H.N Seth, J.:— This first Appeal from order, by Virendra Singh, is directed against an award dated 24th August, 1973 made by the Claims Tribunal, Etawah, established under the Motor Vehicles Act. By means of the impugned order, the Claims Tribunal directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 6000/- to respondent Phulmati as compensation for loss of her husband Mata Deen's life. There is also before us a cross-objection by Smt. Phulmati who claims that the amount of compensation awarded to her should have been Rs. 75,000/- instead of Rs. 6,000/-.

2. On 15th of February, 1970 a cycle driven by one Prakash and Motor Cycle No. USG 3784 driven by the appellant Virendra Singh were involved in an incident. As a result of the accident, Mata Deen father of Rakesh and husband of Smt. Phulmati who was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Rakesh, received serious injuries to which he succumbed on 17th of February, 1970. Smt. Phulmati filed the claim giving rise to this appeal alleging that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by Virendra Singh and as such, he was liable to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 75,000/- to her, her minor son Krishna Prem, aged about 16 years and her minor daughter Km. Prakashwati, aged about 13 years. The appellant contested the claim and denied that the accident in question was caused by any rash or negligent act on his part. According to him, the accident was caused by the negligence of the cyclist himself and as such he was not liable to pay any compensation.

3. The Claims Tribunal accepted the evidence produced on behalf of the claimant and rejected that produced by the appellant and held that incident in question was the result of rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle by appellant Virendra Singh and made him liable for compensation amounting to Rs. 6,000/-.

4. The main submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant before us is that the Claims Tribunal was not justified in accepting the evidence produced on behalf of the claimant and in holding that Mata Deeo had died because of the rash and negligent driving of the motor-cycle by the appellant. He also contended that the evidence produced in this case shows that the death of Mata Deen had been caused because of negligence on the part of the cyclist and as such he was not liable to pay any compensation.

5. According to the claimant, on 15th of February, 1970 at about 6/6.15 P.M, Mata Deen, who was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by his son, was proceeding from Bhartana to Bakevar. As they reached near village Haraipur and while Rakesh was driving his cycle on the road on his left, Virendra Singh came driving his motor-cycle from the opposite side at a very high speed. At that time Virendra Singh was driving his motor-cycle on the wrong side of the road and knocked down the cycle driven by Rakesh. Both Rakesh and Mata Deen received injuries because of which Mata Deen died on 17th of February, 1970.

6. The case set up by Virendra Singh, however, was that on 15th of February, 1970 at about 7.30 P.M and after it had become dark, he was proceeding from Bakevar to Bhartana on his motor-cycle and was driving it at a moderate speed of 40-45 kilometer per hour. He saw four persons on two cycles coming from the opposite direction. The cyclist were driving the cycles abreast of each other. As he sounded the horn, the two cyclists lost their nerves and started swaying their cycles on their right and left. As he applied his brakes, one cyclist came and collided with his motor-cycle and as he tried to avoid that collision the other cycle also got entangled with his motor-cycle. He, thus, claimed that the accident was not the result of any rashness or negligence on his part.

7. In case, claimants' case was set out above is accepted, as has been done by the Claims Tribunal, there can be no manner of doubt that the appellant was driving the motor-cycle rashly and negligently and that he is liable to pay compensation. If, on the otherhand, the case as set out by the appellant is accepted, it will not be possible to say that the incident occurred because of any rashness or negligence on his part and he would not be liable to pay any compensation.

8. In order to prove her case, the claimant produced P.W 1 Rakesh Chand, P.W 4 Shyam Kishore and P.W 5 Kishan Singh. The appellant examined only himself as a witness for establishing his version of the accident.

