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Smart Summary

Concise Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The two writ petitions arise from common facts and were heard together. The petitioners are commission agents/dealers in food-grains operating at Kashipur (Nainital) under licences issued under the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 and the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 ("the Adhiniyam").

The Mandi Samiti, Kashipur issued a notice dated 23-6-1993 demanding market fee for specified agricultural produce that had been brought within the Kashipur mandi area. The Secretary of the Mandi Samiti passed assessment orders dated 29-7-1993 levying market fee of Rs. 43,984.60 and Rs. 28,455.65 in the two petitions, and the revisional authority affirmed those assessment orders on 15-9-1994. The petitioners challenged the notice and the assessment and revisional orders by writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the impugned notice and orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the movement of specified agricultural produce from the market area is presumed to result from a sale within that market area under the Explanation to Section 17 of the Adhiniyam, and if so, whether that presumption has been rebutted by the petitioners.
  2. Whether the revisional authority acted within jurisdiction, in accordance with principles of natural justice, and on valid material such that this Court should refrain from interfering under its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether Section 17(iii) of the Adhiniyam constitutes an impermissible tax on inter-State trade or otherwise offends Articles 286 and 301 of the Constitution, or whether it is a reasonable regulation of transactions of sale in a market area.
  4. Whether the impugned notice and assessment orders (dated 23-6-1993, 29-7-1993 and the revisional order dated 15-9-1994) are liable to be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Sri Sunil Ambwani)

  • No sale transaction took place in the Kashipur market area; the goods were purchased outside Kashipur and were brought into Kashipur mandi only for transportation/despatch to Ex-U.P. principals on whose behalf the petitioners acted as commission agents.
  • The market fee had already been paid at the mandies where the goods were purchased; Kashipur was used because rail transportation facilities were available there, and the goods were merely led/despatched via Kashipur mandi due to lack of transport facilities at the point of purchase.
  • The bills submitted by the petitioners included the market fee on purchase, handling charges and other expenses (and commission), and thus the revisional authority was not justified in inferring that those charges were not borne or charged by the petitioners.
  • Reliance was placed on earlier decisions (including C.S.T. v. Bhaktwari Lal Kailash Chand Arhadi and Shree Mahalakshmi Sugar Works v. State of U.P.) in support of the challenge.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Sri B.D. Mandhyan)

  • The petitioner failed to prove that the specified agricultural produce taken into the Kashipur market area was not sold there; the statutory Explanation to Section 17 presumes such movement to be for sale unless the contrary is proved.
  • The revisional authority's conclusion is based on material on record (including gate passes issued in the petitioner's name and the absence of separate billing for mandi fee/transport from the purchase point) and therefore is not amenable to interference under Article 226.
  • Section 17(iii)(b) is a reasonable regulatory measure and does not amount to a tax on inter-State sale/purchase or offend Articles 286 and 301 of the Constitution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 : AIR 1989 SC 997 Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into an appeal; the Court examines the decision-making process and will not substitute its view where a statutory authority considered valid material and came to a reasonable conclusion. The Court applied this principle to hold that if the revisional authority reached conclusions based on valid material after fair treatment, the High Court should not disturb those findings in certiorari jurisdiction.
C.S.T. v. Bhaktwari Lal Kailash Chand Arhadi, (1992) 3 SCC 750 The decision was cited by petitioner’s counsel (as reliance), though the opinion does not elaborate the precise rule from the case. The Court stated that reliance on this Supreme Court decision (and on the Division Bench decision noted below) was "not of much avail" to the petitioner and did not change the Court's conclusion.
Shree Mahalakshmi Sugar Works, Faridnagar v. State of U.P., 1987 (2) U.P.B.E.C. 967 A Division Bench decision of the High Court relied upon by the petitioner (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). The Court held that this Division Bench authority did not assist the petitioner sufficiently to overturn the revisional authority's factual findings and final assessment.
Atma Ram Ratan Lal v. State of U.P., 1979 ALJ 126 Holds that the Adhiniyam is regulatory of transactions of sale/purchase in a market area and not a tax on inter-State trade; payment of fee/taking licence by an importer does not impede free flow of trade. The Court relied on this decision to reject the contention that Section 17(iii) offends Articles 286 and 301, treating the provision as a reasonable regulation rather than an impermissible tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by first examining the statutory text and the evidentiary effect of the Explanation to Section 17 of the Adhiniyam. Section 17(iii)(b) authorises levy and collection of market fee on sales within the market area and provides that such fee is recoverable from the commission agent (who may recover it from the purchaser). The Explanation creates a statutory presumption that specified agricultural produce taken out of a market area by or on behalf of a licensed trader is to be presumed sold within that area "unless the contrary is proved."

