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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Original Suit No. 729 of 1995 was filed on 12-10-1995 by Respondent No. 3, Jamin Raja Khan, against the petitioners seeking a decree of permanent injunction and cancellation of a sale deed dated 29-12-1994 in favor of the petitioners. An ex parte decree was passed by the trial court on 1-5-1997 in favor of the plaintiff. Subsequently, on 24-1-1998, the petitioners filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) to set aside the ex parte decree, along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Both applications were rejected by the Civil Judge on 8-3-2001. The petitioners' miscellaneous appeal against this order was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 16-5-2002. Aggrieved by these orders and the ex parte decree, the petitioners filed this writ petition seeking to quash the orders dated 8-3-2001, 16-5-2002, and the ex parte decree dated 1-5-1997.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ex parte decree dated 1-5-1997 should be set aside on the ground that the petitioners were not properly served with notice of the suit.
  2. Whether the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree was sufficiently explained to justify condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the courts below erred in rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and the subsequent appeal by taking a technical view of the sufficiency of service of notices.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners had no knowledge of the ex parte decree until 20-1-1998, when Respondent No. 3 disturbed their possession of the property.
  • They filed the application to set aside the ex parte decree promptly on 24-1-1998 after inspecting the case file.
  • The sale deed dated 29-12-1994 was executed in their favor and they had possession and had made constructions on the property.
  • The notices of the suit were never actually served; they were sent only by ordinary post and later through an Advocate Commissioner who reported refusal of acceptance by the petitioners in the presence of two inimical witnesses.
  • The courts below erred in deeming service sufficient merely because of refusal to accept notices and a mention of the suit in another unrelated case.
  • The courts should adopt a liberal approach to allow the matter to be decided on merits rather than on technical grounds.

Respondent No. 3's Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwan Pandey v. Ill Additional District Judge Ballia, 2001 (92) RD 809 Setting aside ex parte decree and orders under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. on similar facts The court relied on this precedent to emphasize the need for courts to take a liberal view and set aside ex parte decrees where parties were not properly served, directing trial courts to proceed on merits.
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katij, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 Liberal approach for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act The court applied this principle to hold that limitation for setting aside an ex parte decree starts from the date of knowledge of the decree and that courts should adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay to do substantial justice.
Mst. Bhabia Devi v. Permanand Pd. Yadav, (1997) 3 SCC 631 : AIR 1997 SC 1919 General principles on condonation of delay The court found this precedent distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the present case.
Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena, AIR 1996 Orissa 29 General principles on condonation of delay The court found this precedent distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the facts and found that the notices were never properly served on the petitioners. Notices were sent only by ordinary post and later through an Advocate Commissioner whose report was questionable due to the presence of inimical witnesses. The courts below relied on a deemed service principle and a mention of the suit in an unrelated case to conclude that the petitioners had knowledge of the suit, which the court found to be a technical and inappropriate approach. The court emphasized that the overriding objective should be to decide cases on merits after giving parties sufficient opportunity, rather than deciding ex parte on technical grounds. The court also noted that the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree begins from the date of knowledge of the decree, which the petitioners complied with promptly. The court rejected the precedents relied upon by Respondent No. 3 as distinguishable and reiterated the need for a liberal approach in condoning delay and setting aside ex parte decrees to avoid grave injustice.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed.

The court quashed the impugned orders dated 8-3-2001 and 16-5-2002, as well as the ex parte decree dated 1-5-1997. Original Suit No. 729 of 1995 is revived and directed to be decided on merits expeditiously without unnecessary adjournments. This decision directly affects the parties by restoring the suit for adjudication on merits and does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing principles emphasizing liberal approach and justice on merits.

    Sudesh v. Additional District Judge

    1. Original suit no. 729 of 1995 was filed on 12-10-1995 by Respondent no. 3 Jamin Raja Khan against the petitioners for a decree of permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed dated 29-12-1994 passed in favour of the petitioners.

    2. An exparte decree dated 1-5-1997 was passed by the trail court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Then on 24-1-1998, the petitioners (defendants) filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C for setting aside the exparte decree alongwith application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The application for condonation of delay, as well as the application for setting aside the exparte decree, were both rejected by the Civil Judge vide his order dated 8-3-2001. Misc. Appeal No. 25 of 2001 filed by the petitioners against the said order has also been dismissed by the Additional District Judge vide his order dated 16-5-2002. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, this writ petition has thus been filed with the prayer for quashing the orders dated 16-5-2002 and 8-3-2001 passed by Respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, as well as the exparte judgment and Decree dated 1-5-1997 passed by the Respondent no. 2.

