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  • Section 33 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Rule 173B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985(5 of 1986)
  • sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B
  • sub-rule 10 of the Rules
  • sub-rule (2A) of the Rules
  • Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • Rule 9-B of the Rules
  • Rule 10 of the Rules
  • Rule 56 of the Rules
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Rule 9-B
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 33 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Rule 173B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985(5 of 1986)
  • sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B
  • sub-rule 10 of the Rules
  • sub-rule (2A) of the Rules
  • Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • Rule 9-B of the Rules
  • Rule 10 of the Rules
  • Rule 56 of the Rules
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Rule 9-B
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner originally was a going concern, Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Ltd., a composite textile mill registered under the Companies Act, 1956, manufacturing textiles including yarn. By the time of this opinion the company had gone into liquidation and the Official Liquidator attached to the Court represented it.

The petitioner's grievance related to clearances and excise duty treatment for three billing/assessment periods commencing 15-7-1977 to 28-7-1979 and 15-11-1979 to 20-8-1980 to March 1981. During the periods in question the mill had been assessed to excise duty at concessional rates under Central Government Notifications No. 226/77 (15-7-1977) and No. 301/79 (30-11-1979).

Between 9-11-1977 and before 24-2-1981 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mysore (1st respondent) issued a series of show cause notices proposing to reopen the concluded assessments on the ground that the "drill" manufactured by the mill did not fall within the drill specified in the notifications. Orders resulting from those notices were passed from 24-2-1981 and 10-4-1981.

Appeals against the Assistant Collector's orders were allowed by the Appellate Collector at Madras by an order dated 25-9-1981, who remanded the matter for de novo proceedings to decide whether the goods were entitled to concessional duty. On remand the Assistant Collector issued a fresh composite show cause notice dated 4-1-1982 (annexed as Annexure-L), alleging that the drill fabrics did not conform to the Textile Commissioner's definition of "Controlled Drill" (Notification CER/I/68 dated 2-5-1968 and the Textile Commissioner's letter of 24-10-1980) and seeking differential duty aggregating to Rs. 6,02,156.16 and rejection of four refund claims.

The petitioner challenged the resultant order (Annexure-Q) by a writ petition seeking certiorari to quash the order and complained of several alleged illegalities in the show cause notice and the order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Assistant Collector (1st respondent) had jurisdiction to recall or reopen earlier approval of classification lists under Rule 173B(2A) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and to demand differential duty after assessments had been concluded and concessional duty collected.
  2. Whether, in the facts of this case, the department could validly act upon or rely on a sample test report furnished by the Textile Commissioner (report dated 24-10-1980 in respect of a sample drawn in February 1980), in view of Rule 56 of the Rules and Section 12-A of the Act concerning designated excise officers.
  3. Whether the procedure followed and the contents of the show cause notice complied with principles of natural justice, specifically whether the assessee was given adequate and legally permissible basis to meet the case for alleged short levy.
  4. Whether the requirements for reopening an assessment (as contemplated in Rule 10 of the Rules or relevant provisions) were satisfied to permit demand of alleged short levy or whether the impugned proceedings were vitiated for want of statutory authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. G. Chander Kumar)

  • The show cause notice and the consequent order (Annexure-Q) contained several illegalities and are vulnerable to certiorari.
  • Rule 173B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (particularly sub-rule (2A)) and Rule 9B were relied upon to show that approval of a classification list may be withheld and provisional assessment allowed; once approval had been given and duty had been collected at the concessional rate, such approval could not be recalled to reopen concluded assessments.
  • Any short levy can be reopened only if the requirements of sub-Rule 10 (Rule 10) of the Rules are satisfied; Rule 10 does not provide for recalling an approval that has once been accorded.
  • The sample drawn in February 1980 was impermissibly sent for testing to the Textile Commissioner (in Bombay), who was not a person designated under Rule 56 and therefore not a proper officer under Section 12-A of the Act to conduct that test; reliance on the Textile Commissioner's report (dated 24-10-1980) was therefore wrongful.
  • The show cause notice of January 1982 relied primarily on the Textile Commissioner's report and did not fairly or adequately inform the assessee of a legally permissible basis on which to meet a claim for short levy, thereby violating rules of natural justice.