The Court explained the legal significance of that presumption: it is a rule of evidence that places the burden on the commission agent to prove that no sale occurred in the market area. The Court distinguished primary onus (duty to establish the case) from secondary onus (duty of adducing evidence), noting that whether the statutory presumption has been rebutted is a question of fact depending on the circumstances. If the statutory authority, on proper consideration of relevant material, concludes that the presumption has not been rebutted, the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with those factual findings under Article 226.

The revisional authority's factual findings were then reviewed. On admitted facts the produce had been moved out of Kashipur market area; the revisional authority nonetheless found on the material on record that the sale transaction occurred in the Kashipur mandi and that the goods were taken out after finalisation of sale. The revisional authority relied on: (a) gate passes issued in the petitioner's name rather than the ultimate consignee; (b) absence in the petitioner's bills of separate charging for the mandi fee allegedly paid at the purchase point or for incidental transport expenses incurred in moving the goods to Kashipur; and (c) the fact that the petitioner was not a licensed commission agent ('Arhati') at the mandies where the goods were purchased.

The Court acknowledged the petitioner's counter-argument that the bills may have included market fee and incidental charges within the indicated price, but observed that where two reasonable views on a question of fact are possible, the statutory authority's choice of one view places the matter beyond the scope of judicial review under Article 226 (citing State of U.P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh). On the facts found by the revisional authority, the statutory presumption under the Explanation was not rebutted.

Finally, the Court addressed the constitutional challenge under Articles 286 and 301. It held that Section 17(iii) is a reasonable regulatory provision governing sale transactions in a market area and is not a tax on inter-State sale/purchase; reliance on Atma Ram Ratan Lal supported the view that the Act is regulatory and does not impede free flow of trade or commerce.

In sum, the Court found that the revisional authority had considered valid material, observed principles of fairness, and arrived at factual conclusions that the Court would not disturb in certiorari jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petitions lack merit and are DISMISSED in limine. The Court found no infirmity, perversity or breach of natural justice in the revisional authority's order and upheld the view that the statutory presumption under the Explanation to Section 17 was not rebutted on the materials before the revisional authority.

Implications:

  • The assessments and the revisional affirmation (notice dated 23-6-1993, assessment orders dated 29-7-1993, and revisional order dated 15-9-1994) are sustained by this Court and will stand as not quashed by the writ petitions.
  • The decision reiterates that where a statutory presumption of fact is in place and the statutory authority, after considering material evidence, finds the presumption unrebutted, the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226; judicial review is confined to the decision-making process and does not permit substitution of the Court's view on contested facts.
  • The Court expressly held that Section 17(iii) of the Adhiniyam is a reasonable regulation of sale transactions in a market area and does not infringe Articles 286 or 301 by constituting an impermissible tax on inter-State commerce.
  • No indication was given that this opinion sets a novel precedent; rather, it applies established principles (including reliance on Dharmander Prasad Singh and Atma Ram Ratan Lal) to the facts and dismisses the petitions. A copy of the judgment was directed to be placed on the file of one of the petitions (No. 34161 of 1994).

Petitions dismissed.

    M/S. Shyam Sunder Baldeo Raj v. Director, Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, U.P And Others .

    1. Both these petitions being grounded on identical facts may be disposed by a common order. Sri B.D Mandhyan learned counsel appearing for the respondents in both the petitions stated at the very out set that the writ petitions may be heard and disposed of at the motion hearing stage itself without inviting any formal counter-affidavit. The learned counsel for the parties were heard accordingly.

