necessary regarding observations existing in paragraph 15 thereof, with or without modification as suggested through the refering order, if the answer to question No. 1 happens to be in the affirmative, no independant answer will be required for questions No. 2 and 3 noted above. As the very content of the question No. 1 noted above indicates that if the Full Bench decision in Ramji Pandey lays down the correct law, it will be implicit in the answer to the said question that a person who will thus be deprived of submitting the proper facts and explanation to the show cause notice, shall be within his rights to challenge the proceedings initiated through the said show cause notice by exercising his right under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by filing a writ petition in this Court. Before going into the arguments advanced relevant provisions in the Act and the Rules may be noted. It should be at once clarified, though the original act (U.P Act No. 8 of 1971) was promulgated in the State of Uttar Pradesh with effect from 18-1-1971 there was an amendment brought about by U.P Act No. 1 of 1985 known as U.P Control of Goondas (Amendment Act 1983) which was promulgated on 18-3-1985. By the amendment however no substantial change in the procedure was brought about except that the definition of “goondas” as defined in 2(b) of the original act was substituted by new S. 2(b). The effect of this amendment was that some more categories of anti social elements were brought in the fold of the definition “goonda” that is why persons categorised under clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) were substituted by new clause of persons redefined and delineated in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii). The expression “tout” and “house-grabbers” were also explained by the amending act. The other change noticed by the amending Act was that in S. 3 of the Act two changes were put in. For sub-clause (ii) in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) a new sub-clause (ii) was substituted and likewise for clause (a) of sub-sec. (3), a new clause (a) was added.

6. Therefore, it is clear that some more persons were made subject to the provisions of the Act and apart from the directions which could be issued under original clause of sub-sec. (3) of S. 3, some new method of issuing directions are incorporated by the amending Act. The need to refer to the amending act was thought necessary for the reason that the Full Bench decision in Ramji Pandey was pronounced in the year 1981 and one may per chance have a thought that may be that the amendments may have nullified or modified or affected the decision in Ramji Pandey. As noted above there is absolutely no change in any of the provisions so as to nullify or affect the decision in Ramji Pandey by the legislative changes brought through the amending act. In spite of the amending act, therefore, Ramji Pandey's decision continued to hold the field. This Court therefore has now to answer the question as posed above with regard to the correctness of the observations in Ramji Pandey's case with particular reference to paragraph 15 of the said judgment. It may be mentioned here that in the refering order the following observations exist.

7. In other words the Full Bench has insisted on the form of the notice rather than its substance. This view of the Full Bench would be found in so many words in paragraph 15 of the judgment in the case of Ramji Pandey, (1981 Cri LJ 1083) (supra). It would be proper to quote the relevant portion from the said paragraph:

‘In the impugned notice the District Magistrate has set out matters as required by clauses (a), (b) and (c) in the prescribed form. The prescribed form as well as the impugned notice both seek to maintain a distinction between material allegations and the matters set out in clauses (a).(b) and (c) of the notice. The facts stated in column (a), (b) and (c) of the notice refer to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate with regard to the matters set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S. 3(1) of the Act. Clause (d) of the notice intended to set out general nature of material allegations against the petitioner with a view to give him oppournity submit hjs explanationand to defend himself. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention that columns (a), (b) and (c) of the notice set out the general nature of material allegations against the petitioner.’

(Underlined by us)

“Prima facie, this view of the Full Bench in Ramji Pandey's case appears to be too technical as normally it is not the form but the substance which should matter while conveying the general nature of material allegations against the person to whom the notice is issued. As a matter of fact in the two cases which went to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the High Courts, the High Court had found the notices to be vague, but the Supreme Court had reversed the views of the High Courts and had found the notices to be in order. These cases are State of Gujarat v. Mehbub Khan, AIR 1968 SC 1468 : (1969 Cri LJ 26) and Pandhari Nath Rangnekar v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1973 SC 630 : (1973 Cri LJ 612). Going through the judgment of the Supreme Court, it appears that the Supreme Court was also rather concerned with the substance of information than the form.”