Respondent-Central Government's Arguments (as summarized for Mr. Shylendra Kumar, Standing Counsel)

  • Though Rule 173B may not expressly provide for recall of an approval, the department should have power to recall or review an approval because there cannot be an estoppel against the statute; the power to reopen should be impliedly available.
  • Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision, Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector Of Central Excise (1988), to support the proposition that there can be no estoppel against the law.
  • An argument was mentioned that questions of limitation or similar defenses would not arise under Rule 10 or Section 11-A in view of earlier show cause notices issued on 9-11-1977; the respondents suggested the earlier proceedings remained relevant despite subsequent remand and appellate decisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector Of Central Excise, 1988 (38) E.L.T 571 (SC) Principle: "There can be no estoppel against the law" (as stated in paragraph 8 of the reported decision). The Court accepted the stated proposition as correct in principle but found the facts of Elson Machines materially different from the present case and therefore held the decision not to be relevant to justify recalling approval of classification lists in this matter.
W.P. No. 5892/1986 dated 30th August, 1990 (earlier writ of this Court) Cited as a prior decision upholding the validity of Section 33 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The petitioner did not press a prayer to strike down Section 33 in the present writ petition in view of that earlier decision; the Court noted this reliance and proceeded without considering a challenge to Section 33.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in several linked steps, grounded in the language of the Central Excise Rules and the facts described in the show cause notices and appellate record:

  1. Interpretation of Rule 173B(2A) and Rule 9B: The Court excerpted sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173B and Rule 9B. It observed that sub-rule (2A) expressly contemplates that approval of the list may be withheld and, in such cases, the assessee may be permitted to follow the provisional assessment procedure under Rule 9B. The Court inferred from the plain language that approval can be delayed but that there is no provision in Rule 173B for recalling an approval once it has been given.
  2. Effect of having collected duty at concessional rate: The Court noted as an unquestionable fact that duty had been collected on the drill at concessional rates during the periods in question, which was the factual basis prompting the department's efforts to reopen concluded assessments. The Court reasoned that if the statutory scheme allowed indefinite recall of an approval once given, it would undermine the flow of revenue; hence the statutory language must be read to mean that once approval is given it cannot be recalled (absent express power).
  3. Rule 10 and its limitations: The Court observed that any levy which has escaped can be reopened only if the requirements of Rule 10 of the Rules are satisfied. It noted that Rule 10 (which had been considered in earlier cases) did not contemplate recalling an approval once accorded; thus the Rule 10 route did not furnish authority for the department to recall an earlier approval and levy differential duty on that basis.
  4. Improper reliance on Textile Commissioner report and Rule 56 / Section 12-A: The Court considered the sampling provision (Rule 56) and observed that the officers designated in that rule become excise officers under Section 2-B of the Act. The Textile Commissioner was not one of the officers designated under Rule 56 and therefore was not a "proper person" to conduct that test under Section 12-A. The Additional Collector of Appeals, Madras, had found fault with the Assistant Collector at Mysore for sending the February 1980 sample to the Textile Commissioner (in Bombay). The Court held that reliance on the Textile Commissioner's report (dated 24-10-1980) by the Assistant Collector was therefore impermissible.
  5. Violation of natural justice and lack of adequate basis in the show cause notice: The Court pointed out that the January 1982 show cause notice (the composite notice) relied primarily on the Textile Commissioner's report and did not incorporate or properly refer to any Chemical Examiner's report in its body. Thus the assessee was not given an adequate or legally permissible basis to meet the case for alleged short levy. That failure amounted to a breach of the rules of natural justice, because the person likely to be affected was not informed correctly of the basis of the proposed recovery.
  6. Conclusion on jurisdiction and relief: Because the show cause notice and the order were founded on a report that could not lawfully be acted upon and because the assessee was not properly informed of a legally permissible basis for recovery, the Assistant Collector at Mysore lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice and to pass the order (Annexure-Q) insofar as it demanded alleged short levy. The Court therefore quashed the impugned order in that respect.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned order (Annexure-Q) is quashed insofar as it relates to the demand for the alleged short levy on the "drill" manufactured by the petitioner.