    3. I have heard Sri Chandra Kumar Rai on behalf of the petitioners and Sri M.A Siddiqui on behalf of the contesting respondent no. 3 and have perused the record. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition if being disposed of at the admission stage itself.

    4. In the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C the petitioners have categorically stated that they had no knowledge of the exparte decree till 20-1-1998 when the Respondent no. 3 had, for the first time, come to disturb the possession of the petitioners over the property in dispute. Immediately thereafter on 22-1-1998, the petitioners contend, they got the file inspected and on 24-1-1998 filed the application for setting aside the exparte decree on 24-1-1998. The case of the petitioners is that after the execution of the sale deed dated 29-12-1994, they had come in possession of the property in dispute and that the plaintiff-respondent no. 3 is basing his claim solely on the basis of some agreement executed in his favour in the year 1975, which was nearly 20 years prior to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioners. The Civil Judge rejected the applications primarily on the ground that service of notice was deemed to be found sufficient. Although the notices were never actually served on the petitioners, but since allegedly the petitioners refused to accept the notices, the same were deemed to have been served on the petitioners. It was also mentioned by the trial court that in a written statement filed in some other suit, in which the husband of one of the petitioners was a party, a mention of the suit for cancellation of the sale deed had been made and thus also it would be deemed that the petitioners had knowledge of the pendency of the suit. As such, the trial court refused to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C and thus rejected both the applications. The appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the trial court has also been dismissed on similar grounds.

    5. From a perusal of the record it is clear that notices were actually never served on the petitioner. The notices were only sent by ordinary process and not even by registered process. It was thereafter that notices were sent through Advocate Commissioner who reported that in presence of two witnesses the petitioners refused to accept the same. It is the clear case of the petitioners that the two witnesses who had been shown in the report of the Advocate Commissioner were inimical towards the petitioners as there was litigation going on with them and as such no reliance could have been placed on the Advocate Commissioner. It is also improbable that even on coming to know of a suit for cancellation of their sale deed, the petitioners would not contest the suit, especially when the possession of the property in dispute had been handed over to the petitioners on which, as claimed by the petitioners, they have already made constructions. The endeavour of the courts of law should be to decide the case on merits after giving sufficient opportunity to the parties and hearing them. In the present case, although technically it had been recorded that the service of notices on the petitioners was deemed sufficient but actually, from the facts it does not appear that the petitioners had ever been served with the notices in the suit. Merely because in some other case filed against the husband of one of the petitioners, some mention of the pendency of the present suit was made in a written statement, the same would not amount to be sufficient service of notices on the petitioners. The trail court as well as the appellate court have taken a very technical view of the matter. In my opinion, in the circumstances of the case, without the trail court having sent notices by registered post or if still not served, directing publication of notice in the newspaper, the order of deeming sufficiency of services was not appropriate. The endeavour of the courts should be to give the parties sufficient opportunity to contest the case on merits, rather than to decide the same exparte. In such cases, the courts of law are to take a more liberal view while dealing with such issues and make every effort to decide the lis between the parties on merits, as passing of an exparte decree, may at times, as in the present case, amount to causing grave injustice to a party. In the case of Bhagwan Pandey v. Ill Additional District Judge Ballia 2001 (92) Revenue Decisions 809, (which is based on similar facts as in the present case) where the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.R.C was rejected by the trail court and the appeal against the said order was also dismissed, this Court had set aside the said two orders, as also the exparte decree and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit on merits.

    6. As regards the application for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting setting aside the exparte decree, it may be observed that in case of exparte decree, the limitation would begin from the date of knowledge of the passing of the exparte decree, which in the present is 20-1-1998 and the application was filed four days of the same. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katij (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 has held that “The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing matters on ‘merits’.” While laying down the guidelines for deciding such application, it was held that the Courts should adopt a liberal approach in the matter while dealing with application for condonation of delay.

    7. The cases of Mst. Bhabia Devi v. Permanand Pd. Yadav, (1997) 3 SCC 631 : AIR 1997 SC 1919 and Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena AIR 1996 Orissa 29 as have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the Respondent no. 3 are distinguishable on facts and would have no application in the present case.

    8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my view, the orders impugned in this writ petition are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, This writ petitione succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 8-3-2001 and 16-5-2002 passed by the trial court as well as the appellant courts and the exparte decree dated 1-5-1997 passed by the trail court are all quashed. Original suit no. 729 of 1995 shall stand revived. Since the suit is of the year 1995, it would be desirable that the same be decided on merits, as expeditiously as possible, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties.

    9. Petitions allowed.

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    Comments

    Sudesh v. Additional District Judge
    (Jan 4, 2006)