8. To appreciate the various contentions advanced a look at the relevant provisions appears necessary. Section 2 and 3 of the Act are therefore quoted below:

“S. 2 Definitions — In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

(a) “District Magistrate” includes an Additional District Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf;

(b) “Goonda” means a person who—

(i) either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of an offence punishable under S. 153 or S. 153-3 or S. 294 of the Indian Penal Code or Chapter XV, or Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the said Code, or

(ii) has been convicted for an offence punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in women and Girls Act, 1956, or

(iii) has been convicted not less than thrice for an offence punishable under the U.P Excise Act, 1910 or the Public Gambling Act, 1867 or S. 25, S. 27 or S. 29 of the Arms Act, 1959, or

(iv) is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community; or

(v) has been habitually passing indecent remarks or teasing women or girls; or

(vi) is a tout;

Explanation — ‘Tout’ means a person who—

(a) accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever as a motive or reward for inducing, by corrupt or illegal means any public servant or member of Government, Parliament or of State Legislature, to do or forbear to do anything or to show favour or disfavour to any person or to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central or State Government, Parliament or State Legislature, any local authority, corporation, Government Company or public servant; or

(b) procures, in consideration of any remuneration moving from any legal practitioner interested in any legal business, or proposes to any legal practitioner or to any person interested in legal business to procure, in consideration of any remuneration moving from either of them the employment of legal practitioner in such business; or

(c) for the purposes mentioned in explanation (a) or (b), frequents the precincts of civil, criminal or revenue Courts, revenue or other offices, residential colonies or residences or vicinity of the aforesaid or railway or bus stations, landing stages, lodging places or other places of public resort; or

(vii) is a house-grabber.

Explanation — ‘House-grabber’ means a person who takes or attempts to take or aids or abets in taking unauthorised possession or having lawfully entered unlawfully remains in possession, of a building including land, garden, garages or outhouses appurtenant to a building.”

S. 3 Externment, etc. of Goondas — (1) Where it appears to the District Magistrate;

(a) that any person is a goonda; and

(b)(i) that his movements or acts in the dis trict or any part thereof are causing, or are cal culated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property; or

(ii) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to engage, in the district or any part thereof in the commission of an offence referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause, (b) of S. 2, or in the abetment of any such offence; and

(c) That witnesses not willing to come for ward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property.

The District Magistrate shall by notice in writing, inform him of the general nature of the material allegations against him in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c) and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them.

(2) The person against whom an order under this section is proposed to be made shall have the right to consult and be defended by a counsel of his choice and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of examining himself, if he so desires, and also of examining any other witness that he may wish to produce in support of his explanation, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the District Magistrate is of opinion that the request is made for the purpose of vexation or delay.

(3) Thereupon the District Magistrate on being satisfied that the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b) and.(c) of sub-sec. (1) exist may by order in writing—

(a) direct him to remove himself outside the area within the limits of his local jurisdiction or such area and any district or districts or any part thereof, contiguous thereto, by such route, if any, and within such time as may be specified in the order and to desist from entering the said area and such contiguous district or districts or part thereof, as the case may be, from which he was directed to remove himself until the expiry of such period not exceeding six months as may be specified in the said order.

(b)(i) require such persons to notify his movements, or to report himself, or to do both, in such manner at such time and to such authority or person as may be specified in the order;

(ii) prohibit or restrict possession or use by him or any such article as may be specified in the order;

(iii) direct him otherwise to conduct himself in such manner as may be specified in the order; until the expiration of such period, not exceeding six months as may be specified in the order.”

9. That it is the aforesaid two sections which are primarily to be examined in order to answer the questions referred. It may at the same time be mentioned that the other Ss. 4 to 7 and 9 to 14 refer to the contingencies which may appear after the passing of a final order under S. 3. S. 8 of the Act reads as follows:—

“S. 8. Nature of evidence — The District Magistrate or the Commissioner may for the purpose of satisfying himself as to whether the conditions necessary for the making or confirmation of an order under S. 3 or S. 5 exist or not, take into consideration any evidence which he considers to have probative value, and the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972, shall not apply.”