9. P.W 1 Rakesh claimed that he was, at the time of the accident, carrying his father Mata Deen, the deceased, on the carrier of his cycle and that P.W 2 Shyam Kishore was carrying P.W 5 Kishan Singh on another cycle. Both the cyclists were driving their cycles on or their left-hand side of the ‘road patri’. Suddenly the appellant came driving his motor-cycle at a very high speed and his motor-cycle collided with his cycle as a result of which he and his father fell down. Thus, according to him, Virendra Singh was driving his motor-cycle on the wrong side of the road and that the accident took place on the Patri just abutting the road. P.W 4 Shyam Kishore corroborated the version given by P.W 1 Rakesh and stated that as he and Rakesh were driving their respective cycles on the ‘patri’ on their left side, Virendra Singh reached the spot driving his motor cycle on his wrong side and collided first with his cycle and thereafter with the cycle driven by Rakesh. As a result of the accident, he, Kishore Singh and Rakesh fell on the ‘kacchi Patri’ and Mata Deen fell partly on the kacchi patri and partly on the road. P.W 5 Kishore Singh, supported the version of P.W 4 Shyam Kishore and, stated that immediately after the accident, he went and lodged the First Information Report at the police station (Ex. 9). In that report he narrated the facts which fully corroborated his version. P.W 4 Shyam Kishore and P.W 5 Kishore Singh are wholly independent witnesses. Nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to show that they are either interested in the claimant or any other member of her family, or that they had any animus to depose against the appellant.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that earlier statement of all these three witnesses had been recorded in criminal proceedings in which the appellant had been accused in connection with this very accident. He urged that there are certain contradictions between the statements made by these witnesses in the criminal court and that made by them in the present proceedings. These contradictions are such which make the evidence of these witnesses unreliable. The contradictions pointed out by the learned counsel were, regarding the precise time and place of the accident. According to the statement of the witnesses made in these proceedings the incident took place at about 6 p.m shortly before the sunset. The statement made by some of the witnesses before the criminal court, however, was that the incident took place very shortly after the sunset. In our opinion, this contradiction is not very material. The fact that these witnesses were present at the scene of accident has not been questioned. Whether the accident took place shortly before the sunset or shortly thereafter, it does not make any difference to the capacity of the witnesses to observe the circumstances of the accident. So far as the contradiction regarding precise place of accident is concerned, statement made by the witnesses in these proceedings is that at the time of the accident when they saw the appellant coming on the motor-cycle the two cyclists were driving their cycles on the road patri towards their left hand side. In their evidence before the criminal court these witnesses mentioned that at the time of the accident the two cyclists were driving their cycle on the road and that after seeing Virendra Singh coming towards them on the motor-cycle, they got down on the patri and collision between the motor-cycle and the cycles took place on the patri. It is true that there is some difference in their statements on the point as to whether shortly before the accident the two cycles were being driven on the road and on seeing the motor-cycle the cyclists got down on the road patri or whether they were driving the cycles on the road patri even before seeing Virendra Singh coming towards them. However, the witnesses have been quite consistent in saying that the actual accident took place on the road patri. Whether the accident took place on the road patri after the cyclists moved their cycles from the road to its patri or that it took place when the cyclists were driving their cycles on the road patri, does not, in the circumstances of the case, make any difference to appellants liability. A minor contradiction of this type which may be due to some confusion in the mind of the witnesses, who are independent and whose presence at the spot is not open to doubt cannot make their evidence unreliable.

11. We are, accordingly, of opinion that there is absolutely no reason to take a view different from that taken by the court below with regard to reliability of evidence given by the three witnesses produced on behalf of the claimant.

12. So far as the evidence of D.W Virendra Singh is concerned, he is clearly interested in giving out a version which would absolve him of his liability. It is significant to note that there is nothing on the record to corroborate his version or even to show that immediately after the accident he gave out the version of the accident, as set up by him in these proceedings. Although, the witness claimed that immediately after the accident, he had asked his servant Radhey Shyam to go to the police station and lodge a report giving out his version of the accident, no such First Information Report is forthcoming to corroborate his case. The witness tried to complain this by saying that after returning from the police station Radhey Shyam told him that his report had not been taken down. According to the witness after Radhey Shyam returned from the police station he sent another man to lodge a report but by that time the report of the other side had been taken down and this is why his report was not written. It is difficult to believe that if, as stated by this witness, he deputed his servant Radhey Shyam to go and lodge a report at the police station, the police would have refused to take it down, especially when no other version of the accident had come to its notice by that time. Although the witness asserted that he had received injuries in his leg his statement in this regard remained uncorroborated by any medical evidence. This clearly shows that assertion made by the witness that he wanted to convey to the police the circumstance in which the accident took place, is not correct. Apart from this, the witness does not claim to have given out his version of accident to anyone else. Indeed the witness had, at the earlier stage, altogether been denying his involvement in the accident. All these facts go to show that D.W 1 is not speaking the truth and his evidence about the manner in which the accident took place, cannot be relied upon.

13. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that there is no error in the appraisement of the evidence made by the claims Tribunal and its finding that the accident in question was as a result of rash and negligent act on the part of the appellant, cannot be interfered with. In the result, we find no force in the appeal which deserves to be dismissed.

14. This brings us to the cross-objection whereby Smt. Phulmati claims that the amount of compensation awarded to her should be increased to Rs. 75,000/-.

15. The award in question was made on 28th of April, 1972, Section 110-D provides that any person aggrieved by an award made by a Claims Tribunal may within ninety (90) days from the date of the award file an appeal before the High Court. Smt. Phulmati did not challenge the award by filing an appeal within the time prescribed therefore under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. After notice of the appeal filed by Virendra Singh was served upon Smt. Phulmati, she filed a cross-objection purporting to be under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C on 15th April, 1974. Learned counsel for the appellant took a preliminary objection and urged that in proceedings arising out of an award made by the Claims Tribunal established under the Motor Vehicles Act, no cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of Code of Civil Procedure, is maintainable.

16. The Right to obtain relief against an award made by Claims Tribunal established under the Motor Vehicles Act flows from the provisions contained in that Act and from nowhere else. Section 110-D of the Act enables an aggrieved person to question an award made by the Claims Tribunal by filing an appeal before the High Court, in the circumstances mentioned therein. Neither the Motor Vehicles Act nor the Rules framed thereunder lay down the procedure for disposal of appeals filed under section 110-D of the said Act. In the case of Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar . A.I.R 1968 S.C 384. the Supreme Court observed thus:

“That neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder prescribed any special procedure for the disposal of the appeal under section 19(1)(f). Appeals under that provision have to be disposed of just in the same manner as other appeals to the High Court. Obviously after the appeal has reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the Rules of practice and procedure of that Court. The Rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court…………”

17. These observations make it clear that where under a statute an appeal lies to a Court but the statute does not Jay down the procedure for its disposal, the court has to decide the controversy involved therein in accordance with the rules regulating its practice and procedure. Accordingly, the High Court will, while dealing with the appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, have to adopt a procedure which it normally adopts in disposing of appeals involving similar disputes. Clearly the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court does not enable the High Court to entertain any controversy in connection with and to grant any relief against an award in circumstances other than those contemplated by section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.

18. It may also be accepted that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure is the normal procedure which the High Court adopts for disposal of appeals relating to disputes similar to that involved in an appeal against an award made by Claims Tribunal and that notwithstanding the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure has not been applicable to such proceedings it is open to the High Court to adopt the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for disposal of such appeals, it is however, to be kept in mind that the Code of Civil Procedure does not confine itself merely to the laying down of procedure for disposal of causes coming up before the courts. In certain case it also provides for conferement of rights. Accordingly, while deciding the controversy raised in an appeal filed under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the High Court will be able to adopt only such of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which lay down the procedure for disposal of appeals filed under the Code of Civil Procedure.

19. Order 41 Rule 22(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:—

“Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the ground decided against him in the court. Below, but take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by the way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the appellate court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the appellate Court may see fit to allow.”

20. It will be seen that Order 41 Rule 22 is in two parts. First part of the rule enables a respondent who has not appealed from any part of the decree to support the decree appealed against also on any ground decided against him. Second part of the rule enables a person who is aggrieved by a decree to approach the appellate court for the redress of his grievances in the contingency mentioned therein. Approach made to the appellate court for belief, in the circumstances mentioned in the Rule…………is called “cross-objection.”