Direct consequences and remedial directions (as ordered by the Court, extracted from the opinion):

  • The part of the impugned order making a demand (noted in the opinion as Rs. 8,68,493.18) for alleged short levy on drill manufactured by the petitioner is quashed.
  • The petitioner had not sought relief against the refusal of refund; accordingly the Court left that portion of the order refusing the four refund applications undisturbed.
  • The Court directed that all amounts paid by the Company in liquidation as a consequence of earlier directions of this Court dated 11-3-1985 shall be refunded to the Official Liquidator, who shall hold the sums as assets of the company in liquidation to be dealt with under the Companies Act.
  • Out of the funds refunded or other refunds available, the Official Liquidator was directed to pay Mr. Chander Kumar (counsel for the petitioner) his fees fixed at Rs. 1,000/-.
  • The petition was allowed with costs and the rule was made absolute in the terms indicated; the opinion concludes "Writ Petition allowed with costs."

Wider implication: The Court did not purport to set a novel precedent expanding departmental powers; rather it interpreted existing Rules (Rule 173B(2A), Rule 9B, Rule 56 and the scope of Rule 10) and applied established principles (including requirements of natural justice) to the facts. The opinion expressly treated the Elson Machines decision as factually distinguishable and did not adopt it as a basis to uphold a departmental power to recall approvals; no new broad doctrine was announced beyond the factual holding described above.

This summary is confined to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or reasoning not present in that text.

    M/S. Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Limited v. Asst. Collector Of Central Excise, Mysore & Another

    1. The petitioner, when the petition was presented was a going concern registered under the Companies Act, 1956 manufacturing textiles, including yarn, in what is commonly termed as a composite textile mill. Since then the Company has gone into liquidation and is now represented by the Official Liquidator attached to this Court. Its grievance relates to three years commencing from 15-7-1977 to 28-7-1979 and 15-11-1979 to 20-8-1980 to March, 1981. During the periods in question, the assessee-pctitioner textile mill was assessed to excise duty at concessional rate in terms of Notifications No. 226/77 dated 15-7-1977 and 301/79 dated 30-11-1979 issued by the Central Government. Such concessional duty levied was sought to be reopened by show cause notices issued between 9-11-1977 and before 24-2-1981 inter alia on the ground that the drill manufactured which was allowed concessional rate of duty was not drill specified in the notifications. As a result of such show cause notices and the cause shown by the petitioner, orders came to be passed on various dates commencing from 24-2-1981 and 10-4-1981. The appeals preferred against those orders of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mysore-1st respondent herein came to be allowed by the Appellate Collector at Madras by his order dated 25-9-1981. He, however, remanded the matter to the lower authority, namely, 1st respondent, to start proceedings afresh and determine the question whether the controlled drill or drill manufactured by the textile mill in the periods in question was entitled to the concessional rate in the two notifications of the Central Government referred to earlier by us. On such remand, fresh notice as at Annexure-L to the petition dated 4-1-1982 came to be issued by the 1st respondent-Assistant Collector, Mysore. It will be useful to extract portions of that show cause, as that clearly sets out the facts of the case which we may not repeat.

    “And whereas, on the basis of an appeal filed by the assessees against the above noted orders, the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras has ordered conducting of denovo proceedings in respect of the above cases, under his order A. Nos. 170 to 179/81.C. No. V/19/31/81(b)-GR. II dt. 25-9-1981.