    2. The petitioner in each of the writ petitions is engaged in the business of sale/purchase of food-grains as ‘dealer’ and ‘commission agent at Kashipur, Nainital and for that purpose’ it has been issued licences under the provisions of the U.P Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 and those of the U.P Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (in short ‘the Adhiniyam’). The notice dated 23-6-1993 and the orders dated 29-7-1993 and 15-9-1994 are sought to be quashed in these petitions. It was by mean's pi the impugned notice dated 23-6-1993 that the Mandi Samiti, Kashipur, district Nainital had called upon the petitioner to pay market fee on the sale/purchase of specified agricultural produce which were admittedly brought within the M andi area of Kashipur. The notice was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the specified agricultural produce in fact was purchased outside the market area of Kashipur and it was brought in Kashipur Mandi for and on behalf of Ex. U.P Principals for the purposes of transporation only and no transaction of sale/purchase had, in fact, taken place in the Mandi area of Kashipur. The Secretary, Mandi Samiti, Kashipur passed and order of assessment dated 29-7-1993, whereby market fee amounting to Rs. 43 984.60 was levied in the case of writ petition No. 34460 of 1994 and Rs. 28 455.65/- in the case of writ petition No. 34161 of 1994. The orders of. assessment in each of the two cases having been affirmed by the revisional authority vide order dated 15-9-1994, the petitioner i. e. the concerned commission agent has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders.

    3. The main thrust of argument advanced by Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was that no transaction of sale of the specified agricultural produce had, in fact, taken place in the market area of Kashipur and the goods were brought there only for the purposes of transportation to Ex-U.P principals on whose behalf they were purchased by the petitioner as commission agent at other Mandies, for which the market fee had already been paid. It was urged by Sri Ambwani that due to lack of transportation facility in or near the Mandi area, where the goods were purchased, the petitioner had to bring the goods in Kashipur Mandi for the purposes of leading and despatching them to the Ex-U.P principals by rail which facility is admittedly available at Kashipur Mandi. Sri B.D Mandhyan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents refuted the submissions made by Sri Ambwani and urged that the petitioner failed to prove that the specified agricultural product brought inside market area of Kashipur was taken out of it not in pursuance of any transaction of sale having taken place in the market area of Kashipur but in pursuance of a sale transaction which took place, as alleged by the petitioner, at the point of purchase outside Kashipur Mandi. Sri Mandhyan relied upon the Explanation of Section 17 of the Adhiniyam and submitted that the impugned order passed by the revisional authority being based on considerationiof material on record is not liable to be quashed by this Court in its extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    4. A bare perusal of Section 17(iii)(b) of the Adhiniyam would indicate that a Committee is vested (with the power to levy and collect market fee on transaction of sale-of specified agricultural protein the market area on such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than two percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by Notification and that such fee is liable to be realised from the commission agent if the produce is sold through a commission agent. The commission agent may, however, realise the same from the purchaser. According to the Explanation appended to Section 17, any specified agricultural produce taken out of proposed to be taken out of a market area, by or on behalf of a licenced trader, is presumed to have been sold within such area. The presumption is, however, rebuttable, as is clear from the expression “unless the contrary is proved occurring in the Explanation. The Explanation has the effect neither of enlarging nor of diminishing the scope of the charging clause. It only, lays down a rule of evidence in that it visualises that 1 “unless the contrary is proved”, the movement-actual or proposed — of specified agricultural produce out of market area would be ‘presumed’ to have taken place as a result of a transaction of sale materialised within such area. In view of this statutory presumption the burden to prove that no transaction of sale took place within the market area is on the commission agent and if he fails to rebut the presumption, the authorities under the Adhiniyam would be well within their jurisdiction to take any movement of specified agricultural produce from Mandi area to an outside place, whether within or without the State, to have taken place as a result of transaction of sale having materialised within the market area so as to attract the charging clause i.e Section 17(iii)(b) of the Adhiniyam.

    5. It may be pertinently observed that the onus of proof in its primary sense means duty of establishing a case and in this sense it remains constant and never shifts throughout the proceeding. It is a question of law, but in its secondary sense, onus is no more than the duty of adducing evidence being led in the case. This involves no question of law but only of fact. It may also be observed that the Explanation of Section 17 of the Achiniyam raises a presumption of law, it being statutory in nature, but since the statutory presumption under the Explanation pertains to a question of fact, the question whether the presumption has or has not been rebutted, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and if the authorities under the Adhiniyam have, on a proper self-direction to the facts and circumstances of the case, arrived at the conclusion that the statutory presumption has not been rebutted, this Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would be loathe to interfere with the view taken by the statutory authorities except where the Statutory Authority is found to have acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. It is well settled that judicial review under Article 1226 of the Constitution cannot be converted intq an appeal in-that it is directed not against the decisions rendered by the statutory authority, bulhas to be confined to the examination of the decisioji making process. Accordingly if the conclusions rqached by the revisional authority, are found to be based on consideration of valid material on record ‘after according fair treatment’ to the parties, then it is not for this Court, sitting in certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to say that the conclusion arrived at by the revisional authority is incorrect and/or to supplant the same by its own — (See State of U.P v. Dharmander Prased Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 : AIR 1989 SC 997).