21. As explained above, right to file a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22(1) is nothing but a right given to a party to approach the appellate court for the redress of his grievances. Sub-Rules 2 to 4 of the Order 41 Rule 22 lay down that such cross-objection shall be in the form of memorandum and the provisions of Rule 1, in so far they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. These rules further provide that where in any appeal the respondent has, under the rule filed a memorandum of objection and the original appeal is either withdrawn or dismissed for default, the objection so filed may neverthless be heard and determined after such notice to the other party as the court may deem fit. Just as the object underlying an appeal is to determine as to whether the appellant is entitled to have the decree under appeal set aside or modified in his favour, the purpose of a cross-objection is to determine as to whether the respondent (objector) is entitled to similar relief in respect of the decree under appeal. A cross-objection therefore, is very much akin to an appeal and the proceedings therein go on even if for some reasons the appeal, in connection with which it was filed, becomes infructuous. In the circumstances it cannot be said that filing of a cross-objection or taking any proceeding in respect thereof is a matter of procedure for disposal of the appeal.

22. Aforesaid analysis shows that a right to file a cross-objection under order 41 R. 22 C.P.C is as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ganga Ram Bhagede v. Spl. Dy. Collector, Ahmadnagar a right identical to that of filing of an appeal. Only difference being that whereas limitation for filing an appeal is calculated with reference to the date of the decree and that for filing a cross-objection is calculated with reference to the date of service of notice of the appeal filed by the other party. Conferment of right to file an appeal. Undoubtedly amounts to vesting of a right and cannot be treated as laying down a procedure for its disposal. Likewise conferment of a right to file a cross-objection under order 41, R. 22 C.P.C must also be treated as vesting the objector with a right and not as laying down procedure for disposal of an appeal. Such a right in respect of an award made by the Claims Tribunal cannot possibly be inferred in derogation of the provision contained under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act which merely enables the aggrieved party to question the award by filing an appeal before the High Court within ninety (90) days thereof.

23. In the case of Zahid Hussain v. Khairati Lal Jain . A.I.R 1954 All. 412., a division bench of this Court while considering the question regarding maintainability of a cross objection in relation to an appeal filed under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, observed thus:

“The first question that arises is whether these cross objections are maintainable. Section 76 of the insolvency Act provides for an appeal within 30 days to the District Court, and within 90 days to the High Court. There is no provision for cross-objection to be filed within 30 days after service of the notice as under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as we can see there is nothing in the provincial Insolvency Act making provisions for Order XLI Rule 22 Civil Procedure Code applicable to an appeal under S. 75. These cross objections were, therefore, misconceived.”

24. Again while discussing the question as to whether a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C can be filed in an appeal filed under the Letters Patent, another Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Daroupdi Debi v. S.K Datta . A.I.R 1957 All. 48., observed thus:

“It follows, therefore, that the right to file a cross-objection is an independent right and therefore just as no review application lies against the justment in a Letters Patent, no cross objection should lie in a Letters Patent appeal when the Letters Patent do not allow the filing of such cross-objection.”

25. The view expressed by this Court in Daroupdi Debi's case was approved by yet another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukhnand Prasad v. Baikunth Nath . A.I.R 1962 All. 511..

26. No decision of this court, wherein either a contrary view has been expressed or it has been held that the filing of a cross objection is a matter of procedure for disposal of an appeal and is not a substantive right, has been brought to our notice, it will thus be seen that the conclusion to which we have arrived in this case is fully in consonance with the view that is being consistently taken in this Court.

27. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the right to file a cross objection in an appeal filed under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, having not been conferred by the Act, cannot be availed of on the basis of the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 22.

28. We may, at this stage, point out that right to file a cross objection before Allahabad High Court flows not from Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure but from Order 41-A of the Code as added by the Allahabad High Court, Rule 10 whereof reads thus:

“Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below, but take any cross objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.”

29. However, the principle underlying the aforesaid discussion would apply equally to cross objections filed under Rule 10 of the order 41-A.

30. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, invited our attention to the following cases, wherein it has been held that right to file a cross-objection would, on the basis of Order 41 Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, be available in similar circumstances.

1. A.L Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chetty, A.I.R 1919 Mad., 784.

2. Jaikrishan Vishwanath v. Sawatram Ram Prasad Shop, A.I.R 1940 Nag. 292.

3. Imla Khazamahi Shah v. Hazi Niaz Ali, A.I.R 1940.

4. Ramasray Singh v. Bibhison Sinha, A.I.R 1960 Cal. 372.

5. Invatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, A.I.R 1959 M.P 58.

6. Delhi Transport Undertaking of Delhi Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Kumari Lalita, A.I.R 1972 Delhi 281.

7. The Central Provinces Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Sita Devi, A.I.R 1973 M.P 134.

8. Smt. Satyabhamadevi Choubey v. Ram Kishore Pandey, A.I.R 1974 M.P 115.

9. The Union Co-operation Insurance Society Ltd. Madras v. Lazarammal Ravel, A.I.R 1974 Mad. 379.

10. Madhu Sudan Rai v. Smt. Basanti Kumari Devi, A.I.R 1974 Orissa 163.

11. K. Chandrashekara Naik v. Narayan, A.I.R 1975 Karnatak 18.

12. The Pheonix Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kalpana Rajput, A.I.R 1975 Gauhati 20.

31. Some of these cases specifically deal with the question regarding right to file a cross-objection in an appeal filed under Section 110-D; Motor Vehicles Act and hold that cross-objection in an appeal filed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicle Act is maintainable. A close scrutiny of these cases reveals that the learned Judges have, while deciding the enunciated and applied following legal principles.

1. Where under a statute an appeal lies to the High Court but the statute does not provide for the procedure for its disposal, the appeal has to be determined in accordance with the Rules of practice and procedure of the Court.

2. Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the normal procedure for disposal of appeals coming up before appellate courts and that the procedure provided therein can be availed of by the High Court even in appeals coming up for hearing before it under a statute which does not make the Code of Civil Procedure applicable thereto; and

3. Right to file a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 being an incidence of filing of appeal, is a matter relating to the procedure and can be availed of in an appeal filed under a statute which while providing for an appeal does not lay down a procedure to its disposal.

32. So far as principles 1 and 2 mentioned above are concerned, we think that they are well settled, and do not require any further comments from us. Generally speaking, we agree that Order 41 of the Code lays down the procedure for disposal of appeals coming up before appellate courts. But it does not in our opinion, mean that the provisions contained therein deal merely with procedure and have nothing to do with conferment of substantive rights. As explained in the earlier part of our judgment, whereas one part of Rule 22 of Order 41 deals with the procedure for disposal of an appeal coming up before the appellate court, the other part confers on a person a substantive right of filing a cross-objection. Although it is true that right to file a cross-objection conferred by Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C is dependent upon filing of an appeal by the other party and in that sense it can be said to be an incident of the appeal itself, yet conferment of such a right cannot be treated as laying down a procedure for disposal of the appeal. It appears that while holding that the right to file a cross-objection is a matter of Procedure, learned Judges deciding the afore-mentioned cases were impressed by the fact that provisions in its regard were contained in the Code of Civil Procedure which is primarily concerned with laying down of the procedure for disposal of cases coming up before civil courts. In our opinion, in these cases the aspect that the code not only provides for procedure but also deals with rights as also that with regards to the real nature of cross-objection, seem to have been missed. So far as this Court is concerned, it has consistently been of the view that the right given by Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C, to file a cross-objection is not a matter of procedure governing disposal of appeals. Even after giving our most careful consideration to the view expressed by learned Judges of various High Courts in the aforementioned cases. We do not find any reason to think that the view so far taken in this Court viz. that the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C enabling a party to file a cross-objection is a matter relating to substantive right and that it is not a matter laying down procedure for disposal of cases is either wrong or requires reconsideration. We have, therefore, followed the earlier decisions of the Court and have decided the controversy raised in this case accordingly.

33. In the result, both the appeal and the cross-objection fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in the appeal and in the cross-objection.