    Now, therefore, the assessees Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Ltd., Mysore are hereby informed that there is reason to believe that drill fabrics manufactured and cleared by them during the period from July 1977 to August 1980 does not conform to the definition of “Controlled Drill” in terms of Notification No. CER/I/68 dated 2-5-1968 issued by the Textile Commissioner and also on the basis of the letter of the Textile Commissioner dated 24-10-1980. As such, the 16 classification lists filed by them (as discussed in order (original) C. No. V/19/22/5/80 MP I dated 24-2-81 noted above) requires to be revised and the differential duty for having availed the concession in terms of Notification Nos. 226/77 dated 15-7-1977 and 301/79 dated 30-12-1979 for which they do not appear to be eligible, is required to be demanded from them. Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Ltd., Mysore, are therefore called upon to show cause to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mysore, as to why the 16 classification Lists (as noted in order (original) C. No. V/19/22-5-1980 MP I dated 24-2-1981 noted above) should not be ordered to be revised denying them concession as per the above noted notifications, any why the 4 refund claims preferred by them should not be rejected, and also why the differential duty for the period from July 1977 to August 1980, aggregating to Rs. 6,02,156-16 (Rupees six lakhs two thousand one hundred and fifty-six and paise sixteen only) as discussed in the orders cited at para (2) above, should not be demanded from them.”

    2. Mr. G. Chander kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has drawn our attention to several illegalities in the show cause notice and the resultant order as at Annexure-Q to the petition with which the petitioner being aggrieved has moved this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the same. A prayer to strike down Section 33 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as unguided and arbitrary has not been pressed at the time of hearing of this writ petition in the view this Court has taken in an earlier writ petition upholding the validity of Section 33 of the Act (See W.P No. 5892/1986 dated 30th August, 1990).

    3. He has drawn our attention to Rule 173B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) which reads as follows:

    “Rule 173B. Assessee to file list of goods for approval of the proper officer.-(1) Every assessee shall file with the proper officer for approval a list in such form as the Collector may direct (in quintuplicate) showing—

    (a) the full description of (i) all excisable goods produced or manufactured by him, (ii) all other goods produced or manufactured by him and intended to be removed from his factory, and (iii) all the excisable goods already deposited or likely to be deposited from time to time without payment of duty in his warehouse;

    (b) the Chapter, Heading No. and sub-heading No. if any, of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985(5 of 1986) under which each goods fall;

    (c) the rate of duty leviable on each such goods; and

    (d) such other particulars as the Collector may direct.

    (2) The proper officer shall, after such inquiry as he deems fit, approve the list with such modifications as are considered necessary return one copy of the approved list to the assessee who shall, unless otherwise directed by the proper officer, determine the duty payable on the goods intended to be removed in accordance with such list.

    (2A) All the clearances shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 173CC, be made only after the approval of the list by the proper officer. If the proper officer is of the opinion that on account of any inquiry to be made in the matter or for any other reason to be recorded in writing there is likely to be delay in according the approval, he shall, either on a written request made by the assessee or on his own accord, allow such assessee to avail himself of the procedure prescribed under Rule 9-B for provisional assessment of the goods.”

    …………………………………………………………………………

    (rest of the sub-rules are not necessary for our purpose)

    4. From the provision made under sub-rule (2A) of the Rules the approval of the list may be withheld and in accordance with the provision made allow the assessee to proceed under Rule 9B of the Rules. Rule 9B of the Rules which is worded more or less similar to the language of sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B of the Rules is as follows:

    “Rule (9-B) Provisional assessment to duty.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules,—

    (a) where the proper officer is satisfied that an assessee is unable to produce any document or furnish any information necessary for the assessment of duty on any excisable goods; or

    (b) where the proper officer deems it necessary to subject the excisable goods to any chemical or any other test for the purpose of assessment of duty thereon; or

    (c) where an assessee has produced all the necessary documents and furnished full information for the assessment of duty, but the proper officer deems it necessary to make further enquiry (including the inquiry to satisfy himself about the due observance of the conditions imposed in respect of the goods after their removal) for assessing the duty,

    the proper officer may, either on a written request made by the assessee or on his own accord, direct that the duty leviable on such goods shall, pending the production of such documents or furnishing of such information or completion of such test or inquiry, be assessed provisionally at such rate or such value (which may not necessarily be the rate or price declared by the assessee) as may be indicated by him, if such assessee executes a bond in the proper form with such surety or sufficient security in such amount, or under such conditions as the proper officer deems fit, binding himself for payment of the difference between the amount of duty as provisionally assessed and as finally assessed.