10. Section 15 empowers the State Government to notify the rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act which rules have been promulgated through the U.P Gazette dated 9-9-1970.

11. Rule 4 provides that the notice under S. 1 of sub-sec. (3) as far as may be conform to Form-1. For ready reference the contents of Form-1 are quoted hereinafter:—

“Form I

Notice under S. 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970.

(See rule No. 4)

Whereas it appears to me on basis of information Lald before me that—

(a) Sri……… son of Sri……… ordinarily residing in……… is a “goonda” that is to say, he either himself *or* as a member or leader of gang, habitually commits, *or* attempts to commit, *or* abets the commission of offences punishable under *Chapter XVI*, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code* has been convicted under the suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956/* has been convicted not, 1910/* is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community; and that

(b) his movement or acts in……… are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property/* there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to engage in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of any offence punishable *under Chapter XVI/* Chapter XVII/* or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code,* or under Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956* or under the U.P Excise Act, 1910* or in the abetment of any such offence; and that

(c) Witnesses are not willing to come for ward to give evidence against him by reasons of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property;

And whereas the material allegations against him in respect of the aforesaid clauses (a)/(b)/(c) are of the following general nature;

1 to 3………………………………………

The said Sri……………… is hereby called upon to appear before me on (date) at (time) in my Court room and if he so desires, to tender an explanation in writing regarding the said material allegations showing cause why an order under sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970, may not be made against him, also intimating me-whether he de sires to examine himself or any other witness (if so, their names and address) in support of his explanation.,

The said Sri……………………… is hereby informed that if he fails to appear in aforesaid or if no explanation or intimation is received with the time specified it will be presumed that Sri……… has no desire to tender any explanation/examine any witness in regard to the said allegation and I will proceed to pass the proposed order.

Seal of Court District Magistrate/Alld.

District Magistrate.”

12. It has thus been noticed above that strict adherence to the provisions of Indian Evidence Act 1972 has been bypassed and a discretion has been vested in the District Magistrate to take into consideration any evidence which he considers to have probative value for the purpose of satisfying himself as to whether the conditions necessary for the making or confirmation of an order under S. 3 of S. 5 exist or not. It may be mentioned that S. 5 permits an extension of an order of externment in certain given situations.

13. It may at once be stated here with firmness that neither before the amending Act nor by the amending Act nor after the amending Act was, is or has been any clause (d) after clause (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 3. The rules as quoted above also do not bring any such clause (d). The Form 1 in the schedule also confines reference to clause (a), (b) and (c) without denoting the general nature of the material allegations.

14. A close scrutiny of the decision in Ramji Pandey however, indicates that in the said case the notice which was issued to the petitioner threin namely Ramji Pandey, there was mention of a clause described as clause (d). The Full Bench while discussing the allegations as existed against Ramjit Pandey per force referred to the clause (d) as it existed in the show cause notice to Ramjit Pandey. To repeat, the law does not require any such clause as (d) to be mentioned after clause (a), (b) and (c). And, therefore, what is required by the aforesaid Form to be specified as “material allegations” against him in respect of the aforesaid “clauses (a), (b) and (c)” are of the following nature:—

(1) to (3)…………………………”

15. Were referred in Ramji Pandey's case as clause (d) in the instant cases there is no such mention of clause (d). Therefore, when Ramji Pandey referred to the clause (d) as mentioned in paragraphs 15 of its judgment, specifically noted in the refering order of the Full Bench as quoted above, must be confined to the show cause notice which was issued to Ramji Pandey.