    6. Accordingly it may be examined whether the revisional authority, in the instant case, has acted in tune with the principles of natural justice and has decided the Revision, on a proper self-direction to relevant consideration i.e without neglecting to take into account the relevant factors or any material piece of evidence, circumstances having bearing on the point in controversy.

    7. On the. admitted facts the agricultural produce were taken qut of the market area of Kashipur and therefore, the burden to prove that despite movement of the goods, out of the market area of Kashipur no transaction of sale had in fact taken place in the market area of Kashipur, was on the petitioner. The revisional authority has on consideration of material on record, held that the petitioner had brought the goods in thei market area of Kashipur Mandi and the same were taken out of Kashipur Mandi afterthe transaction of sale was finalised in the market area of Kashipur. In coming to this conclusion the revisional authority has placed reliance on the gate pass which was issued in the name of the petitioner and not in the name of the person/trader to whom the goods were ultimately despatched. It has also relied on the fact that neither the Mandi fee alleged to have been paid by the petitioner to the Mandi Samiti from where the goods were purchased nor the incidental expenses incurred bj[it in transporting the goods from such Mandi Samiti to Kshipur Mandi, were charged in the bills submitted by the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner was not a licenced commission agent or ‘Arhaiti’ in; respect of the Mandies from where the goods werfc purchased, has also been taken into consideration by the revisional authority in support of its conclusion that the goods in question were purchased by the petitioner for itself and not for any Ex-U.P principal/trader. According to the revisional authority, the sale transaction between the petitioner and the Ex-U.P principals took place after thegoods were brought in the Kashipur Mandi and it was thereafter that the goods were transported to Ex-U.P principlas by rail. The findings arrived at by the Director, Mandi Parishad/revisional authority are findings of fact arrived on consideration of valid material on record. Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the market fee on purchase transaction, handling charges and other expenses were included in the price indicated in the bills besides the commission payable to the petitioner and the revisional authority was not justified in holding that the Mandi fee paid by the petitioner on the purchase transaction and other expenses were not charged by it and in drawing the inference it has drawn on the strength of these facts. It is no doubt possible that the price of the goods indicated in the bills submitted by the petitioner maybe inclusive of Mandi fee paid by the petitioner on purchase transaction and other incidental charges incurred by it, but it is also settled that where two views on a question of fact are reasonably possible and the stututory authority takes one view, then the matter would go out of the purview of the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution as indicated by the Supreme Court in Dharmander Prasad Singh's case (supra). As indicated hereinabove, the Explantion to Section 17 of the Adhiniyam raises a presumption on a question of fact which presumption, on the facts found by the revisional authority, does not stand rebutted. The Explanation is in pari materia with clause two of Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The impugned order, in my opinion does not suffer from any infirmity, perversity or breach of natural justice.

    8. The decision of the Supreme Court in C.S.T v. Bhaktwari Lal Kailash Chand Arhadi, (1992) 3 SCC 750 : (1992 All LJ 884) and that of the Division Bench. of this Court in Shree Mahalakshmi Sugar Works, Faridnagar v. State of U.P, 1987 (2) U.P.B.E.C 967 (sic) reliance on which was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are not of much avail to the petitioner. Section 17(iii) of the Adhiniyam being in : the nature of reasonable regulation of a transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area; cannot be said to be offending Articles 286 and 301 of the Constitution. It is not in the nature of a tax on Inter-State sale/purchase of goods. In Atma Ram Ratan Lal v. State of U.P, 1979 ALJ 126, a : Divisjon Benchof this Court has repelled_the similar contention and ruled that “The Act, in its term and in its operation, is merely regulatory of the transaction of sale and purchase in a market area. It does not impede the free flow of trade or commerce in the State. The fact that an importer of commodities from outside State has to pay fee or take out a licence has nothing to do with the purchase of goods. The levy is on the event of storage or sale etc. in the market area.”

    9. In view of the above discussion, I find no merits in these petitions and they are accordingly dismissed in limine. Let a copy of this judgment be placed on the file of writ petition No. 34161 of 1994.

    10. Petition dismissed.

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    M/S. Shyam Sunder Baldeo Raj v. Director, Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, U.P And Others .
    (Nov 11, 1994)