    (2) xxxxxxxx

    (3) The Collector may permit the assessee to enter into a general bond in the proper Form with such surety or sufficient security in such amount or under such conditions as the Collector approves for assessment of any goods provisionally from time to time;

    Provided that, in the event of death, insolvency or insufficiency of the surety or where the amount of the bond is inadequate, the Collector may, in his discretion, demand a fresh bond and may, if the security furnished for a bond is not adequate, demand additional security.”

    5. That the list submitted in accordance with Rule 173-B of the Rules must be deemed to have been approved or the assessee was permitted to avail himself of the procedure under Rule 9-B of the Rules cannot be disputed, as duty has been collected on the drill at concessional rate during the periods in question. It is that fact which provoked the 1st respondent right from 9-11-1977 to issue the series of show cause notices to reopen the concluded assessments. If there was no provision to review an approval as is apparent from the reading of Rule 173B of the Rules, then the question of reopening by recalling such approval would not arise. The plain language employed in sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173-B of the Rides clearly indicates that an approval may be with-held. No other provision is made to recall if it has not been so with-held. The intention of the legislature is clear, the flow of money into the public coffers should not come to a stand still by not according approval in time. Therefore, even if there is no approval given, it can only be delayed, but once given it cannot be recalled.

    6. Even otherwise, as pointed out by Shri Chander Kumar any levy which has escaped levy can be reopened only if the requirements of sub-Rule 10 of the Rules are satisfied. Rule 10 of the Rules has fallen for consideration several times by this Court, the other High Courts and the Supreme Court (which has since been repealed) expressly provided certain ingredients in the absence of which it could not be pressed into service by the department. What Rule 10 of the Rules did not provide for is a case like this where the proper officer might recall the approval he had once accorded. If that cannot be a ground under Rule 10 of the Rules for bringing to tax the duty leviable on the drill cloth or short levy on account of the concession availed of by the assessee-textile mill. We find from the order of the Additional Collector of Appeals, Madras that the officer at Mysore had committed an error in referring the samples obtained in February, 1980 for test and report to the Textile Commissioner at Bombay. In that behalf, it is necessary to see the provision made under Rule 56 of the Rules which is as follows:

    “Rule 56. Taking of samples for excise purposes.-(1) The manufacturer shall permit any officer to take samples of any manufactured or partly manufactured goods or of any intermediate or residual products resulting from the manufacture thereof, in his factory.”

    7. From the above it is obvious, the persons designated in the rule, become excise officers as defined under Section 2-B of the Act. The Textile Commissioner not being one of such officer designated under Rule 56 of the Rules, he was not the proper person to conduct the test on the sample drawn in February, 1980. Therefore, Additional Collector at Madras - Appeal was justified in finding fault with the officer-Assistant Collector at Mysore for sending the sample for test out-side the department. We have noticed in the show cause notice of January, 1982 the basis for the entire period in question was the report of the Textile Commissioner dated 24-10-1980 in regard to the sample drawn in February, 1980. Therefore, the case which the assessee-textile mill was to meet was founded on a report which could not have been acted upon by the 1st respondent-Assistant Collector, as the Textile Commissioner was not the proper officer in terms of Section 12-A of the Act. Though there is a reference to the report of the Chemical Examiner at Madras, that reference is only by way of sending a copy of such a report and no reference to it is made in body of the show cause notice, most of which we have extracted earlier in the course of this order. Therefore, not only was the assessee textile mill not called upon to show cause against any other Chemical Examiner's report specified, it was directed to show cause only against that which had already been urged by the assessee to be incorrect. To put it in another way, despite the correction made by the Additional Collector, the mistake was repeated by the 1st respondent-Assistant Collector of Central Excise. It is therefore permissible for us to infer that there was no adequate opportunity to Textile mill to meet the case which had already been made before the Additional Collector of Appeals, Madras. It is one of the essential ingredients of rules of natural justice, that the person who is likely to be affected by the proposed recovery of short levy should be informed the basis on which such short levy is being recovered. If that basis was not something legally permissible, then he was not informed correctly of the case he should meet and therefore there was violation of rules of natural justice and as such the 1st respondent-Assistant Collector at Mysore lacked jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice and proceed to pass an order as at Annexure-Q by which he not only rejected the four applications for refund but also made a demand in the sum of Rs. 8,68,493-18. We, therefore, should not have any hesitation to quash the impugned order in so far as it relates to the demand made for the alleged short levy in the periods in question on the ‘drill’ manufactured by the petitioner.