16. In substance therefore, assuming that clause (d) is removed from the show cause no tice to Ramji Pandey it would transpire that “material allegations” and “general nature thereof” were not disclosed to Ramji Pandey and the only mention of some first information reports existed in the show cause notice. This was therefore held by the Full Bench to be contrary to the provisions as contained by S. 3 backed up by Rule 4 and specifically delineated by contents of Form 1. It is therefore clarified that the reference to clause (d) in Ramji Pandey in paragraph 15 of the said jdugment was to the said clause (d) which was so mentioned in the show cause notice of Ramji Pandey. It may further be added that it would not matter whether a clause (d) is added or not added, so long as the material allegations are made known by the general nature described in the show cause notice. However, the mention of clause (d) should not in any way be interpreted as putting something in the judgment which was not required by the provisions of the Act or the Rules or the Form.

17. Having held this, the pith and substance of Question No. referred to this Bench may now be considered.

18. In Harsh Narain v. D.M, Allahabad, 1972 All LJ 762 a Division Bench has held that:—

“The act was not a law providing for preventive detention and cannot be challenged on the ground of being offensive to Article 22(4).”

19. It has further been mentioned that the defect of not setting out the general nature of the material allegations in the notice is a fatal defect as it results in non compliance with the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Act because such notices cannot be deemed to be notices under S. 3(1) of the Act. It may be pointed out that in Harsh Narain (1972 All LJ 762) (supra) externment order had already been passed when the contents of the notice were challenged by the petitioner therein. It was specifically held in Harsh Narain (1972 ALL LJ 762) (supra) that S. 3(1) enjoins upon the District Magistrate to in form the goonda of the general nature of the material allegations against him in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c) and further enjoins upon him to give the goonda a reasonable opportunity of furnishing his explanation regarding them. If the goonda is not informed of the general nature of the material allegations regarding clauses (a), (b) and (c), he can furnish no explanation in respect of them and would be deprived of the reasonable opportunity to which he is entitled under S. 3(1).

20. It may now be mentioned here that it is the correctness of Harsh Narain's case which was the basic issue in Ramji Pandey's case. It has been held in so many words in Ramji Pandey's case that:—

“If the notice fails to contain the general nature of material allegations it would be vitiated and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereof would be rendered null and void. We are in agreement on this question with the view taken by the Division Bench in Harsh Narain's case.”

21. It may be mentioned here that the Full Bench in Ramji Pandey did examine in detail the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehbub Khan, AIR 1968 SC 1468 : (1969 Cri LJ 26) as also Pundhari Nath v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1973 SC 630 : (1973 Cri LJ 612). The Full Bench has noticed the provisions contained in. S. 59 of the Bombay Act which was the subject matter of discretion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. After discussing the relevant law and the provisions in the Bombay Act and also in the U.P Control of Goondas Act the decision in Ramjit Pandey records that:—

“We are also of the view that the decision of the Division Bench in Harsh Narain's case is not inconsistent with the law Laid down by the Supreme Court in Mehbub Khan's case or Pandharinath's case…… “These matters could have been stated in a narrative form as was done in the case of Mehbub Khan and Pandharinath, but the impugned notice does not contain these allegations, instead it contains a list of first information reports and pending cases. In our opinion, it is difficult to uphold the respondents' contention that the list of first information reports of list of cases in which the petitioner was convicted or the list of cases in which the petitioner was acquited or the list of pending criminal cases against the petitioner is sufficient to meet the requirement of setting out ‘the general nature of material allegations’. The impugned notice is, therefore, not in accordance with S. 3(1) of the Act as it fails to set out general nature of material allegations against the petitioner.”

22. Before concluding this matter it may be useful to mention that the right of the petitioners to offer explanation would have to depend upon the material allegations consequently, the reasonable opportunity which is afforded by sub-sec. (2) of producing his evidence in support of his explanation which is guaranteed to the petitioner shall not be exercisable if the petitioner does not come to know the general nature of material allegations against them.

23. Before proceeding further it may be noticed that in Harsh Narain also, proceedings, subsequent to the issuance of notice were quashed It has been held therein that:—

“For these reasons, we think that the notices issued to the petitioners were illegal, not having been issued in accordance with the provisions of S. 3(1) and the subsequent action taken on the basis of these notices must fall with the notices. The orders of externment passed by the District Magistrate and the appellate orders of the Commissioner confirming them deserve to be quashed.”

24. It may be mentioned here simultaneously that in Subas Singh (1997 All Cri C 262) (supra) Hon'ble A.P-Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was) has specifically noted in paragraph that:—

“The petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned notice dated 16-11-1991 is quashed. However, it is without prejudice to the right of the respondents to issue fresh notice in accordance with law. Costs on the parties.”

(Emphasis added)

25. Having thus noted the sum and substance of Ramji Pandey as also Harsh Narain (1972 All LJ 762) and Subas Singh (1997 All Cri C 262) (supra) it may be pointed out that the anxiety of the learned Division Bench in Ballabh Chaubey is appreciable when it points out that:

“The preamble of the Act shows it has been enacted to make special provisions for the Control and Suppression of Goondas with a view to the maintenance of Public Order. The provisions of the Act are intended to prevent further mischief by a Goonda and not to secure his conviction in a pending case.”

26. The aforesaid anxiety of the Division Bench should be taken due note by the Executive and whenever a show cause notice is issued it should strictly comply with the provisions of the Act and rules. Once the decision of Ramjit Pandey has held the field in this State for more than 18 years there does not seem to be any necessity of taking a contrary view for the simple reason that all that the District Magistrate was expected by that decision to do is that the proposed Goonda should be made aware of “general nature of material allegation” against him, which is the requirement of the law. By asking the respondents to furnish to the proposed Goonda the general nature of material allegations against him, the Full Bench in Ramji Pandey only required the law to be followed. None should doubt that once in the show cause notice the general nature of the material allegations exists, no Court interference with such a show cause notice is called for. Challenge to a valid show cause notice complying with the requirement of law has always failed and no scope of exercising provisions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India exists in such matters. On the contrary, whenever general nature of material allegations are absent and the proposed goonda raises a grievance through a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court's interference to the extent of the illegality of the notice being examined has been rightly upheld in Ramji Pandey but simultaneously it must be added that, always ensuring that, fresh notice may be issued by the District Magistrate in accordance with law. It has already been noticed above that in Subas Singh (1997 All Cri C 262) (supra) the respondents right to issue fresh notice in accordance with law was upheld and even in Harsh Narain (1972 All LJ 762) (supra) subsequent proceedings alone were quashed due to the defective notice.

27. In the admistration of criminal law in our country one comes across two very important terms (1) charge and (ii) statement of accused. In fact these two are fundamental requirements of the principles of natural justice which have to be followed before an accused is condemned. One would shudder at the idea that an accused shall have stood condemned when the charge would only narrate that there is an FIR against him registered under S. 302, IPC at a police station or that in the statement of the accused only one question is put to him that an FIR has been lodged against him under S. 302 at a police station and that alone is held sufficient compliance of law. For action against a proposed goonda, the provisions contained in S. 3 of the Act, bereft of the technicalities and broader legal necessities in atrial of an accused under the Criminal Procedure Code, combine not only the “charge” and the “Statement of the accused”, but also requires his “defence evidence”. Thus the proposed goonda must get the fullest opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, the general nature of the material allegations must be disclosed to him by the District Magistrate.

28. Before closing this chapter one may usefully refer to the latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in whirlpool Corporation, (1998) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 22 : (1998 AIR SCW 3345) which has held that “alternative remedy does not affect jurisdiction of High Court”.

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the combined answer to the aforesaid three questions is that the decision in Ramji Pandey is good law, a show cause notice which fails to indicate general nature of material allegations may be challenged and quashed on that ground under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with liberty to the respondents always to issue fresh notice in accordance with law. With the aforesaid answer, the Registry will now send the individual writ petitions to the Bench concerned for admission/orders.

S.K PHAUJDAR, J.:— 26. I agree.

V.P GOEL, J.:— 27. I agree.

J.C GUPTA, J.:— 28. I agree.

K.D SHAHI, J.:— 29. I agree.

30. Order accordingly.