    8. The petitioner has not asked for any relief against the refusal of refund and therefore we cannot grant it and we must leave that part of the order untouched.

    9. However, before parting with this case, we must notice some of the arguments advanced by Mr. Shylendra Kumar, Standing Counsel for the respondent-Central Government who appeared for the respondents. He contended that though there was no specific provision made to recall an order of approval given under Rule 173B of the Rules, the power should be, nevertheless, conceded as there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. In fact, he was unable to explain the thrust of the argument. The power to recall or review must be expressly conferred on an authority. If it is not so conferred then there is no power of review in that authority. This is well settled judicial principle which does not brook any citation. However, a decision of the Supreme Court was relied upon by the learned counsel for the Central Government in the case of Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector Of Central Excise ., 1988 (38) E.L.T 571 (SC). In paragraph-8 as reported in the Excise Law Times, the Supreme Court has ruled as follows:

    “8. The next submission on behalf of the appellant is that the Classification Lists had been approved earlier and the Excise Authority was estopped from taking a different view. Plainly there can be no estoppel against the law. The claim raised before us is a claim based on the legal effect of a provision of law and, therefore, this contention must be rejected.”

    10. With that proposition none can have any quarrel. But, that is not the same as stating that the approval of the list can be reviewed by the department. The facts of the case were wholly different and they were as follows:

    “For the financial year 1st April, 1980 to 31st March, 1981, the appellant had disclosed a clearance value of Rs. 13,43,443-55 on account of electric motors for home consumption and a clearance value of Rs. 6,51,138-50 on account of electric motors “for captive consumption” in the manufacture of monoblock pumps. It was contended by the appellant that the electric motors used for making monoblock pumps could not be taken into consideration when calculating the clearances eligible under the Notification. According to the appellant the captive consumption did not amount to clearance. The claim was disputed by the Department, which relied on Explanation V to the aforesaid Notification dated 19th June, 1980.”

    11. We do not think that has any relevance to the facts of the case which we have dealt with.

    12. It was next contended that question of limitation and such other matter would not arise under Rule 10 of the Rules or Section 11-A of the Act as the case may be in view of the earlier show cause notices issued on 9-11-1977. We have not examined the question of limitation in the light of what we have earlier stated. Assuming that there was an argument advanced on the ground of limitation, the question is whether show cause notices issued earlier on the basis of which 10 orders had been passed and those 10 orders had been set aside it could be ultimately said that the show cause notices issued earlier survived even after the orders had been set aside by the Appellate Authority.

    13. In fact, the very foundation for the impugned order at Annexure-Q is the show cause notice issued in January, 1981 which is a composite notice relating to the three periods which we have mentioned. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the earlier show cause notices to drive home any point. We are satisfied that the writ petition deserves to be allowed in terms we have indicated and we further direct that all amounts paid by the Company in liquidation as a consequence of the directions given by this Court by order dated 11-3-1985 shall be refunded to the Official Liquidator who shall hold the same as an asset to the company in liquidation to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions governing liquidation under the Companies Act. Out of the funds refunded or any other refunds available, the Official Liquidator is directed to pay Mr. Chander Kumar his fees which we fix at Rs. 1000/-.

    14. Petition is allowed with costs and rule is made absolute in terms indicated.

    15. Writ Petition allowed with costs.

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    M/S. Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Limited v. Asst. Collector Of Central Excise, Mysore & Another
    (Oct 22, 1990)